What this covers

This is a conversation between Russ Roberts and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, recorded in March 2009 while the crisis was still unfolding. Taleb starts from the problem of estimating rare events. By definition there is little data on them, so a claim of a once-in-10,000-years event rests on assumptions rather than experience. He ties this to Silent Evidence: the historical record shows only the scenarios that survived, which makes risk look smaller than it is. He also argues that calibrating to the last extreme, such as the 1987 crash, guarantees failure, because the next large deviation will be different and worse.

The middle of the talk is about incentives and institutions. Taleb describes the Asymmetric Payoff (Heads I Win, Tails You Lose)) facing traders: one who blows up every ten years collects nine bonuses, and taxpayers cover the loss. He dates moral hazard to the 1982 rescue of banks after international lending, with the 1998 LTCM rescue as a later example. His claim is that each rescue let fragile institutions grow, and that capitalism needs punishment as well as reward. He also argues that concentration raises the cost of rare errors, since liquidating 50 billion dollars costs more than ten times liquidating 5 billion. His proposed remedy is a Barbell Strategy: mostly riskless assets plus a small high-risk slice.

The conversation then moves well beyond finance. Taleb disputes the idea that Black-Scholes produces option prices, citing a study he did with Aspen Hogg, and uses Hayek on dispersed knowledge to argue that theory-led practice often fails. He extends this to medicine, claiming that trial-and-error tinkering beat rationalist medicine and that doctors did more harm than good until recently. These are the most contested and fringe claims in the talk. He also discusses winner-take-all effects of the Internet, and Cicero's idea of probability as something one approves of regardless of the odds. The talk closes on religion, which Taleb treats as a set of practices and a source of humility more than a set of beliefs.

Sharpest takeaway

Taleb argues the 2008 crisis was caused by fragile, fat-tailed risk models such as Value at Risk, combined with bonus incentives and government bailouts that stop fragile institutions from failing early, and that robustness is easy to build by abandoning those metrics.

  • Models estimate rare events from theory rather than experience, so small-probability, high-impact losses are systematically underpriced
  • Bankers face asymmetric payoffs: they keep bonuses in good years while taxpayers absorb losses in bad ones
  • Bailouts since 1982 and LTCM in 1998 prevented early failure, letting fragility accumulate

The claims · ranked76 claims · weighted by value

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0.86

Concentration of production among few banks or firms increases the cost of rare errors because one large error is far worse than many smaller errors spread over time, especially when liquidation costs are nonlinear, as with liquidating 50 billion dollars costing more than ten times liquidating 5 billion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“assume that you had nonlinearities in execution costs liquidating fifty billion dollars is actually more costly than ten times liquidating five billion dollars”

0.80

The Internet creates winner-take-all concentration: where recordings and mass distribution exist, a handful of top performers capture most of the income in music, sports, arts, and literature, while many others struggle, unlike a local opera singer who could earn a living at weddings before recording.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the whole planet will have a handful of opera singers making more the bulk of the income and huge amount of money”

0.80

Moral hazard is very real and began in 1982 when banks started international lending, because no one was penalized and capitalism requires punishment as well as reward; incentives without punishment give someone a free option.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“if you have incentive without punishment someone has a free argument”

0.80

Wall Street participants had an incentive to build huge tail risks because if a trader blows up every 10 years, he collects nine bonuses and someone else pays the cost, so asymmetric payoffs reward hidden exposure to rare disasters even when expected returns are negative.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“if you blow up every 10 years you've got to make 9 bonuses and the times here someone will pay the cost not you”

0.79

Silent evidence biases observed data: random variables tend to show rosier pasts because we observe only scenarios that survived, so the historical record makes risk look smaller than it is.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“there's certain bias I call it the silent evidence that random variables tend to show the rosier passes the scenarios conditional on existing”

0.79

Option pricing formulas such as Black-Scholes are not the source of market prices; traders priced options successfully before using them, and Taleb and Aspen Hogg's study found that people priced options better before Black-Scholes formulas.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we did a lot better before they have had black control formula it's very interest so so so we here we have evidence that that theories are getting us in trouble”

0.78

Decisions under uncertainty should be based on payoffs and judgment rather than true-false statements, because statistics such as a 95 percent confidence interval treat truth as binary, while the ancients treated probability as something one approves of regardless of the odds.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we don't make decisions based on true-false true-false heads tails heads tails epistemology is about you know deciding whether something is true or not true”

0.78

Hayek's point that prices convey information through trading means that option formulas are an attempt to fit a formula on top of observed price formation, so following theory in option markets gets traders into trouble.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“what quartz are doing is observing price formation and trying to fit some formula on top of it”

0.78

Calibrating risk models to recent extreme history, such as the 10 percent 1987 crash, guarantees failure because large deviations do not have predecessors, and the next large deviation will be different and worse than the last.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“so not realizing that definitely large deviations don't have predecessors okay the next large deviation is not going to have the predecessor it'll be different it's going to be different and it's gotta be worse”

0.76

Dentists and masseurs cannot scale their work, whereas writers and performers can, so an informational economy delivers large deviations and spikes, with the best producers capturing outsized returns.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“a dentist cannot store his work he cannot leverage his work he cannot scale you cannot scale it up the world's greatest dentist is limited in how many people he can see in 24 hours”

0.73

Hayek's insight that knowledge is dispersed means that using theoretical knowledge to direct practice often fails, and history of medicine shows that tinkering and trial and error outperformed directed research based on understanding of biological processes.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“whenever we use knowledge as a driver rather than tinkering we got on trouble”

0.73

Robustness to rare events is extremely easy to build: hold one portfolio with 80 percent in riskless assets and 20 percent in high-risk instruments, which is far more robust than a portfolio of medium-risk instruments with the same apparent variability, because one of them can disappear while the other survives.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“if you can find such the same for say 80 percent of your portfolio and high risk for 20 percent of your portfolio is lot more robust to rare events then an equivalent portfolio on medium risk instruments”

0.73

Smaller-probability events in fat-tailed domains can be far more consequential than their frequency suggests, so one 100-year flood matters more than ten 10-year floods, and what matters is probability times impact, i.e., the expectation of the event.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“a ten year flood has a higher probability than a hundred year flood but the hundred year flood the smaller probability will be massively more consequential”

0.73

Incentives without punishment give someone a free option; the system needs both incentives and punishment, and bailouts remove the punishment that would otherwise correct risk-taking.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“you have incentive without punishment someone has a free argument”

0.72

Too-big-to-fail bailouts have a long history: banks were saved in 1982 after making similar international lending mistakes, and again with the 1998 LTCM rescue, and each save allowed fragile institutions to grow larger, causing moral hazard to start in 1982.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“if we did not save the banks in 1982 banks made the same mistake 1982 and that 91 see if we did not save the banks then we wouldn't have led or also in 1998 with LTCM”

0.72

Estimating rare events is inherently unreliable because we have little data on them by definition, so a claim like a once-in-10,000-years event relies on assumptions or models rather than personal experience, and the smaller the probability, the more the estimate depends on a priori specification.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we don't know much about rare events by definition because they're rare”

0.72

Mother nature likes early breakage and capitalism is about failing early, so bailouts that prevent fragile firms from failing lead to larger, more costly failures later.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the mother nature likes the bracings early and capitalism is about failing early not had some government pop you up so when you fail you fail big”

0.70

Religion also works as an illusion-of-control substitute: historical accounts show people giving fortunes to temples after doctors failed them, and since doctors often did more harm than good, religion's effect of drawing patients away from doctors may have been net neutral or helpful.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“anything that took you away from a doctor to satisfy your illusion of control what's good for you guys and there again religion if it's just neutral okay it was helpful”

0.70

Doctors caused more deaths than they saved until very recently, and practices such as bleeding and delivering babies after coming from the morgue show that medical rationalism had a negative contribution, while patients who went to temples like the Temple of Apollo sometimes felt better.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“given that doctors up until very recently killed more people than they saved that you really had negative contribution stiffly when they bled you”

0.70

Empirical doctors were successful until rationalistic medicine, which seeks to minimize theories and generalizations, was displaced by theory-driven practice; modern medicine's real improvements came from barbers and surgeons who practiced empirically rather than from rationalist physicians.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the healers the empirical doctors were extremely successful until they were completely eliminated with the rise of Arabic medicine and I was rationalistic medicine”

0.70

Religion's main function is practice rather than belief: humans cannot be trusted to do what they are told, and religion helps by providing rules, humility, and a way to say I don't know, since God knows.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I just realize that religion was about practice you cannot trust humans of dollars you tell them what to do and and religion helps a lot”

0.68

Cicero defined probability as something one approves of regardless of the odds; for example, one would not drink water left on a table by a stranger even without evidence it is harmful, so probability was a decision-making tool for the ancients rather than a precise number.

definitionhigh valuefringenovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“probably came from Cicero who coined the word in his beautiful treatise and for him probability was something you approve off regardless of the odds”

0.68

The current financial crisis is a once-in-a-lifetime event unlike the 1929 to 1946 depression, so the ability to learn general principles from it may be limited, since rare events are idiosyncratic.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“it's going to be different it's a once-in-a-lifetime one-of-a-kind event and your ability to learn from it is might just be limited”

0.68

Taxpayers are effectively paying for the bonuses of the first nine years, making the incentive structure especially vicious because the public absorbs the losses from rare blowups while managers keep their compensation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we taxpayers are paying respectively for the bonuses of the first nine years”

0.68

Nationalizing failing institutions is preferable to bailouts because bailouts prop up weak institutions, making the problem worse next time, and fragile institutions should break early like a heroin addict who should be stopped early rather than given more drugs.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I prefer a nationalization of whatever we need to nationalize to bailout because and my idea is that the government doesn't understand that you don't give heroin to a heroin addict”

0.68

Government ownership would be better than being forced to bail out institutions on Sunday, but the problem is that governments cannot keep their promise not to bail out the other part, because politicians and civil servants have different incentives and like regulation because it grants them power.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“they can't keep their promise to not bail out the other part yeah that's a problem is this the it is it is because when I didn't government you have all these diseases of DNA of governments”

0.68

More regulation is not the answer, because Value at Risk was implemented at the regulators' request and regulators made the banking system fragile, so people will go around regulation and the solution is a smaller government-owned piece with the rest left unregulated.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“body at risk was implemented because the regulators wanted it so they made the mistake of the regulars brought the banking system to mean that needs more regulations people are going to go around it”

0.68

IQ is a narrow measure: it captures local skill at visual tasks and test-taking ability between roughly ages 16 and 23, so the idea that genetically selecting smarter children makes the world better is naive.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I'm more and more convinced that IQ notion of IQ is number one local with blast one in the visual and two it supplies you know exam taking”

0.68

We have absolutely no idea how to estimate very small probabilities, yet they can be very consequential in fat-tailed domains, so models that produce small probabilities from theory are dangerous.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we have absolutely no idea how to estimate very small probabilities and they can be very consequential”

0.68

Riskless world fantasies cannot be sustained: the system will break because no government is big enough to save large banks, and globalization makes the problem worse because no government knows which government should intervene when a foreign bank fails.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the good no government is big enough to save to save large banks we're discovering it now”

0.66

Bernanke's Great Moderation label was a mistake: volatility was compressed while the tails were getting fatter, so the risk from the tails was increasing even as measured volatility declined.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“he didn't realize that what we call the tails were getting fatter in other words volatility was compressed but the the contribution the risk coming from chumps was increasing”

0.66

Value at Risk tells you there is a 99 percent probability you will not lose more than a set amount, such as 2 million dollars, but the problem is that if you lose beyond the threshold the expected loss can be 50 million, so the probability of loss matters less than how much you lose when you lose.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the Israeli risk told you life was 99% probability you won't lose more than 2 million dollars the problem it had was that should you lose more than a million dollars the expected loss can be 50 million”

0.63

Leverage in the US and Europe roughly tripled relative to GDP since 1980, and complexity cannot tolerate leverage because there is no room for error, so a leveraged complex system can deliver large deviations very quickly.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we had since 1980 a considerable increase in leverage in the US and in Europe about three times tripling of leverage you know the ratio of leverage to GDP”

0.61

Regulators caused the crisis by helping rating agencies spread their ratings and by putting pressure on banks to hold triple-A assets, which raised the return to producing triple-A assets and led to a premium on making assets triple-A.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“this crisis was caused by regulators with the rating agencies the regulator's helped rating agencies spread their ratings ironically it seems to me we put a lot of pressure on banks to hold their their assets if in the form of triple-a”

0.57

Globalization produces fat tails because it concentrates production in few locations, such as outsourcing to Bangalore, so a single political disruption there can hit many firms at once, reducing diversification in exchange for lower costs.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“mathematical argument wide localization produces fat tails but the casual explanation is as follows”

0.57

Complexity in the economy rose after 1995, and the internet raised the risk of cascades because it lets cultural ideas and tastes spread across the planet at once, producing synchronized behavior and fat tails.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the complexity started rising in 1995 and the risk of cascades increases with the internet”

0.57

Firms that avoided blowups earned lower returns year after year than their riskier counterparts, so they should be doing extremely well now, yet government propping-up of the failing firms prevents them from buying distressed assets.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“what about the ones who didn't do it we say about them they had lower returns year after year than their risk riskier counterparts”

0.56

The ancients understood how to live in a world they did not understand far better than moderns, who suffer from the hubris of overestimating their knowledge, and this overestimation is especially dangerous for small probabilities.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the ancient knew how to do that much better than the modern we suffer from the hubris problem of overestimating our knowledge”

0.52

Bank managers and traders were fooling themselves about risk, because people tend to adopt a comforting story that fits their interests, a psychological dimension that explains why executives were unaware of how much they were gambling.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“they were fooling themselves there's some psychological dimension so people tend to fool themselves into believing a certain story because it's them”

0.52

The most damaging part of the crisis is that the exposure to these tail events was preventable, because banks kept pushing into increasingly unprofitable areas such as subprime, increasing exposure while margins shrank.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the fact is that bothers me the most in this is that exposure to these two elephants was preventable”

0.52

Pascal's wager is a naive argument, but its core idea of an option with free payoffs applies broadly to decision-making: religious belief costs little and has much higher payoffs than the costs if God does not exist, though it assumes God would not see through the gaming.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“it's sort of like the idea of Pascal's wager that keeps coming back just taking the concept beyond generalizing it to about everything in decision-making”

0.52

Patients cannot rely on doctors to know the probabilities for their particular case, because every person and every treatment is different, so people must reclaim the ability to think about risk themselves rather than trusting the science and experts.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the doctor has no idea what the probabilities are every person is different every treatment is different”

0.52

People refused to abandon standard risk metrics for psychological reasons, because it is hard to accept years of lower returns than peers in exchange for avoiding a rare catastrophic year, akin to standing on shore as the Titanic sails.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“it's very difficult to say I'm going to have lower returns than you year in year out but then there's going to be one year where I'm gonna trounce you”

0.52

People analyze the past in relation to the present rather than applying the same analysis to today as the past, a cognitive failure Taleb calls a form of autism; for example, people do not reason that because the worst event was 23 percent in the past, the next worst could be 50 percent.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we don't work at the past in relation to its own past the world we look at the present in relation the way it is a relation to our own past”

0.51

Probability is not directly observable and is swamped by consequences in decision-making, so people often act against the odds when consequences are severe, even without analyzing probabilities.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“probability is very opaque we don't observe it it's not an object and two even if it were something tangible we wouldn't use it it'll be completely swamped by the consequences”

0.50

Information-based economies produce large deviations, so the spikes in income that come from scalable work like recordings or book sales create high-variance outcomes that can make people rich if on the right side and wipe them out if on the wrong side, especially when leveraged.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the more informational economic life is the more it can deliver large deviations”

0.48

The models used by banks relied heavily on theories to produce small probabilities of extreme losses, and these models were sized to produce humongous positions on tail events, so the banking system was extremely fragile even though some individuals with rare-event exposure were robust and others were fragile.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“these models were very size of details of course but led to the Delta of humongous positions on terror events calibrated to these theories called Value at Risk”

0.47

Globalization creates a more vicious problem because it becomes unclear which government should intervene when a foreign bank such as a Swiss bank fails, since its failure affects US taxpayers too.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“globalization is creating a more vicious problem which is that nobody knows which government should get involved”

0.47

Greenspan's defense that the events had never been seen before is invalid because large deviations never had predecessors, as the First World War and Cold War also lacked predecessors, so risk must account for events without historical precedent.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“he said well we never saw these events before but love deviations never had predecessors”

0.44

Theories should not be trusted over trial-and-error knowledge: Descartes was dangerous because he believed reason could triumph over everything, while pragmatists trusted wisdom that had emerged from trial and error.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the idea that Descartes was a little bit dangerous because he thought reason could triumph over everything and the pragmatism were interested in a again very Hayekian way of trusting what had emerged from trial and error”

0.44

No government is big enough to save large banks, so the fragile system must break regardless of size, and the prevailing attempt to stabilize all banks by propping up insolvent firms is a poor strategy.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the good no government is big enough to save to save large banks we're discovering it now”

0.42

Most medicines are used for something completely different from their original intention, so side effects dominate medical discovery, and tinkering is a way to collect positive side effects.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“most medicines are used for secure something completely different from what the original intention was”

0.40

Universities have made a negative contribution to technological knowledge compared to practitioners, since inventors like those who first flew kept practicing and only later did academics claim credit, and Taleb is gathering data to show this.

factualfringenovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I'm trying to provide data showing exactly that universities had negative contribution to knowledge compared to positions could be”

0.40

IQ is a narrow measure: it captures local skills like exam-taking and is not a meaningful measure of intelligence, and Taleb is increasingly convinced that its notion is flawed.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“IQ notion of IQ is number one local with blast one in the visual and two it supplies you know exam taking”

0.38

The Arabic and Hebrew word for religion or law, Deen, shows that being religious means being a law-abiding citizen who keeps the rules, and that following rules is harder without faith.

definitionfringenovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the name for a listened in Arabic Deen is a name for law in Hebrew yes that's what I mean to be religious”

0.33

Believing that religion is about belief rather than commitment is a mistake, and similarly people are skeptical of religion but not of economics or risk, even though worshipping man instead of God leads them to think humans can solve their own problems.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I'm losing patience with people who are skeptic about religion you see and at the same time who are not skeptical about economics or risk”

0.31

Mathematics increases the form of autism in risk thinking because quants with PhDs in economics or financial engineering fail to grasp that the worst observed event is not a ceiling, and this overconfidence is partly hubris.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“it seemed it may increase with the use of mathematics because that driver would understand the point simple traders will get my point”

0.31

The nation state is losing control over economic activity in a globalized world, but it still controls citizens through taxation, which remains the bread and butter of the nation state.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the nation state ceases to exist people have no control governments have no control”

0.31

Anyone who used Value at Risk after the 1994 mini-crisis or after the 1998 LTCM blowup should have had their head examined, since those episodes showed that bubbles form fast, tail events happen, contagion occurs and correlations go to one.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“anybody who still used value at risk after 1998 what had had a problem he means that to have his head examined”

0.30

Friedrich Hayek had instinct and his contributions will someday be part of philosophical thinking, and the fact that people still hear of him is a sign of progress.

normativeestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I read Hayek you know after 15 years and I just realized this man had a lot of instinct”

0.26

Bankers and regulators relied on risk methods they should have tested rather than trusting, and using Value at Risk without testing it was a breach of scientific ethics.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“something that's at risk was to me a breach of scientific ethics because it should test it”

0.26

Value at Risk is a crime against every form of scientific knowledge because treating risk as a single number makes regulators treat it as a fixed quantity that everyone must report as satisfactory.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the Value at Risk is a to me it's like crime against every form of scientific knowledge that we have and regulators life is a risk because it's a number”

0.26

Senior tranches of collateralized debt obligations offered such low returns, just pennies, that a hedge fund friend could not understand why anyone bought them, suggesting the riskiest players were pushed into thin-margin positions, like LTCM and the Palazzo-era blowup.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“a friend of mine in the hedge fund business said he could never figure out why anybody bought those senior tranches of those of the collateralized debt obligations because they weren't very the return wasn't high enough”

0.26

The same argument about spikes and fragility explains commodity price swings: oil and wheat prices can surge sharply on small demand imbalances and collapse rapidly, and speculative activity in commodities is poorly understood, possibly stemming from the same mistakes as easy credit.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“such a sharp rise in the response to very small imbalance in demand such a rapid collapse”

0.23

Gordon Brown's plan to stabilize all the banks is a bad strategy because it props up every insolvent bank, and globalization has made the nation state less able to control outcomes, leaving the tax system as its main remaining control over citizens.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the nation state ceases to exist people have no control governments have no control the tax system remains the bread and butter of the nation state”

0.23

The best use of Taleb's work is to spread ideas through books so that a small minority of readers understands the points and becomes conscious of the need to be robust to large deviations, which is his contribution to society.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“the ideas are out there they should spread I think that with a couple million books couple million copies small minority will understand the points and spread them”

0.21

The Greenspan era of low interest rates after 2001 and the subsequent risk buildup in the economy, as well as the Great Moderation, reflect the same mistakes as easy credit.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“surprisingly we kept building risk in the economy after that Italy starting in 2001 2002 with Greenspan's Novocain”

0.21

Some companies, after reading their risk reports, were effectively sitting on a lot of dynamite, and the explosion came somewhat later than Taleb expected but still happened.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“some companies after looking at their risk reports or sitting on a lot of dynamite”

0.21

Managers kept their bonuses even though their institutions lost everything, although some managers were wiped out or had their reputations dragged through the mud.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“but managers of these institutions have kept their bonuses so there is an incentive well not all of them some of them were wiped out”

0.21

Taleb started using Value at Risk in 1993, saw a 1994 mini-crisis, and concluded that Value at Risk was hogwash and that these risk claims were bogus; if the people using them were monitored by the FDA, they would be arrested.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“we had a 1994 crisis you know financial market has a mini crisis maybe definitely people don't remember it but it was enough for me to convert us to convince me that value at risk was hogwash”

0.21

Banks should not be allowed to have so much leverage, and regulators should teach banks to be more disciplined, which means reducing the size of institutions rather than tolerating their growth.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“that we should not be allowed to banks because we should teach the bank's to be a little more or a little more disciplined”

0.21

Hayek is a smart thinker whose ideas, rooted in his experience of poverty, will eventually become part of philosophical thinking, and Taleb reread Hayek after fifteen years and realized he had a lot of instinct.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I read Hayek you know after 15 years and I just realized this man had a lot of instinct”

0.20

Cash is a legitimate investment, and holding 80 percent in cash was ridiculed, yet in the crisis cash performed among the best, with cash allowing one to buy ten times the number of assets as prices collapsed.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“people thought that cash was not an investment and as you can see from this crisis there's what are the securities that performed the best yeah cash is doing pretty well”

0.18

Major banks were effectively insolvent: they had lost more than their capital base, and Citibank trading at one dollar per share reflected only the value of its options, meaning the expected return on those institutions was negative.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 0/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“banks are as we're speaking literally insolvent they've lost more than the capital base”

0.18

Some ratings agencies reportedly built into their forecasts the possibility that housing default rates could reach Great Depression levels, which would be safe, but the exposure to these tail events was preventable.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“I'm told that that some of the ratings agencies did build into their forecasts the possibility that default rates on housing would reach levels of the Great Depression”

0.18

Taleb had been financially involved in the crisis, and after the sort of ignoring his warnings, he decided to return to trading and focus on writing as a philosopher, expecting that a couple million copies of his book would reach a minority who understand and spread the ideas to make people robust to large deviations.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Nassim Nicholas Taleb

“my contribution to society is take place in the form of people being conscious of the need to be a robust to these large deviations”