What this covers

Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama trace the emergence of religious freedom through European history, arguing that it arose not from Enlightenment arguments about tolerance but from a structural shift in how states governed. As state capacity grew, rulers encountered increasing religious and ethnic heterogeneity—especially through territorial conquest and economic expansion—that made enforcement of conformity prohibitively costly. They contend that the transition from identity rules to general rules, treating all subjects equally before law rather than assigning legal categories based on group membership, became the foundation of liberal states capable of sustaining genuine pluralism. The conversation draws on historical cases from medieval Poland to Tokugawa Japan, alongside demographic and climatic analysis, to show why persecution intensified precisely when states grew strong enough to impose themselves on religious life but had not yet committed to universal legal principles.

The discussion moves across several distinct terrains. Early medieval Europe, they argue contrary to received opinion, saw relatively little persecution; the rise of what they call the "persecuting state" occurred later, as rulers expanded territory and tax systems. They examine how Jewish communities operated under identity rules—holding monopoly rights to moneylending but facing extraction through taxation—a system that generated both fiscal benefit and cultural stigma that fed anti-Semitism. The Black Death surfaces as a natural experiment revealing which cities recovered based on geography versus agglomeration effects, and volcanic eruptions like Tambora appear as coordinating shocks for political upheaval. Crucially, they distinguish between weak states (like Poland, which produced no liberal outcome) and genuinely liberal ones, and argue that intellectual advocates for toleration—from Castellio through Locke—had little direct influence compared to the political incentives facing rulers. Radical claims emerge: that Elizabeth I was a tolerant thinker running a police state, that Britain's tolerance applied only within the kingdom while slavery thrived abroad, and that the truly seismic economic shift came not in the Renaissance but after the seventeenth century.

Sharpest takeaway

Johnson and Koyama argue that religious freedom emerged not from intellectual arguments for tolerance but from a political-economic transition from 'identity rules' to 'general rules,' driven by states confronting heterogeneity and the rising cost of enforcing conformity as state capacity grew.

  • Persecution rose with state expansion because growing states ran into religious heterogeneity that old identity-rule arrangements could not accommodate
  • Weak states avoid persecution but rarely produce durable liberal tolerance; liberal states committed to general rules do
  • Intellectual arguments for toleration mattered little; outcomes were mediated through incentives of political actors

The argument · threads9 threads · 37 claims
0.69

Persecution peaks when state expansion encounters religious heterogeneity, not from unchanging intolerance.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Anti-Semitism and religious persecution intensified from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance not because earlier eras were uniquely peaceful, but because rising state capacity led states to expand territory and impose themselves on more aspects of life, generating tensions described as 'the rise of the persecuting state.'

    “there is more tension that’s emerging in Europe, in part because of states growing more powerful, rising state capacity. States are expanding their territory... this is sometimes called the rise of the persecuting state.”

  • The largest amounts of persecution occurred when economic dynamism plus state expansion (e.g., the French conquering southern territory) brought rulers into contact with more religious and identity heterogeneity than before, as illustrated by the Albigensian Crusades against the Cathars.

    “there is more tension that’s emerging in Europe, in part because of states growing more powerful, rising state capacity. States are expanding their territory... this is sometimes called the rise of the persecuting state.”

  • Europe passed through three phases: an initial identity-rules equilibrium where groups like Jews were placed in legal/social categories and served fiscal purposes with relatively little persecution; a phase of state expansion where market-based arrangements (tax farming, subcontracting moneylending to Jews) broke down and persecution peaked; and eventually a shift toward general rules underpinning liberal states.

    “you have an initial phase where individuals are being categorized according to identity rules. They’re being placed into legal categories and social categories... based on things like their religious identity.”

  • It is a myth that a tremendous amount of religious persecution went on during the early-to-late Middle Ages up until roughly 1200-1300.

    “One myth that a lot of people believe is that there was a tremendous amount of religious persecution that was going on during, say, the early Middle Ages to the late Middle Ages”

  • Schindler's List, while a technically amazing piece of cinema, is not a perfect or definitive Holocaust film because it tells a happy story about survivors of an event from which the vast majority did not survive, and Spielberg's sentimentality undermines it.

    “it’s a happy story about survivors, about an event from which the vast majority of people did not survive. So it cannot be “the” Holocaust movie”

0.69

Jews thrived or endured based on fiscal utility and bargaining power, not liberal values or tolerance.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Poland's apparent tolerance stemmed not from liberal values but from very weak central state authority and the second serfdom following the Black Death, where nobles doubled down on controlling peasants and used Jews' skills in bookkeeping and labor monitoring as 'court Jews'; Jews remained in an identity equilibrium that insulated them from persecution until the 19th and 20th centuries, when conditions turned much worse.

    “Poland never really goes through these transformations of developing state capacity. And Jews remain in this identity equilibrium in Poland, which insulates them from the persecution that we observe at the time... But of course, you don’t get the emergence of a true form of tolerance. And this comes back doubly bad, much, much worse in the 19th and into the 20th century.”

  • Expelling or killing Jews was puzzling and 'off the equilibrium path' because rulers did not need to do so to extract resources—the optimal arrangement for both ruler and community was for Jews to remain and be taxed—which is why expelled communities were often invited back within years.

    “you don’t need to actually kill all the Jews or expel them in order to extract resources from them. In fact, in some way, this is off the equilibrium path.”

  • The expulsion of Jews from England around 1290 likely functioned as a credible way for the king to give something to discontented nobles—handing over revenue streams and debts owed to Jews—amid the conflicts of the 13th century such as the Barons' Wars, representing a top-down scapegoating mechanism.

    “one reasonable explanation that’s almost certainly playing a part in the eventual expulsion of Jews in 1290 is that this is a credible way for the king to give something to the nobles”

  • Towns granted Jews monopoly rights to lend money, but the monopoly profits were extracted via taxation by Christian authorities; this pernicious equilibrium produced a cultural byproduct in which Jews were perceived as usurious 'Shylocks,' generating anti-Semitism that in turn made them easier to tax.

    “This is actually a rather pernicious equilibrium because you also get a cultural byproduct, which is that Jews are perceived as Shylocks lending at excessive interest rates. And this generates anti-Semitism, which in turn makes it easier for them to be taxed”

  • Jews settled favorably in England under Cromwell because the moment was politically opportune: the Puritan independents identified with Zion and Israel, the petitioning Sephardic Jews from Amsterdam brought capital and were allied against Spain, and the community was small enough that—absent virulent anti-Semitism—there was little reason for hostility until the late 18th century.

    “the Jews who petitioned Cromwell to settle in England — Sephardic Jews from Amsterdam — they have capital. They have money. They’re allied in a war against Spain... So it’s a very politically opportune moment for them to come, and they secure good terms.”

0.63

Weak fragmented states lack both persecution capacity and liberal commitment; liberalism requires strong states ideologically devoted to pluralism.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A weak central state with federalism and fragmentation (as in Poland, where powerful nobles could protect sympathetic Protestants) is a reliable predictor of the absence of persecution, but it is NOT a strong predictor of producing a liberal state or enduring religious freedom later; durable religious pluralism instead arises after a tipping point where conformity becomes too costly to restore, launching a 150-200 year process of building a pluralist society.

    “a weak state, federalism, fragmentation, is a reliable predictor of an absence of persecution. But what you see subsequently going forward is, that’s not a strong predictor of getting a liberal state later, or enduring religious freedom.”

  • The worst atrocities against Jews in World War II occurred in regions where states were weakened; following Timothy Snyder and Hannah Arendt, it is stateless people who are at greatest risk, while strong states in place tend to reduce persecution, implying strong liberal states are protective rather than threatening for minorities.

    “the worst atrocities that occurred against Jews — they happened in the regions that had states that were weakened at the time, during World War II. This is point made by Timothy Snyder... It’s stateless people that are at the greatest risk.”

  • The relevant variable for tolerance is not raw state strength but commitment to liberal values: a state with sufficient coercive power relative to a minority (like Tokugawa Japan, which sealed off the country to suppress Christianity despite controlling only part of its territory) can thoroughly persecute, while very weak states (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) get captured by nobles and privatized, producing feudal arrangements hostile to both markets and freedom—so liberalism requires a state strong enough but committed to liberal values.

    “the “strong state” is not my favorite terminology... very weak states, like, say, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, are too easily captured by a few nobles or vested interests. So the state, in some sense, becomes privatized”

0.57

Geographic and geopolitical factors—productive cores, nomadic threats, isolation—shape state capacity and reunification differently across regions.

11 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The French Revolution's auctioning of confiscated Church land acted as a natural experiment lowering transaction costs: feudal property had overlapping rights requiring negotiation with many parties, but auctioning put land into the hands of those who valued it most, who then consolidated holdings and invested in irrigation and crop rotation, raising agricultural productivity through the end of the 19th century—a real-world demonstration of the Coase theorem.

    “the productivity of agriculture in places that had more Church land that was auctioned off was higher than places that didn’t have this happen — up until the end of the 19th century... it’s a story about what economists are familiar with, the Coase theorem.”

  • Chinese political unity is likely to hold in the near term despite genuine regional separatist sentiment (Shanghai, Guangdong, Hong Kong feel dominated by northerners, with the most pro-CCP nationalism concentrated in the north), because China has only fragmented every few hundred years and the most recent fragmentation was relatively recent; fragmentation becomes imaginable only in the wake of a catastrophic collapse, and the regime's 'one China' ideology makes disunity unthinkable.

    “China has fragmented every couple of hundred years in its history. The most recent one, though, was still not that long ago, so I don’t see it happening anytime soon. But in the wake of a disaster or some catastrophic collapse, you can imagine it happening.”

  • A possibly underrated factor in the British Industrial Revolution is that it occurred in the periphery (Manchester, Yorkshire, Birmingham, Derbyshire) rather than the political center, with industrialists self-funding developments out of savings rather than relying on London's sophisticated banking sector, suggesting something about English society enabled entrepreneurs to kick-start the revolution far from London despite it being neglected and slow to start.

    “it doesn’t occur in a political center. It occurs in the periphery, in Manchester, Yorkshire, Birmingham, Derbyshire... London has a sophisticated banking sector, but the London bankers are not financing the Industrial Revolution. They’re being financed out of savings.”

  • Switzerland's exceptional wealth lacks a clear explanation; an old speculative theory tied it to specie flows from mercenaries paid in gold seeding banking institutions, but the Swiss were poor until the chemical revolution, and despite four language groups with measurably different welfare preferences they sustain a strong national identity—possibly related to small size—though the cause is genuinely unknown.

    “I think there’s something in there that has to do with size, that it can work in a place the size of Switzerland. They definitely have a national identity, which is very strong... otherwise, I actually don’t know the answer.”

  • England's strong early nation-state may partly be read backward through survivorship bias: because England ended up a strong nation-state, we look back and see antecedents in Anglo-Saxon and medieval history, whereas had Catalonia become a powerful state we would find comparable early evidence there—though Anglo-Saxon England (the Wessex-derived state with the Domesday Book) does appear genuinely bureaucratically capable for its age.

    “had Catalonia become a powerful state, we could find evidence of that in the early Middle Ages. So there’s an element of survivorship bias.”

  • China's persistent reunification—not just its early unity—is best explained not only by core grain-producing regions (Yellow and Yangtze deltas) but by the periodic threat from nomadic steppe peoples: China's sharp geographic slope from productive farmland to horse-suitable steppe made it easily invadable from the north, producing a centralized, militarized northern state, whereas Europe lacked this centrifugal/centripetal force and could not reunify along Roman lines.

    “the periodic threat from a nomadic steppe is another key factor. This is geographic because China has a very sharp slope from really productive agricultural land to land which is only fit for horses... it’s these periodic steppe invasions which we argue are responsible for the centralization, an almost militarized character of the Chinese state”

  • China and Japan responded differently to the West largely because of scale and state agility: vast China, with a state evolved to dominate the steppe and lacking a navy, struggled to redeploy resources against simultaneous British coastal and Russian land threats, while small, geographically vulnerable, ethnically cohesive Japan faced an existential crisis that—after 15 years of chaos and Dutch-learning observation of China's Opium War defeat—it could resolve by overthrowing the shogunate and building a modern state, though much of the divergence remains a mystery attributable to luck or statesmanship.

    “Agility is kind of a term — we sometimes think about it with respect to states as well as individuals, that premodern states are not agile. They can’t redeploy resources, reprioritize. So the Chinese state really struggles to do this.”

  • Home-field advantage in English football has declined because televising every game and detailed statistics (e.g., kilometers run per player) reduced the shirking problem in team sports: previously, fans only knowing the score from newspapers couldn't observe individual performances, allowing players to underinvest, whereas now better information on each player's performance makes shirking harder, diminishing the home crowd's monitoring edge (alongside the persistent factor of referee influence).

    “with the internet, we have — every player’s performance can be rated... how many kilometers each player is running. Then it’s much harder for any individual player to shirk. And the idea was that the home fan base... they get much better information on each individual player’s performance.”

  • The Western pattern of less cousin marriage—part of a package the Catholic Church promoted in the early/high Middle Ages—is associated with undermining kinship groups and thus a more free, democratic, liberal society; the comparison is most persuasive between the Middle East/Islamic societies and Europe but less clearly explains Europe's rise versus China or Japan.

    “Prohibiting cousin marriage — this is something the Catholic Church was doing in the high Middle Ages or early Middle Ages... seems to be associated with undermining kinship groups.”

  • Amateur astronomy is underrated because, beyond initial scientific curiosity, it cultivates an appreciation for the scales of the universe and a sense of proportion, though it is a dying hobby dominated by older males and hampered by light pollution.

    “it really does give you an appreciation for the scales involved with the universe, and it gives you a sense of proportion.”

  • Northern England's steep decline is concentrated in one-industry mining towns like Doncaster and Barnsley that fell into disrepair, while large cities like Manchester and Liverpool with cultural amenities have partly revived; the comparison with Germany is unsurprising because German manufacturing survived far more than British manufacturing, and the most salient comparison may be with American coal towns in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, which also did very badly.

    “It’s places like Doncaster and Barnsley, which were often mining towns or one-industry towns, which have really fallen into disrepair. Germany, I’m not surprised, because German manufacturing has survived to a much larger extent than British manufacturing.”

0.52

Major demographic and climatic shocks reshape labor bargaining power and coordinate political upheaval.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The Black Death, killing roughly 40 percent of Europe's population, was a pure demographic shock that raised the relative bargaining power of workers/peasants versus nobles and shifted economic gravity toward northern trading cities, constituting the main institutional change of the era.

    “This is going to change the bargaining power, the relative bargaining power of workers compared to nobles... One of the biggest changes that’s going to happen is you’re going to see the emergence of more trading cities in the north relative to the south.”

  • The Black Death serves as a natural experiment testing increasing-returns theories of urban agglomeration: by removing ~40 percent of a city's population, it allowed people to reshuffle toward locations favored by geography (e.g., northern Hanseatic trading cities recovered faster than Mediterranean Roman-road cities), revealing whether cities exist because of increasing returns or because of underlying geographic advantages.

    “the Hanseatic cities, which are the trading network that exists on the Baltic in the north of Europe — those cities recovered much more quickly than cities in the south, cities tied to the old Roman road network”

  • Large volcanic eruptions caused crop failures that coordinated political discontent: the 1257 Samalas eruption piled agricultural pressure onto already-discontented English nobles before the Second Barons' War, and earlier eruptions linked to Indonesian volcanism coincided with Nile flooding failures and the end of the pharaonic empire, showing climate acting as an agency in coordinating simultaneous revolt.

    “now they’re all becoming upset at the same time because you have crops failing, the king is still asking for revenues, and they all are feeling the pressure at the same time. And you end up getting a coordinated political action against the rulers.”

  • Large climatic and epidemiological shocks tend to be worse where places are networked together, because while integrated markets smooth idiosyncratic local shocks via trade (so grain prices barely move), a massive correlated shock like the 1815 Tambora eruption overwhelms market institutions because trade cannot smooth a shock hitting everywhere at once.

    “when you have idiosyncratic shocks, climate shocks hitting places across Europe, you tend to have trade smoothing those over... But when you have something like Tambora, which is a VEI 7... the markets can’t handle it.”

0.49

Religious identity became salient through printing and the Reformation, not pre-existing as a driver of persecution.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Contrary to the view that the Renaissance marked dramatic economic change, it is questionable whether it was qualitatively different from what preceded it, since merchant ventures remained controlled by charter companies and royal agents; the truly seismic change in the scale of economic activity was the post-17th-century Industrial Revolution, not the Renaissance.

    “I don’t see it as a decisive break in the same way I see, say, post-17th-century Industrial Revolution period. I see that as a seismic change on the scale of economic activity. The Renaissance is... not clear to me that it’s qualitatively different from what went before.”

  • Rising religious intolerance in the Renaissance is better explained by non-economic factors like the printing press and the Reformation, which 'Christianized' Europe by making religious identity salient—before the Reformation people had local saints and a vague background Christianity, whereas afterward 'I'm Catholic, you're Protestant' became a foregrounded identity, partly driven by print technology.

    “The Reformation Christianized Europe. Prior to the Reformation, people had their local saints... Whereas, with the Reformation it’s like, “I’m Catholic. You’re Protestant.” This becomes more salient. And that’s partly due to technology, the printing press.”

  • Radical intellectual arguments for religious toleration (Castellio, the Anabaptists, even Locke and Bayle) show little evidence of direct influence on outcomes; greater religious freedom did not flow from rulers' personal beliefs (e.g., the tolerant-minded Elizabeth I ran a police state killing ~300 Catholics), but from political-economy incentives—ideas were always mediated through the incentives of actors holding political power.

    “I don’t think the intellectual debates are the forefront of what’s going on. The political economy seems much more important... they’re always being mediated through the incentives of the actors who have political power.”

0.36

Developing nations cannot leapfrog institutional development; liberal tolerance requires time and practical learning unavoidable through observation.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Developing countries are unlikely to adopt liberal values of toleration merely by observing them elsewhere; they must go through a similar process of building state capacity and encountering the practical reasons intolerance fails, and Western pressure to leapfrog these phases (demanding women's rights and broad tolerance alongside capitalism instantly) is unrealistic and destabilizing—as shown by England retaining Test Acts excluding Catholics until 1828, long after the 1688 Glorious Revolution.

    “I don’t see any reason why a developing country, say in Africa, is going to decide to adopt liberal values about toleration just because they observe them in another place. I think they have to go through a somewhat similar process of building up state capacity”

  • The European and American transitions to liberal institutions were aided by high underlying homogeneity; the US founders were a narrow group of white, Christian, mostly Protestant men drawn from four English groups, and even then ratification of the Constitution barely succeeded—suggesting modern observers underappreciate how much homogeneity and time these political arrangements required.

    “the amount of homogeneity that was present in a lot of these European states when they went through these transitions was very high... these were all white men who were Christian... they were Protestant for the most part. So this is an extremely homogenous group. And then they barely got it”

  • The book's marginal contribution is that general rules—treating people equally before the law, the rule of law—are the sine qua non of a liberal state allowing individuals to flourish, that religion was at the heart of the historical shift from identity rules to general rules, and that one must distinguish mere de facto absence of persecution from a liberal state genuinely committed to pluralism, free thought, and a multiplicity of religions.

    “treating people equally before the law, is like the sine qua of a state which allows individuals to flourish. And I call states like that liberal states. What we add to that is... religion is at the heart of this rise of liberal states, and it’s at the heart of a rise of the shift from identity rules to general rules.”

0.19

Britain's tolerance toward some groups coexisted with brutality toward others because rules differed sharply inside the kingdom versus outside it.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Britain's apparent inconsistency on tolerance—relatively welcoming to Sephardic Jews under Cromwell while brutally repressing the Catholic Irish and colonial subjects—is resolved by recognizing that rules within Britain differed sharply from rules outside it: slavery, for example, was not practiced within the kingdom but was central to the empire abroad, so the 'schizophrenia' is between inside and outside, not within Britain itself.

    “rules in Britain are very different than rules outside Britain. For example, slavery — you couldn’t have slavery in England... the schizophrenia is not within Britain. It’s between what’s inside and what’s outside.”

  • The multicultural transformation of south England over recent decades is irreversible and not stage one of a Brexit-style reversal, because there are simply too many EU and other migrants who have built their lives in the UK for them to return to their countries, so society will not revert to the more homogeneous and 'boring' 1950s.

    “I don’t see how it’s reversible... there are just too many of them. There’s no way these people are returning to their countries. They’ve made their lives in the UK.”

0.16

Misguided moral intuitions about usury and interest, rooted in Aristotelian thought, enabled rent-seeking rather than ethical reasoning.

1 pointcentrality 2/5
  • Anti-usury laws originate in a widely held but mistaken moral intuition—going back to Aristotle's view that interest was theft—that misunderstands why interest exists, namely differing preferences for intertemporal smoothing; in European history the medieval bans reflected not adverse-selection or moral-hazard justifications but rent-seeking by merchants who could evade the laws and by rulers who licensed groups like Jews to lend and collected monopoly rents.

    “it doesn’t seem to explain why Europe, for example, banned all interest rates throughout most of the Middle Ages. That seems to be a combination of rent-seeking by merchants who could evade these laws, by rulers who might license some groups — often Jews — to lend at interest, and thereby collect monopoly rents”