
William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/2009
What this covers
Russ Roberts talks with William Cohan, author of House of Cards, about the last year of Bear Stearns. They begin with how Wall Street firms make money and fund themselves, then move to the summer of 2007, when two of the firm's hedge funds failed even though Bear's own stake in them was small. In July the management committee, with Jimmy Cayne dissenting, chose to become the overnight lender to those funds. Cohan compares that rescue to the Long-Term Capital Management episode of 1998, when Bear was the lone holdout.
The middle of the conversation covers how the trap was built. Cohan traces mortgage-backed securities to Lou Ranieri in the early 1980s and describes rivals copying the product. He notes that Goldman Sachs pulled back in December 2006 while others doubled down. He and Roberts discuss the absence of a depositor base, leverage of roughly 30 to 50 to one, and lenders shortening their loans to overnight in 2007. Cohan also says Bear's executive committee turned down outside capital, including an August 2007 KKR offer.
The last stretch is the most contested. Cohan says partnership-era banks risked partners' own wealth, while public firms shifted that risk to shareholders and creditors. He points out that Cayne's large paper losses overstate what he realized. Cohan says Bear's executives were not consciously betting on a bailout, while Roberts argues that expected rescue weakened their discipline. They also dispute whether executive stock ownership restrained risk or merely covered it. Cohan sets the episode against decades of boom-and-bust cycles and argues that taxpayers bore costs the bettors did not.
Cohan argues Bear Stearns died because its business depended on overnight repo funding backed by mortgage securities it manufactured, and because executive pay and bailout expectations let managers take risks with other people's money.
- Bear Stearns funded itself with overnight repo borrowing secured by mortgage-backed securities it could no longer sell
- Leverage rose after the 2004 SEC capital rule change, and executives were paid on return on equity, which discouraged holding capital
- Executives kept large cash compensation and had little personal exposure, while creditors and counterparties were bailed out
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Goldman Sachs pulled back from mortgage securities trading and from using them as collateral in December 2006, a decision that protected it, while the rest of Wall Street doubled down and looked better than Goldman for a while.
“in december of 2006 ... they made the decision to in effect pull back from the mortgage securities market and trading of mortgage securities”
Wall Street's mortgage-backed securities were a financial innovation dreamed up by Lou Ranieri at Salomon Brothers in the early 1980s, and once a profitable innovation appears, every firm rushes to copy it, which is why Bear Stearns, Lehman, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch all vertically integrated into mortgages.
“once somebody comes up with a good idea everybody rushes to copy it and reproduce it”
Bear Stearns's executive committee was paid on return on equity, so they minimized the capital base in the denominator to maximize the ratio, and so refused capital offered by outsiders during the last year of the firm's life, including a KKR offer in August 2007.
“the executive committee of Bear Stearns which was compensated on a return on equity calculation ... they constantly refused capital from everybody who was trying to throw it at them”
The market shortened the maturity of its lending to Bear Stearns in 2007: lenders stopped providing longer-term funding and only rolled overnight or very short loans, signaling that they expected the firm might not last three months.
“the market basically wouldn't provide them even longer term short-term financing ... we think you're gonna be here tomorrow but not three months from now”
Bear Stearns's hedge funds were treated as part of the firm even though legally they were a separate asset management arm, because clients expected the parent to step in and bail out investors, as Goldman Sachs had done with its Alpha funds.
“investors and clients expect because they're called you know they're associated with their stern to somehow Bear Stearns will step up and if things go wrong you know bail out the investors”
Bear Stearns's parent's decision to rescue its lenders resembled the 1998 Long-Term Capital Management episode, when the Fed organized a bailout of creditors, but this time Bear Stearns refused to join the rescue of others and chose instead to protect its own lenders, which was ironic because it had been the lone firm to stay out of the 1998 bailout.
“this is a replay of what had happened nine years before in 1998 when long-term capital management a similarly highly leveraged hedge fund ... except for one firm and that's Bear Stearns”
Bear Stearns, like a commercial bank, borrowed short to lend long, but unlike a commercial bank it had no depositor base, so it had to rely on wholesale short-term borrowing in the capital markets, which made it fragile when that funding dried up.
“Wall Street firms which don't have a depositor base ... are forced to borrow money in the capital markets in effect”
Wall Street is not monolithic; it is a set of individuals whose individual incentives produce a series of bad collective decisions, so the crisis is better explained by distributed incentives than by a single conspiracy.
“Wall Street is not monolithic it's a bunch of people making decisions based on incentives that they have individually and that can lead to a series of bad decisions”
Goldman was less reliant on overnight funding, which cost more in interest because longer-term financing is more expensive, but it avoided giving short-term lenders a daily vote on whether to keep doing business with it.
“they didn't want to give their short-term overnight lenders a vote every night about whether to keep doing business with them”
Bear Stearns' counterparties were interconnected through long-term trades on its books and through its hedge fund clients, so the people owing it money for unwound trades meant that one firm's failure would cascade through the system, which is why it was too big to fail.
“they have a number of counterparties they trade with in other words other Wall Street firms that they are enmeshed in long term trades”
Roberts argues that Bear Stearns's executives did not hold enough of their own capital at risk because they expected to be bailed out, so the incentive to manage risk was weaker than it should have been.
“I'm starting to come to the view that those incentives weren't there because they were counting on being bailed out”
Overnight lenders kept lending to Bear because they knew the government would likely step in to insulate creditors, and the result was that creditors and counterparties who financed the risky bets got most of their money back, which Cohan calls a bad incentive.
“the creditors and counterparties who would it financed all of those bad bats ended up getting most of their money back seems like a rather bad incentive”
Wall Street pay is mostly cash, so even executives who received half their compensation in company stock still made far more cash than most people earn in a lifetime, and the stock served as a cover for risk-taking rather than a real restraint.
“even if 50% of their compensation is in the stock of the company the other 50% is in cash and by the way that cash portion alone is you know many multiples”
Partnership-era investment banks put partners' own net worth at risk, which aligned incentives; when firms went public after 1970 and then in 1985 for Bear Stearns, that risk shifted to shareholders and creditors, so the partners' money became other people's money.
“what had been their own money what had been the individual partners money that was on the line and their entire net worth that was on the line ... became other people's money on the line”
Bear Stearns's leverage was roughly 30 to 50 to one, meaning about 2 to 3 dollars of equity supported every 100 dollars of assets, so a small drop in asset values could make the firm insolvent.
“Bear Stearns at the end is is typically leveraged in a in a month anywhere from thirty to fifty to one”
The overnight lenders ended up accepting mortgage-backed securities as collateral that Bear Stearns itself manufactured and was trying to sell, so the firm's funding loop collapsed once it could no longer sell those securities and had to hold them on its own balance sheet.
“by March of 2008 Bear Stearns could no longer sell those mortgage-backed securities that it was manufacturing and they ended up having to keep them in inventory”
Executive stock ownership served as a cover for risk-taking rather than a disciplining incentive, because the stock was held in a form that made the firm's risky strategy palatable to outsiders while insiders could sell and diversify.
“the stock is the cover for what they do rather than the stick or the or the carrot I agree with that”
Bear Stearns' executives did not think about being bailed out at all; the concept of a government rescue had not come up in their thinking, so the incentive problem for them was not a deliberate bet on a bailout.
“I don't think they thought about whether they would be bailed out or not bailed out if that whole concept hadn't even come up yet”
The costs of Wall Street's bets were borne by taxpayers, who did not share in the good times, while the people who made the bets and their funders kept the gains, which Cohan argues is damaging to democracy and capitalism.
“our money came into it as taxpayers not as investors we didn't share in the good times”
Boom-and-bust episodes in finance have recurred for decades: the 1987 crash, the junk-bond and leveraged buyout bubble, internet IPOs in the late 1990s, emerging-market telecom debt, and the East Asian and Mexican crises, all driven by the combination of financial innovation, compensation, and other people's money.
“the deadly combination of financial innovation on Wall Street and the compensation system on Wall Street and the fact that they're using other people's money ... has created this seemingly never-ending cycle of boom and bust”
In July 2007 Bear Stearns's management committee, with CEO Jimmy Cayne dissenting, chose to become the overnight repo lender to its own hedge funds, taking on their collateral of depreciated mortgage securities.
“the management committee of Bear Sterns although Jimmy Cayne dissented ... became the overnight lender to the hedge funds”
The obvious response to high leverage is to retrench by raising capital and reducing borrowing so a bad period is not fatal, yet neither Bear Stearns nor Lehman did this after Bear Stearns's collapse, even though their balance sheets were similar.
“the obvious thought to do to prevent death is to retrench it's to raise capital it's to lower the amount you have to borrow”
The first sign of Bear Stearns's trouble came in summer 2007 when two of its hedge funds failed, even though Bear Stearns's own investment in those funds was small, initially 20 million dollars and later raised to 45 million.
“Bear Stearns total commitment to these funds which were in the billions was actually only twenty million dollars later went up to a forty five million dollar stake”
Jimmy Cayne lost roughly a billion dollars on paper from the stock's high of about 172 dollars, but he eventually sold about 6 million shares for about 61 million dollars, so his realized losses were far smaller than the paper losses.
“he ends up selling his six plus million shares for 61 million bucks instead of the 1 point something billion it was worth 15 months before”
Rating agencies were overrated as a cause of the crisis, though there was a conflict of interest because the underwriters paid for the ratings, and the market knew about that conflict.
“the ratings agencies which I think are overrated as a cause of the crisis”
Bear Stearns's leverage surged after the SEC in June 2004 adopted new capital guidelines that let investment banks use much more leverage than the 10-to-12-times limit for commercial banks, a change Wall Street had lobbied for after the 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall.
“the leverage started getting it really out of control in June of 2004 when the SEC passed new guidelines on leverage for Wall Street which Wall Street had been lobbying for”
Bear Stearns made its hedge fund managers, Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, fund managers even though they had no hedge fund management experience, because the firm wanted to keep valued insiders and meet client demand for hedge funds.
“they made them hedge fund managers even though they had no hedge fund management experience like this guy Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannen”
Rating agencies gave triple-A ratings to the senior tranches of mortgage packages by assuming defaults would be confined to riskier slices, but the default rates rose faster than expected and the agencies were surprised; the tranching created a false sense of security.
“they rated them as triple-A because of the tranching system that is that they anticipated some defaults on the riskier parts of the package”
Bear Stearns was vertically integrated into subprime mortgages: it owned EMC, a mortgage lender making subprime loans, and an online lending operation called Bear Direct, so it originated, packaged, held, and sold the mortgage risk itself.
“they had a mortgage company that they owned called EMC which was making subprime loans directly”
Some mortgage-backed securities were built from second mortgages on homes owned by borrowers with weak credit, and the senior slices of these packages still received triple-A ratings.
“some of them would be made up of second mortgages ... and then that would all be packaged up and the senior-most part of that was rated triple-A”
Bear Stearns needed to borrow roughly 75 billion dollars a night in the short-term secured lending market, and when its own credit problems closed off unsecured commercial paper, it became dependent on overnight repo lenders such as Fidelity Investments.
“they needed to borrow approximately seventy five billion dollars a night from these people”
Shareholders and creditors of Bear Stearns were bailed out at 100 cents on the dollar, while Lehman creditors received about 10 cents, and Bear Stearns stock was sold to JPMorgan at about 10 dollars a share, so the outcomes for different stakeholders diverged sharply.
“the creditors of Bear Stearns got bailed out of a hundred cents on the dollar versus the Lehman creditors who got about 10%”
The SEC agreed to the 2004 leverage change as a quid pro quo for more monitoring of investment banks, but it did not begin monitoring Bear Stearns closely until August 2007, more than three years later, so the oversight bargain failed.
“the SEC was supposed to do a lot more monitoring of what went on at these firms unfortunately the SEC forgot to do that until it was too late”
Jimmy Cayne held a stake in Bear Stearns worth over a billion dollars at the stock's peak, yet he had taken several hundred million dollars in cash out over the years, so he was effectively playing with the house's money and his losses did not threaten his lifestyle.
“he had taken out you know and you know several hundred millions of dollars in cash that he is you know tucked away and knew that you know he was essentially playing with the houses money”
Bear Stearns reported its first quarterly loss in its 84-year history in the third quarter of 2007, after writing down mortgage-backed securities it had taken onto its balance sheet, which began the death spiral.
“in the fall the third quarter of 2007 they experienced the first loss in their 84 year history”
Starting in late 2006 and early 2007, the value of mortgage-backed securities fell because borrowers who were not in a position to afford their loans defaulted, driven partly by political mandates to expand homeownership in the 1990s and through both Bush terms.
“the people who borrowed you know money to buy these homes that they probably shouldn't have borrowed ended up not being able to pay the mortgages”
Bear Stearns executives did not appear to understand how vulnerable their business model had become, because they never seriously considered that overnight lenders could refuse to roll their loans, and their risk management skills did not anticipate the run.
“I don't think they understood how vulnerable they had made their firm ... let alone even conceived of the fact that the overnight lenders could say you know in March of 2008 no we're not going to do business with you anymore”
Wall Street is not monolithic; outcomes depend on individual firms' decisions driven by each firm's incentives, so comparing Goldman's choices at 85 Broad Street with other firms' choices explains why some survived.
“you have to keep reminding yourself that Wall Street is not monolithic it's a bunch of people making decisions based on incentives”
Allen Schwartz, Bear's final CEO, concluded that the only way out was to sell the firm, because its business plan depended too heavily on fixed income and the manufacture of debt securities, and the firm never sold.
“his conclusion was that we had no choice but to have sold in other words only way out of this was to have sold and they didn't do that”
Bear Stearns decided not to bail out its hedge fund investors, who lost about 1.6 billion dollars, but it did bail out the overnight repo lenders to the funds, which was a fatal mistake because the firm was itself dependent on overnight financing.
“they decided not to bail out the investors and the investors lost approximately 1.6 billion ... what they did do which was a fatal mistake was they bailed out the overnight repo lenders”
Jimmy Cayne argued that the hedge fund lenders were big boys who had taken their chances, and he voted against rescuing them, but the rest of the executive committee, about 20 people, overruled him and Bear Stearns became the overnight lender to the funds.
“the rest of the executive management team ... voted Jimmy came down and bear agreed to become this is how the parent company got involved”
Lazard Frères operated as a private partnership from 1848 until 2005 with advisory-only work because no capital was at risk, so the partners' reputation was the only thing on the line, and this kept the firm out of proprietary bets with other people's money.
“there was a reason that Lazard stayed solely in the business of providing M&A advice because no capital was required and the only thing at risk was basically your reputation”
The Titanic analogy captures the mistake behind the mortgage securities: the ship was supposed to be unsinkable because damage would be confined to one compartment, just as the packages assumed defaults would stay regional, when in fact a national housing downturn was possible.
“it was the ship that couldn't sink because if there was a leak the damage would be limited to just this one area”
Bear Stearns made a fatal mistake by treating the falling value of mortgage-backed securities as a buying opportunity, adding exposure instead of selling, and then continuing to use those assets as collateral for overnight financing.
“Bear Stearns use it as a buying opportunity and that was a fatal mistake”
Bear Stearns's parent kept lending to its hedge funds and maintained short-term borrowing for nine months after July 2007, effectively guaranteeing the funds' holdings with its own borrowed money, as borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.
“they are essentially guaranteeing implicitly the holdings of their hedge fund and compensating or repaying the lenders ... they're doing all that with their own borrowed money”
Bear Stearns' leaders had been on a path that they could not change because the fixed income business was so profitable and compensated them so well that they refused to alter their strategy, and by the time they recognized the problem, it was too late, like a company that had 'infected itself with cancer.'
“they didn't want to change their business plan they liked it because they're very welcome yeah a lot of money and by the time they realized that they had infected themselves with cancer”
Warren Spector, fired in August 2007, was worth roughly $300 to $400 million, and Allen Schwartz, Bear's last CEO, had a similar net worth, so the executives who ran the firm into collapse largely avoided financial ruin.
“Warren Spector fired in August of 2007 I was probably worth three or four hundred million dollars Allen Schwartz who is the CEO at the end probably something like the same zip code”
Bear Stearns was fine in its formal capital disclosures: by SEC guidelines its capital was described as large and healthy, though that claim was not true in substance.
“they said they did by the way you quoted in the book many times they'd claim their capital we're capitalizing large it's healthy wasn't true”
Most Bear Stearns executives who sold stock earlier and cashed out substantially had net worths that fell less than expected, so the executive team as a whole avoided the wipeout that equity losses would seem to imply.
“most of the other executives as Bear Stearns had been selling stock right along Jimmy Cayne you know had been selling stock too”
Jimmy Cayne's stock in Bear Stearns was worth more than a billion dollars at one point, and he took great pride in that, so his personal wealth was tied to the firm's business model that rewarded short-term revenue.
“at one point you know Jimmy Caine's stock in Bear Stearns was worth more than a billion dollars and he was the only Wall Street CEO who stock was worth more”
The SEC's first meaningful appearance at Bear Stearns came in August 2007, more than three years after the 2004 leverage change, and even then regulators seemed unconcerned.
“you have the first appearance of the SEC at Bear Stearns in August of 2007 more than three years later”
The 2008 Bear Stearns collapse, followed by the Lehman failure, showed that a firm grown large and entwined with other firms became too big to fail, a status no firm that had gone public at that size had faced before.
“then we lead to where we are now which is too big to fail but no firm that had gone public and it was this big”
Bear Stearns' hedge funds borrowed heavily from major Wall Street firms such as Goldman, JP Morgan, Lehman, and Credit Suisse, and the collateral those loans relied on fell from near full value to something like 50 or 30 cents on the dollar as default rates rose.
“instead of being a hundred cents on the dollar or even 98 or 97 it looks like it worked might be more like 50 cents or 30 cents”
Wall Street firms like Bear Stearns are opaque: their disclosure is minimal and outsiders often cannot figure out how they make money, unlike a company such as Procter and Gamble that sells soap and toothpaste.
“you can often never figure out how they make money which is strange”
Cohan's view is that the ratings agencies were overrated as a cause of the crisis; the bigger failure was the sense of false security that tranching and triple-A labels created for investors.
“the ratings agencies which I think are overrated as a cause of the crisis”
Bear Stearns' stock in the 2008 collapse, sold to JP Morgan and the Fed, was a repudiation of hubris in which Bear's executives had 'infected' the firm with the belief that they could manage risk, and by the time they recognized the cancer it was too late.
“by the time they realized that they had infected themselves with cancer you know it was it was too late to do anything about it”
Bear Stearns's stock was hit in March 2008 by hedge funds and big investors who bought put options betting on the stock's disappearance within a week, and they turned out to be right, raising questions of their own.
“hedge funds and other con you know big investors were making bets short-term bets that Bears stock you know buy buying puts”
Bear Stearns had never posted a losing quarter in 84 years, and the last major Wall Street firm failure before it was Drexel in 1991, so the market's willingness to think Bear might not survive three months was itself unprecedented.
“the firm has been around for 84 years and they've never had a losing quarter”
Bear Stearns was a 14,000-person firm and the fifth-largest securities firm on Wall Street, with asset management, a small brokerage, investment banking, and a large fixed income sales and trading business that generated most of the trouble.
“it all added up to a fourteen thousand person firm and the fifth largest securities firm on Wall Street”
Following the October 19, 1987 crash, when the market fell 22.6 percent in one day, the financial system has not changed the underlying incentive structures, so the same cycle continues even after a traumatic crisis.
“the market went down 22.6% and one day and grown men were crying in front of quote on machines”
Historically, the 2008 collapse matched a pattern of dangerous Wall Street episodes that followed the public listing of investment banks, in which other people's money let insiders take large risks that others bore.
“we're going back to that so quickly without any reform of this system”
Bear Stearns's collapse resembled a terminal illness: the firm had effectively been informed of its condition, continued for a time, and then failed, because the market began to shorten the maturity of its funding.
“it's not unlike you know sadly well you know if somebody gets a you know terminal illness and they're informed and you know they carry on for a period of time and then they don't”
Lehman's former executives and the Bear Stearns executives were both affected, but Bear's failed executives largely managed to land new jobs, while many still seemed depressed; Cohan says this is a question of individuals moving on rather than an accountability outcome.
“a lot of the people at Bear Stearns have managed to get you know new jobs not not nearly you know making as much”
Trivial closing remark: the interview was part of EconTalk and the guest thanked the host.
“this is econ talk part of the library of economics and liberty”