What this covers

This lecture, from a Wheaton College history of philosophy course, takes up the Scottish realists, with Thomas Reid at the center. It is set against the background of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and David Hume. The instructor defines realism as two claims: material objects exist independently of minds, and we truly know them as they are. Reid is shown treating the theory of ideas as a philosophers' fiction. He says ideas do not smell or dazzle, so perception is presentational rather than representational. Ideas appear instead as signs) that prompt spontaneous belief, and they become objects of knowledge only in memory, reflection and imagination.

The lecture then moves through the places where Reid's epistemology reaches elsewhere. Natural beliefs are presented as universal and rooted in human proclivities, and the lecture separates psychological from logical necessity. It compares Reid with Hume, who also affirms natural belief but without Reid's theistic justification. The instructor also argues that Hume's bundle theory of the self sits uneasily with his appeal to natural proclivities. Reid's dismissal of Cartesian doubt is pointed: he likens doubting one's own existence to believing oneself made of glass. The Presbyterian setting is tied to a parallel in Calvin's Institutes.

The later sections are more contentious. In ethics, Reid resembles Hume in holding that moral approval joins reason and feeling, but he insists that ethics has first principles, such as preferring a greater good to a lesser one, and he blames the theory of ideas for Hume's ethical subjectivism. On freedom, he defends agency causation against determinism and answers the principle of sufficient reason by saying agency is itself a sufficient reason. The lecture ends by following the legacy forward. It says Kant answers Reid's account of knowing causes. Twentieth-century realists, including G.E. Moore, keep natural-belief epistemology without its theology, and the instructor notes stimulus-response features in Reid that resemble behaviorism.

Sharpest takeaway

Scottish realists, particularly Thomas Reid, opposed the representational theory of ideas and argued for direct realism—the view that we have immediate, unmediated awareness of physical objects and their properties grounded in natural beliefs arising from human constitution rather than rational demonstration.

  • Ideas are not intermediaries between mind and object but rather signs or dispositions for belief; direct awareness is fundamental to perception
  • Natural beliefs (not ideas) form the foundation of knowledge—these arise spontaneously from human nature and God's design rather than from reasoning
  • Reid's realism grounds knowledge in both the independent existence of material objects and our true knowledge of that independent reality, opposing both phenomenalism and idealism

The claims · ranked33 claims · weighted by value

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0.75

The representational theory of ideas—the view that the immediate object of mental awareness is the ideas in our minds rather than external objects—is a fiction created by philosophers, particularly those in the Cartesian and Lockean tradition, and departs from common sense.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“that theory says Reid is a fiction created by philosophers”

0.75

Reid dismisses Descartes' methodical doubt (meditation one) as unfit for philosophical reasoning, comparing Descartes' doubting his own existence to a person claiming to be made of glass, suggesting both indicate psychological dysfunction where natural proclivities are misfiring.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“listen to to what Reed says about your friend Descartes a man like Descartes who doubts his own existence remember meditation one is surely as unfit to be reasoned with as a man who believes that he's made of glass there may be disorders in the human frame that produce such extravagances but they'll never be cured by reasoning”

0.75

Reid's ethical view interestingly resembles Hume's in some ways: both hold that feeling/emotion and rational judgment are inseparable in moral approval; neither can replace the other, and neither is reducible to the other—moral approval involves both reason and feeling.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“his his own view sounds remarkably like Hume in some ways he says that ceiling okay that's the emotive feeling and judgment that's the rational are inseparable in giving moral approval making moral judgments both reason and feeling no that's what Hume said one cannot replace the other one is not reducible to the other”

0.74

Reid distinguishes between agency causation (the causal power of a human agent to initiate events) and physical causation, making agency causation a distinctive kind of causal power that 20th century discussion adopted as a key distinction.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“there is a causal power involved in human action which is distinctive he calls it the he calls it human agency human agency as a result of which in the 20th century discussion we distinguish between agency causation and simply physical causation agency causation involving the human agent”

0.74

This epistemology of causation—where we directly know causal connection through experience—is crucial because it will be a key point that Immanuel Kant responds to, making the question of how we know about cause and effect relations beyond present experience a fundamental issue in Kant's philosophy.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“keep it in mind because this is a point that Immanuel Kant is going to come back to the crucial question as humid out for our knowledge of things matters effect beyond present experience outside the mind the crucial question is the question of cause and effect do we know there are cause and effect connections Hume said no till we come to believe Reid says knowing is simply having true beliefs and we have natural belief and Kant isn't satisfied with either”

0.74

Realism in the relevant sense means two things: (1) the independent existence of material objects and their qualities, independent of minds (contra Berkeley and idealism), and (2) the belief that we have true knowledge of that independent reality, not merely that it exists but that we actually know it as it is.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“the independent existence of material objects and their qualities the independent existence and you'll notice this term independent use repeatedly the independent existence independent of minds”

0.73

Psychological necessity (where human psychology makes certain beliefs unavoidable) differs from logical necessity (where the contradiction of a proposition is self-contradictory).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“the word necessary in this case seems to mean something like psychologically necessary given human psychology you cannot help but believe certain things psychological which is different is it not from the notion of what is logically necessary we're at necessary truth the logical sense is one whose only alternative the contradiction of it is self-contradictory and therefore false so if the alternatives are an honor turns out to be self contradictory and therefore false then the logical necessity a is true you see that would be a logically necessary truth”

0.70

A person experiencing a choice between two alternatives where there is no overwhelming case for one over the other experiences what might be called 'agonizing freedom'—they realize they could go either way and might even change their mind at the last moment.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“a lot of times when you do that you realize you you could go either way and perhaps at the last minute you change your mind you see there is that experience of agonizing freedom of choice”

0.69

Reid argues that ideas themselves do not possess secondary qualities; roses smell and light dazzles, but ideas do not smell or dazzle. Therefore, perception should be understood as presentational rather than representational—objects are directly presented to consciousness, not represented through ideas.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“he is arguing for a presentational view of perception rather than representational that is to say the the view that objects are not represented to us by ideas but a directly presented to the consciousness”

0.69

Natural beliefs or common-sense beliefs are universal human beliefs that arise spontaneously from human nature and God's design, not from reasoning processes; they are rooted in the intrinsic nature and proclivities of human beings rather than being artificial constructs.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“natural beliefs depend upon the intrinsic nature of human beings they're not artificial beliefs that we make up you know as it is in the post-modern view that we create our own values and we create our own meanings and we create our own beliefs no not to read there are beliefs that arise naturally in the course of nature spontaneous not artificial”

0.69

The key difference between Hume and Reid on natural beliefs is not that both affirm them, but that Reid emphasizes the theistic justification: God made us in such a way that we naturally come to certain beliefs, whereas Hume does not provide this theological grounding.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“the difference is this not that the Scottish realists affirmed that human nature universally tends to produce certain beliefs human believes that but Reid's emphasis is on the fact that God made us in such a way that we would in the course of nature come to certain beliefs he has a theistic justification for paying attention to natural beliefs”

0.69

Reid illustrates his ethical reasoning through the principle 'we should prefer a greater good to a lesser good'; on the basis of this principle, if one judges that alternative A has greater good than alternative B, then it logically follows that one should prefer A—making the moral judgment a real judgment based on intuitive principles.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“when on the basis of a principle like we should prefer a greater good to a less on the basis of something like that I judge that there is greater good to one alternative than the other you see it logically follows that I should prefer that one with the greater good and so accordingly of the moral judgments real judgments based on intuitive principles”

0.68

The reading of Hume as a radical skeptic (taking his skepticism as his final position rather than affirming natural belief) persisted in many circles and is likely still the popular image of him among those who do not read his work more carefully.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“and that reading of Hume seems to have been one which persisted in many circles and I suspect to this day is the popular image of him until you obviously read further”

0.68

G.E. Moore, in early 20th century realism, maintains that natural beliefs are logically necessary because the contradiction of them is self-contradictory, exemplified by the claim that 'time is unreal,' which contradicts itself every time one says 'I've got to do something before I do something else.'

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“GE Moore who picks up on this right after 1900 he maintains that these natural beliefs are logically necessary why because the contradiction of them is self contradictory how come well take for instance that guy that I mentioned last time who said that time is unreal time is unreal he contradicts that every time he says I've got to do something before I do something else it's a self contradictory view more calls it the the paradox that philosophers are constantly denying by what they do things that they say”

0.68

Reid's account of natural belief has stimulus-response features resembling behavioristic psychology (though Reid predates behaviorism), and 20th century realists did appeal to stimulus-reflex mechanisms in explaining direct awareness of sense perception.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“makes it sound like behavioristic stimulus response mechanisms so that the nature of direct awareness is such that if that's the I okay there's a stimulus sensation okay which immediately produces response affirming something”

0.68

In response to the objection that everything must have a sufficient reason (law of sufficient reason), Reid responds that agency is a sufficient reason; when I am the cause of my acts, my agency provides the explanation, and this is not capricious but deliberate.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“one kilter argument is that there surely has to be sufficient cause to explain everything everything must have a reason law of sufficient reason to which reads a response is agency is sufficient reason there are Cajuns when I'm the cause and my choice if there are no causes its capricious and dangerous to which he says agency is not an uncaused act I am the cause of my agent acts and I don't act capriciously but deliberately”

0.68

Scottish realists were not surprisingly Scottish Presbyterians, and their theistic grounding of epistemology finds a parallel in John Calvin's Institutes, where the manifold agility of the soul—its ability to survey heaven and earth, retain memory, use imagination—serves as proof of divinity in human nature.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“the Scottish realists were not surprisingly Scottish Presbyterians and their theism comes out in ways I've indicated but I'm interested to find a parallel kind of statement not that not identical but a parallel statement in John Calvin”

0.68

Ideas play a role in normal cognitive functioning not as intermediaries to reality but as signs of what may or may not be present; they are objects of knowledge only when nothing present is being represented, such as in reflection, memory, or imagination.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“ideas then play a role but not as intermediaries they play a role rather Rose signs of what may or may not be present but not as intermediaries that the only time the ideas are intermedia is when you're thinking of the idea and there's nothing present”

0.64

Hume's philosophy contains an internal inconsistency: he claims the self is merely a bundle of mutually independent and isolated perceptions with no underlying substance, yet he also asserts that human nature has certain natural proclivities that persuade us—implying a unity or continuity that contradicts the atomistic view.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“Hume says in in effect that the self is simply a bundle of mutually independent and isolated ideas perceptions and impressions with no underlying mind or soul substance we can know of yet paradoxically he also says that human nature has certain natural tendencies that persuade us it's curious there's no relationship between the bits and pieces in the consciousness but somehow or other we we join them together in certain standard ways Uniondale argues that that's an inconsistency in Hume he's got two different views of the self”

0.62

Reid argues for human freedom against determinism by claiming that freedom is the ability to choose between alternative reasonings and alternative motives, sometimes independent of stronger reasons or conscious motives—freedom is the power to choose, not an act of reasoning or consequence of motivation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“freedom is the ability to choose to cause something or not to cause something to happen that freedom is not just an act of reasoning our reasonings may be determined by antecedent ideas and beliefs the freedom is not an act of reasoning or the result of that it's not just motivation because our motives assumed has pointed out may be determined but the choice is a choice that we have between alternative reasonings and between alternative motives and sometimes we choose without appealing to stronger reasons or without conscious motives”

0.61

Sensation is a sign arranged by God that should produce a spontaneous belief; memory is a sign that something is coming back to mind; imagination is a sign that one is imagining something rather than perceiving a real object, and in each case we respond spontaneously and affirm without explicit reasoning.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“I'm a sensation then is a sign that God is arranged we should get a remembrance is a sign yes a I'm remembering something something's coming back I say to my mind coming back it's a sign that there is something there to come back and spontaneously I respond and affirm in an imagination what you know isn't simply imagination is a sign knowing it's something you're imagining”

0.61

By the 20th century, realists like G.E. Moore no longer require theistic justification; Moore remains religiously agnostic, yet maintains the natural belief epistemology developed by Scottish realists.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“when you get to the 20th century people like GE more there's no theistic justification they GE more remains sort of agnostic religiously okay”

0.61

Reid criticizes Hume's theory of ideas for leading from the subjectivity of secondary and primary qualities to the subjectivity of beauty, right, and wrong—Hume's ethical subjectivism—which Reid opposes.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“it's in that context that he criticizes human he says that Humes theory of ideas led from the subjectivity of secondary and primary qualities to the subjectivity of beauty and of right and wrong Humes ethical subjectivism”

0.55

Ethics, like any science, has first principles from which we deduce further knowledge, contrary to Hume's view that ethics and metaphysics are not sciences because they lack first principles.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“ethics like any science has its first principles that's a very revealing statement ethics like any science has its first principles Hume says that ethics is not a science metaphysics is not a science because there are no first principles from which you deduce but Reid says that ethics is a science and there are first principles from which you deduce”

0.45

Reid's experience of carrying 40-pound sacks of water softener salt illustrates direct awareness of causal power: you feel the causal connection throughout your body as you carry the weight, demonstrating that causation is not merely an abstract regularity but a felt force.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“sometimes use the illustration of carrying these large 40-pound sacks of softener salt that we have to use in water softeners around here into the house yeah one in each hand you know and with one in each hand you you brace your arms and you you carry them along tottering as you go you know and you feel it all the way up you feel the causal connections in some parts of the body”

0.43

Thomas Reid traced verbal similarities between G.E. Moore and Thomas Reid that suggested Moore was influenced by Scottish realism, but when submitting his article to the British Journal of Mind, he discovered a recent book by someone else making the same argument, and he did not pursue the matter further.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“I traced a whole collection of actual verbal similarities between GE Moore and Thomas Reid and it's one of those vain hopes of a historical article which would change the picture until when I submitted it to the British Journal mind it came back with note about a recent book that had just appeared that did the same thing and so that was the end of that little venture”

0.41

The Scottish realists were a group of thinkers in the Scottish Enlightenment in Edinburgh in the late 18th century whose influence persisted into the 20th century through direct transmission to Princeton and also through influence on early 20th-century British realism, particularly G.E. Moore.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“little attention has been paid to the Scottish realists and their place in the history of philosophy largely because the scene was dominated by the British empiricism are CLE Hume against whom Immanuel Kant reacted yet whose influence persisted in 19th century and in 20th century empiricism John Stuart Mill and positivism yet the the Scottish realists were a group of thinkers in the Enlightenment reformation enlightenment in the Edinburgh circle of the Enlightenment I'm sorry Reformation got in there somehow in the Scottish enlightenment there in Edinburgh in the late 18th century whose influence persisted into the 20th century not only through its effect by virtue of those who came to the United States powerful influence at Princeton but even in British thought”

0.41

The term 'common sense' carries at least two meanings: in Aristotle it referred to a faculty that unified the other senses (sensus communis), while in ordinary usage (as with Berkeley's idealism) it refers to natural and universal assumptions shared by many people, though what is common in one culture may not be common in another.

definitionestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“you remember in Aristotle the common sense was a sense that coordinate he'd unified to the other senses the census communist as it was called the common sense it worked with the other senses in common with them all a unifying sense now that's not reads usage of the term reads using it more in the way we use it when you say in response to your first reading of George Berkeley's idealism oh that just violates common sense”

0.41

The first principles of ethics Reid identifies include very general principles: some things merit approval and others merit blame (difference between right and wrong); we ought to use the best means we can to be informed of our duty; we have moral responsibility to find out what our duty is.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“the first principles of ethics that he derives in this way or thinks of in these terms are very general some things merit approval others merit blame all right there's a difference between right and wrong first principle you need that somewhere again we ought to use the best means we can to be informed of our duty we have moral responsibility to find out those are the sorts of things he regards as first principles”

0.34

Natural beliefs that Reid identifies include beliefs about the laws of logic, axioms of mathematics (Euclidean geometry), the existence and nature of material things, causal connections, memory, human freedom, and moral principles.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“among these natural beliefs that read has our beliefs about the laws of logic beliefs about the axioms of mathematics Euclidean geometry for instance beliefs about the existence and nature of material things and incidentally he didn't buy into the atomism of matter”

0.29

The lecture was meant to transition from Scottish realists to Immanuel Kant, with Kant's philosophy being discussed in detail in the subsequent lecture, making the Scottish realists important as a philosophical background that Kant was responding to and aware of.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lecture instructor

“this afternoon we want to focus our attention on the Scottish realists and as you may notice from the outline on the board this will get us making the transition to Immanuel Kant so that I plan to spend next time Friday orienting us in broad contours to Kant”

0.26

Moore's claim that contradictions between theory and practice demonstrate logical necessity is not well received by non-realists, and some suspect a category mistake—mixing the practical order (action) with the theoretical order (propositional truth).

factualcontestednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor

“it's never been very favorably received by people who are not realists but some people understandably will think that there is some slip of categories going on there mixing the practical of the theoretical”

0.20

The speaker was an acquaintance of Gilbert Ryle, who was editor of the British Journal of Mind at the time, and notes this as a 'rather distinguished' accomplishment.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Professor/Lecturer)

“I did succeed though in getting an autograph on the Dear John letter from the editor who happened to be Gilbert Ryle at that time a rather distinguished British man”