What this covers

This hour-long lecture from Wheaton College's history of philosophy series, given by an unnamed lecturer, sets George Berkeley against the intellectual climate of the early 18th century. The lecturer begins with the worry that drove him: Isaac Newton's mechanistic physics had made God seem superfluous and, unintentionally, encouraged materialism, deism, and atheism. The lecture then follows Berkeley's use of John Locke's own evidentialism to argue that there is no sufficient evidence for matter, physical force, absolute space, or absolute time. Along the way it separates phenomenalism from idealism, and empiricist idealism from the rationalist German kind of the 19th century.

The middle of the lecture covers Berkeley's attack on Locke's representationalism. It sets out three arguments: unperceived things have no empirical meaning, ideas must have mental causes, and primary and secondary qualities are inseparable and both relative to the perceiver. A distant castle, for instance, looks like a small round blob and becomes large and square on approach. A separate thread is Berkeley's rejection of abstraction. He denies that he has a faculty for abstract ideas and offers a nominalist alternative to Locke's conceptualism, which the lecturer links to William of Ockham and Thomas Hobbes and to Berkeley's ethics. The same reasoning is extended to matter, space, and time.

The lecture also covers causation. Occasionalism, which the lecturer ties to a Calvinist emphasis on divine omnipotence, is presented as background, as is the Cartesian mind-body problem. Berkeley's mental causation sidesteps that problem. The lecturer also takes up Samuel Johnson's rock-kicking "refutation" and argues it misses the point: Berkeley grants that the pain is real and asks only what causes it. He is not calling hands or castles illusions. The lecture closes by noting the affinity between idealism and religious thought, and it contrasts Berkeley with Leibniz's energetic rejection of Newtonian matter.

Sharpest takeaway

George Berkeley defends metaphysical idealism—the view that only minds and their ideas exist—by arguing that empiricist epistemology provides no evidence for matter's independent reality, and that this position dissolves the conflicts between materialism, deism, and Christian theism that dominated 18th-century philosophy.

  • Berkeley uses Locke's own empiricist framework to argue there is no empirical evidence for matter as an independently existing substratum
  • By denying abstract ideas and showing primary and secondary qualities are interdependent and relative, Berkeley undermines the conceptual foundations of mechanistic materialism
  • Idealism preserves both the causal power of God and the reality of the divine needed for theism, avoiding the incompatibility between Newtonian mechanism and active providence

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0.74

Occasionalists were motivated by a strong Calvinist commitment to God's omnipotence: if God is truly all-powerful, He has all the causal power that exists, and nothing else has any causal power. This commitment drove occasionalists to deny that physical objects have causal powers.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the thing that the occasionalist were trying to do uh trying to protect was a certain strong calvinist view that when we say God is allmighty all powerful we mean that he has all the power there is and nobody else has any causal power nothing else oh is see that's why panal glands don't work nothing physical has any causal power God is the one who has power he's all power so um somewhat analogous leader that Berkeley is going to say that it's God that is the cause is”

0.73

Berkeley's strategy was to use John Locke's own epistemology against him by denying that there is sufficient evidence for the objective reality of primary qualities (the properties Locke thought represented matter), thereby undermining Locke's representational theory of knowledge and realism about matter.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Berkley's strategy becomes relatively simple uh namely to deny that there is any objectively real representation of our idea of primary qualities you see to deny that you can break through this uh this cognitive barrier and get to what is extramental outside the Mind L thought you could do it by causal inference what's the cause of my Sensations and that's the sort of thing therefore that Berkeley qu questions so that whereas Lo is a realist about materiality Berkeley is what nowadays we would call an anti-realist about matter you see denying the independent reality of matter”

0.73

Phenomenalism is the view that all we know are appearances of things like material objects, but whether matter truly exists is another question; idealism is a subset of phenomenalism in which the idealist asserts that all that exists is ideas and appearances with no matter at all, whereas other forms of phenomenalism remain agnostic about the existence of matter.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“we'll run across other views that question the reality of matter that become known as phenomenalism phenomenalism that is say assert that um all we know are appearences of um things like material objects but whether in reality there there is matter is another question phenomenalism now if you like idealism is one subset of phenomenalism that is to say the idealist says all we have is the ideas the appearances there is no matter as such it's a kind of phenomenalism but there are other kinds of phenomenalism besides idealism and we'll see that uh Manuel K is some sort of a phenomenalist”

0.73

Berkeley is an evidentialist who proportions his beliefs to evidence, following Locke's principle, but differs from Locke by arguing there is insufficient evidence for the existence of matter, physical force, absolute space, and absolute time.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Berkeley if you like is an evidentialist Lu kind of an evidentialist proportion your beliefs to the evidence the difference between Berkeley and lo is that Berkeley doesn't think there is evidence sufficient evidence for the existence of matter physical Force absolute space absolute time”

0.73

Berkeley's argument against abstract ideas is an empirical argument directed at Locke: he accuses Locke of failing to be sufficiently empirical, asking what is actually present in experience when people think they are forming abstract ideas.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“what sort of an argument is that is think it's an empirical argument he's telling luck of all people that he's not sufficiently empirical you see he's telling luck that he's not sufficiently empirical on this matter of abstract ideas and I suppose if Lo wants to reply if Lo the empiricist wants to reply the only response he can give is an empirical response what is there in our experience of using general terms which relates to thinking abstract ideas thinking abstract ideas”

0.73

Berkeley's idealism denies matter but preserves both the reality of minds and the reality of God. It is phenomenalist about physical objects (we cannot know their independent existence, only appearances) but not completely phenomenalist because minds and God are asserted as real.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“on the theory of ideas his conclusion is mentalism all that exists is minds and ideas if you like it's a kind of phenomenalism about physical objects the thing that keeps him from Pure phenomenalism is that he asserts the reality of mind and the reality of God and if God and mind are for real real then he's not completely phenomenalist he's phenomenalist just about physical objects so it's a lesser kind of phenomenalism than John Stewart Mill is going to get us into”

0.72

Rationalist idealism (19th-century German idealism) emphasizes innate creative and expressive resources of the human spirit and inner realities as springs of activity, whereas Berkeley's empiricist idealism emphasizes the passivity of the human mind as a recipient of sense stimuli.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“rationalism is talking about the intellectual resources this kind of rationalism the intellectual resources innate within the human mind innate knowledge a priori knowledge now you move from the Age of Reason into the 19th century and the emphasis is upon innate resources not for knowledge but for Creative self-expression you see so what you get here is an IDE is an idealism that is more of the romanticist sort than of the Enlightenment sort you see uh an idealism that um uh that depends upon the the recognition of the um the inner realities the Springs of activity and action and thought which there are within the human Spirit uh whereas for Berkeley as an empiricist no his idealism doesn't stress the creative resources of the human spirit it stresses the passivity of the human mind as a recipient of certain kinds of sense stimuli very different picture”

0.69

Berkeley uses nominalism to support ethics within a tradition that includes William of Ockham, Thomas Hobbes, and other nominalists, combining 'right reason' (thinking in terms of consequences, consequentialist ethics) with 'the word of God' (divine command ethics).

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“go back to William ofan what did he do about about ethics go back to Thomas hobs what did he do about ethics go back to Luther who was a nominalist what did he do about ethics and there's a two-fold formula that you find running through that whole nominalist tradition and on into some [42:13] conceptualists Calvin as well right reason and the word of God what right reason yes R reason is thinking in terms of consequences a breakdown of the medieval synthesis with its metaphysically grounded ethic it's um natural law ethics that's why [42:45] the breakdown of that medieval synthesis bred utilitarianism consequentialist ethics and the word of God yes Divine command the so just is What God Says”

0.69

Newton's mechanistic physics, which systematized the independent reality of matter, force, causal power, uniform absolute space, and uniform absolute time, unintentionally encouraged the rise of materialism, deism, and atheism by providing a theoretical framework that made God seem superfluous.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the thing which um has encouraged the rise of material ISM and with it the rise of deism uh the rise of atheism is um unintentionally on the men's part Newton's physics because what Newton is asserting in the mechanistic physics that he systematized in his day what he is asserting is the independent reality independent of whether we're aware of it or not the independent reality of matter of force causal power of uniform absolute space and uniform absolute time those are the key essential formative concepts for Newtonian physics for mechanistic physics”

0.68

Berkeley's primary philosophical concern was responding to the rise of materialism and its association with atheism in the 18th century, and to the problem that Newtonian mechanistic physics made an actively involved God seem superfluous, leading to deism as a major religious alternative to Christianity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“in reality Berkeley was very much concerned about the um world of ideas in his time uh his was a day in which materialism was on the rise not always the more religiously benign materialism of Thomas hobs but often associated with atheism and in addition the deism of the day was built upon a foundation of Newtonian physics for if nature operates according to its own fixed mechanical laws then a god actively involved and imminent in nature uh becomes superflous and so deism was a major religious alternative to Christianity in his day and all this concerned the Learned Bishop his project was related to that”

0.66

Idealism and empiricism are compatible: an idealist can be a rationalist (like 19th-century German idealists) or an empiricist (like Berkeley). Similarly, phenomenalism can be grounded in either rationalist or empiricist epistemology.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“you can be an idealist with two different uh epistemological traditions you can be a rationalist who's an idealist you can be an empiricist who's an idealist no problem there um if you're ingenious enough in what you do with it uh but the other thing that uh that confuses you is that um there are two kinds of phenomenalism so what uh you can have phenomenalism on an empirical basis and phenomenalism on a rationalist basis”

0.66

Berkeley argues against Locke's theory of abstract ideas by claiming that Locke is not sufficiently empirical on this matter and proposing a nominalist position opposed to Locke's conceptualism: general terms do not necessarily name general objects or abstract ideas, but language serves many functions beyond naming and referring.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“his first move is to argue against John Lock's theory of abstract ideas okay that's why we careful to take time to uh spell out Lock's theory of abstract ideas becomes crucial um this of course is dealing with the philosophy of language and so in the open introd in the opening introductory section of the material that we have from Berkeley he talks about language and he talks about abstract ideas and he argues for a nominalist position in opposition to John Lock's conceptualist position”

0.66

Berkeley extends his argument against abstract ideas to argue that we have no abstract idea of matter itself, since Locke conceded that matter is 'something I know not what'—an unknown substratum. Similarly, we have no abstract ideas of space or time as such, only of particular spatial relationships and durations.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“bring it home to roast do you have an idea of matter abstract well even lock didn't he said it's something I know not what oh that comes home to roost no you don't have an idea of matter you you have an idea of um a particular Apple particular tree a particular Rock a particular [Music] chair but not matter in the abstract do you have an idea of space in the abstract no of certain spatial relationships of distances of areas occupied in particular but not in the abstract do you have abstract idea of time same problem”

0.66

Berkeley's causal argument avoids the Cartesian mind-body problem: Descartes posed the problem of how immaterial souls can interact causally with physical bodies, a problem that grew more acute by Berkeley's time as nobody took Descartes' pineal gland solution seriously.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“right away you see that he has realized the awfully difficult problem day cart had posed for himself with his mind body dualism and causal interaction yeah how can bodily changes produce mental changes how can physical stimuli to the senses producing brain processes cause changes in them that immaterial Soul what's the causal connection and by Berkeley's time nobody took panil Glenn seriously”

0.66

Berkeley employs three arguments against Locke's representative realism: (1) unperceived things (Locke's unknown substratum of matter) have no reference and no empirical meaning; (2) ideas are mental things, and by the principle that the cause must be like the effect, ideas must have mental causes; (3) primary and secondary qualities are inseparable in experience and both relative to the perceiver, so neither can be objectively real.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“in order to get to that he has to deal more closely with John Lock's theory of ideas and uh you'll find that he's working with I I think at least three arguments in um this section that runs from 247 to 254 in the Anthology uh three arguments one is um that unperceived things some things I know not what unperceived things unknown like Lock's unknown substratum so talk of unknown things has no reference no point of reference doesn't refer to anything”

0.66

Berkeley is not claiming that ordinary objects like hands, castles, or alarm clocks are illusions; rather, he is claiming that the independently existing material substratum traditionally postulated by materialists has no empirical evidence and therefore should be rejected, while the experiences of these objects remain fully real.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“The initial problem um getting a hold on Berkeley that um students have in introductory courses in 101 particularly is crediting the fact that somebody could deny the existence of man you see I'd like to think that you're beyond that I'd like to think that you're beyond saying you mean my hand is an illusion no Berkeley never says it's an illusion”

0.66

Berkeley argues that we can only form ideas of particular shapes, sizes, colors, and extensions—not abstract ideas of shape, color, or extension in general—because in actual experience we never perceive properties in abstraction from other properties, and language itself reflects this limitation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“do you have an idea of spatial extension in general berley asks no you have idea of a particular shape a particular size a particular area that is occupied but extension what about color that secondary qualities color do you have an abstract idea of color in general oh no you you have a an idea of the shade of blue that my shirt has I was careful to put a blue shirt on today um the shade of blue my tie has the shade of blue my eyes have and so on and so forth but do you have an idea of blow in general no the word is simply a catch all for all of these shames and H classified in certain ways”

0.63

Religious thinkers in both Judeo-Christian and Eastern traditions have often adopted metaphysical idealism because they find it to be the best way of talking about the ultimate reality of the Divine, suggesting natural affinities between idealism and theism/pantheism.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“I still don't like it but um as you know um religious um thinkers not only in the judeo-christian tradition but in eastern Traditions have often adopted metaphysical idealism as they what they find to be the best way of talking about the Ultimate Reality of the Divine as a material being yeah”

0.61

Berkeley's strategy to defeat materialism is to pull matter, physical force, space, and time out from under the materialists' feet by arguing these are all objectively unreal, thereby collapsing materialism and deism.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Berkeley argues that all four of them are objectively unreal now if you can pull matter physical Force space and time out from under the materialists feet he can't stay standing you think so essentially what Berkeley does is to pull the rug out from under their feet and materialism collapses that at least is his project that's his strategy”

0.61

Leibniz opposed mechanistic science by denying that matter in the Newtonian sense is the ultimate real or basic substratum, instead proposing that the basic stuff of reality consists of monads as units of force or energy, a position that is realist but about energetics rather than mechanistic physics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“liet was one who fought it denying that matter in the Newtonian sense is the ultimate real the basic stuff substratum you see because for Li nits um the uh the basic stuff what he calls monads are units of force units of energy he was proposing a oh a kind of realism but a realism not about matter but about what we would call energistics not mechanistic physics but energistics”

0.61

Berkeley denies that he possesses a faculty of abstraction and claims he can only imagine particular things with specific properties—a particular shape, color, or extension—and asks whether others truly possess such an abstractive faculty or if Locke and other conceptualists are mistaken.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“this whether others have this one wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas they best can tell but for myself I find I have a faculty of imagining of representing to myself the ideas of particular things I've perceived and of compounding and dividing them I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse a fairy giraffe with butterfly wings I can consider the hand the eye the nose each by itself separated from the rest of the body but it must have some particular shape and color I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea described it's equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body that's moving neither Swift nor slow curval linear or rectal linear and the like to be plain I own myself unable to to abstract”

0.60

Occasionalism is the view that there is no direct causal connection between mind and body; rather, when something physical happens, that is the occasion on which God causes a corresponding mental state, and when the mind wills an action, that is the occasion on which God causes the physical action.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“there was a tradition which um had developed in Europe um known as occasionalism one um representative of which uh malr Frenchman was himself a metaphysical idealist now occasionalism is the view that that there is no direct causal connection between mind and body but um rather when something physical happens to me that is the occasion on which God causes a corresponding mental state to occur and when in my mind I decide to do something that's simply the occasion on which God causes physical action to occur”

0.60

Samuel Johnson's refutation of Berkeley by kicking a rock and claiming the pain was real misses Berkeley's point: Berkeley agrees the pain is real and involuntary (not imagined), but the question is what causes the pain—whether it requires a material substratum or can be caused by God.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“it was the um the famous essayist um Johnson who who said he was going to refute the Learned bishop and kicked a rock and went away holding his toe and said that pain was real see to which uh Bley replied um yes it's what we call quote real because it was an involuntary kind of pain now at the same time um there are voluntary kinds of pain as you imagine the idea yeah but that was one cause the only question is what's the cause of the pain what's the cause of this involuntary idea of pain that you have and so um it's not a silly position um it's a Well measured serious position”

0.60

Thinking abstractly does not require forming mental images of abstract ideas; rather, it involves thinking within a language or symbolic system where symbols relate to other symbols, as in mathematics where one thinks 'the square on the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides' without picturing a particular triangle.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“how you might try to answer it how others try to answer it you have to think of words not as names but as symbols not as names that point to objects but as symbols which build into a whole language where symbols relate to other symbols so when you think abstractly what you think is in terms of a language and within the framework of that language thinking that language you are thinking in abstraction from particular objects you think it's the way it is in mathematics Square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides now don't try to picture that it won't be accurate you're not thinking about a particular You've got to think in the language of mathematics”

0.60

In common sense experience, primary and secondary qualities are inseparable: one never perceives color without spatial extension, nor spatial extension without something that enables perception (color or other sensible quality). Empty space without color or other sensible properties is not empirically perceivable.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“in common sense [53:52] experience I never perceive color that is not spatially extended even a small blob of blue must have extension and if a spatial extension were to be perceived at all it would have to have color something at least which enables me to see it not just empty extension what's empty extension empty space what's that nothing nothing empirical”

0.60

If both primary and secondary qualities are relative and subjective, then there is no empirical evidence for the existence of matter as an objectively real substratum independent of perception. This conclusion follows from rigorous empiricism applied to Locke's own framework.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“now if both primary and secondary qualities are relative and subjective what is the left of objectively real matter independent in its existence empiric nothing there's not a trace of empirical evidence for the existence of matter as objectively real substratum oh that doesn't mean to say I don't see a castle sure I see a castle doesn't mean to say the alarm clock isn't something that I see something of of course I see something of it's reading it I have trouble with no the the question is not whether we have the experiences we have no empiricist would deny we have experiences of the sort we have the question is whether what we experience has an independently existing material substratum and for that there's not a shred of empirical evidence according to”

0.60

Secondary qualities are subjective and relative to the perceiver's sensory conditions (e.g., a color appears different depending on lighting; a sound is clearer or fainter depending on ear condition), and the same relativity and dependence on observation conditions applies to primary qualities like shape: a distant castle appears as a small round blob, but when approached appears as a large square shape.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“secondary qualities yeah it depends if you wash your ears out how clearly you hear the sound depends if you got your Spectacles on whether you see it clearly you sure I can't even see to read the alarm clock when I wake up without my spectacle uh gets worse all the time one of these days I guess I just won't bother but um okay uh what you see secondary quality is relative to the condition of your sense organs and all sorts of other observation conditions um and therefore he says it's subjective there's no objective correlate but the same is true of primary qualities associated with those secondary qualities you see and and he points to um an old castle keep on the horizon you know those great Square Norman castles and um he says what shape is it somebody says Square no no look what shape do you see from this distance well it's not exactly Square it it's more like a tiny round blob and then as you get closer what shape does it become notice become what comes huge Square it fills the whole Horizon obviously primary qualities like secondary qualities are relative”

0.60

Berkeley argues for mentalism—the view that only minds and their ideas exist—by reasoning that if ideas are mental things and the cause must be like the effect, then ideas must have mental causes, either from one's own mind or from other minds.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“his argument is that um if uh I ideas are indeed the um initial stuff out of which knowledge is composed sure simple ideas compound ideas uh related to each other with affirmations or denials that's the stuff of which knowledge is composed um if that's the case and if um ideas are mental things mental events then um if um the cause must be like the effect then ideas must have mental causes so the ideas that flood through my mind must be caused either by my mind or by other mind or Minds like cause like effect”

0.35

19th-century German idealism and the idealist movements that blossomed throughout Europe and America are phenomenalist in character, following from the rationalist tradition rather than the empiricist tradition (which includes Berkeley's idealism).

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“all of 19th century German idealism is phenomenalist and the idealist movements which blossomed throughout Europe and America in the late”

0.34

Metaphysical idealism is defined as the view that all that exists is of the nature of mind or immaterial spirit, and it is by definition a form of anti-realism about matter because if an idealist holds that all that exists is immaterial, then nothing material exists.

definitionestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“all that exists is of the nature of Mind immaterial Spirit um in order to get a handle on what he is doing and why”

0.34

George Berkeley was a practically minded man who served as a bishop in the Anglican Church in Ireland, attempted to establish a school for American Indians on Bermuda, settled in Newport Rhode Island, and pursued various socially related projects including medical research with tar water.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“he was a very practically minded man uh a bishop in the Anglican Church in Ireland he tried to establish a school for American Indians on the islands of Bermuda um which um never never got off the ground because of financing and because he didn't realize they have no natural uh water supply depend on rainwater so instead he settled in Newport Rhode Island and to this day you can see his house there”

0.29

Plotinus and the Platonic tradition are phenomenalist in character because matter has no independent existence in that framework—rather, as one descends the hierarchy of being through emanations, one approaches nonbeing, with no substratum of reality called matter at the lower levels.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“if you think back to the ancients plotinus yeah really he's a phenomenalist too because matter has no independent existence there are souls world of ideas but as you sink lower and lower on the chain of emanations the hierarchy of being you get down towards nonbeing and there is no substratum of reality down there called matter it's non-being you see and so the platonic tradition likewise is um potentially a kind of idealism it's certainly a kind of phenomenalism”

0.29

Berkeley's method is thoroughly empiricist, insisting that the only resources for natural knowledge are the simple and compound ideas that comprise experience, and affirming that the empirical faculties given by God are trustworthy if used rightly and confined to assertions for which we have evidence.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“his method therefore is going to be thoroughly empiricist with luck he's going to insist that the only resources we have for natural knowledge is the ideas that comprise EXP simple ideas and with L and with decart he's going to affirm that the empirical faculties which God has given to us are quite trustworthy if we use them a right if we confine our assertions to that for which we have evidence”

0.29

Christian idealism, particularly of a Platonic sort, has persisted in British thought since Cambridge Platonism in the 17th century and has recurred ever since.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“there's a long tradition uh particularly in in British thought of um Christian idealism particularly of a platonic sort well you remember I mentioned the Cambridge platonism of the 17th century and that sort of thing has kept uh recurring ever since”

0.21

Jo Wisdom attempted a posthumous psychoanalysis of Berkeley, arguing that Berkeley's idealist metaphysics and his medical venture with tar water were both illusory attempts at finding a panacea, stemming from pathological aversion to dirt and excretion.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unknown Lecturer

“one uh person a men by the name of Jo wisdom has tried to do a postumus psychoanalysis of George Berkeley in a book called The unconscious origins of Berkeley's philosophy in which he sees the um Venture with tar waterer and his idealist metaphysic as equally delus Ive attempts at finding a Panacea for our physical woes treat them with medicine and deny the existence of materiality uh due to some pathological aversion uh that he had to dirt and excretion such the psychoanalysis postly of George Berkeley take it with all the pinches of salt that it deserves”

0.17

Berkeley's position on ethics likely follows the nominalist tradition combining 'right reason' (consequentialist thinking) and 'the word of God' (divine command), though Berkeley does not write a treatise on ethics but preaches as a bishop.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Lecturer

“my guess is though I um don't have any um place in Burley that says that that he's tuned in enough to the nominalist tradition you see which is very very real very powerful in the 17th and 18th century that he would follow along in that uh that tradition yeah um yeah I think that's yeah I think that's the case”

0.13

Berkeley's third underlying principle, which will complete his system, is theism, and his replies to objections will be covered in the next lecture.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Unknown Lecturer

“this clock runs about 5 minutes slow I've discovered and um we'll pick it up next time with his third underlying principle his theism and the replies to objections so we we should um do all we need to do with Berkeley next time”