secondary qualities
In the Newtonian tradition, qualities like color, smell, sound, which are treated as subjective properties of the perceiving mind rather than actual properties of physical objects
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 63 Whitehead's "Science and Modern World"
Where it comes up · 8
- A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism5 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas4 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 30 Thomas Hobbes2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 50 Scottish Realism1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 41 John Locke1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 15 Epicurean Philosophy1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 63 Whitehead's "Science and Modern World"1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 17Search all claims for “secondary qualities” →
- Epicurus explains sense perception through the emission of transparent films from physical bodies that pass through the sense organs (particularly the eyes), become perceived within the mind, shrink but retain shape, and produce perception of shape without color or secondary qualities—showing that secondary qualities are products of the mind's interaction with matter, not properties of external objects.A History of Philosophy | 15 Epicurean Philosophy
- The distinction between subjective secondary qualities and objective primary qualities makes it possible for later empiricists like Berkeley to ask whether a tree falling in the forest when no one is present produces any noise, because if noise is a secondary quality (subjective), then without consciousness to register the sound waves, there is no noise.A History of Philosophy | 30 Thomas Hobbes
- Berkeley's philosophical position becomes substantially more plausible once his three basic positions are understood: nominalism (matter is an abstract idea with no reference), mentalism (all we know are minds and their ideas of primary and secondary qualities), and the claim that God's orderly provision of ideas explains the uniformity of nature.A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections
- All empirical knowledge of material objects derives from ideas of primary and secondary qualities; we never have primary quality ideas independently of secondary qualities or vice versa; both primary and secondary qualities are relative to observation conditions; therefore both kinds of qualities are subjective features of our ideas, with no evidence for unchanging or objective qualities existing in a material substrate.A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections
- When describing a colored object (e.g., 'my blue shirt'), the shirt is not actually blue; rather, the shirt's primary qualities cause the observer to see blue—the shirt causes blue appearance in consciousness, not the shirt possessing the quality of blueness.A History of Philosophy | 30 Thomas Hobbes
- In the Newtonian tradition, secondary qualities (color, smell, sound) are understood as subjective qualities of mind rather than properties of nature; therefore, nature itself is devoid of aesthetic value and natural beauty is an illusion created by human minds projecting their subjective qualities onto inert matter.A History of Philosophy | 63 Whitehead's "Science and Modern World"
- Secondary qualities are qualities that exist only in consciousness as products of the action of material bodies on our sense organs, having no objective counterpart in the material world itself—for example, a rose is not actually red, does not actually smell rosy, and is not actually soft, but produces these sensations in our experience through the properties of the matter that composes it.A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas
- Substance is a complex idea inferred from the presence of particular qualities—we infer that there must be something that 'has' those qualities, but this substance is 'something I know not what,' an utterly unknown substratum underlying the qualities we perceive, whether material substance or mental substance (mind/spirit/soul).A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas
- Reid argues that ideas themselves do not possess secondary qualities; roses smell and light dazzles, but ideas do not smell or dazzle. Therefore, perception should be understood as presentational rather than representational—objects are directly presented to consciousness, not represented through ideas.A History of Philosophy | 50 Scottish Realism
- The Newtonian scientific worldview strips the world of secondary qualities—color, sound, smell—creating a world of purely primary qualities (shape, size, density, motion) that is fundamentally alien to human sensory experience, which prompted Romantic poets like Tennyson to lament this loss of a world alive with sensory richness.A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas