Rana Foroohar on the Financial Sector and Makers and Takers
What this covers
Rana Foroohar speaks with Russ Roberts about her book Makers and Takers, laying out a historical argument about the trajectory of U.S. finance over four decades. Foroohar contends that the financial sector has progressively detached itself from its original function—channeling capital to productive enterprise—and instead turned inward, trading existing assets and enriching itself. The conversation traces this drift to specific policy and regulatory decisions: the 1982 legalization of stock buybacks under SEC Director John Shad, the shift toward share options as executive compensation in the 1990s, and a cascade of bailouts beginning with Continental Illinois in 1984 that established the principle of moral hazard—the expectation that large creditors would be rescued at taxpayers' expense.
The discussion ranges across the mechanisms by which finance has crowded out productive investment. Foroohar documents how only roughly 15 percent of capital from major U.S. financial institutions reaches real businesses, while the remainder trades in existing assets. Short-Termism induced by stock-price pressure and quarterly earnings cycles discourages R&D spending in favor of buybacks and dividends. The conversation ventures into the structural parallels between too-big-to-fail banking and emergent tech giants, the role of Government-Finance Symbiosis in driving regulatory capture, and how the U.S. system of Shareholder Value vs Stakeholder Capitalism differs from European and Asian models. Roberts raises objections and counterpoints throughout—on the ambiguous effects of Dodd-Frank regulation, the limits of market-manipulation claims, and whether the Forest Fire Analogy for serial bailouts holds. The debate also touches the 2016 election, linking public anger over unequal bailout treatment to broader populist sentiment.
Foroohar argues that over the last 40 years U.S. finance has shifted from serving the real economy to serving itself, channeling capital into trading existing assets rather than productive investment, and that incentives, tax policy, and bailout-driven moral hazard have made the system both bigger and more dangerous to the broader economy.
- Only ~15% of capital from major U.S. financial institutions reaches real businesses; the rest trades existing assets
- Stock buybacks (legalized in 1982) and options-based executive pay create short-termism that crowds out R&D
- Repeated bailouts since 1984 created moral hazard that incentivized the publicly-traded, highly leveraged bank model
Repeated bailouts since 1984 prevented small crises but accumulated systemic risk until the catastrophic 2008 collapse.
- Repeatedly bailing out institutions to avoid small painful disasters is like suppressing every forest fire out of fear it will spread—it allows the buildup of fuel until you get a fire you cannot put out, so the serial bailouts since 1984 each prevented unpleasant-but-survivable disasters while sowing the seeds of the much larger 2008 conflagration.
“the forest fire: If you put out every fire because you are afraid it's going to lead to a forest fire, a bigger fire: Eventually you allow the buildup of a fire you can't put out.”
- Once it became clear (starting with Continental Illinois in 1984 and continuing through the Mexican crisis) that debt holders would be protected in bailouts and get nearly 100 cents on the dollar, the Wall Street partnership model—where banks risked their own money—became too costly, incentivizing investment banks to become publicly traded and highly leveraged, which unleashed the most dangerous potential for disaster and culminated in the housing crisis.
“once it became clear that debt holders would be protected in bailouts--which started in 1984 with Continental Illinois-- and then proceeded regularly through the Mexican Crisis and elsewhere, that people who lent money would be able to get almost 100 cents back on the dollar.”
- When the government forces creditors to be compensated for risks they took and messed up—getting 100 cents back on the dollar—while leaving the responsible people in their jobs, it produces the worst of both worlds: not capitalism (where firms rise and fall on their own) and not accountability, since creditors took haircuts almost nowhere and almost no one was removed.
“once you say the government can then force people to be compensated for risks they took and messed up and get their money back anyway, you're in a different world... that's the worst of both worlds.”
Dodd-Frank's complexity entrenches big banks, leaves too-big-to-fail unsolved, and creates regulatory uncertainty harming real investment.
- Since Dodd-Frank didn't solve too-big-to-fail and bailouts come down to political will, the goal should be to make it politically and culturally difficult for politicians to bail out failed financial firms—letting firms rise and fall on their own successes and failures like venture capital firms, who would simply be laughed at if they asked Washington for their money back after bad investments.
“my goal is to make it politically difficult for politicians to make those kind of bailouts. I want there to be... make it culturally difficult to do these things”
- Dodd-Frank's complex, labyrinthine regulation imposed compliance burdens that only the biggest banks can easily absorb (by devoting whole departments to it) while smaller banks cannot, making the banking industry more concentrated, so each remaining bank is more systemically important and more able to demand the next, even bigger bailout—while the legislation never solved the too-big-to-fail problem, which comes down to political will.
“We've made the regulatory framework more byzantine, more labyrinthine, with the result that only the biggest banks find it easy to comply... So, what we've done is we've made the banking industry more concentrated”
- Passing a large law like Dodd-Frank to fix a big problem when it is only 50-60% completed—with the rest written later in ways the public will never notice—is death to a democracy and is part of the problematic administrative state, and the resulting regulatory uncertainty is part of why real investment in America is unhealthy.
“we're going to pass this big law to fix this big problem, but we're not sure what's in it; we're going write what's in it as we go forward in ways you'll never notice... That's, to me, just not a good thing.”
Economists and the profession facilitate Wall Street's symbiotic relationship with Washington through compromised objectivity and models.
- Many academic economists are facilitators of the symbiotic relationship between Washington and the financial sector, and as Luigi Zingales points out, the profession has its own special interests that compromise its objectivity, so economists should be more skeptical about finance's overall value and skeptical of their own models.
“too many of them are the handmaidens of Wall Street... have been the facilitators of this evil, symbiotic relationship between Washington and financial sector.”
- A Chicago-school economist and a progressive journalist can vehemently agree that Wall Street has too much power and influence and can wreak destruction beyond its boundaries, even while disagreeing on how the rest of the economy works and on the underlying disease causing the agreed-upon symptoms.
“people like you and me who look at the world very differently, agree very much on this one issue: Which is that Wall Street has too much power.”
- Procedural statement promising to discuss trade issues later in the program.
“my listeners want to hear about trade issues at some point; I keep promising we'll get to it.”
Market competitiveness and structural incentives, not isolated misconduct, explain financial sector power and risk.
- Risky innovation is best done in the early days of a company funded by venture capital firms holding portfolios of many companies—knowing most will fail and they can't predict which will become unicorns—because the public stock market does something different, so it is unsurprising that brilliant innovation is hard to sustain through a company's life cycle.
“They make those investments now, in the early days of their company, spending their own money and the money of their financial capital investors who have a portfolio of 10, 20, 30 companies of which they hope a few will become unicorns”
- The price of aluminum actually fell during much of the period when Goldman Sachs was allegedly manipulating the market, suggesting the core issue is market competitiveness—how many firms can access the market—rather than the warehouse maneuvers themselves.
“It looks to me like aluminum actually fell--the price of aluminum actually fell during a large part of this claim when Goldman was manipulating the market.”