
A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas
What this covers
This is a university lecture on John Locke, part of a longer history-of-philosophy series, delivered by a single instructor. It follows Locke's account of how the mind gets from sensation to knowledge. Locke holds a Representational Theory of Knowledge: the mind observes its own ideas and infers what lies outside it. The lecture works through the structure he builds on that base, including the Three Kinds of Knowledge: intuition, demonstration, and sensation. It also explains why he cannot get far beyond mathematics without ceasing to be an empiricist. A logical point is raised against demonstration: a conclusion cannot contain anything absent from the premises, so external reality would already have to be in them.
The middle of the lecture covers the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. Ideas of the first are copies of how things are, while a rose is not actually red or sweet-smelling. The lecturer links this to the Newtonian picture of a world stripped of sensory richness, and to the Romantic reaction against it. Other topics include substance as "something I know not what," and abstract ideas. On Locke's view, abstraction explains genus and species, which is only abstract ideas with names, and it marks the line between humans and animals. The lecture also places Locke as a conceptualist between the nominalisms of Berkeley and David Hume, and briefly mentions Condillac's thought experiment of a person encased in stone.
The later sections turn to what follows from all this. Knowledge beyond present experience rests on probability, which depends on coherence and the testimony of others. The lecture presses on Locke's Evidentialism, arguing that the rule to proportion assent to evidence cannot itself be justified by that rule. Hume's reduction of causal power to constant conjunction and the problem of the uniformity of nature are previewed. Contesting all of this is the Scottish realist alternative of Thomas Reid, who treats certain beliefs as arising naturally. The most contentious claim is Reid's view that radical doubt about bodies or other minds is a psychological malfunction rather than a philosophical problem.
Locke's representational theory of knowledge establishes that we know only our own ideas, not external reality directly, which generates fundamental epistemological problems about knowledge of material bodies, other minds, God, and moral obligations that persist through empiricism and into contemporary realism debates.
- Knowledge is of mental representations (ideas) as immediate objects of awareness, not external world directly
- The mind must infer external reality through cause-effect arguments, but cannot establish genuine causal connection, only constant conjunction
- This framework opens irresoluble questions about what we can know beyond appearance—a problem still central to realism/anti-realism debates
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The historical problem of universals plays a crucial role in 18th century philosophical debates: Locke is a conceptualist affirming abstract ideas, Berkeley is a nominalist denying abstract ideas, and Hume is also a nominalist—because of nominalism, Hume rejects conceptions of matter and mind as substances, of causal power, and of infinite space or infinite time.
“so because Hume is a nominalist he rejects conceptions of matter and mind as substances and of causal power and of infinite space or infinite time now not only human dit next week when we get to George Berkeley who's sort of a halfway house to you Berkeley to is a nominalist as distinct from a conceptualist so the old problem of universals is going to play a crucial role in this 18th century debate”
There is a crucial distinction between correlation (two events occurring together in conjunction) and causal connection (one event actually causing another), and Locke acknowledges that the idea of causal connection arises only as a voluntary assumption, not as something we perceive—we see only the correlation, not the connection itself.
“you notice in the way I described that a distinction between their being correlations between two events and there being a connection between two events correlation if you like conjunction they are there in conjunction but is there any connection you think now says LOC the idea of a connection just arises and we voluntarily affirm it the idea of causal power”
A logical problem with demonstration knowledge for knowing external reality: in a deductive proof, the conclusion cannot contain anything that is not already in one of the premises (no syllogism can have in a conclusion something that is not involved in one of the premises), so if we want knowledge of the external world through demonstration, the external world must already be in the premises, but how can we get external reality into the premises if it is not representational?
“gain that's not dealing with what is representational unless the proof is such as to get beyond the representation to reality itself but how in a deductive proof do you get external reality in a conclusion if it's not in one of the premises you see in no syllogism can you have in a conclusion something which is not involved in one of the premises problem”
Locke's principle 'you should proportion your assent to the evidence' is itself difficult to justify because it is a normative claim made without sufficient empirical evidence for why you should believe it—this creates a self-referential problem where the criterion of justified belief is not itself justified by the criterion it proposes.
“and it's so crucial as his conclusion at this juncture that I think we ought to underscore it page 201 well no it's not in this 201 I beg your pardon he talks about evidence there but I don't think he makes this point there okay take that back the point that he makes is this you should proportion your ass sent to the evidence you should always proportion your assent to the evidence now the first time I came across that I sort of nodded you know sent if I had enough evidence for that assertion because I think that we are conditioned in a scientific age to proportioning our ascent at least the scientific beliefs proportioning our ascent to the evidence but then I was struck when I heard a philosopher make this comment where is the evidence for that criterion of assent why should I believe Locke when he says I should proportion my assent to the evidence when he tells me that with insufficient evidence”
The empiricist tradition asks: what logical basis justifies the assumption that nature is uniform—that the future will resemble the past and that unobserved causes will operate like observed causes—and this question of the uniformity of nature becomes central to epistemology
“because probability assumes the uniformity of nature and it remains for David Hume to question the logical basis of probability he really does a thorough job”
The entire mystery of genus and species—the Aristotelian classification system that made such a 'noise in the schools' (among scholastics)—is nothing but abstract ideas with names assigned to them, and the essences that define species are not real Platonic forms or metaphysical entities but rather the common, recurrent qualities that are essential to all members of a class as conceived of abstractly.
“this whole mystery of general and species the Aristotelian classification this whole mystery of general and species which make such a noise in the schools they scholastics with justice so little regarded out of them is nothing else but abstract ideas with names and”
The fundamental answer to the question of how we can know things beyond present experience is that if something is not known intuitively and cannot be demonstrated from what is known intuitively, the only way we can know it is through experience based on probability—probability is the best we have in empiricism.
“the answer essentially is this if it's not something you know immediately intuitively if it's not something that can be demonstrated from what is known immediately then the only way you know that something somewhere you think it is is on the basis of experience probabilities are the best we have and I think that's characteristic of this whole empiricist tradition that if you want to know anything beyond present experience you have to go with probability”
The hypothesis of Baron de Condillac—that a person encased in stone with no sensory contact with the world would have no experience or consciousness at all, gaining consciousness only as the stone is chipped away revealing sense organs—illustrates a thought experiment about the role of sensation in consciousness
“there was a Frenchman the Baron de Condillac who constructed that hypothesis I I think there's something to be said for that not the kondal acts reasons he was a materialist but simply because of the way in which are psychosomatic unity functions”
Locke adopts a representational theory of knowledge where knowledge is basically of our own ideas, which are the immediate objects of our awareness, and knowledge is at best representational—the mind observes its own ideas and infers from these what there is in the external world.
“Locke like Descartes has a representational theory of knowledge that is to say that knowledge is basically of our own ideas ideas are the immediate objects of our awareness and so knowledge is at best representational the mind observes its own ideas and infers from these were what there is in the external world”
The epistemological problems generated by Locke's representational theory—particularly the question of whether we can know anything more than appearance since phenomena as distinct from reality in itself—persist in contemporary debates over realism and anti-realism.
“in a very important way that question is still with us in contemporary debates over realism and anti-realism and so Locke in a way is setting the stage for a great deal that comes later”
Two factors contribute to probability (degree of belief) in empiricism: (1) consistency or coherence—whether what you believe is consistent with your other beliefs and with your experience, or contradicted by them, and (2) the testimony of others—the credibility and consistency of others' reports—which becomes important because individual experience is very limited and we all depend greatly on others' experience.
“what contributes to probability well two things basically one is the consistency of what I believe with my experience with other things I know that is to say there can be beliefs which contradicted by other beliefs or knowledge based on experience there so there's a matter of overall consistency coherence secondly the testimony of others he admits as contributing to belief probability of belief testimony of others”
Locke is unable to go much beyond mathematics in his account of demonstrative knowledge while remaining faithful to empiricism, because if he were to claim knowledge of the physical universe independent of sense experience, he would cease to be an empiricist
“mathematical theorems that's the classic example of the istening yeah yeah and he can't go much beyond that if he wants to be true to his empiricism you see because if he's gonna say you can no independently of sense experience things about the physical universe he's not going to be an empiricist”
Locke illustrates Aristotelian genus-species classification by showing how 'man' and 'horse' are both species of the genus 'animal' (body with life and spontaneous motion), which itself is a species of the more general genus 'living thing' (leaving out sensation), and so forth in a hierarchy of increasingly general categories
“notice how he's playing with the Aristotelian things humans are rational animals what's an animal animals are living things what's a living thing you see the larger and larger Universal categories until he gets to the end of that paragraph”
An alternative tradition to Locke's evidentialism has developed, called Scottish realism or the natural belief approach, which holds that certain beliefs arise spontaneously and naturally in humans rather than through voluntary proportioning of assent to evidence—beliefs are not always voluntary products of deliberate reasoning but rather arise through natural belief-forming mechanisms.
“I'm not sure that beliefs are always voluntary you see and then there's another tradition which develops represented the Scottish realism that we'll be talking about after Hume a tradition that that speaks of the fact that we are so constituted that certain beliefs arise spontaneously naturally nowadays philosophers are talking of belief forming mechanisms which are at work in the human psyche”
David Hume will argue that the idea of causal power is reducible to the idea of constant conjunction—we have no empirical basis whatsoever for affirming any actual causal connection beyond the observed conjunction of events—making Hume a skeptic about causal power.
“when you're reading David Hume you'll hear him saying there all the all there is that this idea of power is the idea of constant conjunction we have no empirical basis at all for affirming any causal connection and he becomes a sceptic about knowing anything about causal power”
Secondary qualities are qualities that exist only in consciousness as products of the action of material bodies on our sense organs, having no objective counterpart in the material world itself—for example, a rose is not actually red, does not actually smell rosy, and is not actually soft, but produces these sensations in our experience through the properties of the matter that composes it.
“secondary qualities are simply qualities of our ideas that have no objective counterpart so the rose is not red it doesn't really smell rosy it's not soft in itself but only to the touch that is to say secondary qualities are qualities produced in our experience by material bodies their external cause is the effect of the material body via our sense organs so that our ideas of secondary qualities our ideas of qualities which are purely subjective exist in the consciousness”
Substance is a complex idea inferred from the presence of particular qualities—we infer that there must be something that 'has' those qualities, but this substance is 'something I know not what,' an utterly unknown substratum underlying the qualities we perceive, whether material substance or mental substance (mind/spirit/soul).
“the idea of substance likewise as you read Locke notice carefully the way he talks about substance on pages 186 and again 189 whether it be material substance or whether it be mental substance immaterial mind spirit soul you see what we have in our simple ideas is simply ideas of certain qualities primary qualities secondary qualities where does the idea of substance come from well it's an idea of something which has those qualities you think you get the idea of material substance by putting primary quality ideas together it is something I know not what that has those qualities”
Because Locke affirms an immaterial mind, he is not bound to physical sensations as was the materialist Hobbes, and the immaterial mind possesses active powers of abstraction—mental activities we are aware of through reflection—and one of these powers of mind is the power of abstraction itself.
“being a conceptual is then he's not going take it back having an immaterial mind he's not going to be so tied to physical sensations as was Thomas Hobbes and he thinks of the powers of the mind the active powers of the mind that were aware of in reflection and one of these mental activities mental powers we are aware of is the power of abstraction”
One of the main distinctions between humans and animals is that humans have the power of abstraction—we form abstract ideas and think abstractly—whereas animals may have sense perception but they do not think abstractly; they do not form abstract or general ideas.
“Brutes abstract not he makes the point that this is one of the main distinctions between humans and animals that we have abstract ideas we think abstract ly animals do not they may have sense perception and so forth but they don't think abstract ly”
The Newtonian scientific worldview strips the world of secondary qualities—color, sound, smell—creating a world of purely primary qualities (shape, size, density, motion) that is fundamentally alien to human sensory experience, which prompted Romantic poets like Tennyson to lament this loss of a world alive with sensory richness.
“it's this world stripped of secondary qualities a world without color and sound smell of which he says can I take a thing so dead embrace it for my mortal good you can see how the Remender cyst was going to Wordsworth's heart dances with the daffodils”
Hume will make great mockery of Locke's concept of substance as 'something I know not what,' exploiting the fact that Locke has admitted we have no knowledge of the substance that allegedly underlies qualities—we only perceive the qualities themselves.
“obviously somebody like Hume is gonna make her out of that”
Locke distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: (1) knowledge of the first kind by intuition (immediate self-evident knowledge, such as laws of logic and mathematical truths), (2) knowledge of the second kind by demonstration (logically proven knowledge derived from intuitive premises), and (3) knowledge of the third kind by sensation (sensory knowledge based on probability, not certainty).
“what he does in talking about knowledge and belief is to distinguish three kinds of knowledge knowledge of the first kind second kind third kind and you can track this down for yourself pages 198 to 201 there abouts knowledge of the first kind is by intuition knowledge of the second kind is by demonstration demonstration demonstration knowledge of the third kind is by sensation sensory means”
Our ideas of primary qualities are indeed representations and copies of the way things are (a 'copy theory of knowledge'), whereas our ideas of secondary qualities are not copies, so truth as correspondence between idea and thing applies only to primary qualities, not secondary qualities.
“our ideas then of primary qualities are indeed representations copies of the way things are so this is sometimes called a copy theory of knowledge we have mental colors so in that sense truth is seen as correspondence between the ID and the thing but our ideas of secondary qualities are not copies”
Thomas Reid, a Scottish realist, argued that some of the radical doubts Descartes raised (such as doubt about material bodies or other minds) are not philosophical problems but rather symptoms of psychological dysfunction—people who have such doubts need psychological help, not philosophical arguments, because their belief-forming mechanisms are not functioning correctly.
“there was a Frenchman the Baron de Condillac who constructed that hypothesis I I think there's something to be said for that not the kondal acts reasons he was a materialist but simply because of the way in which are psychosomatic unity functions but that's one question would reflection have anything to reflect on if there'd been no initial sensory input that's one question the origination question the other question though is here I am a functioning human being do I have anything to reflect on other than sensations yes yes I have all sorts of ideas abstract ideas general ideas of my own mental activities to reflect on enough to keep me busy quite apart from new sensations so in that sense yeah yeah that's only one function of reflection self awareness self consciousness yeah basically yeah that's that's my point that's my point yes reflection means basically introspective awareness”
Would humans have any content for reflection—any mental activities to reflect on—if there had been no initial sensory input from an external world, and does reflection depend on prior sensation for its content?
“would reflection have anything to reflect on if there'd been no initial sensory input that's one question the origination question the other question though is here I am a functioning human being do I have anything to reflect on other than sensations yes yes I have all sorts of ideas abstract ideas general ideas of my own mental activities to reflect on enough to keep me busy quite apart from new sensations”
The instructor believes that consciousness and self-awareness arise through psychosomatic integration—the physical and sensory interaction with the world—rather than being independent of bodily experience, suggesting an integrated view of mind and body
“I'm inclined to think we're such integrals psycho physical beings that it's the physical and sensory interaction with the world which awakes self-awareness within us”
Nicholas Wolterstorff is one of the key figures in developing reformed epistemology and belief-forming mechanism theory; he was the person who raised to the lecturer the self-referential question about whether there is evidence for Locke's criterion of assent.
“the person who raised the question in my hearing about the evidence for Locke's insistence on evidence was Nicholas Walter store who's one of the people in this development of the reforming mechanism theory”
Simple ideas of reflection derive from introspective awareness (the 'inner sense') and include mental acts such as thinking, doubting, wishing, and hoping, as well as mental states and particular mental feelings that accompany having other ideas.
“simple ideas of reflection have to do with what he calls the inner sense that is to say introspective so that as you experience your own experiencing you reflect on those ideas yes but also on the mental states that you have in having those ideas so you have for instance a simple idea of reflection that has to do with thinking the idea of thinking the idea of doubting of wishing of hope a feeling of expecting mental acts mental states as well as particular kinds of mental feelings”
Complex ideas are mental constructs that we voluntarily create by compounding and combining various simple ideas, such that the idea of a human body is a composite that the mind has constructed from multiple simple ideas put together.
“complex ideas are simply the result of our compounding combining various simple ideas and he makes the point that this compounding seems to be a voluntary kind of activity so that we've somehow or other chosen to put these simple ideas together into larger composites so my idea the human body is a composite that I've constructed it's a mental construct compound ideas complex ideas”
Simple ideas of sensation derive from the five outer senses and include specific sensations such as particular colors (e.g., a particular blueness), particular sounds (e.g., a particular loudness), and sensations across the full range of the five senses: color, sound, smell, taste, and touch.
“simple ideas of sensation have to do with color sound smell taste and touch the five senses and you can readily come up with examples of simple ideas then of each of these simple idea of color is the sensation of Lunas a particular sensation of a particular blueness a simple idea of sound is a sensation of loudness a particular sensation of particular louts”
Primary qualities are those qualities that material bodies objectively possess whether or not they are perceived, including spatial properties such as shape, size, and density—the properties of material bodies as understood in Newtonian science.
“the primary qualities that we ascribe to material bodies are the qualities which those bodies themselves objectively have whether we perceive them or not and the qualities which material bodies have in the Newtonian science of the day simply the properties of spatial occupancy shape size density primary qualities”
Locke is known in contemporary epistemology as an 'evidentialist'—someone who holds that beliefs should be proportioned to evidence—and he is the paradigm case of evidentialism in the history of epistemology.
“in contemporary epistemology he is known Locke is known as an evidential in fact he's sort of the paradigm case of an evidential”
The idea of infinity is a complex idea developed through extrapolation: we take a point in space, then imagine a point beyond it, then another point beyond that, extending this process endlessly (ad infinitum) to generate the complex idea of infinite space, and similarly we extrapolate from particular moments of time to generate the idea of infinite time.
“if we're talking of space being infinite as Newton did what we're talking of is a point beyond this point beyond this point beyond this point and so on as we say ad infinitum the idea of infinity is a complex idea developed by that process of extrapolation an endless extrapolation and similarly with the idea of infinite time extrapolation”
Descartes takes a conceptualist position on universals: we do have abstract ideas (not just empirical generalizations of particulars), and this is because Descartes is a rationalist—he believes there are things we know independently of experiencing particular instances, so abstract ideas are not dependent on sensory experience of particulars.
“in the case of Descartes somewhat different de cartes not an empiricist on the source of our ideas he's a rationalist there are things we know independently of experiencing particular so Descartes is a conceptualist we do have abstract ideas not just empirical generalizations”
Abstract ideas are developed through the process of abstraction, an Aristotelian and scholastic term referring to the mental process by which we gain universal concepts from particular experiences—a key mechanism for understanding how particular ideas become general concepts.
“abstraction abstraction plainly is the Aristotelian and scholastic term for the way in which we gain universal concepts it is in effect where does John Locke come out on theories of universals”
Mathematical truths (such as that the three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles) are ultimately intuitive because, although they emerge through demonstration, each step in the proof must come through with intuitive certainty, ultimately resting on intuitive self-evidence.
“applications of the laws of logic that you get for instance in mathematics where the three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles you see is that intuitive well in the final analysis it is after it's worked out comes through intuitively”
Bacon and Hobbes were both influenced by Ockham's nominalism and took nominalist positions: all we can think is particulars, we do not have abstract ideas at all, we only have general ideas (mere generalizations of particulars), so there are no universal concepts, only particular ideas applied generally.
“bacon and Hobbes are both directly influenced by The Economist nominalism and take nominalist positions to say all we can think is particulars we don't even have words that stand for abstract ideas because we don't even have abstract ideas all we have is general ideas”
Words function as outward signs (physical marks, written or heard/seen) that stand for internal ideas—the use of words is to be outward marks of internal ideas—and words become necessary because if every particular idea required a distinct name, names would be endless, so the mind makes particular ideas become general ideas.
“the use of words being to stand as outward marks of internal ideas words are outward marks physical signs written or heard seen or heard words are outward signs of internal ideas ideas taken from particular things if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name names would be endless so to prevent this the mind makes the particular ideas to become general ideas”
Alvin Plantinga, in response to those who claim they do not believe in material bodies or God, responds 'What's wrong with you?'—implying that failure to have these fundamental beliefs indicates malfunction of belief-forming mechanisms, not rational disagreement, and in his Gifford Lectures, Plantinga extends this response to lack of belief in God, treating disbelief as a symptom of dysfunctional belief formation.
“if somebody says to planning uh well I I just don't believe in the existence of material bodies his responses what's wrong with you yes sir and in his Gifford lectures in Scotland a few years ago that he's putting into print now you know he does the same thing with regards to the existence of God you don't believe in the existence of God what's wrong with your belief forming mechanisms”
Hume adapts Locke's terminology for the distinction between simple ideas of sensation and reflection by using 'impression' for the immediate sensation and 'idea' for the subsequent idea of the impression, making this distinction clearer through different terminology.
“when we get to hue we'll see he adapts the terminology to make that distinction a little more clearly for Hume the immediate sensation is called an impression and then an idea that is used for your subsequent idea of the impression but the immediate sensation is an impression”
Joseph Butler's 18th century apologetic work 'The Analogy of Religion' used analogical arguments from natural phenomena to religious claims, arguing that if nature exhibits certain properties, we can analogically infer that similar properties hold in religious reality—a probabilistic approach to religious justification characteristic of Lockean influence.
“the classic example in the 18th century was Joseph Butler's book the analogy of religion in which he used analogical arguments from phenomena in nature to the structure of things religious in arguing for the truth of things religious by analogy from the truth of things in nature you think but it's sort of a probabilistic approach”
David Hume will raise important questions about the credibility of witnesses and the conditions under which testimony can justify belief—specifically, he will examine what makes testimony reliable and under what circumstances testimony should be trusted.
“once again David Hume has some things to say about the credibility of witnesses whose testimony we draw on and we'll see what he has to say about that subsequently”