Capitalism, Government, and the Good Society
What this covers
On April 10, 2013, Richard Epstein, Michael Munger, and Robert Skidelsky presented competing visions of government's economic role at a Liberty Fund symposium, followed by moderated discussion with Russ Roberts. Epstein and Munger argued from a libertarian direction: the state should act as a referee, preventing aggression and rent seeking while resisting capture by interest groups. Skidelsky defended an interventionist case: markets inherently fail to ensure full employment and fair opportunity, requiring active state stabilization and redistribution. The symposium reframed the debate by comparing imperfect markets to imperfect government rather than against an imagined ideal, turning on the question of which real institution—not theoretical construct—better serves the good society.
The conversation ranged widely across how externalities should be classified and when government action is justified, whether macroeconomic knowledge is reliable enough to steer the economy (Roberts and Munger argue it is not), and how transaction costs shape which institutions ought to govern different domains. Epstein pressed the view that government-protected cartels pose the greatest threat to capitalism, citing the Sherman Act and historical examples of how regulation freezes markets. Skidelsky invoked Hayek's warning about the road to serfdom, but argued the danger depends on a society's moral traditions, not size of state alone. Munger introduced Three Spheres (State, Market, Society)) as a third category—voluntary, non-coercive relationships—that both state and market can undermine. Disagreements surface sharply on stimulus policy, labor market stickiness, moral hazard in banking, and whether supposed public goods can be provided through voluntary arrangements rather than state action.
Three thinkers debate the proper role of government in a capitalist economy, with the libertarian-leaning participants (Munger, Epstein) arguing the state should mainly serve as a referee that prevents aggression and monopoly while resisting capture by interests, and Skidelsky arguing markets inherently fail to ensure full employment and fair opportunity, requiring active state stabilization and redistribution.
- Comparing imperfect markets to imperfect government honestly ('don't award the prize to the unseen pig') reframes the debate away from market-vs-state binaries
- Macroeconomic policy knowledge is too imprecise to confidently steer the economy, so much of what economists do is post-hoc storytelling
- Monopoly creation through government-protected rent-seeking, not competition, is the central threat to a healthy capitalist system
Regulatory and tax uncertainty paralyzes both supply and demand sides, collapsing markets more than demand-side stimulus can cure.
- When private and public saving together cause a downturn, the Keynesian response of spending on the public side merely creates an offset to the problem (often spending badly and decreasing the long-term capital base), which is like subsidizing employers to cancel out a minimum wage; the better approach is not to have two mistakes cancel each other but to remove the first mistake—the uncertainty that makes both sides of the market reluctant to act.
“instead of fixing the problem they're trying to create an offset. So this is equivalent to saying, well the minimum wage drops employment so we have to subsidize employers... You don't want to have two mistakes cancel one another out, what you try to do is to get rid of the first mistake.”
- Regulatory and tax uncertainty acts as an implicit tax on both supply and demand, so the stimulus program will fail because it targets only the demand side, whereas the uncertainty theory is more accurate: when no important US tax rate has a known shape or duration beyond a year or two, businesses pull back on both sides of the market, collapsing all markets—so removing uncertainty and keeping government rules constant matters more than short-term stimulus.
“Uncertainty when it increases is like an implicit tax, and uncertainty is a tax on both supply and demand.”
- The enormous increase in unemployment in both Europe and the US has a known cause and cure: the level of direct regulation on voluntary exchange has increased exponentially—family leave laws, sick leave laws, minimum wage increases (up thirty-odd percent in 2005-2007), labor standards, anti-discrimination laws, union protections—so the unambiguous prescription is to remove all of that and free up labor markets, since macro-economists' unwillingness to address these micro-issues affecting 150 million people is a colossal mistake.
“This is a situation in which the level of direct regulation on voluntary exchange has increased exponentially since earlier times... The unambiguous prescription is not to try and guess the monetary aggregates... but to simply remove all of that stuff and get yourself back to a situation where labor markets are much freer.”
- Free markets equilibrate quickly while regulation freezes them: after the San Francisco earthquake markets returned to prior supply-demand equilibrium in about a year as high prices drew in capital, whereas New York City rent control, renewed every three years since 1969, has produced complete stasis and a two-tiered market for forty-four years—so deregulated markets would re-form within a week, not the five-to-ten years critics fear.
“With the markets the equilibration takes place more in one year than under regulation in a place like New York has taken place in forty four years.”
Government should address only genuine externalities—aggression, fraud, monopoly—while private incentives and markets handle the rest.
- The proper ordering of priorities is: first expand growth by controlling aggression and monopolies, then let private incentives and voluntary charity fill gaps, and only last deploy a modest government redistribution program—because the first two functions are positive-sum while redistribution is negative-sum, so the redistribution function should not be allowed to wag the dog.
“the redistribution function should not be allowed to wag the dog.”
- The great decline in US and European social policy stems from confusing three distinct kinds of externalities—physical (trespass/aggression), fraud, and competitive (a rival offering a better or cheaper product)—and treating disappointed competitors harmed by 'ruinous competition' as a justification for state intervention, when in fact competition necessarily produces higher social output than any alternative and protecting against it converts efficient competitive industries into monopolies.
“it has been exactly the confusion I just mentioned between physical externalities, fraud externalities, and competitive externalities whereby what we do is we say in effect that certain people suffer from ruinous competition, when somebody else comes up with a better mousetrap or a cheaper good to sell, and so therefore the state has to intervene”
- A social system, like a body, needs two types of property: 'long and skinny' communication networks (rivers, trails, roads, highways) that must be subject to rules of open access so individuals can communicate, and 'short, square and squat' productive centers (farms, factories, houses) that must be privately owned and defended to give incentives for front-end investment—so the optimal arrangement is a mix of collectively-operated communication networks and privately-controlled productive assets.
“it's only if these things are subject to various kinds of rules of open access can you have communication back and forth between individuals who occupy private parts of land.”
- Some complex networks (telephone, public utilities, railroads) cannot be served by competition because no one benefits unless everyone can cooperate, so monopoly is sometimes necessary; the correct mechanism is not price control but a non-discrimination rule allowing the monopolist fair and reasonable returns while preventing exploitation—and this same template (just compensation, non-discrimination) is how the state should operate when it exercises its own monopoly of force through taxation and condemnation.
“the mechanism that is introduced in order to control that, is in fact, a non-discrimination rule which says that people are entitled to fair and reasonable investment returns on a non-discriminative basis from their assets.”
Past government intervention in depressions and crises created durable institutional damage far exceeding any short-term stabilization benefit.
- Contrary to the narrative that the early Depression involved no government intervention, there was massive intervention: Hoover-era deflation destroyed long-term fixed-dollar contracts (forcing farmer foreclosures), tariff legislation sent the recovering 1930 market into another nosedive, and Roosevelt was 'the cartel king of western civilization,' setting up thousands of destructive cartels while a 62% tax rate killed private investment, leaving pump-priming as a second-best option.
“Roosevelt comes in, far from being noninterventionist, the man was the cartel king of the western civilization, hundreds upon thousands of these things were set up, one more destructive and insane than the other.”
- The financial crisis arose from a mixture of bad public incentives and bad private responses: government acting as lender of last resort guaranteed irresponsible bank behavior (banks looked to the guarantee rather than the security), while the Fed churned out money through low interest rates that could only be accessed by bidding up the price of the complementary asset, real estate—so large financial firms played with house money, winning kept gains and losses bailed out.
“you have the government, government is a [?] last resort. Which is guaranteed to create irresponsible private behavior by banks, who look to the guarantee rather than the security... Then on the other hand you have the guys running the Fed, churning out money like there's no tomorrow.”
- Efforts to control short-term economic disability tend to institutionalize long-term disasters, as illustrated by New Deal-era institutions—the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Civil Aeronautics Board—which were created alongside short-lived stimulus programs but lasted forty to sixty years.
“the effort to try and figure out how you control the short term disability, results in the institutionalization of long-term disasters... the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Civil Aeronautics Board, lasted for somewhere between forty and sixty years.”
- Government protection makes cartels more dangerous, not less, as in Parker v. Brown (1943) where the Supreme Court upheld a state-organized raisin cartel against the Sherman Act precisely because the state ratified it—but a good economist recognizes a state-run cartel is durable because it won't break down from cheating, unlike a private cartel.
“a good economist would say: "Oh my God, a state run cartel in fact is durable, it won't break down for cheating,"”
Markets equilibrate faster than regulation allows, and labor-market stickiness reflects efficient contracting, not irrational rigidity.
- Milton Friedman's great achievement was not merely defending markets but advocating a monetarism designed for stability—keeping the money supply roughly proportionate to the level of goods so interest rates remain relatively constant, allowing long-term contracts without the uncertainty of currency-risk fluctuation—because every private contract denominated in pounds or dollars has a state component in its operation.
“you tried to keep the money supply, difficult to find to be sure, roughly proportionate to the level of goods so that the interest rates remain relatively constant, so that long term contracts could take place without that incredible uncertainty that takes place with currency risk fluctuation.”
- The prescription for macroeconomic adjustment cannot be applied to microeconomic trade policy, because removing trade barriers and subsidies is unambiguously positive and does not cause mass unemployment—as Roger Douglas demonstrated in New Zealand by abolishing subsidies and tariffs one after another without slowing down, to prevent rent-seekers from organizing a counter-revolution.
“When you remove barriers to exports and imports, you don't have the 50% unemployment rate. These are unambiguously positive situations, so you can't take the prescription that you would apply to the macroeconomic stuff and apply it to the micro economic stuff”
- Labor markets are stickier than goods markets not out of irrationality but for good reason ('sticky smart, not sticky stupid'): long-term contracts that keep stable wages let up-and-down movements cancel out over time, so avoiding constant adjustment saves transaction costs without gain—while day spot markets for labor do fluctuate rapidly—undermining the Keynesian assumption that rigidity is uniform across sectors.
“Labor markets are always a little bit more sticky, but there's a reason for that. It's not that they're sticky stupid, they're sticky smart. If you have a long term contract, essentially to keep a stable raise, and you have movements up and down it, they cancel out over periods.”
Information gaps and complex networks do not justify broad state control; private intermediaries and careful non-discrimination rules suffice.
- The lawyer's role, following Coase, is to organize social and political systems so as to minimize the frictions and transaction costs that obstruct beneficial exchange—where transaction costs are to social interactions what frictions are to physical systems, never doing any good—so that creative productive activity can take place.
“figure out how it is that you've tried to organize a system so as to minimize frictions and transactions costs, where the transactions costs are to the social interactions what frictions are to the operations of physical systems. They never do you any good”
- It is a dangerous leap to conclude that because information gaps exist, only government can address them; private markets generate intermediaries—brokers paid by both sides of an exchange—who have enough information to organize both sides and spread risky financial instruments across many parties rather than concentrating them, and these institutions mostly succeed.
“it is a very dangerous leap to say that by virtue of the fact that there are gaps in the information markets that only government can stabilize them. One of the things that private markets do is they introduce all sorts of intermediates who have exactly that kind of role.”
- Most economists believe voluntary contracts result in mutual gains between the parties, so Marx was wrong that labor contracts were winning on one side and losing on the other; the real problem is only when external effects (as with monopoly) are negative and override those mutual gains.
“most of us believe that voluntary contracts result in mutual gains between the parties, and the problem is whether or not, as with monopoly, the external effects are negative and override those gains.”
- On inequality, increasing inequality from voluntary exchange where everyone improves is a Pareto improvement, but extreme distribution creates trouble; the right approach is to worry about growth first to lift the base (so the need at the bottom diminishes from life-or-death to color-vs-black-and-white TV), then encourage private civil-society institutions, then add a modest government program last—but the expansion of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and unemployment benefits suggests such programs cannot be confined to modest levels.
“First, worry about growth so that you can move the base up, at which point the need for support at the bottom diminishes because it's not a question of life or death anymore, it's a question of a black and white TV as against a color TV.”
- Lawyers are remarkably uncreative—they never invent new industries or organize collective action—but serve as the keel of the boat rather than the sail that propels it, ensuring enthusiasms do not exceed capacity, which is a necessary complement to the creative forces that drive an economy forward.
“Lawyers are remarkably uncreative people... we are essentially the keel on the boat, we are not the sail that propels it forward. But a boat needs a keel as well as a sail because what it has to do is to find a way to make sure that your enthusiasms do not exceed your capacity.”