
A History of Philosophy | 30 Thomas Hobbes
What this covers
This lecture, one entry in a university history-of-philosophy series, treats Thomas Hobbes as a systematic thinker whose political theory follows from his account of method, perception, and the mind. The lecturer begins with his intellectual sources: Francis Bacon's inductive approach, which Hobbes found too simple because it yielded regularities but no theory to ground ethics and politics, and Galileo's method of dissecting a process and then reconstructing it in rational order. Hobbes's chart of the sciences, running from geometry and physics through ethics, poetry, and the science of justice, treats every field as a study of causal consequences. This is the sense in which he is a methodological naturalist. The lecturer also asks whether he goes further, into metaphysical materialism or determinism, and notes that this is contested. A brief digression covers Descartes's methodological doubt as a device for finding indubitable axioms.
The middle of the lecture works through Hobbes's psychology. Sensations are effects of physical processes, so a shirt does not possess blueness but causes it to appear in consciousness. This distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities is then tied forward to Berkeley's question about the tree falling unheard. Imagination is the decay of sensory processes, there are no innate ideas, and Hobbes's nominalism holds that nothing is universal but names. Deliberation is a seesaw of competing desires, and the feeling of freedom comes from that ambiguity, which yields a compatibilist notion of freedom. The lecturer also raises Hobbes's possible Christian materialism, with echoes of the Stoics and Tertullian, and his Calvinist upbringing.
The final stretch moves to politics. Hobbes lived through the English Civil War as a royalist who rejected divine right, so he needed another basis for authority. Humans are psychological egoists driven by a restless pursuit of power, and their conflicting ideas of good and bad produce a kind of ethical relativism. In the natural state there is no natural right beyond survival. Right reason supplies consequentialist natural laws: seek peace and keep covenants. These justify a covenant vesting absolute authority in a sovereign, who still cannot destroy the citizens, because self-preservation outranks any covenant.
Thomas Hobbes develops a systematic philosophy grounded in methodological naturalism and empiricism that explains human nature, consciousness, and political authority through causal processes, leading to the conclusion that absolute sovereign authority based on social contract is necessary to prevent the natural state of conflict and preserve self-preservation.
- Hobbes synthesizes Bacon's empiricism, Galileo's reconstructive method, and Descartes's deductive reasoning to create a unified causal-mechanistic explanation of all phenomena from sensation through politics
- Consciousness, desire, and human action are entirely determined by brain processes and material causation, making humans naturally self-interested and inclined toward conflict without external authority
- Political authority must rest on a social contract that vests absolute power in a sovereign ruler to overcome the natural war of all against all and secure peace through right reason
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Hobbes speaks of freedom in two senses: first, freedom as absence of external constraints (being free to do what one desires), and second, freedom as self-caused action through inner determination by one's own desires, appetites, and passions—what becomes known as soft determinism.
“And he um uh he speaks of freedom in two senses. One, [51:51] when I am free from external constraints, free to do what I desire. That's freedom. Now, even though my desires cause my actions, desires cause my actions, my actions are caused. But he takes freedom to mean self-caused, [52:22] an inner self-determination, caused by my own desires, appetites, passions.”
Life becomes a power struggle in Hobbes's account because humans are perpetually driven by a restless desire for the power they need to survive, making power-seeking the fundamental human motivation.
“But we're drawn perpetually by a restless desire for the power that we need to survive. Power? Yeah. So, life becomes a power struggle.”
Hobbes lived through the English Civil War in the 1640s and remained a royalist in his sympathies, but opposed the divine right of kings, forcing him to wrestle with the question of what basis for political authority could replace the discredited doctrine of divine right.
“living as he did over into the um early 17th century, um he um lived through the English Civil War in the 1640s. Um in that political turmoil, uh he remained in his sympathies a royalist, but opposed to the divine right of kings. Uh which um was of course the uh basis adduced for the absolute authority of the monarch. And so uh without that basis for authority, he has to wrestle with the question, what basis is there for political authority if not that?”
Hobbes regarded Bacon's inductive empirical method as simplistic because it only identified constant conjunctions and regularities for practical application, but failed to provide the overall theoretical understanding necessary as a basis for ethics and political philosophy.
“he regarded um Bacon's inductive methods as simplistic. Essentially, all that Bacon is doing is um uh defining uh certain constant conjunctions, as they get to be called later on, certain regularities, um that we can make use of in the applications of scientific knowledge. Uh but that's not providing an overall theoretical understanding that can be a [8:09] basis for um for what? Uh for a view of human persons, human behavior, and political order.”
Hobbes found his methodological solution in Galileo's method of reconstruction, which involves analyzing and dissecting natural processes, physical objects, and human bodies through empirical observation, then reconstructing those findings in intelligible rational order, allowing deductive inference of further conclusions.
“he finds his clue in the scientific method that had been that is traced to uh Galileo. I was going to say it was developed by him. I'm not sure of that. But at least traced to Galileo. Um the method of reconstruction, as it's called, of reconstruction. [9:10] Uh that is to say, if in uh analyzing uh natural processes, physical objects, human bodies, we dissect, we analyze, that's not enough. What we need to do is to reconstruct in some intelligible rational order [9:41] our findings. So that from the broad generalizations of empirical science, we can proceed deductively to draw further conclusions.”
Hobbes's chart of natural philosophy includes sciences ranging from prime philosophy (basic concepts of being) through geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and mathematics, into physics, mechanics, engineering, architecture, navigation, meteorology, optics, music, and extends to ethics (consequences of human passions), poetry, rhetoric, logic, and the science of justice and injustice—all treating phenomena as causal consequences.
“Now, if you look over the range of natural philosophy, swing right over to [15:33] the right-hand column, and notice that it goes from prime philosophy, which is basic concept of being, to geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, geography, in other words, mathematics, then into the physical sciences, into mechanics and the applications of it in engineering, architecture, navigation, meteorology, [16:04] into sciography, haha, uh what we would call astronomy, in and then astrology, the influence of the stars. Uh that's an interesting thing from our standpoint. But, optics, music, yes, the physics of music, ethics, [16:35] yes, having to do with human passions. In other words, he sees psychological causes for moral behaviors and moral desires.”
Civil philosophy and political philosophy focus on consequences of the institution of commonwealths (where commonwealth signifies the common good) and their implications for duties, rights, and legislation, distinguishing bodies politic from individual physical bodies but maintaining causal analysis throughout.
“And when you look at uh the second division, where you're dealing with bodies politic, well, there you have consequences of the institution of commonwealths. Notice that the term commonwealth is the term that Oliver Cromwell used [18:07] for the form of body politic which he established. The Cromwellian commonwealth. Commonwealth means the common good. Uh so, then um civil philosophy, political philosophy, has to do not with the individual, but with the common good. And then, the consequences of that for duties and rights. And hence, for legislation, [18:41] and so forth. Uh so, the distinction is simply between individual bodies, the physical sort, and bodies politic. Uh but, throughout, it's cause, effect, cause, effect, methodological naturalism.”
Hobbes treats all human sensations as effects in the self produced by physical processes in the external world: particular objects have particular qualities that cause changes in the sense organs and nervous system, triggering reflex responses from the heart that produce thought or overt action or both.
“So, he sees all of our sensations as the effects in the human self of physical processes in the external world. That is to say um [30:10] particular, and I stress particular because he is going to be a nominalist. The influence of Ockham is explicit in Hobbes. Okay? Particular objects have particular qualities which causes changes in our sense organs the nervous system [30:43] the brain and that stimulus produces reflex responses from what he calls the heart. You know how your heart pounds with the appropriate stimulus. You see? Responses produced by the heart in thought or overt action or both.”
Hobbes distinguishes between the natural state (a condition of conflict and power struggle with no natural right other than the desire to survive, and no natural law in the Aquinas sense) and natural law (which he redefines as the dictates of right reason—consequentialist thinking about the effects of actions).
“He makes a distinction between the natural state [57:06] and natural law. The natural state is one of conflict, power struggle, the war against all. Life is nasty, short, and brutish. There's no such thing as any natural right other than the desire to survive. There's no such thing as any natural law in Aquinas' sense, grounded in some inbuilt teleology. No, [57:37] this is a mechanistic universe. Causal processes determine everything. What then does he mean by natural law? He means the dictates of right reason. Where have you heard that phrase? William of Ockham. The dictates of right reason. In other words, consequentialist thinking.”
The question of whether Hobbes is not only a methodological naturalist but also a philosophical naturalist or metaphysical materialist is contentious, as it parallels the question of whether he is a determinist or merely investigating causal processes.
“Now, that uh raises the interesting question, of course, as to um whether he is not only a methodological naturalist, but also a philosophical naturalist. Is he metaphysically a materialist? Since all he's going to be investigating is, in effect, matter and the forces which cause changes with material bodies. Matter and motion, mechanistic view. That's the science. But, is he then a materialist? Well, that's a a good question. Uh pretty well as good as the question, [19:45] is he really a determinist? Or is he just investigating the causal processes?”
In decision-making or choice, alternating desires produce deliberation where one desires one option 'because' reason X and another option 'because' reason Y, creating a seesaw effect between competing desires, and choice occurs when one desire outweighs the other—the feeling of being free to decide is caused by the ambiguity of one's own competing desires.
“There are times when we have alternating desires. [52:53] What am I going to order from that menu? What am I going to pick up over there in Anderson County? You got a choice to make. And in that alternation of desires, you move first in one direction, then in the other direction, sort of seesawing, teeter-tottering between the two in the consciousness, you're deliberating. Well, I want this because But I like this [53:24] because the deliberation goes on. And choice is simply one desire outweighing the other. In that emotional seesaw, you simply give way to one desire. And the last desire is the one that wins, and you say you've chosen that. So, the sense of being free to decide is simply a byproduct of the ambiguity of your own desires.”
Hobbes was raised by an Anglican clergyman who was a Calvinist after the death of his parents, making him likely familiar with Calvin's concept of sensus deitatis (sense of a deity) and the semen religionis (seed of religion) that Calvin used to explain universal human belief in God.
“He was raised actually uh because of the death of his parents he was raised by um an Anglican clergyman who was a Calvinist. Uh so he was pretty surely familiar with um Calvin's way of uh thinking. And what he seems to be saying then is that this um causal inquiry [24:58] leads to some vague idea of a first cause, some sense of a deity uh which is in turn the cause of the development of religion.”
The distinction between subjective secondary qualities and objective primary qualities makes it possible for later empiricists like Berkeley to ask whether a tree falling in the forest when no one is present produces any noise, because if noise is a secondary quality (subjective), then without consciousness to register the sound waves, there is no noise.
“You see? That's what's going to make it possible when we get to Berkeley for Berkeley to say does the tree that falls in the forest when there's nobody around to hear make any noise? [34:55] Because if noise is a secondary quality, it's subjective. Is there a noise as noise when there's nobody to hear it? Nobody on whom the sound waves registers in consciousness.”
Hobbes is a psychological egoist: he makes the empirical and descriptive claim that humans do pursue self-interest and that it is an empirical fact of psychology—not an ethical position that we ought to pursue self-interest, which would be ethical egoism.
“Well, it's um on that basis that he comes out as a psychological egoist. A psychological egoist is one who pursues self-interest. Uh and that's an empirical generalization. Egoism is the view that Egoism is about pursuing self-interest primarily, dominantly. The bottom line is self-interest. [54:58] Psychological egoism is simply a descriptive assertion. It's a psychological fact we do. As distinct from ethical egoism, which would say we ought to. He's a psychological egoist. He's not saying we ought to pursue self-interest.”
Natural laws that right reason and prudence dictate for self-preservation are: first, seek peace; and second, keep covenant with others when you enter into an agreement or contract.
“And so, what sort of natural laws then does right reason out of prudence [58:39] and for self-preservation lay down? One, seek peace. Well, you're blaming in a civil war or in the war with Spain or in religious conflict or when he's living in exile. Come on, make peace with Cromwell. You see? Seek peace. Second, keep covenant [59:10] with others. When you enter into an agreement, into a contract, keep it.”
Hobbes proposes that what a body politic needs is a covenant in which, out of right reason, citizens vest authority in an absolute ruler who has complete authority over them, except the ruler cannot destroy citizens because self-preservation takes precedence over any covenant.
“And he goes on, therefore, to propose that what we need in a body politic is some covenant that out of right reason we'll keep. A covenant in which we vest authority in an absolute ruler. [59:42] Cromwell was as much an absolute ruler as um um Charles had been. But we vest the authority by covenant, if you like, by contract in an absolute ruler who has complete authority over us except if he tries to destroy us. Then the desire for self-preservation takes precedence.”
Hobbes held sympathies with the broad church or latitudinarian tradition in the Anglican Church, which attempted to avoid religious conflict by preventing sectarian authority and persecution of minorities.
“Um Hobbes' sympathies were with what um is sometimes called the broad church, the latitudinarian tradition in the Anglican Church of the day. Um And uh in that broad church, there was an attempt constantly to avoid religious conflict, uh to avoid um churchly authority that [4:29] could be the uh source of persecution of minorities.”
The speaker notes that Hobbes's materialism resembles the Stoic tradition, where a material being pervades and influences everything, and Hobbes appears to be a theistic materialist or Christian materialist, similar to Tertullian's resistance to Gnostic dualism.
“And of course that tradition goes back, does it not, to the uh Stoics? Uh the idea of a being pervading everything, influencing everything. Uh that sort of thing. In in which case uh Thomas Hobbes then would seem to be something of a theistic materialist. [21:18] A Christian materialist. Likewise, in his view of the human soul. Well, there was something of that back in Tertullian, you remember, who drew on the Stoic philosophy in uh trying to resist the Gnostic dualism of the day.”
When describing a colored object (e.g., 'my blue shirt'), the shirt is not actually blue; rather, the shirt's primary qualities cause the observer to see blue—the shirt causes blue appearance in consciousness, not the shirt possessing the quality of blueness.
“Now, his point is that when we therefore talk of a colored shirt, my blue shirt we fancy it is blue. But the shirt isn't blue. It is rather that the shirt causes you to see blue. It appears to you bluely. [34:24] But it's not blue. Okay? This is talking about what becomes known as the subjectivity of secondary qualities. The objectivity of primary qualities.”
After the cessation of a sensory cause (e.g., stopping looking at an object), a person retains a mental image of that object, which is simply the product of decaying processes in the sense organs and brain—this is what Hobbes calls imagination.
“Now, after the cessation of the cause you stop looking at my shirt. [35:26] But you still have a mental image of my shirt. This is simply the product of decaying processes, changes in the sense organs and the brain. It's what he calls imagination. Notice that the term imagination at this juncture is simply nothing but [35:57] having mental images.”
Because consciousness is entirely a byproduct of brain processes in Hobbes's account, there are no innate ideas in consciousness and no a priori knowledge independent of cause-effect processes producing sensation, establishing his pure empiricism.
“We have no way of originating ideas because consciousness is entirely a byproduct of brain processes. Just as sensations are byproducts of brain processes. [38:39] And reasoning is a byproduct of brain processes. So all consciousness is a byproduct of brain processes. Physical changes produce consciousness... there are no innate ideas in the consciousness. There's no a priori knowledge independent of the cause-effect processes producing sensation.”
In Hobbes's nominalist account, words are merely particular signs that stand for groups of particular things, and the universality of one name applying to a whole class of things has caused men to falsely believe that the things themselves are universal, when in reality there is nothing universal but names.
“Uh because he he says in as many words that words are just particular signs that stand for [39:42] groups of particular things. Uh so that um in his not in the Leviathan, but in his work The Elements of Philosophy, he says um the universality of one name, one name applying to a whole class of things, the universality of one name has been the cause that men think that things are themselves universal. But it's plain there is nothing universal but names.”
Because humans have diverse and conflicting conceptions of good and bad based on individual desires and aversions, the result is substantial ethical relativism between humans; all goods and bads are ultimately rooted in subjective desire rather than objective reality.
“What we desire, we think of as good. What we dislike, we think of as bad. So, while we might have some common goods like survival, we have a lot of very different goods and bads. And so, we have a lot of ethical relativism between us.”
Descartes' initial methodological skepticism—doubting everything that can even in principle be subject to doubt—is not metaphysical skepticism but rather a methodological device to identify what is completely indubitable and axiomatic, forming the foundation of his deductive system
“Descartes wanted to do philosophy using the method of mathematics. So, his initial skepticism is simply a methodological ploy enabling him to identify and lay aside everything which can even in principle be subject to doubt. So, that he can identify what is completely indubitable, beyond doubt, completely axiomatic, self-evident.”
In Hobbes's time, the term 'imagination' simply means having mental images—a later development (with Romanticism in the 19th century) added the meaning of imagination as creativity, which did not exist in Enlightenment philosophy.
“You don't get the idea of imagination as creativity until you get to romanticism, 19th century. You see? That begins with people like Kant. But you don't get it in the Enlightenment. Imagination is simply images left over dying off getting confused, mixed up [36:29] with each other.”
Right reason is consequentialist thinking: one can reason correctly about consequences and can do right reasoning by understanding causal processes, making knowledge of causes essential to moral reasoning.
“And you can think consequentially, you can do right reasoning if you understand the causal processes. And so, knowledge, in this case right reason about the consequences of human actions, knowledge is power.”
The sovereign has authority over religious matters and interpretation, with God's laws binding through right reason, direct revelation, or the authority of rulers; the ruler's authoritative interpretation of divine commands settles religious disputes, implementing Hobbes's Erastian settlement.
“And um that ruler has authority in matters of religion. Remember I said Hobbes was an Erastian? God's laws are binding on us, yes, by virtue of right reason or direct revelation or the authority of those in authority. And it's the interpretation of the ruler that tells us what God's commands are going to be. What they are. The authoritative interpretation of the ruler will settle religious disputes.”
Thomas Hobbes was born in 1588, the year of the Spanish Armada, and his mother was so frightened by the Armada's sighting that she delivered him prematurely, which Hobbes himself reported as a traumatic beginning to his life.
“Notice he was born in 1588. And any of you who are familiar with English history know that's the day of the Spanish Armada. In fact, he reports in one place that he was born prematurely because his mother was so scared when the Armada was sighted.”
The influence of William of Ockham's nominalism is explicit in Hobbes's account of language and universals, connecting Hobbes's philosophy to medieval nominalist tradition.
“Particular, and I stress particular because he is going to be a nominalist. The influence of Ockham is explicit in Hobbes.”
Primary qualities are the intrinsic properties that physical objects possess: size, shape, density, weight, and spatial occupancy—the basic material properties studied in mechanistic physics.
“Well, what is matter like? Well, a lot matter just has special properties. Size shape density weight special occupancy properties. And consequently, it is those that are the primary qualities.”
The phrase 'peace is the law' or injunction to seek peace flows directly from right reason analyzing the consequences of perpetual conflict and is continuous with Hobbes's empiricist and causal-mechanical philosophy.
“And this is where right reason in view of the consequences makes”