What this covers

Paul Romer and Russ Roberts discuss economic growth, the role of cities, and the disciplinary crisis in economics. Romer opens with his foundational argument about economics of objects vs ideas: objects are rival (scarce, zero-sum), while ideas are non-rival—everyone can use them at once—which means population growth need not be harmful. The conversation moves from this theoretical premise into concrete territory: housing crises driven by inelastic supply, the undervalued role of cities as engines of learning, and why norms, not laws, form the bedrock of functional societies. Romer also reflects on his departure from the World Bank, where he served as Chief Economist, and uses that experience to indict modern macroeconomics for abandoning scientific standards.

The substance ranges across how charter cities—new settlements on blank land where a founding group's norms become the default—might let people exit dysfunctional norm equilibria. On cities themselves, Romer argues that rising floor-space costs lock poor workers out of the most opportunity-rich places, treating geography like a school one cannot attend, while data on mincer regressions show wages rise faster in larger cities and richer countries—evidence that migration compounds learning. On methodology, both speakers confront how economists have drifted toward unfalsifiable models, unexplained "shocks," and resistance to transparency, with particular weight on the need to expose which regressions were run and how many produced the reported result. The conversation is contentious on several points—housing expansion, the feasibility of norm change, comparative harm from financial versus nuclear accidents—but throughout privileges empirical detail over assertion.

Sharpest takeaway

Romer argues that economic growth comes from the unique non-rival nature of ideas (not objects), and that economics has gone astray by over-attending to what is measurable, neglecting norms and social belonging, and abandoning scientific standards of evidence and transparency in macroeconomics and institutions like the World Bank.

  • Ideas are non-rival, so more people is potentially good (positive-sum), unlike the zero-sum Malthusian world of scarce objects
  • Norms, not laws, are the foundation of functional societies, which motivates charter cities as a way to let people change norms
  • Modern macroeconomics and institutions have stopped letting evidence decide and resist transparency, harming the integrity of the discipline

The argument · threads8 threads · 39 claims
0.71

The World Bank violated transparency norms and data integrity; economists undervalue careful empirical work and embedded assumptions.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The World Bank's response to Romer's Chile concern—commissioning an audit that concluded he was wrong, issuing a press release, but refusing to release the underlying analysis—violates the most basic scientific norms of transparency for non-sensitive numbers, and is indicative of the questionable value of the Bank's research and intellectual culture.

    “They would not release the underlying analysis. And I just think that's, kind of the--that's indicative of all of the problems with the intellectual culture at the Bank.”

  • It is unrealistic and inaccurate to claim that data summaries are free of beliefs about policy or underlying causal mechanisms; we should be skeptical of anyone who says their analysis is theory-free and instead test empirically whether independent analysts following the same process would reach the same results, and investigate why they diverge.

    “it's unrealistic, or it's inaccurate to say that the summaries that most people provide of data are free of, you know, beliefs about policy, or free of beliefs about the underlying causal mechanisms.”

  • Romer became worried that ideological or political views may have distorted the World Bank's Doing Business Report rankings, exemplified by Chile's ranking falling every year the Center-Left held power and rising under the Center-Right, where holding the underlying measures constant made virtually all those changes disappear—indicating the changes were driven by repeatedly altering which indicators were used, not by real policy.

    “the Doing Business ranking just moved down, you know, every year, when the party of the Center Left was in control, and moved up when the party of the Center Right was in control.”

  • The World Bank is fundamentally a bank with about $200 billion in assets and matching liabilities that borrows at the sovereign rate, lends to countries at a higher rate, and earns about $2 billion a year net, which it spends almost entirely on staff salaries.

    “the Bank is a bank. It's got assets of about $200 billion. It's got liabilities of the same size... it borrows at a low rate; it lends the countries at a higher rate. And on that $200-billion portfolio, it makes a kind of a net of about $2 billion a year. And it spends that $2 billion a year on its staff.”

  • There is great value in sharply separating the entity that establishes the facts of what happened (like the NTSB after a crash) from the entity that proposes regulatory changes (like the FAA), and this separation—begun for finance via a Dodd-Frank data-gatherer—should be replicated across many parts of government because finding facts and setting rules are fundamentally different jobs.

    “it's the job of the NTSB... to establish what happened in each crash. It's the job of the FAA... to specify what regulatory changes might be required. I think that separation between finding a fact and then setting regulations is a really valuable one, and it's something we should replicate in many other contexts.”

  • Economics gives too many rewards to theorists and too few to the hard, careful work of collecting data and summarizing it in usable ways, even though that data is the actual basis for judgments about growth, GDP, and policy; Romer would tweak the profession to pay more attention to data analysis and the assumptions embedded in summarizing it.

    “I think we give too many rewards to people who do theory, like I do. And not enough to the data that is actually the basis for judgments about, you know, like, growth, and growth and GDP.”

  • When financial regulations are not set exactly right, deposit insurance can enable 'looting'—as Romer and George Akerlof argued about the Savings and Loan Crisis—because if people think they won't lose their money they become far less careful, illustrating that misaligned guarantees let many bad things happen.

    “I wrote this paper with George Akerlof about the big damage that could come from deposit insurance. We called it "Looting," and it was about the Savings and Loan Crisis.”

  • Every job is a match between a person and a position, so when Romer concluded his World Bank role was not a good match and he was wasting his time, the right move was to leave rather than dig in—consistent with his general pattern of taking high-value risks but abandoning them once they prove unlikely to succeed.

    “every job is a match. There's a job and there's a person. It wasn't clear to me that this was a good match, to have me go to the Bank.”

  • Quantified literally, the losses from the financial sector's accidents have done much more harm to the world than the accidents of nuclear power, raising the question of why we have such radically different presumptions about regulating the two industries.

    “I think if you quantify the losses from the financial sector and set them alongside the losses of nuclear power, the financial sector has done much more harm with its accidents than nuclear power has done.”

  • If weaknesses in empirical methods and non-reproducible results keep emerging, the entire integrity of social science could be called into question, so the profession should adopt practical transparency measures—tracking pre-testing and resetting significance standards in light of it.

    “it could become a vulnerability for all of social science if, you know, if we keep, if it keeps coming out that there are weaknesses in our empirical methods or, you know, things that aren't reproducible, then, like, the whole integrity of our, you know, our discipline gets called into question.”

0.70

Urban areas offer superior learning and opportunity, so housing supply must expand to prevent segregation of low-skill workers.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Historically the only way to grow urban floor space enough to keep up with demand is large expansion of built urban area—building taller in the center adds only some—as Paris and London each grew about 200-fold in built area over 200 years while remaining livable; the widely shared belief that cities shouldn't expand is what drives toward crisis, though if some cities refuse, others will expand.

    “the bulk of the additional floor space is going to come from expansions in built area. And Paris and London grew by a factor of about 200 in built area over about 200 years.”

  • With a minimum floor space per apartment, rising prices for floor space mean people at the bottom of the skill distribution simply cannot afford to live in high-income cities—the very places that, like developing-world urban areas, may offer the best chance to learn—so denying them entry is like denying them access to the best schools, since work is school.

    “If you have a minimum floor space in an apartment, and if the price of floor space goes up, people at the bottom end of the skill distribution simply will not be able to live in a city with very high income.”

  • Mincer regressions show wages grow about a percentage point per year faster in developing-world urban areas than rural areas, but wages grow another point per year faster in rich countries than developing countries (urban to urban), meaning the learning advantage of moving between countries can exceed that of moving from rural to urban within a developing country.

    “Wages grow faster by about a percent per year in an urban area in the developing world than in a rural area... wages grow about a percent per year faster in rich countries than in developing countries. Say, like, urban to urban, you get another point.”

  • If people spend a constant fraction of income on housing, demand for urban floor space grows at the rate of urban income growth (driven by per-capita growth plus in-migration), and there is no mechanism for supply to keep pace, so business-as-usual implies skyrocketing prices per square meter and, combined with minimum apartment sizes, increasing segregation of low-skill people out of the most opportunity-rich cities.

    “If you have a minimum floor space in an apartment, and if the price of floor space goes up, people at the bottom end of the skill distribution simply will not be able to live in a city with very high income.”

  • Holding individual effects constant, movers' wages grow faster in cities than in rural areas—and faster in bigger cities—suggesting cities offer greater potential for on-the-job learning; this implies better jobs (like better schools) are concentrated in cities, so the priority should be identifying and multiplying those better jobs rather than where they happen to locate.

    “There's a little bit of evidence that holding individual effects constant, people's wages grow faster in cities; even, the bigger the city is, the faster the growth. So that suggests something like a potential for learning that's greater in cities.”

0.64

Ideas are non-rival and discoverable by anyone, making human presence inherently valuable regardless of material endowment.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The traditional gains-from-trade story says it is good that Portugal exists because of differing endowments, but the deeper insight from ideas is that it is good that the Portuguese (the people) exist, because other people independently discovering things benefits everyone—a moral reframing that makes us see others as valuable beyond their land or resources.

    “And the usual story about gains from trade says it's good that Portugal exists. The new insight is that 'It's good that the Portuguese exist.'”

  • Because ideas can be used by everyone at once, having more people around—even strangers—is potentially good, since any of them might discover something valuable that all can use, so a smaller set of objects per person can still yield more value per person.

    “if there's more people--even more people that are remote from me: I don't know all of them, I don't like 'em--it may still be good to have them around because even though there's less total objects per person, they might discover something valuable”

  • The fundamental difference between objects and ideas is that objects are rival (only one person can use them, creating zero-sum conflict), while ideas are non-rival insights about rearranging objects that everyone can use simultaneously, which is why more people can be good even with fewer objects per person.

    “if there's more people--even more people that are remote from me: I don't know all of them, I don't like 'em--it may still be good to have them around because even though there's less total objects per person, they might discover something valuable”

0.61

Academic macroeconomics relies on unexplained shocks instead of evidence, abandoning scientific method and refusing legitimate critique.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Leading academic macroeconomists have departed from the practice of science—not merely getting wrong answers but abandoning the scientific method—by relying on unexplained 'productivity shocks' that function like phlogiston, letting theory rather than evidence decide what is true, and refusing to engage with well-intended critique; Romer calls this pseudoscience.

    “it was not just that they were coming to the wrong answers, but in a more fundamental sense, they were not following the practice of science. They had really departed from science. And I called it pseudoscience.”

  • Making a serious accusation like 'this is pseudoscience' is akin to pulling a fire alarm: if it turns out to be a false alarm, the accuser should pay a big reputational price, because you don't want such accusations to become an everyday occurrence—yet when the problem is genuine, other members of the profession have a responsibility to raise the alarm.

    “it's kind of like when somebody pulls the fire alarm. If you do it and it's a false alarm, a person ought to pay.”

0.53

Social norms are learned through interaction and can shift via migration between societies, preceding and enabling rule of law.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • A society can accumulate valuable shared values—such as courtesy, propriety, honesty, or a reputation for honesty—that make everyone better off especially in dense urban contexts, raising the practical question of whether values can actually be changed in a social context.

    “a society can develop certain values. Like, ones you were referring to before: like, courtesy, or propriety. Those might be very important values when you live in a dense, urban context. And, if we can accumulate more of those values, we might all be better off.”

  • Preferences are history-dependent: the history of our interactions shapes how we feel about something today, so that an initially aversive experience like coffee or beer can become enjoyable over time, and moralistic preferences (like the urge to scold jaywalkers) can shift once you assimilate to new social norms.

    “the history of our interactions can influence how we feel about something today. So, if I've, first time I taste beer, I might think beer tastes awful.”

  • Individuals trapped in a bad norm equilibrium (e.g., tax cheating in Greece) cannot change it alone, but competition between social groups—as when a person moves from Greece to Switzerland and soon adopts honest tax norms—shows that moving people between societies, not just reform within one, drives the dynamics of norms.

    “People can move from Greece to Switzerland. We know that when you take somebody who had like the Greek values that pay--it's a kind of a game to cheat... you move that person to Switzerland, and pretty soon they are going to think it's bad to cheat on your taxes.”

  • Imposing rule of law on a new place before establishing supporting norms is deeply flawed because laws inconsistent with a society's norms get ignored and the system collapses; instead one must first get the norms moving, then build laws on top, creating a positive feedback loop between norms and laws.

    “if those laws are not consistent with the norms in society... nobody follows the laws. The system just collapses.”

0.53

The World Bank abandoned value as a lender but could provide global public goods; charter cities could accommodate norm migration.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Because countries can now issue debt and borrow in private markets, the World Bank's $200 billion in loans generates far less value than 50-70 years ago, so the more valuable use of its $2 billion a year would be providing global public goods—especially ones valuable to the developing world—rather than spending it on staff salaries.

    “now, these days, countries could issue debt. They can borrow in private markets. The loans themselves are probably generating a lot less value than they did, uh, you know, 50, 70 years ago.”

  • Arguably the best thing the World Bank ever did was, through representative Edwin Lim, arrange macroeconomics lectures (e.g., James Tobin on aggregate demand and inflation) for high-level Chinese officials confined on a Yangtze boat, giving Deng Xiaoping's reformers the confidence to liberalize prices—a critical step toward China's market economy—illustrating the Bank's value as a trusted technocratic adviser rather than as a lender.

    “Edwin arranged some basic Macroeconomics 101. So, like, James Tobin gave some macro lectures along with some other macroeconomists on a boat trip on the Yangtze... And that gave them the confidence... to win the battle and start to liberalize prices.”

  • Developed countries like Britain, Germany, or Canada could voluntarily acquire land and set up a new jurisdiction that people could move into—replicating the Hong Kong experience without the historical coercion—as a humanitarian way to change norms and accommodate the hundreds of millions of people who say they want to leave their current society.

    “I just don't see any reason why Canada couldn't create, you know, a 20x20, you know, square mile zone some place in the world and say, 'Let's try and create a place people could move to, live in, work in,' and see how it goes.”

  • A charter city is a new city built on a blank sheet of paper—empty land—where a breakaway group with desired norms forms the majority, so that subsequent immigrants assimilate to those norms; Romer designed it as the smallest viable new social unit (a city of up to 10 million) to give people unhappy with their society's norms a way to change or choose them.

    “It was to basically create a sort of a blank sheet of paper on which one could build a new social group.”

0.31

Economists should expand welfare analysis to include social interaction as a consumption input in preference functions.

1 pointcentrality 3/5
  • Economics could be expanded by treating social interaction—the physical presence of and conversation with another person—as a consumption input in the utility function, an approach Romer calls 'extended preferences,' which would let economists keep welfare analysis while gaining insight into wellbeing.

    “one of the consumption inputs might be consuming the physical presence of another person, and consuming the interaction of the conversation with that person. So, we could include. as part of consumption in utility, social interaction.”

0.20

Charter cities fail in low-capacity states where domestic opposition to outside influence undermines implementation.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The internal-reform (Shenzhen/Deng Xiaoping) model of charter cities is unworkable for most of the developing world because low-development, low-government-capacity countries struggle to run a differently-governed zone, and domestic actors pushing the project oppose the outside influence needed to make it work, as Romer experienced in Honduras and Madagascar.

    “a country which is at a low level of development and with low government capacity is going to have real trouble trying to set up a zone that is run differently”

  • One should resist the 'I have a hammer, I want to find a nail' temptation; charter cities are not the right policy response to distressed places like West Virginia, even though such regions face real problems.

    “one temptation that I have to resist and I think everybody should resist is this 'I have a hammer, I want to go find a nail'-kind of phenomenon.”