What this covers
Greg Ip, a Wall Street Journal reporter and author of Foolproof, joins Russ Roberts to examine a paradox at the heart of risk management: efforts to eliminate danger in complex systems often backfire and create new ones. The conversation ranges across finance, ecology, sports, and public health to show how safety measures reshape human behavior in ways their designers did not anticipate. The 2008 financial crisis anchors much of the discussion, but Ip draws parallels to natural disasters, car accidents, football injuries, and even the history of banking failures under Herbert Hoover, showing that the problem is structural rather than specific to any one domain.
The core tension is between two approaches to managing risk. One seeks to make systems foolproof by preventing failure—suppressing recessions, extinguishing forest fires, mandating safety equipment. The other accepts that failure cannot be eliminated and instead builds resilience and tolerance for small shocks. Ip argues the first approach often backfires: when the Federal Reserve made recessions less frequent, it encouraged debt accumulation that made eventual crises worse; when the Forest Service suppressed fires, fuel accumulated and subsequent fires became catastrophic. The Peltzman Effect captures a key mechanism—seatbelts and anti-lock brakes change how people drive, offsetting some safety gains. In finance, derivatives merely redistribute correlated risk rather than eliminate it, leaving institutions like Goldman Sachs thinking they were protected from AIG's collapse when in fact their insurers (Lehman Brothers, Citigroup) were equally vulnerable. No system can truly insure itself against systemic crisis because correlations tighten when it matters most.
Ip argues that efforts to make complex systems (financial, ecological, physical) safer often backfire by changing behavior and concentrating risk, so the goal should be resilience and tolerance of failure rather than the illusion of being foolproof.
- Suppressing small disruptions (recessions, forest fires) allows risk/fuel to accumulate, making eventual disasters more severe
- Safety devices that affect how people perform a task induce offsetting risky behavior (Peltzman effect)
- No system can insure itself against systemic risk because correlations become near-perfect in a crisis
Safety measures and protective policies generate hidden costs that often outweigh their benefits through behavioral and systemic feedback.
- If a Great Moderation lasted 50 years, one prediction of the safety-induced-risk idea is that the event that ends it would be horrific rather than merely unpleasant, because dampening swings in the economy lets the eventual crisis become much more severe.
“If we could create a Great Moderation that would last 50 years, one of the predictions of this idea is that the thing that would end it would be horrific rather than just unpleasant.”
- Foolproof is a mistake as a goal; rather than trying to eliminate all possibility of failure, policy should aim for systems where the costs of a failure are small relative to the potential disaster, and our policy toward financial institutions has failed that criterion by producing an inherently fragile system.
“Foolproof is a mistake. We shouldn't be shooting for foolproof. We should be shooting for something where the costs of a failure are small relative to the potential disaster.”
- Making airplanes safer drives up the cost of flying, which encourages more people to drive instead, and since driving is much more dangerous than flying, an engineering improvement in air safety can produce a non-obvious net increase in overall fatalities.
“as you make planes safer, you do drive up the cost; and that encourages more people to drive. And driving is much more dangerous.”
- In our relentless desire to purge our bodies of parasites and disease we have encouraged autoimmune diseases to expand, illustrating that there is no free lunch: making children's environments cleaner and safer makes them more likely to get sick when older, just as shielding them from excitement carries hidden developmental costs.
“in our relentless desire to purge our personal ecosystems, our bodies, of parasites and other diseases, we've encouraged a set of autoimmune diseases to expand.”
Bailouts shield decision-makers from losses, breeding recklessness and ensuring repeated crises through misaligned incentives.
- The AIG bailout functioned as a bailout of large financial institutions like Goldman Sachs, Societe Generale, and Deutsche Bank, because AIG was a conduit through which government money flowed to the creditors who were owed insurance-like payments.
“I often describe the bailout of AIG as a bailout of Goldman Sachs. It's a bailout of, I think it was Societe Generale, the French Bank. Deutsche Bank was in the top five.”
- If decision-makers on Wall Street had been wiped out by the crisis they would have learned a lasting lesson and driven more carefully thereafter, but because the government promised to hover over them with new lifeboats, the people actually learning the painful lesson are taxpayers who do not see the connections clearly, making repeated crises highly probable.
“if you promise that you'll always be hovering over the Titanic with a new set of lifeboats, they will drive less carefully.”
- The government acting as insurer of last resort is the source of the problem rather than the solution: investors' myopia about systemic risk is itself a product of believing Uncle Sam will step in, and if there were a credible belief that the government would not bail people out, those dangerous systemic interconnections would not persist because investors would be far more aware of systemic risk.
“isn't that fundamentally a view saying, 'Well, I don't have to worry about the systemic risk, because there's always Uncle Sam who will step in?' And wouldn't those risks be more--wouldn't investors and institutions be more aware of systemic risk if there was not a bailout of last resort?”
Capital misallocation during booms masks illusory growth when incentives fail to direct investment to highest-value uses.
- The deeper destructive cost of crises is the poor use of scarce capital, not just investor losses: devoting a trillion dollars to larger houses is a bad allocation, so the boom that looks beneficial is not as valuable as it appears because capital is only directed to its highest use when incentives are right, and when incentives are wrong much apparent growth is illusory.
“to devote a trillion dollars to new and larger houses is really a bad allocation of scarce capital.”
- Because genuinely safe Triple-A assets are scarce, financial institutions seeking to satisfy safety requirements found creative ways to manufacture securities that looked Triple-A but turned out not to be, which was a central mechanism by which the financial system became fragile.
“you had to hold a lot of Triple-A assets. But as you point out in the book, they are scarce. And as you point out in the book, they found creative ways to create what looked like Triple-A assets that turned out not to be Triple-A assets.”
Policy and historical narratives often misdiagnose root causes and credit, obscuring what actually drives outcomes.
- The key issue with football is the difference between choosing to play in ignorance versus knowledge: everyone knew football was dangerous but not how dangerous, and now that we know more about chronic brain damage, many parents are steering children to other sports, so the sport is at some risk of disappearing unless the risk is reduced -- if brain damage were certain after a decade of play, the sport would vanish.
“there's a big difference between making a decision to be a football player in ignorance versus knowledge.”
- Contrary to the popular myth that Herbert Hoover stood by and let the Great Depression happen, he actively tried to stop it, and Franklin Roosevelt largely did more of the same things Hoover had done -- which also did not work well, though Roosevelt received the credit.
“a lot of people have the myth that he basically stood by and allowed the Great Depression to happen... He actually tried to do a lot to stop it.”
- Human beings are powerfully and universally drawn to water, as Melville observed in Moby Dick that even the most absent-minded person set walking will infallibly lead you to water, which explains why population concentrates at the water's edge and why inevitable flooding produces tragic loss of life and property.
“we do like, as human beings for whatever reason, we do find water attractive. It's why there is huge population intensities at the water's edge.”