
Richard Posner on the Financial Crisis 11/16/2009
What this covers
In November 2009, federal judge and legal scholar Richard Posner sits down with Russ Roberts to discuss the origins and causes of the 2008 financial crisis. Despite his book's title suggesting otherwise, Posner locates primary responsibility not with reckless bankers or irrational exuberance in the markets, but with governmental failure: the Federal Reserve's loose monetary policy in the early 2000s, fragmented regulatory oversight that left a vast shadow banking system unsupervised, and an economics profession that failed to sound alarm. His central claim is that financiers behaved rationally given the incentives and information the government created—the real failure was institutional.
Posner develops this argument across several overlapping domains. He frames systemic risk as a negative externality analogous to pollution: individual banks rationally maximize shareholder profit without regard to the chain-reaction effects their collapse might trigger across the financial system, which is precisely why regulation exists. He examines how housing finance amplified this problem—the combination of leverage (80–100% mortgages), rising prices that justified looser lending standards, and the expectation of continued appreciation made rational business decisions that collectively destabilized the system. He critiques Milton Friedman's monetary theories as having enabled Bernanke and Greenspan to believe loose money alone could prevent disaster, and he assesses the 2008 stimulus package as poorly designed, pointing to Friedman's permanent-income hypothesis to explain why tax rebates saved rather than spent. He also pushes back on Friedman's own prescriptive ideas—both the optimal-deflation scheme and fixed money-growth rules—as either unworkable or dangerously inflexible. The conversation includes practical discussion of shadow banking gaps, too-big-to-fail moral hazard, and emerging regulatory remedies like bringing derivatives onto balance sheets.
Posner argues the 2008 crisis was a failure of capitalism's governmental institutions—unsound Fed monetary policy, fragmented regulatory inattention, and a complacent economics profession—rather than irrational behavior by financiers, who responded rationally to the incentives and environment the government created.
- Unsound Fed monetary policy in the early 2000s flooded the economy with cheap credit and fueled asset (housing) inflation the Fed failed to recognize
- Bankers' risk-taking was rational ex ante given the environment; controlling the systemic externality is the regulator's job, not the businessman's
- Regulatory inattention plus a 'shadow banking' system outside bank regulation interacted with low rates to produce systemic risk
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Systemic risk is an externality analogous to pollution: an individual bank's bankruptcy risk is rational for its shareholders, but through a chain-reaction effect it can bring down the whole economy—a cost the bank doesn't care about, which is precisely why regulation is needed, since businessmen maximize profit, not environmental protection or systemic stability.
“It's like pollution, right? We don't expect businessmen to worry about pollution cuz the pollution affects you know, other people.”
Asset price inflation in housing is especially dangerous because houses are bought with debt (often 80-100% mortgages), so a housing boom draws the banking system heavily into housing finance; when the bubble bursts and prices dive, it can bankrupt the entire banking industry.
“houses are the products that are bought with debt, you know, like an 80% mortgage, an 80% mortgage, sometimes a 100% mortgage. So, that means when you have a housing boom the banking system becomes very heavily involved in housing because it's financing the boom.”
Moral hazard intensifies the systemic-risk externality: if banks expect to be bailed out, they not only have an incentive to ignore the externality they create but an incentive to increase it—taking more risk is then perfectly rational, but this itself is a regulatory failure because businesses adapt rationally to whatever environment the government creates.
“If you tell banks, 'Yeah, do whatever you want, we'll bail you out.' Of course they're going to take they're going to take more risk. That's perfectly rational.”
Powerful interest groups like the elderly, who are not looking to the long term and want their benefits now, have tremendous political power, and because the costs of government are shoved off onto the future, those future costs carry little weight with politicians who have a limited time horizon.
“you have you know, these very powerful interest groups like the elderly who are not looking to the long-term. They just want their benefits now and... they have tremendous political power”
Systemic risk from banking is a negative externality analogous to pollution: businesses maximize profit, not environmental protection or global financial stability, so they will take risks endangering the broader economy whenever paid more than the expected private cost; therefore regulation is necessary to internalize what firms have no incentive to consider.
“It's like pollution, right? We don't expect businessmen to worry about pollution cuz the pollution affects you know, other people... Business is profit maximization, not environmental protection. So, you have to have regulations. It's the same with these banks.”
Falling default rates and eroding down-payment standards during the housing boom were rational, not irrational: when prices are expected to rise (say 5% a year), a 100% mortgage becomes a 20% equity position within a few years, and a borrower in trouble simply sells rather than defaults, so rising prices justify laxer lending.
“if you lend a person a 100% mortgage, in 4 years, he'll have a 20% equity, right? Because the price will be his mortgage will be the same, but but the price will be higher.”
Transfer payments and tax rebates make poor stimulus because, per Friedman's permanent-income hypothesis, people tend to save windfalls or transitory income (as happened with the 2008 rebates), and the part that is spent goes to retail purchases from inventory that bear no relation to the impaired industries—construction and manufacturing—which account for about half the jobs lost since December 2007.
“There's a great deal of evidence that um people tend to save what is called transitory income. Windfalls, you know, non-recurring incomes.”
A largely unregulated 'shadow banking' industry—broker-dealers like Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns—grew up doing functionally what banks do (borrowing capital and lending it) but without bank regulation or federal deposit insurance, overseen only by a lax SEC that doesn't understand banking, creating a major regulatory gap.
“there's grown up a large uh, banking industry you know, usually referred to as a shadow banking industry of companies that that do what is functionally banking, but they're not regulated as banks.”
Unless 'too big to fail' is eliminated, it is very difficult to be confident banks will act with prudence, because an implied promise to save firms—due to size or critical interconnection (like Lehman)—creates an incentive to take more risk; this moral hazard is real.
“if we don't uh get rid of too big to fail, it's going to be very difficult to be confident that uh that those banks lacked with any um any prudence.”
Transfer payments (tax rebates, credits, unemployment/health benefits) are weak stimulus because, per Friedman's permanent income hypothesis, people save transitory/windfall income rather than adjust their standard of living, and the portion that is spent goes mainly to retail from inventory with no direct employment effect and no relation to the distressed industries (construction and manufacturing, where about half of jobs lost since December 2007 are concentrated).
“There's a great deal of evidence that people tend to save what is called transitory income. Windfalls... This is a very genuine contribution by Milton Friedman.”
A large 'shadow banking' industry of broker-dealers (Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns) functionally did banking—borrowing and lending capital—but was not regulated as banks, lacked federal deposit insurance, and was overseen only by a lax SEC that does not understand banking, creating a critical regulatory gap.
“there's grown up a large uh, banking industry you know, usually referred to as a shadow banking industry of companies that that do what is functionally banking, but they're not regulated as banks.”
Friedman's optimal-deflation proposal—shrinking the money supply by a fixed percentage each year so that deflation acts as an implicit interest rate on cash, offsetting the suboptimal incentive to hold non-interest-bearing money—is unworkable academic 'moon gazing' that would produce economic chaos.
“he thought the uh he thought the Federal Reserve should um should reduce the money supply uh every year by a by a fixed percentage like 1%. And it was ingenious, but you know, real kind of academic um moon gazing.”
Financiers' risk-taking in 2003-2006 was not excessive ex ante: facing huge demand for cheap-credit housing loans and being told by the Fed and economists there was no bubble, taking those risks was a rational profit-maximizing decision, since all businessmen accept a bankruptcy risk.
“I don't think their risk-taking was excessive ex ante.”
Bubbles are real, but buying into a bubble is not irrational: a low interest rate starts the boom by making houses more affordable and demand outstrips slow-to-respond supply, then the rising prices become self-sustaining as people rationally try not to miss out—a phenomenon Posner calls 'rational exuberance' since a cautious investor can profit in the middle if he exits in time.
“I believe in bubbles, but I don't think buying in a bubble is irrational.”
Milton Friedman's monetary theory bears responsibility for the crisis mindset: the Friedman-Schwartz thesis that the Great Depression would have been a mere recession but for the Fed reducing the money supply led Bernanke and Greenspan to believe that keeping money loose during a downturn is sufficient to avoid trouble—but in September 2008 monetary policy proved totally ineffectual as rates were pushed to zero with no effect on lending.
“he argued that um the depression... the Great Depression that began in 1929... would have been just a recession if it hadn't been for unsound monetary policy by the Federal Reserve.”
Milton Friedman's proposals were unworkable or risky: his optimal-deflation idea (steadily shrinking the money supply ~1% a year so deflation substitutes for the foregone interest on cash) would cause chaos, and his fixed-money-growth rule eliminates the flexibility needed to handle emergencies—without a central bank able to create money, you cannot save banks in a crisis.
“he thought the uh he thought the Federal Reserve should um should reduce the money supply uh every year by a by a fixed percentage like 1%. And it was ingenious, but you know, real kind of academic um moon gazing.”
Bubbles are real but buying into a bubble is not irrational ('rational exuberance'): low interest rates start a housing bubble by making mortgages cheaper, raising demand faster than supply; at some point it becomes self-sustaining as people expect continued price rises and don't want to miss out, and a rational, cautious person can profit from a bubble by exiting in time.
“I believe in bubbles, but I don't think buying in a bubble is irrational.”
Lenders rationally eroded down-payment standards because rising house prices made high loan-to-value mortgages safe: if prices rise ~5% a year, a 100% mortgage builds 20% equity in four years, and rising-price markets have low default rates because troubled borrowers simply sell rather than default.
“if you think house prices are going to rise, say you're confident that they're going to rise at a rate of 5% a year. Then that means that if you lend a person a 100% mortgage, in 4 years, he'll have a 20% equity”
The political system is extremely hospitable to expansions in government and extremely reluctant to finance them, because powerful interest groups like the elderly want benefits now and lack long-term horizons, and the more costs are shoved onto the future, the less weight they carry with politicians who have limited horizons.
“the political system is uh extremely hospitable to expansions in government and extremely reluctant to finance them.”
As a result of fall 2008, the big five investment banks all vanished (Lehman failed, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired by banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies), so the surviving four are now regulated by the Federal Reserve with full examiner power; new future shadow institutions will fall under the SEC, which historically did only investor protection, not solvency regulation.
“the big five all vanished. So Lehman Brothers went broke. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired by banks. And Goldman and uh Morgan Stanley converted... to bank holding companies.”
Asset price inflation in housing is especially dangerous because houses are bought with debt (often 80-100% mortgages), so a housing boom draws the banking system heavily into housing finance; when the bubble bursts and prices dive, the whole banking industry can be bankrupted because it is so heavily invested in housing.
“houses are the products that are bought with debt, you know, like an 80% mortgage, an 80% mortgage, sometimes a 100% mortgage. So, that means when you have a housing boom the banking system becomes very heavily involved in housing because it's financing the boom.”
A fixed money-supply growth rule without a central bank is dangerous because, although it might have prevented this recession, it leaves no flexibility to handle emergencies—there is no way to create money to save banks—so eliminating discretionary monetary authority is like flying planes without pilots.
“if you if the economy does get into trouble, and you don't have a central bank, you just have an automatic rule expanding the money supply, then... you can be in really serious trouble. Cuz then you you've no flexibility to uh you know, deal with an emergency.”
Even if low early-2000s interest rates were not the cause of the bubble, the Fed could have burst the bubble by raising interest rates if it had spotted it—so failing to identify and prick the bubble was the great failure regardless of the bubble's origin.
“even if zero interest rates in 2000s didn't have an effect, which is hard to believe. I think it did. But even if it didn't, the Federal Reserve if it if it had spotted the bubble, could have burst it by raising interest rates”
Paul Volcker's proposal to bar banks from proprietary trading and risky affiliated divisions, and proposals to bring off-balance-sheet liabilities (special investment vehicles, credit default swaps and other derivatives) onto bank balance sheets, are sensible reforms because such hidden liabilities make it hard for bank examiners to know a bank's true financial situation.
“Paul Volcker... he's suggested that uh banks should not be allowed to engage in in risky conduct. They shouldn't be allowed to be affiliated with... proprietary trading... I think there's a lot of merit to that.”
The political system is structurally biased toward fiscal crisis because it is extremely hospitable to expansions of government but extremely reluctant to finance them, so deficits and a soaring national debt will likely be resolved through inflation and devaluation rather than high taxes—weakening the dollar's profitable status as the international reserve currency and draining American wealth, especially since about 45% of the publicly held debt is owned by foreigners.
“the the political system is uh extremely hospitable to expansions in government and extremely reluctant to finance them.”
The economics profession was complacent, lulling everyone to sleep with the belief that there would never be another depression and that recessions could be cured nearly painlessly by the Fed lowering interest rates—a belief that proved false in the fall of 2008.
“you have a very complacent economics profession, which was lulling everybody to sleep by saying that, you know, never going to be another depression, that if you have a recession Federal Reserve, uh, can cure it more or less painlessly.”
The 2008 crisis was a failure of capitalism, but primarily a failure of the governmental institutions of capitalism—the central bank and the regulatory system—rather than of markets per se, because banking is inherently risky and requires regulatory controls and a central bank as part of the capitalist system.
“it's a failure primarily of, uh, the governmental institutions of capitalism. Uh, the central bank, you know, the Federal Reserve and the, uh, regulatory system for, uh, controlling financial, uh, business.”
The single biggest cause of the crisis was unsound monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in the early 2000s—cheap credit and too much money flooded the economy, interest rates fell dramatically, and the Fed was fooled by low CPI inflation while in fact there was asset price inflation, especially in housing and stocks.
“it would be unsound monetary policy by the Federal Reserve System in the early 2000s. Cheap credit, too much too much money. uh, flooded the economy with money.”
No new institutions are needed because the problems are largely self-correcting: the Fed should simply pay more attention to the Taylor rule (from which it greatly deviated in the early 2000s, holding the federal funds rate near 1% for years, effectively negative in real terms), and regulators already have all the powers they need and just have to be more alert.
“the Federal Reserve should pay more attention to the Taylor rule. There You don't need a new institution. You just need a reminder that they, you know, they've got to worry about bubbles.”
Greenspan made a colossal error rooted in overconfidence in conservative economic policy: he believed he had squared the circle by stimulating the economy with low rates while avoiding inflation, and he assumed intelligent bankers wouldn't take excessive risks—ignoring that even Chicago economists recognize externalities, so bankers will take risks that are excessive from the economy's standpoint if there is enough money in it.
“he had that by by low interest rate policy he would he had stimulated the economy but had managed to avoid inflation. That's That's a tremendous error that he made. I mean, it's colossal error.”
Keynesian fiscal stimulus is sound in principle—when fear causes massive hoarding (banks holding a trillion in cash, households buying safes, rising savings), idle money sits inert, and government can borrow it to substitute public demand for impaired private demand—but in practice the 2009 stimulus was enacted too late (February rather than the prior fall), implemented far too slowly due to red tape and politics, and full of wasteful or political expenditures.
“the government if it can borrow it and put it to work, you know, on public projects of various sorts. That's that's the theory... you're just going to substitute public demand for uh a terribly impaired and fearful private demand.”
Direct public-works employment is more effective stimulus than transfer payments: Roosevelt's WPA and Civilian Conservation Corps hired millions within months and gave a tremendous shot in the arm, and Germany and Japan recovered quickly from depression by pouring money into military expansion that put people directly to work.
“Roosevelt at the beginning of the uh his administration, 1933, created these, you know, work prog- ... Within months, they had hired literally millions of people.”
Greenspan made a colossal error rooted in overconfidence in conservative economic policy by believing he had squared the circle—stimulating the economy via low rates while avoiding inflation—and by assuming intelligent bankers would not take excessive risks, ignoring that they will take risks excessive from the economy's standpoint if profitable, especially with golden parachutes.
“that he had that by by low interest rate policy he would he had stimulated the economy but had managed to avoid inflation. That's a tremendous error that he made. I mean, it's colossal error.”
A complacent economics profession contributed to the crisis by lulling everyone into believing there would never be another depression and that the Fed could painlessly cure recessions simply by lowering interest rates—an assumption that proved false in fall 2008.
“you have a very complacent economics profession, which was lulling everybody to sleep by saying that... never going to be another depression, that if you have a recession Federal Reserve can cure it more or less painlessly. It just lowers interest rates”
The Constitution provides little check on the government-business shift because much has changed since the 18th century and the Supreme Court has written a 'pretty blank check' to government; the current conservative Court, mindful of the 1930s backlash to curbing the New Deal, will probably not take it on.
“I don't think the Constitution does because things have changed so much since the 18th century. And really, the Supreme Court has written a pretty blank check to the government.”
The enormous deficits and national debt will lead either to very high taxes or, more likely, inflation and devaluation to wipe them out; with about 45% of the publicly held debt (around $7.5 trillion) owned by foreigners, the US is dependent on foreigners to finance government and pays enormous interest abroad—a drain of American wealth that, if addressed by inflation/devaluation, would weaken the dollar's profitable status as the international reserve currency.
“these deficits will lead either to uh very high taxes or I think more likely to uh inflation and devaluation to try to wipe them out.”
The 2008 crisis was primarily a failure of the governmental institutions of capitalism—the central bank and the financial regulatory system—not a failure of markets per se, because banking is inherently risky and requires regulatory controls and a central bank as part of the capitalist system.
“it's a failure primarily of, uh, the governmental institutions of capitalism. Uh, the central bank, you know, the Federal Reserve and the, uh, regulatory system for, uh, controlling financial, uh, business.”
If one had to identify a single cause, it was unsound monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in the early 2000s—cheap credit and too much money flooding the economy—where the Fed was fooled by low CPI inflation while real inflation was occurring in asset prices, particularly housing and stocks.
“it would be unsound monetary policy by the Federal Reserve System in the early 2000s. Cheap credit, too much too much money. uh, flooded the economy with money. Uh, interest rates fell very dramatically.”
Bankers' risk-taking was rational, not excessive, ex ante: given cheap credit and the consensus (Fed, economists) that there was no housing bubble, financing huge housing demand was highly profitable, and all businessmen take a bankruptcy risk; the problem is that an individual firm's rational bankruptcy risk can, via chain reaction, bring down the whole economy—a systemic externality firms don't internalize.
“I don't think their risk-taking was excessive ex ante. That is, um, if you're a financier in 2003, 4, 5 6 even you see that there's tremendous demand for loans for houses”
Lax regulation (failing to control externalities) and stupid/encouraging regulation (subsidizing foolish activity, e.g., the Community Reinvestment Act, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, implicit government backing, bailout expectations) are both regulatory failures and not meaningfully different in culpability—whatever environment government creates, rational businessmen will adapt to.
“You can have stupid regulation because it's terribly lax. Or you can have stupid regulation because it actually, you know, subsidizes uh foolish activities, right? So, that's the problem with the you know, the Community Reinvestment Act and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”
Pushing down the federal funds rate gives banks unlimited cash reserves but does not necessarily produce lending; forcing the rate to zero would actually halt interbank lending because no bank would lend overnight at zero interest, which is why the Fed paid interest on reserves to keep some interbank lending alive.
“when you force down the federal funds rate, what you get is you get uh unlimited cash reserves for banks. What you don't get necessarily is lending.”
Cash-for-clunkers was ineffective stimulus because it mainly moved consumption forward by a month (a tremendous drop in purchases followed in September), and buying from dealers' swollen inventories produces no production or hiring until manufacturers receive replacement orders, which can take a long time.
“all you do is you move consumption up by a month. And in fact, what happened was uh the program was in August, and in September, a tremendous drop in purchases.”
Paul Volcker's proposed structural reform—prohibiting banks from being affiliated with or having divisions engaged in proprietary trading—has considerable merit as a way to keep a safe commercial banking backbone, though Posner is uncertain it would work since a low-risk commercial banking sector may not be much of a backbone.
“Paul Volcker... he's suggested that banks should not be allowed to engage in in risky conduct. They shouldn't be allowed to be affiliated with... divisions that engage in proprietary trading, which is very very risky... I think there's a lot of merit to that.”
Forcing the federal funds rate to zero produces unlimited cash reserves for banks but not necessarily lending—you can have very low interest rates and no lending—which Posner attributes to a 'great Friedman mistake' (the monetarist implication that keeping the money supply from contracting suffices to avoid economic trouble).
“when you force down the federal funds rate, what you get is you get uh unlimited cash reserves for banks. What you don't get necessarily is lending... can have very low interest rates and no lending.”
Even if early-2000s low interest rates had no effect on the bubble (which Posner finds hard to believe), the Federal Reserve could have burst the bubble by raising interest rates if it had spotted it—so the failure to recognize and pop the bubble is the great failure regardless of the bubble's origin.
“even if zero interest rates in 2000s didn't have an effect, which is hard to believe... the Federal Reserve if it had spotted the bubble, could have burst it by raising interest rates”
Direct employment programs like Roosevelt's WPA and Civilian Conservation Corps, which hired millions within months, were a tremendous shot in the arm even doing low-productivity work, whereas modern fiscal stimulus is very oblique and far less effective; military spending in Germany and Japan also produced quick depression recovery as effective stimulus.
“Roosevelt at the beginning of his administration, 1933, created these work programs... Within months, they had hired literally millions of people... That was a tremendous shot in the arm.”
Fiscal stimulus works in principle by having government borrow inert hoarded money (banks' trillion in cash, swollen personal savings, businesses hoarding cash) and put it to work on public projects, substituting public demand for impaired fearful private demand; but execution failed—the 2009 stimulus came too late (February rather than fall 2008), was implemented slowly due to red tape and politics, and contained stupid expenditures.
“the government if it can borrow it and put it to work... on public projects of various sorts... you're just going to substitute public demand for uh a terribly impaired and fearful private demand.”
The crisis is largely self-correcting and requires no elaborate structural reorganization; the Fed should pay more attention to the Taylor rule (from which it greatly deviated in the early 2000s by holding rates near 1% for years, effectively negative real rates), and regulators already have all the powers they need over commercial banks—they just have to be more alert.
“Taylor observed that in the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve was greatly deviating from from his rule. His rule said they should have a federal funds rate of, I don't know, 2% or something... They held it at 1% I think for about 2 or 3 years.”
Cash-for-clunkers and similar consumption-stimulating subsidies are inefficient because they mostly shift consumption forward in time (a tremendous September drop followed the August program), purchases come from dealers' inventories so production and hiring don't rise until inventories are replaced, and spending will hit in 2010 when the economy is recovering, risking serious inflation.
“all you do is you move consumption up by a month. And in fact, what happened was uh the program was in August, and in September, a tremendous drop in purchases.”
The Constitution has little to say about the expansion of government control over the economy because circumstances have changed so much since the 18th century and the Supreme Court has effectively written a blank check to the government, and the current Court—stung by the 1930s backlash against curbing the New Deal—is unlikely to take this on.
“I don't think the Constitution does because uh because things have changed so much since the 18th century. And really, the Supreme Court has written a pretty blank check to the government.”
Lax regulation and subsidizing regulation are both 'stupid regulation' and equally culpable regulatory failures: the Community Reinvestment Act and the implicit government backing that let Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac borrow cheaply encouraged subprime mortgages, though these were not the critical factor conservatives claim.
“there's no question that the Community Reinvestment Act, you know, 1977 and it strengthened during the Clinton administration and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac... they borrowed very low rates because they were assumed to have a kind of informal backing by the government”
Interest paid on bank reserves (introduced October 2008) and a near-zero federal funds rate together discourage interbank lending and encourage banks to hold reserves, since banks won't lend to each other at zero interest and would rather buy Treasury bills; Roberts counters that the critical issue is lending to businesses, not interbank lending.
“if the uh federal funds rate is zero, no bank will lend to any other bank because... that's the interbank lending... If it's zero interest, no one will lend to another bank.”
There is an unhealthy and serious shift in the line between government and business—government acquiring operating control of General Motors via a majority stock interest, taking over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG, controlling about a third of Citigroup, and dictating executive compensation—amounting to a dangerous expansion of centralized discretion.
“there's a very very unhealthy shift going on in the line between government and business. I mean, it's really really very serious.”
There is a very unhealthy, serious shift in the line between government and business: government acquiring operating control of GM via majority stock, taking over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG, controlling about a third of Citigroup, plus executive compensation controls and enormous expenditure growth—turning these into effectively government companies.
“there's a very very unhealthy shift going on in the line between government and business. I mean, it's really really very serious.”
The Community Reinvestment Act and the implicit government backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (allowing them to borrow cheaply and encourage subprime mortgages) contributed to the crisis but were not the critical factor that many conservative critics claim.
“I don't think they contributed critically the way a lot of conservative critics do... But, there's no question that the Community Reinvestment Act, you know, 1977 and it strengthened during the Clinton administration and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac... they encouraged, you know, subprime mortgages, no question about it.”
The big five investment banks all vanished and are now effectively regulated: Lehman went bankrupt, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired by banks, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies, so the surviving shadow banks now fall under the Federal Reserve's regulatory control.
“Lehman Brothers went broke. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired by banks. And Goldman and uh Morgan Stanley converted... to bank holding companies.”
The historical question of what role Roosevelt and the war played in the Great Depression recovery remains an open question with no consensus, which shows how hard economics is.
“the historical question of what role Roosevelt played, the war played in um the recovery is still an open question... don't have a consensus. Tells you how hard economics is”
Capitalist systems have a banking problem (banking that can go awry) that socialist systems don't, though socialist systems have worse problems overall.
“socialist systems actually don't They have worse problems, but they don't have this particular problem of a banking system that can, uh, go awry.”
Everyone makes mistakes.
“That doesn't mean they won't make mistakes. Obviously. Everyone makes mistakes.”
Banking is an inherently risky business.
“banking is an inherently, uh, risky business.”