What this covers

Tyler Cowen and Russ Roberts treat the European crisis as a problem of Greece first and of its larger neighbors second. Cowen calls Greece's troubles partly self-inflicted: heavy spending and borrowing, weak governance, a place near the bottom of the World Bank's Doing Business Index, and default about half the time since 1850. The wider diagnosis is institutional. Seventeen governments, each with a veto and coalition politics, cannot agree fast enough, a case of Veto Player Fragmentation. Roberts adds the free-rider framing. Cowen also uses Knightian Uncertainty to explain why investors drift toward dollar bonds even without doubting Germany.

The sharpest disagreement is over money versus credit. Roberts asks why the ECB or Fed cannot inject liquidity and let institutions fail. Cowen replies that currency is no substitute for credit once lending stops. That leads back to 2008, where he argues that rescuing Bear Stearns, not Lehman's later failure, was the catastrophic choice. He also endorses Scott Sumner's claim that subprime and the sovereign debt crisis are essentially the same. They then ask whom a Greek rescue really protects. Roberts points to French banks. Cowen says those banks have largely sold their Greek holdings to hedge funds, so the real stake is Precedent and Contagion for Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

The closing stretch covers scenarios and remedies. Cowen calls a German-backed guarantee followed by retreat the worst outcome, and warns that a wave of defaults could bring a 1929-style deflation. Iceland, he says, is no model for Greece. He favors limiting private leverage and moving the Fed toward Rules versus Discretion, while admitting that banking regulation has largely failed.

Sharpest takeaway

Cowen argues the eurozone was unworkable from the start because it combined a common currency with no fiscal or political union, so the crisis is a self-reinforcing loss of credit that will likely force Italy, Spain, and Portugal out of the euro after an informal default.

  • A monetary union without fiscal union and a common electorate cannot hold, and the euro was built that way
  • Once markets treat a euro in a Greek bank differently from a euro in a German bank, credit fragmentation becomes self-reinforcing
  • Bailouts are precedents, and Italy and Spain are too large to rescue, so Germany is unlikely to step up

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0.86

Uncertainty about the euro's future, which Austrian economists call Knightian uncertainty, makes investors reallocate to safer assets like US dollar-denominated bonds even without distrust of German repayment, and this matters for Germany's borrowing costs.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“it's like nightie and uncertainty in Austrian economics lingo and a simple decision on the part of some people”

0.80

The eurozone's 17 nations each have veto power and coalition-based governments, so they cannot agree quickly enough on a decisive response, unlike a unified US decision process.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“you have 17 nations each one of which has some degree of veto power ... they have to insufficient numbers sufficiently rapidly agree to something decisive”

0.80

The euro crisis is a classic tragedy of the commons and free-rider problem: each healthy nation would prefer not to pay for irresponsible ones, but the shared currency means the whole group goes over a cliff together.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“there's an enormous tragedy the Commons free-rider problem here”

0.78

The ECB, like the Fed in 2008, could in theory counteract a banking-driven deflation by expanding money, but expansion of currency is no substitute for credit, because when loans stop being made and collapse into a vortex, currency injection cannot restore the flow of credit.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“there's a difference here between credit and currency ... loans aren't being made loans are being sold margin calls are being made”

0.75

Greece's problems are partly self-inflicted: it spent and borrowed too much, has weak governance, and ranks near the bottom of the World Bank's Doing Business Index, below some African countries, and has been in default about half the time since 1850.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“they're near the bottom they're even below some of the African countries so the level of trust there is not high and Greece has been in default about half of history since 1850”

0.71

Greece spends more than it takes in, and because the eurozone has no common fiscal policy, each nation sets its own spending and taxes while sharing a currency, a setup that was probably never feasible.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“each nation has its own fiscal policy its own tax policy its own spending plans its own tax revenue they share a currency”

0.70

Letting Bear Stearns fail would have been better than rescuing it, and the decision to rescue Bear Stearns, not the later failure of Lehman, was the catastrophic moment of the 2008 crisis, since it occurred months earlier.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I view it actually is the decision to rescue Bear Stearns for five six months seven months earlier”

0.70

Scott Sumner's argument that the subprime crisis and the Pigs sovereign debt crisis are essentially identical, since both involve banks buying assets with a long record of good returns that then collapse as default risk rises, is correct in essence.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I'd say these two crises are essentially identical I should clarify that by essentially identical I mean in essence not in every detail”

0.68

The arrangement behind the euro was never workable in the first place because a monetary union requires a fiscal union, and a fiscal union requires a common electorate, which Europe lacks.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“principle 1 no monetary union without a fiscal union principle 2 no fiscal Union without a common electorate Europe is very far from having a common electorate”

0.68

Markets already expect that Italy and Spain are unhealthy and that a political compromise to fund them is unlikely, so a default that matches expectations would not be a shock, and it could set a useful precedent against reckless lending.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“everybody knows that everybody's aware that it's very unlikely that a political compromise can be fashioned”

0.68

A wave of defaults would make many European banks insolvent and could produce a deflation comparable to 1929, likely a second Great Depression at least in Europe, so the precedent lesson people would draw is that the system must never be allowed to get that bad again.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“so it becomes like 1929 yeah where you have a very large deflation you would have a second Great Depression at least in Europe”

0.68

A Fed bailout of European sovereign debt would be politically costly, and the risk would fall on taxpayers if the securities failed, but a second European Great Depression would also be bad for US taxpayers, so the trade-off favors acting despite the political capital problem.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“it may be better than risking a second European Great Depression which would also be bad for the US taxpayer in a number of indirect ways”

0.68

Limiting financial leverage in the private sector would reduce the frequency and severity of bailouts, even though it causes a short-run macroeconomic cost, because private players with more skin in the game would take more responsibility.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I would do everything possible to limit financial leverage in the private sector ... you have them be less frequent and less painful by having less leverage”

0.68

Iceland avoided bailing out its banks and survived because its banking system was small relative to the global system, and enough domestic trust allowed the government to ask citizens to accept hardship, so a similar path is not available to Greece.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“Icelandic banks are so small in the global scheme of things you don't knock down any larger house of cards”

0.68

If Greece is let go, the signal to markets is that Italy and Spain will be let go too, and the expectation that Italy and Spain will not be rescued may be realized, which would leave Greece and others stuck living within their means while lenders lose money, producing a good precedent of not lending recklessly.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“that's a great precedent for the future that says don't lend money recklessly to dangerous places”

0.64

Limiting the Fed's discretion and restricting its charter toward rules would reduce its ability to finance bailouts, though replacing the Fed is politically out of the question at present.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I would try to get a little less discretion and a little more rule into the feds behavior”

0.64

The Fed and ECB could in principle counter a bank-failure contraction of the money supply through liquidity injections, so Roberts questions why the survival of individual institutions is central to future well-being.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“can't the ECB counter that couldn't the Fed counter that here in the United States why is it”

0.64

The US response in 2008, injecting money and guaranteeing toxic assets such as Bear Stearns', saved institutions rather than letting them fail, and Roberts asks why the alternative of letting every institution fail and using liquidity injections to the system was not chosen.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“why wasn't that option should that have been an attractive option”

0.64

Banking regulation has not worked very well, and one lesson of both the subprime and sovereign debt episodes is that regulation fails, though there is no clear fix yet.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“one lesson of both episodes is that banking regulation doesn't work very well but I don't say we have a clear lesson as to how to fix it”

0.60

Because every bailout is a precedent, a refusal to rescue Greece signals that Italy and Spain will not be rescued either, so the interconnectedness of these countries makes one-by-one resolution far safer than a combined response.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“that's a big reason why things have gone as badly as they have”

0.60

Before the crisis, markets treated a euro in a Greek bank and a euro in a German bank as basically equivalent, but in bad times they diverge sharply, because a Greek bank may fail, be confiscated, or be redenominated into the drachma.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“the euro in the German bank is worth quite a bit more than the euro in the Greek Bank the Greek bank might fail”

0.60

Trying a German-backed ECB guarantee and then retreating would be the worst outcome, producing moral hazard, reform delay, and inflation, while postponing a larger explosion when German taxpayers eventually refuse to continue.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“you start doing it you get some of its bad effects in terms of moral hazard cutting off reforms inflation but you can't see it through”

0.59

Rescuing Greece is really about protecting its creditors, mainly French banks, because a Greek default would trigger French bank losses and then systemic contagion through the banking network.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“that Greek default would mean French bank collapse which would mean French collapse which would mean the banks that owed who had let money to French banks might not get it back”

0.57

Cutting spending by 10 percent would be an unpleasant but manageable adjustment for a household, yet governments treat such a cut as impossible, which shows a political mechanism failure rather than an economic limit.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“an 8% cut is not a big cut 10% cut and yet I don't I agree with you I think the political mechanisms to achieve that don't”

0.57

French and other European banks have largely sold their Greek securities to hedge funds as speculative positions, so the rescue is less about saving French banks and more about preserving the credibility of future bailouts of Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“French banks and a lot of the other banks have by now sold a lot of their Greek securities a long time ago to hedge funds who are doing this as a speculative play”

0.57

European banks are significant net suppliers of funds to the US shadow banking system, potentially more important than the Asian savings glut, so European bank distress would be a negative shock to US shadow banking that could exceed the Lehman or Bear Stearns shocks.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“European banks are significant net suppliers of funds to our shadow banking system ... it may be more important than the so-called savings glut”

0.57

The Fed subsidized foreign banks as well as American institutions in 2008, and the Fed chair faces a choice between buying weak European sovereign bonds held by US banks and accepting political backlash if those bonds lose value.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the Fed took in the 2008 period that not only subsidized American institutions by a significant amount but foreign banks as well”

0.57

France and Germany historically coordinated European decisions through a bilateral phone call and then presented them to other members, but now they are on opposite sides, which removes the customary mechanism for resolving the crisis.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the way things used to be done in the EU is Germany and France would get together have a two-two nation phone call”

0.57

Bank runs will become a common occurrence, as they were in the nineteenth century, at least through shadow banks, and policymakers will live with them while searching unsuccessfully for a solution, because there is more credit than can be guaranteed.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“my current view is that we are faced with the future where bank runs are a pretty common occurrence as they were in the 19th century”

0.57

Coordinated European rescue faces constitutional barriers and 17 nations each with veto power, so decisive agreement is structurally hard, and attempting a rescue would produce moral hazard and inflation while postponing a bigger explosion until the German taxpayer revolts.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“you have 17 nations each one of which has some degree of veto power”

0.56

Every bailout decision is a precedent, so the eurozone cannot settle countries one at a time, and the interconnection of member states is a major reason the crisis has gone so badly.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“everything you do is a precedent and that's a big reason why things have gone as badly as they have”

0.54

England tends to get into trouble and out of trouble faster than the US because its parliamentary system lets the government try policies and face a referendum at the next election, whereas the US system has more inertia.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“England tends to get itself into trouble first and they tend to get out of trouble first our system has a lot more inertia”

0.54

The ECB could in principle solve the crisis by credibly pledging to monetize whatever Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese debt needs support, but that pledge requires transferring real resources, which would mean taxing Germans, which is unlikely, or inflating the currency.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the one thing that could potentially solve the crisis but the problem is this to pay for the mess one way or another you need to transfer real resources”

0.54

The crisis is not really about Greece: Greece is about 2 percent of eurozone GDP, and if it were the only problem wealthier nations could pay the bill, but larger nations like Italy and Spain make it systemic.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the key to understanding the crisis is not really Greece because the Greek economy is about or was about 2% of the eurozone economy”

0.53

The political equilibrium in weaker European countries is that their banks will be nationalized rapidly, and the eventual outcome may be a Europe where weaker countries nationalize their banks and keep them afloat with a wealth tax, which is an ugly ending.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“I'll just predict the political equilibrium is that those banks will be nationalized rather rapidly”

0.53

The most likely scenario, though not with high probability, is that Italy, Spain, and Portugal will informally default around Christmas, reinstitute their national currencies, impose capital controls, and endure three to five years of economic chaos, with Greece's exit nearly certain and Ireland uncertain.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“those countries will be an informal default by Christmastime at some point ... they will leave the eurozone and they will have say three to five years economically speaking of being a total mess”

0.53

The rise in German government borrowing costs from 2.63 to 2.81 percent is not a sign of distrust in Germany's ability to repay, but of fear that the euro deal itself will collapse, causing investors to avoid euro-denominated bonds.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the market is not saying we're afraid about Germany the market is saying we're afraid the whole deal collapses”

0.53

The Fed's Bear Stearns guarantee of about 29 billion, later 32 billion, was described as possibly profitable, yet the value of the assets remained unknown, and the Fed holds about two trillion in Fannie and Freddie obligations with no transparency about their worth.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the Fed guaranteed the assets of Bear Stearns was 29 billion later 32 billion ... we don't know the Fed has bought about I think two trillion worth of Fannie and Freddie”

0.52

Greece's hoped-for transformation into a 'real Europe' economy was a temporary myth, and expectations of growth and institutional convergence were unrealistic because very few Greek sectors are competitive.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“there was this temporary myth that Greece had become part of the real Europe ... but in reality very few Greek sectors are competitive”

0.52

Citizens draw a line between helping Americans and helping foreigners, so a Fed purchase of Italian periphery bonds would be less popular than the domestic TARP-type bailouts, even though it could aid a bailout.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“citizens draw a line between helping out Americans and helping out foreigners rightly or not”

0.52

German citizens opposed Eurobonds about four to one in a recent poll, and a German guarantee of other countries' debt may be unconstitutional for Germany or illegal for the ECB, making the optimistic scenario politically hard.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“there was a recent poll on Eurobond ... German citizens were against that something like four to one”

0.52

The European crisis is a real test for democratic government, but Europe's governments in France and Germany are trusted and have consensus rule, and Germany's sense of sacrifice from reunification makes it likely that France and Germany can bear painful adjustments, so European liberal democracy is likely to hold.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“European government is extremely stable no non democratic force has a credible way to solve the problem”

0.52

The US political system is showing a failure of compromise over Social Security and Medicare, which is a sign that democratic mechanisms for muddling through are weakening, and the same problem appears in European countries where governing classes made unsustainable promises.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I don't see the mechanisms for compromise and muddling through that have worked in the past we see in the United States and in these countries as well”

0.50

The current situation is not transparent: no one knows how much European sovereign debt is held by European and American banks, and if it is large and those banks are not bailed out, their insolvency will follow.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“we don't know how much European debt sovereign debt is our debt meaning issued by countries rather than in companies we don't know how much sovereign debt is held by these European and American banks”

0.50

As trouble approaches, a slow and silent run on banks occurs and capital markets across the periphery begin to fall apart, with the wholesale destruction of capital markets happening in slow motion, the reverse of how markets normally evolve.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“there's a slow and silent run on banks and in general what happens is a variety of different capital markets tend to be pick apart and literally fall apart”

0.49

The European project has deep public support in France, Germany, and the smaller countries, so if it collapses within five years, an attempt to rebuild it better is likely, and only Greece faces a politically nasty outcome that would not matter greatly to Europe as a whole.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“there's a real belief in a European project and if this in some way collapses which I guess I think it will within five years time I think there'll be an attempt to pick up the pieces”

0.49

Greece has no primary surplus, meaning it borrows to pay interest and principal, and to avoid default it would need to cut government spending by another 8 to 10 percent, a cut the country cannot politically absorb without riots or collapse.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“they would have to cut government spending by another eight to ten percent and again I think that's not possible”

0.49

US nominal federal spending has risen roughly 50 percent in the last three or four years, so a 10 percent cut, even just a cut in the rate of growth, is treated as shocking, which Cowen calls a fascinating feature of the current political system.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“nominal spending measured in actual dollars not corrected for inflation has risen something on the order of 50 percent”

0.48

Shadow banking refers to investment banking and other financial institutions' lending among themselves outside traditional deposit insurance, and US banks may be unable to fill the gap left by European banks retrenching.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“by shadow banking you mean investment banks things other than FDI insured sure lending among financial institutions”

0.47

Greece could not nationalize its banks meaningfully without leaving the euro, and a Greek government that is itself a poor credit risk makes nationalization a step backward rather than a fix.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the Greek government is itself such a bad credit risk the idea that the Greek government has nationalized the bank it may be a step backwards”

0.47

The real problem is that Italy and Spain are too big to bail out, and their failure to meet obligations would have much larger economic consequences for Europe and possibly the United States than Greece.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“Italy in Spain are too big to bail out it seems the resources simply aren't there its trillions”

0.46

The bailout fund is being funded by countries that are themselves becoming bailout recipients: Italy, which once contributed to Greece's rescue, now needs one, with about 11 to 12 percent of the fund supposed to come from Italy, and France possibly next, leaving Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland carrying the weight.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“11 to 12 percent of that bailout fund is supposed to come from Italy”

0.46

The optimistic scenario requires Germany to reform the ECB and have it guarantee markets illegally but credibly, so bleeding stops and Italy and Spain can grow out of structural problems, though Cowen does not believe Germany will try it or that it would work.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the optimistic scenario is Germany gets its druthers together and sits down with a few other countries and says we're going to reform the ECB”

0.46

Proponents argue a credible ECB pledge would not require actual inflation because expectations alone would keep the system afloat, but that asks Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland to make a very large bet they may not be willing to underwrite.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“they can keep the whole ship above water just by the embodying expectation that's right and there's some chance that's correct”

0.45

Greece could in theory avoid default through fiscal austerity, raising revenue and cutting spending to regain market access, but that would have needed to start years ago, and it is now too late.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“had they started a few years ago they could have done that I think now it's too late”

0.44

Greece has been in default about half the time since 1850, which is why investors should not trust Greek euro deposits or bonds.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“Greece has been in default about half of history since 1850 or so”

0.44

Greece will likely need an eventual haircut of around 80 percent on its bonds, meaning bondholders would recover roughly 20 cents on the dollar.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“maybe the best guess would be something like an 80 percent haircut ... you give 20 cents on the dollar”

0.44

Italy and Spain are too big to bail out, since the required resources are in the trillions, and the countries contributing to the European bailout fund are themselves becoming weaker, so the funding base is eroding.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“Italy in Spain are too big to bail out it seems the resources simply aren't there its trillions”

0.44

The ECB, eurozone, and EU cannot credibly pledge anything because it is unclear whether the euro will exist a year from now, so even a small chance of breakup undermines any guarantee.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the ECB the eurozone the EU cannot credibly pledge anything we don't even know if it will really be around a year from now”

0.43

If the euro breaks up, the legal and contractual mess will be large because euro-denominated international contracts and external debts will be difficult to honor in reinstated national currencies, and resolution will be slow.

causalestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“all the contracts written in euros for international trade how are they honored external debts and euros how was that honored a lot of legal messes”

0.40

The Minnesota and Mississippi dollar analogy shows the eurozone problem: a dollar in a Mississippi bank is worth the same as one in Minnesota because both are FDIC-backed and withdrawable at equal purchasing power, whereas euros across Greek and German banks lack such assurance.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“let's contrast a dollar in a bank in Minnesota with a dollar in a bank in Mississippi they are both worth the same probably sure they're backed by the same FDIC”

0.40

Europe's current crisis could in other periods lead to revolution and war, as France and Germany's history before 1950 shows, though Cowen does not expect that outcome.

forecastcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“in another time and maybe this time these kind of stories wouldn't just lead to a really bad year for an economy they lead to revolution and war”

0.40

Basel III capital requirements requiring European banks to raise about 700 billion dollars in capital are absurd given that the banks may already be insolvent, which is an example of an impractical can-opener solution.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“they're telling their banks through Basel 3 something like come up with 700 billion in capital ... it's quite absurd”

0.38

The eurozone's unsustainability began on day one because a currency union was created without fiscal coordination or a unified electorate, leaving 17 nations with a common currency but no common governing body or tax base.

causalcontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“part of the unsustainability of this situation which you argue and others have argued began on day one which was a currency union that was not coordinated with fiscal policy”

0.35

The US has a credible FDIC that keeps deposits safe, while many European countries do not, so depositors in those countries face the prospect of losing their bank deposits.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the US has a credible FDIC but a lot of right Merapi in nations do not”

0.35

The Fed can act far faster than the ECB, having often done major rescues in a single weekend, while the ECB cannot easily respond that quickly, so the Fed could buy European bonds more quickly than the ECB.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the ECB has been much slower to buy things than was our fed our fed can act more or less immediately”

0.34

Greek workers can retire at 52, far below the German retirement age, so asking German voters to subsidize early Greek pensions is not a politically viable strategy.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“the Greeks retire it's 52 some can retire at 52 which is much lower than the German retirement age”

0.31

Germany cannot play games with its own credit rating and bond auctions, and the market's reaction is a signal to German and Dutch policymakers to ask whether they are really willing to underwrite the euro's problems.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“you just can't play games with your own country's credit rating and bond auctions and I think it's a sign to the Germans also to the Netherlands”

0.31

Hungary is the most worrying case for a turn toward fascism, since it is in a bad financial crisis outside the eurozone, and Cowen judges such an outcome entirely imaginable in Eastern Europe, though not predicted.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“I would worry most about Hungary actually on this account because they're in a very bad financial crisis themselves”

0.31

Politics is not a reliable substitute for fiscal discipline in Greece: the wealth tax route to nationalized banks and fiscal adjustment would require unprecedented political radicalism that most governments cannot pull off, except very small high-trust countries like Iceland.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“there are governments that can pay a very small homogeneous country absolutely with a high level of trust”

0.26

The bailout is not workable because the burden rests on Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland to support the accumulated fiscal problems of the other countries, and no outside party such as China, the US, Brazil, or Turkey is plausibly willing to absorb the loss.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“you have Germany in the Netherlands and maybe Finland holding up the accumulated weight of the other countries and the fiscal problems it's just not going to work”

0.26

The consequences of default will include belt-tightening that triggers riots and political turmoil, deposits leaving the country, and an economy that cannot recover without a complete implosion and restart.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“belt tightening in Greece has led to a lot of riots”

0.26

Politicians in healthy countries face a rock-and-hard-place choice: paying for irresponsible members makes them unpopular, yet letting the whole bus go over a cliff also damages them, so no one can avoid pain.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“the bus that you're all on is going over a cliff of which you don't have your own parachute”

0.26

Greece's tourism sector illustrates its lack of competitiveness: Turkey offers a nicer vacation at much lower cost, without euro-denominated prices, showing Greece is not competitive even in an industry where it should have a natural advantage.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“even something like tourism which for Greece should be a no-brainer ... you get a nicer vacation in Turkey it costs you a lot less”

0.25

There is a run not only on Greek banks but also on the bond markets of the weaker countries, because private lenders will no longer finance Greece at rates it can afford, so Greece survives only on ECB money.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Tyler Cowen

“they are getting money from the ECB the European Central Bank private citizens such as myself we are reluctant to lend Greece money because the rate that we would require is so high”

0.25

Ballots will occur in Europe and the US, and there will be bailouts, so the best achievable policy is tough restrictions on leverage with a lot of skin in the game on the capital side and minimal other regulation, though Cowen admits he does not know how to get there.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I just don't know how to do it but where I would like to be is have tough restrictions on leverage a lot of skin in the game on the capital side and not regulate too much else”

0.24

The transition period, not the long-run outcome, is the main concern: the adjustment back to national currencies will be ugly even if European integration persists in the medium term.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“I'm more worried about the transition period it's weed how ugly it will be”

0.24

Relying on an outside party such as China, Brazil, or Turkey to absorb losses would be politically unrealistic, since China's per capita income is lower than Greece's and such countries would not accept the cost.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“per capita income in China is much lower even than in Greece”

0.21

The Fed's ability to finance and manage crises should be curbed because it is holding the bag for risky foreign exposure, and Cowen warns that Fed bailouts of European debt could be politically costly without enough political capital to make a difference.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“I doubt if our fed right now has the political capital to do enough to make a difference”

0.18

When Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal sneeze, Europe gets pneumonia, meaning the European banking and fiscal shock from southern default would be far worse than the American version of contagion.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Russ Roberts

“when Italy Spain Greece and Portugal sneeze Europe gets pneumonia and we're gonna get a really bad flu”