moral hazard
The risk that a party insulated from consequences will behave differently (take on more risk) than if fully exposed.
As defined in cwt_noel-johnson-and-mark-koyama
Other definitions
The incentive for a party to take greater risks or act carelessly because they do not bear the full consequences—here, mortgage originators selling poor-quality loans because someone else absorbs the default risk.
Arnold Kling on Freddie and Fannie and the Recent History of the U.S. Housing Market 09/29/2008Situation where a party has incentive to take excessive risks because they do not bear the full consequences of their actions; in debt context, occurs when governments might bail out reckless borrowers, reducing discipline for future borrowing
Keyju Jin: China from within: Myths and realities in a new era
Where it comes up · 105
- Greg Ip on Foolproof7 claims
- Tyler Cowen on the European Crisis 12/05/20116 claims
- George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession5 claims
- Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation4 claims
- Capitalism, Government, and the Good Society4 claims
- Rana Foroohar on the Financial Sector and Makers and Takers4 claims
- 2020 Year of Crisis: The Moral Hazard Threat4 claims
- William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/20093 claims
and 97 more
Most important claims · 10 of 184Search all claims for “moral hazard” →
- Moral hazard is distinct from adverse selection: it is the behavioral effect whereby identical people who are randomly given insurance subsequently use more (drive less carefully, visit the doctor more) — confirmed by the randomized Oregon Medicaid experiment — whereas selection is about who chooses to buy in the first place; the two can be disentangled by randomizing the PRICE of insurance, since buyers willing to pay a higher price show higher healthcare utilization than low-price buyers even though both groups are insured.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- The Oregon Medicaid randomized trial showed that covering low-income uninsured people increases both primary and preventive care (more doctor visits, more mammograms, more diabetes blood-sugar checks) AND emergency room use, contradicting the widely-claimed argument that insurance gets people out of the ER — so one should not advocate insurance expansion on the grounds that it reduces ER use.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Credit availability is the necessary seed and moral hazard from implicit guarantees is the amplifier: without ample credit availability, moral hazard is largely moot because you can't borrow regardless of guarantees; with it, guarantees create 'hidden debt' by raising the demand for credit from economic actors who expect a government bailout, and displace lending quality toward the lower end.Carmen Reinhart on Financial Crises 11/23/2009
- Federal Deposit Insurance was opposed by FDR (citing what we'd now call moral hazard—guaranteed deposits would encourage reckless banking) and by large banks, and had previously failed at the state level where insurance funds went broke encouraging bad banking; it passed by the thinnest margins, pushed by small banks who wanted to appear as solid as big banks to stop depositors fleeing to sounder institutions—another triumph of the small-bank lobby.Larry White on Hayek and Money 02/01/2010
- Banking systems are fragile by design because politics cannot be removed from bank regulation: governments both regulate and borrow from banks, governments use police power to enforce debt contracts on voters who default, and governments liquidate failed banks whose depositors are voters—creating three inherent conflicts of interest that keep politics embedded in banking.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- Moral hazard intensifies the systemic-risk externality: if banks expect to be bailed out, they not only have an incentive to ignore the externality they create but an incentive to increase it—taking more risk is then perfectly rational, but this itself is a regulatory failure because businesses adapt rationally to whatever environment the government creates.Richard Posner on the Financial Crisis 11/16/2009
- When financial regulations are not set exactly right, deposit insurance can enable 'looting'—as Romer and George Akerlof argued about the Savings and Loan Crisis—because if people think they won't lose their money they become far less careful, illustrating that misaligned guarantees let many bad things happen.Paul Romer on Growth, Cities, and the State of Economics
- Rescuing failing financial firms avoids immediate cascading failures but creates moral hazard because other firms then expect to be rescued, and each successive rescue reinforces this expectation, escalating the size of firms eventually bailed out until you reach firms that genuinely are too big to fail.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- Federal flood insurance creates moral hazard: subsidizing people to live below sea level ('at the bottom of a soup bowl') and then paying them again after it floods predictably induces more people to put themselves in harm's way, and indeed the older parts of New Orleans built above sea level (like the French Quarter) escaped flooding.Peter Boettke on Hurricane Katrina and the Economics of Disaster 12/18/2006
- Moral hazard is very real and began in 1982 when banks started international lending, because no one was penalized and capitalism requires punishment as well as reward; incentives without punishment give someone a free option.Nassim Taleb on the Financial Crisis 03/23/2009