What this covers

Larry White, a monetary economist at George Mason University, joins Russ Roberts to discuss Friedrich Hayek's contributions to business cycle theory and monetary policy. The conversation traces Hayek's explanation of how artificially suppressed interest rates channel investment toward long-term, capital-intensive projects that later collapse when credit tightens—a mechanism White uses to frame both Hayek's insights and his blind spots. The discussion moves from the intellectual contest between Hayek and Keynes during the Depression through to modern policy questions, grounding abstract theory in historical events and institutional details.

The podcast covers several distinct domains. It examines what White sees as Hayek's crucial error: failing to stabilize nominal GDP during downturns, instead accepting a painful deflation he later regretted. White then pivots to his own research on free banking systems—particularly Scotland's century-long experience without central authority—arguing that banking instability stems from regulation rather than inherent market failure. This leads to concrete mechanisms: extended shareholder liability, notice-of-withdrawal clauses, and reserve ratios emerging through competition rather than decree. The conversation also engages the Great Depression's persistence, adding regime uncertainty and money-supply collapse to Hayek's theory alone, and touches on alternative currencies and payments innovation as potential restraints on central bank monopoly. It concludes with "Fear the Boom and Bust," an economics rap summarizing the Hayek-Keynes divide.

Sharpest takeaway

White argues that Hayek's Austrian business cycle theory correctly explains why credit-fueled booms create unsustainable malinvestment, but that Hayek failed to prescribe stabilizing nominal spending during busts, and that a competitive private 'free banking' system would deliver more stable money than central banking.

  • Artificially low interest rates distort the structure of production toward interest-sensitive, long-gestation projects that later prove unsustainable
  • Hayek should have advocated stabilizing the money stream (nominal GDP) during the Depression rather than letting the secondary deflation proceed
  • Historical free banking systems (Scotland, Canada) were more stable than the regulation-distorted US system, suggesting banking instability is regulatory, not inherent

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0.81

Federal Deposit Insurance was opposed by FDR (citing what we'd now call moral hazard—guaranteed deposits would encourage reckless banking) and by large banks, and had previously failed at the state level where insurance funds went broke encouraging bad banking; it passed by the thinnest margins, pushed by small banks who wanted to appear as solid as big banks to stop depositors fleeing to sounder institutions—another triumph of the small-bank lobby.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“the surprising thing is how long it took to get Federal Deposit Insurance and at the time it passed it passed by the thinnest of legislative margins and FDR was actually again... everybody had seen deposit insurance at the state level where it almost inevitably went broke... FDR... wrote... is an absurd idea because of moral hazard... the proponents of deposit insurance at the time were small banks that said people think were weak of course we are but if we can look just as solid as the big banks people will stop withdrawing their money”

0.79

In Prices and Production Hayek actually prescribed that the central bank should stabilize the 'money stream' (in modern terms nominal GDP, or M times V), offsetting a shrinking money supply or rising hoarding—the same advice as Milton Friedman—but Hayek did not follow his own prescription during the Depression, instead harboring a 'fond wish' that a little deflation would break wage/price rigidity, an error he later apologized for and called a pipe dream.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“he says the central bank... should try to stabilize the money stream he called it in out of modern terms we would say a nominal GDP or in terms of the equation of exchange M times V... that of course is also milton friedman's advice but Hayek didn't make that advice based on his own norm... he later apologized for it and said well I had this fond wish that a little bit of deflation would help break the rigidity of prices and wages... I should have realized even then that was a pipe dream”

0.79

Extended/unlimited liability for bank shareholders (as in the Scottish free banking era) protected depositors: when a bank's assets declined, shareholders received letters requiring them to chip in more capital to make good on debts, so badly-managed banks failed without depositors losing money—it was the shareholders who bore the loss.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“extended liability for bank shareholders so in the Scottish free banking era Bank shareholders had unlimited liability meaning if the bank assets declined in value... then a letter would go out to the shareholders saying you have to chip in another 50 pounds to make good on the debts of the bank and so banks did fail because they were badly managed but the depositors didn't end up losing any money it was the shareholders”

0.79

Historical research indicates people did not run on banks out of fear of other people running, but typically ran only when a bank was already insolvent, so runs served a healthy purpose of closing failing banks before they lost even more money, and provided a useful incentive for depositors to monitor their own banks rather than relying on others.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“historical research on bank runs indicates that the reason people run is not fear of other people running people typically ran when the bank was already insolvent and so it actually served a healthy purpose of closing the bank before it lost even more money... it provides a useful incentive mechanism for making sure that you monitor your bank”

0.79

Banks can contractually anticipate runs through a 'notice of withdrawal' clause (used by US trust companies and savings banks before FDIC) requiring 60-90 days notice; depositors accept it because they would want the clause invoked on others rather than be last in line, and the delay lets a prudently managed bank sell liquid assets to meet redemptions without dumping unsaleable assets at fire-sale losses.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“there is a way for banks to anticipate and build in a contractual circuit breaker into their deposit contracts it's known as a notice of withdrawal clause... in the event we need to we can tell you that you need to give us 60 or 90 days notice before you withdraw your money... it's in your interest to have that clause in all the deposit accounts if it really is a problem and the 90 days gives the bank time provided it's prudently managed to sell off some of its more liquid assets... so it avoids the problem that's commonly known as fire-sale losses”

0.78

The investment projects most sensitive to interest rates are those with long time horizons between investment and reward, because discounted cash flow analysis means future cash flows are heavily affected by the discount rate; therefore cheap credit makes long-term, roundabout production projects particularly attractive and they take off disproportionately in a low-rate environment.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Larry White

“Hayek emphasized the investment projects that are the most interest sensitive are the ones that are really going to take off in the low interest environment and those are the investments that are really interest sensitive or the ones that involve a lot of time between investment being made and the rewards being reaped so a basic principle of finance is that you discount your cash flows back to the president”

0.77

Just as private firms (FedEx, UPS, and especially email) eroded the relevance of the US postal monopoly without abolishing it, innovation in payments mechanisms—chip cards, internet transfers, easier access to offshore accounts, alternative currencies, and precious metals—could at the margin give people better forms of money and restrain central banks by threatening their market share, as Randy Kroszner argued the late-80s/90s inflation decline reflected.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“just as the monopoly of the postal system... has become less relevant as private firms have been allowed to enter the market... email the dominant destroyer of the monopoly I'm hoping that at the margin innovation in payments mechanisms will give people access easier and easier access to better forms of money and that that will help restrain central bank's... former Fed governor Randy Kroszner wrote a piece about how the decline in inflation during the late 80s and 90s was due to there being more competition on central banks”

0.75

A large spread between short-term and long-term interest rates tempts investors to borrow short and roll over the debt rather than locking in long-term funding, and this maturity mismatch is when people 'get caught out'—and the government is doing the same thing by borrowing short.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“there's a big spread right now between short-term interest rates and long-term interest rates and in that kind of environment although you would avoid getting caught out if you locked in all your money long term... it's very tempting to borrow short because it's so much cheaper and then roll over the debt and that's when people get caught out”

0.75

Hayek and Schumpeter's macroeconomic business cycle theories fell out of favor while their microeconomic work remained respected, largely because Keynes came along; Hayek had a good explanation for the downturn but no good explanation for why the economy kept deteriorating and stayed down so long after 1931.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“Keynes came along... both of them hi could Schumpeter are remembered fondly... their work on microeconomics ironically is still I think very well respected it's their macro stuff that got put on the Shelf... Hayek had I think arguably a good explanation for the downturn he didn't have such a good explanation for why the economy continued to deteriorate after thirty-one”

0.73

Genuine entrepreneurial innovation (e.g., the early auto industry or the internet boom) draws resources toward new projects just like a credit-induced boom, but it is healthy when the rising interest rate acts as a 'brake' rationing resources to what savers voluntarily provide; the danger arises only in Hayek's second scenario where the central bank refuses to let rates rise and pumps in credit, encouraging too many such projects.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“Hayek referred to this as the interest rate break preventing the economy from over committing to these projects... we do want resources to go into these higher payoff projects but to bid them away from the current uses the entrepreneurs need to pay a little more... that's healthy that brings about economic growth... The problem comes in what I was referring to earlier as the second scenario if we don't let the interest rate rise”

0.73

The length and depth of the Great Depression is not explained by Hayek's theory alone; it requires adding Bob Higgs's regime uncertainty and Milton Friedman's money-supply collapse, plus the actual interventions of the National Industrial Recovery Act and Agricultural Adjustment Act, which organized industry and agriculture to restrict output to raise prices—a non-sequitur because cartelizing one industry yields monopoly profit but cannot work for all industries simultaneously, since universal output restriction shrinks total output and reduces hiring.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“I don't think Hayek story explains the length and depth of the Great Depression for that I think we need to add in these stories like Higgs is about regime uncertainty Milton Friedman's about the money supply actually collapsing... they actually organized industry and agriculture to restrict output in a name of raising prices... you can make one industry more profitable by carta lysing it and restricting its output... but you can't do that for everybody because it only works by restricting output if everybody's restricting output then total output is shrimping”

0.73

In a free banking system, redemption is not mandated by law but emerges through competition as part of the bank-customer contract; banks empirically determine the reserve ratio needed to meet clearing-house redemption demands, historically holding 30-40% reserves when gold shipments were slow but as low as 2% as transportation and asset management improved, supplemented by liquid assets like commercial paper and government bonds that can be sold quickly to replenish reserves.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“it would be part of the contract that banks have with their customers... there isn't any sort of a priori answer to that question the bank has to figure out what reserves it needs to hold... banks in the early days when reserves were hard to replenish... would hold 30 40 % reserves as transportation improved... bank reserves some gold and silver reserves sometimes went down to 2%... they had very liquid assets that they could sell in order to get more reserves”

0.73

Hayek's explanation for the onset of the Great Depression was that the Federal Reserve and Bank of England injected credit during the 1920s in an environment of rising productivity to keep the price level from falling; inspired by stabilizationist ideas, this credit injection distorted the interest rate and caused the eventual downturn—so a flat price level was not a reliable indicator of health, and one had to look at relative prices and the structure of production.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England had injected credit during the 20s and built up a credit bubble basically... in order to keep the price level from falling... that injection of credit distorts the interest rate and that causes the problem... he said that's not the indicator you want to look at you want to look at relative prices you want to look at... the structure of production”

0.73

Bank runs and financial panics are actually rare worldwide and not an inevitable consequence of fractional-reserve competitive banking; they were far more common in the US than in Canada (which had no panics) and more common in England than in Scotland, indicating instability has to do with how banks are regulated rather than with banking itself.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“if you look around the world if you don't just look at the u.s. you find that bank runs and financial panics are actually pretty rare so they don't seem to be an inevitable consequence of having a fractional reserve competitive banking system they're much more common in the US than in Canada where there are no financial panics they're much more common in England than than in Scotland”

0.73

Doing nothing—putting stable policies in place to let people plan for the future—is best described as an argument for the rule of law, but it is risky politically (and even for economists) because the natural next demand is to 'do something,' which is only justified if it actually makes things better.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“we need to put stable policies in place to allow people to start planning for the future again... which is an argument for doing nothing which is risky politically... I call it an argument for the rule of law... we have to do something only if it makes it better would seem to be to be a the next part of that sentence”

0.73

The Fed was created to solve the panic problem, but an alternative—deregulating to allow nationwide branching like Canada's—was blocked by the powerful small banking lobby, which feared being out-competed by better-run branching banks; banks did not gain the right to branch across state lines in the US until 1995.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“betfred was created to solve these panic problems but there was another way to do it... deregulate... that kind of reform was blocked by the small banking lobby basically they said hey Canada has nationwide branching of banks if we allow that my neighborhood is going to be invaded by banks that are better run than mine I can't allow that... it wasn't until 1995 that banks got the right to branch across state lines in the US”

0.73

An over-investment/malinvestment boom typically piggybacks on a genuine investment boom and is allowed to go too far because the central bank is too accommodating.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“very often and maybe even typically an over-investment boom a malinvestment boom kind of piggybacks on a genuine investment boom it's just allowed to go too far because the central bank is too accommodating”

0.73

The Hayekian cycle does not require everyone to misjudge the future path of interest rates—it only requires that too many people guess wrong; malinvestments piggyback on sustainable investments precisely because people are convinced 'this time is different' (a new era), an idea central banks like Greenspan sometimes actively encouraged.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“it doesn't require that everybody guesses wrong it just requires that too many people guess wrong about the future path of interest rates in order to get enough malinvestment to cause a problem... people are convinced that this is a new era... Greenspan talked about there being a new economy”

0.73

Hayek opposed stabilizing consumer prices throughout his career because in an environment of rising productivity it requires injecting credit to keep prices from falling, distorting the interest rate; instead he proposed (in The Constitution of Liberty) stabilizing an index of wholesale/input prices so that output prices could fall relative to input prices without triggering credit injections.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“in the constitution of Liberty he later said well maybe a shorthand way of doing that would be to try to stabilize an index of wholesale prices he still didn't want to stabilize consumer prices because of the problem he pointed to in the 20s... if there's a growth in productivity with stable input prices output prices can fall relative to input prices without triggering injections of credit”

0.73

Keynes succeeded over Hayek because, as Milton Friedman noted, Hayek's view was seen as gloomy—that you just have to let the economy purge malinvestments painfully—while Keynes offered a message of hope that active intervention could end the depression; this same hopeful appeal explains why the 2009 stimulus message kept selling despite the economy not improving.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“Hayek's picture of events was regarded as being very gloomy... you just have to let the economy purge the problems out of the system in most painful way possible and so when Keynes came along it was regarded as a message of hope... that hopeful message just keeps selling”

0.73

Stabilizing nominal GDP cannot eliminate real recessions because genuine malinvestments must be written down and real income must fall as resources are temporarily unemployed until they find sustainable uses; but it can prevent the recession from being more punishing than necessary by avoiding making debts hard to repay due to shrinking nominal income.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“you can't eliminate recessions that way because there were real malinvestments when those are written down real income has to decline as resources are unemployed temporarily until they find more sustainable uses... but you don't want it to be more punishing than necessary by making it say hard for people to repay their debts because nominal income is shrinking”

0.73

US banking instability in the late 19th century stemmed from peculiar regulations: branching restrictions across and within state lines left banks undercapitalized and underdiversified, and the National Banking Acts' ceiling on banknote issuance created an 'inelastic currency.' When fall farm-labor payments required currency that banks couldn't supply as new notes, depositors drained reserves instead, country banks pulled reserves from cities and cities from New York, producing panics—events absent in countries without such legal restrictions.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“US banks were not allowed to branch out never across state lines and very often not even within states that meant the banks were undercapitalized under diversified and secondly there were restrictions on banks ability to meet shifts in the public's desire to hold currency... the in elasticity of the currency... the banks would say we're not allowed to issue any more banknotes... turns into a reserve drain the country banks then start pulling reserves out of the cities... and now we've got a panic”

0.73

Under the gold standard there was no tendency toward a rising price level; in an economy with growing output, output often grows faster than the slow-growing stock of gold, producing periods of mild benign deflation, so any positive inflation was cause for concern.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“under the institution of the gold standard... there's no tendency toward a rising price level in fact in an economy with growing output you often have periods of mild deflation that is output grows a little faster than the stock of gold which tends to grow pretty slowly so anything above zero in the price level is cause for concern”

0.71

Once policymakers have dug a deep hole, there is no magic bullet to climb out; the single most important thing government can do is create confidence about the future, but confidence is the one thing economists, psychologists, and policymakers understand very little about—and issuing a new plan every week undermines the ability to plan, as does tax-environment uncertainty.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“the single obvious thing the government needs to do is to create more confidence about the future and that's the one thing that economists psychologists and policymakers know very little about and so we got a new plan every week... which makes it tends to undermine... the ability to plan in the future... creating uncertainty in the tax environment doesn't help that just makes the problem worse”

0.70

White's first-best proposal is a free banking system based on a gold or silver standard with no central bank, in which competing private banks issue currency and discipline each other: any bank that over-issues finds its money returning for redemption and loses reserves to other banks through the clearing house, making the underlying-money constraint immediately binding.

normativehigh valuefringenovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“I've written about the monetary systems based on a gold or silver standard in which banks compete to issue currency traditionally been known as a free banking system... the private institutions discipline each other any one bank that issues more money than its customers want to hold we'll find the money returning to it for redemption and it'll be losing reserves to the other banks”

0.70

Texas unit-banking laws caused two-thirds of its banks to fail when oil prices fell, because the banks were undiversified—almost all their loans were to oil-related industry or real estate—demonstrating how prohibitions on branching create fragility.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Larry White

“Texas of course had nothing but you banks and two-thirds of the banks failed when the price of oil went down because they were not diversified outside Texas all their loans were... to oil related industry or real estate”

0.69

Velocity is reasonably stable—making Friedman's fixed money-growth rule workable—as long as the government doesn't 'monkey around' with the money supply; once the government creates the malinvestment problems discussed, velocity swings (driven by psychology about the future) make the system wildly unstable, which is the kernel of truth in Keynes's point even if it is not the start of the problem.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“velocities stable as long as the government doesn't mess around with them so if M is going at 3% then V will be responding to whatever psychology there is in human beings... but once the government starts monkeying around with m and leading to some of the problems we talked about then sure there's gonna be some V swings that make the whole enterprise wildly unstable and that part I think Keynes was quote right about”

0.69

Contracts specifying payment in alternative units (ounces of gold, foreign currencies, or CPI-indexed amounts) are legally permissible and, per an AER article by Humik Ulick, now enforceable; additionally the rules against US commercial banks issuing currency have reportedly been quietly repealed, though no bank wants to risk competing with the Fed to test it.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Larry White

“we can do that so you'd think you'd see something... if the dollar got out of hand... the courts would enforce those contracts... there was an article in the a eer by humic ulick in which he said these kind of contracts are now enforceable... I'm also told that quietly the rules against commercial banks in the US issuing currency have been repealed... now I suppose no bank wants to stick its neck out and see what the Fed would actually do if it started competing with the Fed”

0.69

Current tax and regulatory rules disadvantage alternative money: capital gains tax applies to gold's rise in dollar price even when no real profit was made (i.e., the dollar merely fell), and money-transfer services—especially informal ones—face heavy post-9/11 restrictions, even though the 9/11 hijackers funded themselves through Western Union rather than unlicensed services; these options should be kept open so people can protect their wealth if the dollar gets out of hand.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Larry White

“currently there are tax disadvantages to putting your money in precious metals you have to pay capital gains taxes if your gold holds its value while the dollar drops... you get taxed on that even if you haven't made any real profit we've had a big increase in restrictions on money transfer services since 9/11... even though we now know that the 9/11 hijackers got their money through Western Union not through some sort of unlicensed money transfer service”

0.68

Artificially low interest rates drive the market rate below the natural/equilibrium rate, creating a disequilibrium between savers' and investors' plans: investors try to invest more resources than are actually available while consumers don't want to delay consumption enough to free them up.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“it drives the market interest rate below the equilibrium or natural rate and creates a disequilibrium between the plans of savers in the plans of investors investors are trying to invest more resources that are really available in the economy consumers don't want to delay that much consumption”

0.68

Hayek identified two scenarios for the business cycle: one where the central bank independently cheapens credit and drives interest rates down igniting an investment boom, and a subtler one where investors become optimistic about new technology and demand more credit, and the central bank accommodates by injecting credit to keep the interest rate from rising rather than letting demand bid it up.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“he had two scenarios one was that the central bank just independently decided to cheapen credit expand the supply of loanable funds... the second scenario is a little more subtle investors become more optimistic they have some new technology that they want to invest in they come to the banks and want to borrow more money and instead of the banking system letting this increase demand for credit drive the interest rate up the central bank then becomes involved by injecting enough credit to keep the interest rate from rising”

0.68

Fixing the Fed by 'getting the right person' for the job neglects that incentives change behavior—as appears to have happened with Ben Bernanke, whose views shifted from his academic period to his time as a central banker.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“one way to quote fix the Fed... is to get the quote right person in the job... which often neglects the incentives that that person faces when they're in the job which certainly case of Ben Bernanke changed from appear to have changed since when he was an academic to when it was a central banker”

0.68

Fiscal policy (manipulating government spending and taxes) has enjoyed a comeback despite evidence it is typically too little too late or largely offset by changes in private-sector spending; the comeback rests on the view that the Fed is 'out of bullets' with rates at zero, but this is wrong because monetary policy still governs the economy's behavior.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the idea that fiscal policy that playing around with government spending and taxes has a big effect has kind of enjoyed a comeback I thought it was dead... the evidence showed that it was too little too late typically or it doesn't really have any effect even no matter when it comes it's mostly offset by changes in private sector spending... the reason it's made a comeback is the view that well the Fed is out of bullets... but I think that's wrong... monetary policy really still is the thing that's ruling the behavior of the economy”

0.68

Because resources (workers, machinery, raw materials) are finite, cheap credit draws them away from sustainable short-payoff projects into time-consuming roundabout projects, making the economy top-heavy; as resources are continually expended to keep long projects going, they bid up the prices of labor and inputs, raising other businesses' costs until it becomes clear there aren't enough genuine savings to complete all projects, forcing some to be abandoned and causing unemployment in those industries.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“they get drawn away from sustainable appropriate investment projects into these more time-consuming more elaborate investment projects that aren't appropriate for the actual state of demand... as resources are expended to keep these investment projects going they start to bid up the price of labor they start to Brit up the price of raw materials... at some point it becomes clear that there aren't enough genuine savings to bring all these projects to fruition and some of them are going to have to be terminated”

0.68

Using the equation of exchange (MV = PT), a collapse in velocity—people hoarding money because they're anxious—is a real problem during a downturn, but it is hard to measure precisely, so offsetting it with the money supply (M) is inherently difficult to do in a timely manner and the right size; this is why Friedman argued central banks should simply target a slow steady monetary growth rate (~3%) rather than try to fine-tune.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if V is tumbling if the velocity of money's... recording money or holding on not spending at the rate that they used to because they're anxious... that's hard to measure the central bank doesn't... it has no real handle on that... that was why Milton Friedman said central banks have done a bad job of it and shouldn't even try should just target the monetary aggregate... a slow steady rate of three percent”

0.66

Russ Roberts prefers that government borrow only short-term because it then has an incentive not to promote inflation, since short-dated debt must be rolled over at higher interest rates if inflation rises.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“actually I like the government to only borrow short because then they have an incentive not to promote inflation well that's interesting because they have announced their debt and higher interest rates if they start setting rates up”

0.65

The 'time to build' modeling approach of Kydland and Prescott helps resolve an empirical puzzle for the Austrian theory—why elevated investment persists even after a policy change becomes evident—because projects require continual investment to reach fruition rather than a single up-front outlay; Mike Montgomery has applied this technique to show the Austrian story fits better and addresses the objection that investment doesn't look as interest-sensitive as the theory requires.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Larry White

“the time to build model was supposed to explain why it isn't just an initial burst in new investment which quickly decays... An economist named Mike Montgomery at the University of Maine has actually written a couple of papers trying to apply this modeling technique of Kidlington prescott to show that there's more mileage in the Austrian approach... he shows that if you take account of the time to build propagation mechanism that it fits the story better”

0.65

In the 1970s Hayek turned to institutional reform, proposing in 'Choice in Currency' (1976) that people be free to use whatever currency from anywhere in the world they find most stable to damper any one central bank's inflationary proclivities, and then in 'The Denationalization of Money' arguing that private firms could issue fiat-type money and would be more reliable than central banks because it is easier to hold private firms to their promises than central banks.

normativehigh valuefringenovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“he famously published a pamphlet in 1976 called choice and currency where he said well to protect themselves against inflation people ought to at least be free to use whatever currency from anywhere in the world they find more stable... published a monograph called the d nationalization of money... Hayek wants to argue that they would be more reliable than central banks have been it's easier to hold private firms to their promises than it is to hold central banks to their promises”

0.63

The 2002-2004 housing boom and bust fits the Hayekian pattern: John Taylor's account holds that artificially low interest rates of that period encouraged excessive borrowing and housing construction, and when Greenspan quickly raised rates around 2004-2005 those projects became unprofitable and many were abandoned.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Larry White

“this is John Taylor's story... the artificially low interest rates of the 2002 to 2004 period encourage lots of borrowing and lots of housing construction when interest rates were quickly raised by Greenspan... those suddenly became less profitable and many of them of course as you say we're abandoned”

0.61

There is a tension in Hayek's Denationalization of Money: he suggests private money issuers would most appeal to the public by promising stable consumer prices, which contradicts his lifelong argument that stabilizing the consumer price index caused the 1920s bubble and 1929 crash—a tension White finds hard to resolve, though Hayek footnotes that he no longer regards it as a problem of much practical relevance.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“Hayek seems to switch toward favoring stability in the consumer price index which is contrary to what he had believed his entire career... in D nationalization of money he says well I imagine that these private money issuers would most appeal to the public if they promised stable prices... he has a little footnote in which he says yes yes I'm I'm among those who pointed out that this could be a problem but I no longer think it's a problem of much practical relevance so I have trouble making sense of that statement”

0.49

The competitive, innovative Scottish banking system (which Adam Smith praised over the Bank of England monopoly) was the training ground for 19th-century bankers, who spread Scottish banking ideas worldwide because they had the most modern banking methods.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Larry White

“Adam Smith wrote about how great the Scottish banking system was didn't see any problem that justified having a government monopoly bank like the Bank of England... because it was a competitive and innovative Scottish banking system was sort of the training ground for bankers in the 19th century and Scottish bankers went throughout the world setting up banks because they had the most modern ideas on banking”

0.48

Inflation reached 13.3% in the US in 1979 and was in the 20s in Great Britain in the 1970s, making that the worst inflationary episode in living memory for people under 50, whereas Hayek's generation had witnessed hyperinflation (notably in 1920s Germany) with horrific political consequences contributing to the rise of Hitler.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the worst inflationary episode in our lifetime was the 70s when inflation reached what 12 ish 13.3% in 1979... for somebody like Hayek and others who lived through the 20s and 30s they had seen hyperinflation... in particularly in Germany and in the aftermath of war one which led to horrific political consequences partly leading to the rise of Hitler”

0.44

It will be problematic, maybe impossible, for the Fed to simultaneously keep prices stable and employment growing.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“we had Michael Boulanger on here recently talking about how... that is sort of inherently gonna be it's gonna be problematic for the Fed to both keep prices stable and employment growing it's a difficult maybe impossible task”

0.29

There is currently no time in recent American history when people have been more hostile toward the whole concept of a central bank.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Russ Roberts

“we're in January of 2010 I don't think there's ever been a time in American recent American history where people were more hostile toward the whole concept of a central bank”

0.24

Free banking is politically a non-starter and unlikely soon because it is a strong form of placing a binding pre-commitment rule on the Fed, and there is little willingness to do even that, let alone eliminate the central bank entirely.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Larry White

“the reason I said earlier that I don't expect free banking anytime soon is that it's kind of a strong version of placing a binding rule on the Fed a pre commitment to a particular path of policy and I haven't seen much willingness to do that so the strong form of it which is eliminate the central bank is even less likely”

0.12

The central bank exists and the market exists.

factual· Unknown Speaker

“the central bank assuming we have one”