What this covers

Carmen Reinhart joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to discuss patterns in financial crises spanning eight centuries and dozens of countries, drawn from her book This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly co-authored with Kenneth Rogoff. The conversation centers on the idea that modern crises—including the U.S. housing and financial crisis of 2008—are not anomalies but repetitions of a recognizable sequence: sustained current account deficits, inflows of capital that loosen credit availability, rising debt levels, and a psychological conviction among policymakers and investors that old valuation rules no longer apply. Reinhart walks through how these elements appear across banking crises, currency crashes, sovereign defaults, and stock market collapses, regardless of a country's wealth, political system, or exchange-rate regime.

The discussion moves through several distinct territories. Reinhart documents how regulation consistently lags financial innovation—whether derivatives in Mexico or securitized mortgages in the U.S.—leaving supervisors perpetually unprepared. She introduces the concept of debt intolerance, showing that emerging markets default at debt levels that wealthy nations tolerate easily. She traces how implicit government guarantees amplify crises by encouraging excessive borrowing in good times. She also addresses the peculiarity of the current U.S. position: because the dollar is the reserve currency and the U.S. borrows in its own currency, the country enjoys advantages—foreign capital fled into Treasuries during the contagion—that emerging markets never get. Arnold Kling joins to argue that regulation itself cannot stay ahead of private adaptation. Throughout, Reinhart's chief concern is not what regulators will learn but what they will forget as memories of crisis fade and new generations of bankers arrive with no lived experience of the last collapse.

Sharpest takeaway

Reinhart argues that financial crises across centuries and countries share recurring quantifiable antecedents—large sustained current account deficits, credit booms fueled by capital inflows, rising debt, and a 'this time is different' psychology—so the U.S. crisis is not unique but a familiar pattern that will recur because regulation lags innovation and memories fade.

  • Crises across exchange-rate regimes, political systems, and rich vs poor countries share common symptoms despite surface differences
  • Capital flow bonanzas and credit availability are the seed; implicit guarantees and moral hazard amplify the boom and degrade lending quality
  • Regulation and supervision chronically lag financial innovation, and complacency returns as the memory of crisis fades

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0.90

The 'this time is different' syndrome is a recurring psychological frame in which policymakers and market participants believe old valuation rules (price-earnings ratios, debt-to-income) no longer apply to them—crises happen to 'other people at other times'—which allows them to overlook mounting warning signs like real estate bubbles, unsustainable current account deficits, and off-the-chart household debt.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the essence of the this time is different syndrome is well look those crises happen to other people and they happen at other times they don't happen to us”

0.86

The most common feature across crises is not the specific instrument or regulatory gap (which is idiosyncratic—derivatives in Mexico, securitization of mortgages in the U.S.) but that regulation and supervision consistently lag behind financial innovation; innovations like derivatives or securitization are introduced as risk-reducing but regulators are caught unaware.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the nature of the regulatory failure is idiosyncratic to the to the particular crisis the common theme is that you know you're you you have regulation and supervision lagging behind”

0.86

Implicit government guarantees (too-big-to-fail) are a critical amplifier of crises, linked to the debt story: if you get a great return in good states of nature and are bailed out in bad states, your willingness to borrow and take risk rises—corroborated by the fact that private debt before a crisis often becomes public debt afterward.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“if you feel that in good states of natures you're going to get a great return and in bad states of nature you will be bailed out your willingness to undertake risk and tomorrow and I stress borrow it's going to be importantly affected by that”

0.86

Financial crises come in six recurring varieties—banking crises, currency/exchange-rate crashes, sovereign defaults on external debt, sovereign defaults on domestic debt, inflation crises, and stock market crashes—and despite differences they share common quantifiable characteristics that can be identified across centuries and countries.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“we have banking crises we have exchange rate crashes we have sovereign defaults on external debt sovereign defaults on domestic debt and we have inflation crises”

0.86

Emerging markets suffer from 'debt intolerance'—they get into trouble at what appear to be low debt levels by international standards; half of post-WWII sovereign defaults occurred at debt-to-GDP ratios that would have met the Maastricht 60% criterion, so tolerable debt thresholds can be extremely low, especially without a track record.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“emerging markets suffer from what we called ed intolerance which is you get into trouble and what seem to be even low levels of debt by international standards”

0.86

The dollar's displacement of the British pound as reserve currency was a long, gradual process visible in debt-issuance data from the early 1800s: by the 1890s emerging markets began issuing more dollar-denominated debt and pegging exchange rates to the dollar rather than sterling—tell-tale signs the pound faced competition—but sterling was not fully displaced until the official end of the sterling zone in 1967, by which time it had de facto already happened.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“as early as the 1890s you know after bearings and so on bearings crises and so on if you start seeing emerging markets issue more debt denominated in dollars rather than British pounds”

0.84

The biggest danger going forward is not what we have learned but what we will forget—the memory of the crisis will live longer for households that lost homes and jobs, but on the whole the next generation (e.g., MBAs minted in 2020 going to Wall Street) will forget, and the crisis pattern will all happen again.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“I'm more concerned with with what we will forget”

0.83

Credit availability is the necessary seed and moral hazard from implicit guarantees is the amplifier: without ample credit availability, moral hazard is largely moot because you can't borrow regardless of guarantees; with it, guarantees create 'hidden debt' by raising the demand for credit from economic actors who expect a government bailout, and displace lending quality toward the lower end.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“if you don't have credit availability the issue of moral hazard is just doesn't it I wouldn't say moot but well you know you don't have credit availability doesn't matter whether it's guaranteed or not you're not going to be able to borrow period”

0.81

You can create banks overnight but you can't create bankers—in Indonesia in 1995, the number of banks grew from little over a dozen to dozens in a very short period, and regulators, though aware problems were brewing, lacked the capacity to supervise the rapid expansion, creating a 'wild west' where supervision lagged far behind.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“you can create banks overnight but you can't create bankers”

0.81

Banking crises had more inflationary consequences after WWII than before; before WWII there was no discernible association between high inflation and banking crises, and the post-WWII inflationary aftermath is predominantly accounted for by Latin America—outside Latin America there is no strong link between inflation and banking crises in the three-to-five years afterward.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“banking crisis had more inflationary consequences after World War two than they did before”

0.81

The post-WWII period (roughly through the Bretton Woods era) was an unusually quiet period for banking crises—visible when plotting crisis incidence from 1800 to 2008—partly because international and within-system capital mobility was restrained and partly because much of the world was rebuilding real, productive 'low-hanging fruit' after wartime destruction.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the drop-off that you see in the incidence of banking crisis in the period after world war two is a pretty marked one I mean we actually plot this out from 1800 through 2008”

0.81

Central government debt rises by about 86 percent in real terms in the three years following a financial crisis, and this is a conservative estimate because it omits new guarantees that have not yet been realized (e.g., the roughly trillion dollars of Fannie and Freddie balance sheet now held by the Fed, which has not been recognized as debt).

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“if you look at the three years following the crisis central government that increases in real terms after adjusting for inflation by about eighty six percent”

0.81

What was uncharacteristic about this crisis is that much of the world fled into U.S. Treasuries during the contagion, allowing the U.S. government to keep borrowing and the dollar to appreciate—the opposite of what would happen to an emerging market in crisis—because the dollar retained its reserve-currency role and there was no viable alternative ('the tallest pygmy').

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“a lot of the world in the middle of this contagion turned to US Treasuries allowing the government to continue to borrow which would be very under not be the case in an emerging market situation”

0.81

Domestic debt crises—when a government defaults on its own local citizens—are a very different and much less documented type of crisis than external defaults, which are well documented because they involve powerful creditors in New York or London; documenting domestic debt crises is an important contribution of the book.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“what is much less documented is domestic debt crisis what happens when the government default on the local citizens”

0.80

Not all debt is bad and debt is the lifeblood of finance, but the danger comes when certain debt thresholds are exceeded—and those thresholds can be quite low; determining what counts as excessive debt shouldn't require rocket science, but problems arise when we start bending the rules.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“not all debt is bad but that you reach certain thresholds and those thresholds can be quite low and then that becomes a problem”

0.79

The U.S. subprime mortgage market functioned like a developing country embedded inside the U.S.—with new entrants into credit markets who had no credit history and often no employment history—so the high default risk and confidence-fragility characteristic of emerging-market debt applied to these domestic households.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the subprime market was nothing less than a developing country in the United States where you had a lot of new entrants into the credit markets with no credit history often with no employment history”

0.78

Financial regulation is not a math problem that stays solved; a regulatory regime elicits responses from private firms who adapt to maximize returns within constraints by amending rules and finding practices within the letter but contrary to the spirit of the rules, placing any regime under continual assault so that over time its ability to prevent crises degrades.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Arnold Kling

“a regulatory regime elicits responses from firms in the private sector as financial institutions adapt to regulations they seek to mack to maximize returns within the regulatory constraints”

0.75

Regulation cannot be static because regulators and supervisors run behind innovation, so it must constantly be up to speed; combined with the tendency for complacency to set in as time elapses from the last crisis, Reinhart is not confident any regulatory framework will prevent a major financial crisis from recurring—elsewhere crises are already brewing, and her bet is that when financial markets morph into new forms, it will all happen again.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Carmen Reinhart

“regulation can't be static it has to be up to speed which makes it very challenging”

0.75

Because U.S. debt is denominated in its own currency (and the dollar is the reserve currency), the U.S. will likely inflate away its debts—a de facto partial default through inflation—rather than an outright de jure default, since it can simply print money to pay.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“that means that you will probably see debts inflated away before you see an outright repudiation or default on those debts because we can just print the money to pay it off”

0.75

Consumer indebtedness was rising and the U.S. savings rate was falling for a long period—going back to the 1980s—well in advance of the 1998-2003 housing price run-up and the subprime explosion, which coincides with the sustained current account deficit story and complicates accounts that focus narrowly on housing policy in the late 1990s.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“consumer indebtedness was growing and the savings rate was falling for a very long period in advance of that and it really coincides to a large extent with that with that current account story”

0.75

Asia ran huge current account deficits before the 1997-98 crisis, much of it financed by foreign direct investment rather than pure debt flows, yet still suffered crisis—showing that even non-debt inflows correlate with the credit availability that precedes crises.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“If you look at Asia prior to its crisis it had huge current account deficits a lot of that was foreign direct investment so you wouldn't call it just debt flows”

0.73

The 'this time is different' fallacy operates not only before a crisis but also during and after it—as economists deploy 'forensic equipment' to find what's special about each crisis, they may fool themselves into seeing a 'perfect storm' of unique causal factors when the underlying pattern is simpler and common.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“we are doing as regards restructuring our banks or more accurately not restructuring them things very similar to what Japan did in the 1990s”

0.73

Although capital inflows may arrive as equity or FDI rather than debt, money is fungible, and there is a strong empirical association across both emerging markets and advanced economies between large current account deficits/capital inflows and domestic credit availability—and the type of inflow matters for how abruptly the flow can reverse (short-term bank lending reverses brutally).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“there's a high correlation between current account deficits and credit availability”

0.73

A common antecedent of crises across exchange-rate regimes, political systems, and budgetary situations is a 'capital flow bonanza'—running large sustained current account deficits financed by borrowing from the rest of the world, which over time makes a country increasingly indebted to the rest of the world.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“I call these episodes capital flow bonanzas which are when you're running large current account deficits and finance them by borrowing from the rest of the world”

0.73

The underlying common cause of these crises is an enormous increase in credit availability that flows into asset prices—particularly housing—through the banking sector, which is a deeper driver than any single story (monetary policy, housing policy); Ireland and Spain in the eurozone (no independent monetary policy) and the UK and U.S. (floating rates) all experienced this, undercutting purely monetary-policy explanations.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“you have the UK and the us with floating exchange rate so they have independent monetary policy but Ireland and Spain did not there were part of the eurozone”

0.73

Running a current account deficit does not necessarily mean increasing indebtedness to the rest of the world, because if foreigners buy American equity, corporate debt, or make foreign direct investment financing real productivity, factories, and projects, that is fundamentally different from a government borrowing to live beyond its means.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if foreigners buy American equity if foreigners buy corporate debt that finances real productivity and factories and projects isn't there an important distinction between that and say the US government borrowing money to live beyond its means”

0.73

As a capital inflow continues, lending quality deteriorates: in the early stages funds go into productive investment, but as inflows persist they move down the quality spectrum into more 'periphery' projects—a pattern seen in the run-up to the Asian crisis.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“as the as the inflow continues you start getting into more of the periphery projects if you will you move down”

0.73

Crises typically follow a sequence that begins with financial liberalization and/or financial innovation, during which innovation gets ahead of regulation and supervision, creating a 'wild west' in which the boom in credit, asset prices, economic activity, and current account deficit takes seed.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“it starts with financial liberalisation and or financial innovation and that can come and wait and often what you have during that those episodes is is innovation getting ahead of regulation and supervision”

0.73

The apparent higher incidence of banking crises in the recent era (vs the 1874-1913 golden age of capital mobility) is significantly an artifact of more countries in the sample—former colonies that are now independent and countries that lacked banking sectors then but have developed ones now—though the share of crises is still somewhat higher after accounting for this.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the only reason that the numbers are higher for the more recent period is that we also have more countries”

0.73

Countries can run current account deficits or surpluses for extended periods, and these flows move in long cycles—England ran current account deficits and capital account surpluses for about 120 years as the world's dominant lender, which would look like a huge deficit by another country's standards but did not qualify as a capital flow bonanza by British standards.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“England ran to current account deficit in a capital account surplus for about a hundred and twenty years”

0.73

Part of the crisis driver was a lack of incentive to invest money carefully because of guarantees: foreign capital (e.g., China buying hundreds of billions in Fannie Mae bonds) and domestic investors funded GSE debt without worrying about loan quality, confident the Treasury would stand behind it—so it was not just an increase in debt but an increase in debt and leverage for unproductive assets that moral hazard amplified.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“I'm thinking about China buying Fannie Mae debt Fannie Mae bonds in the probably hundreds of billions of dollars and not worrying too much whether Fannie or Freddie is buying up loans that aren't as safe”

0.73

Central banks and investors do not buy currencies per se but assets, so the euro is not a viable reserve alternative because the eurozone has no single safe instrument equivalent to the U.S. Treasury market—only fragmented German, Greek, and Spanish bonds that are very different—and China's non-convertible currency cannot serve either, which sustains the dollar's reserve role until a credible alternative crystallizes.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“central banks and investors don't bite euros per se they buy assets and in the Euro market we still have German bonds Greek bonds Spanish bonds and they're very different we don't have the the equivalent of the US Treasury market”

0.66

A capital flow bonanza must be defined country-specifically—it is a current account deficit that is particularly large relative to a country's own historical standard, not merely the existence of a deficit; thus England as reserve currency could run large deficits for over a century without it counting as a bonanza by British standards.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the definition of a bonanza has to be country specific that you're running a particularly large current account deficit relative to what you historically have run”

0.63

The inflation risk from the current crisis is not imminent but a five-to-ten-year horizon problem—measured from when the crisis started (two years prior), not from the present—arising from carrying a higher debt level for a long time; an emerging market with a history of default would have a compressed horizon, but the U.S. has more time.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Carmen Reinhart

“the inflation question becomes more pressing in a five to ten year time horizon and it's not five years from now it's five years from when the crisis started which was two years ago”

0.60

The current U.S. crisis is being treated with the same medicine that caused the disease—giving banks easy credit and making it easy for people to keep borrowing—which suggests the problem may not be over.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“we're providing the same medicine to cure the disease that caused the disease which is rather extraordinary right where we're giving banks lots of easy credit and making it really easy for people to borrow”

0.42

Greece, which now sits at over 100 percent debt to GDP, was in a state of default until the mid-1960s, illustrating that even advanced/European economies have had post-WWII sovereign defaults.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Carmen Reinhart

“Greece which now sits at over a hundred percent debt to GDP was in a state of default till the mid-60s”

0.30

The goal of the research project was to go beyond narrative accounts of crises (like Kindleberger's) and quantify the recurring patterns that lead up to big blowouts—whether countries borrow and live beyond their means, develop asset bubbles, and see savings rates plummet.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Carmen Reinhart

“what we wanted to do was actually go out and quantify it what are the cycles that lead up to these big blowouts”