What this covers

This is a university lecture from a history-of-philosophy course. A philosophy professor takes up Berkeley's replies to the objections against his idealism and then carries the story on to Hume. The speaker is not named. The line of inquiry sets the three British empiricists side by side: John Locke as a dualist, George Berkeley as an idealist, and David Hume as a skeptic about every metaphysical position. Berkeley's view is made more plausible by laying out its three working parts. These are nominalism about "matter" as an abstract idea, the claim that we know only minds and their ideas, and God's orderly supply of those ideas.

The middle of the lecture works through the machinery. Active ideas are those we choose, and passive ideas arrive unbidden, so the passive ones need a cause in another mind. That gives occasionalism, illustrated by speech: my intention to speak is the occasion on which God causes someone else's hearing. The lecture also takes up the falling tree in the forest, which on this view persists in God's mind, and how we know other minds by analogy, with a contrast drawn to Hegelian and Martin Buber's relational accounts. There is also a short history of the concept of matter, including Thomas Hobbes's rarefied "spirit" and the twentieth-century dematerialization of matter.

The contentious turns come in two places. One is the problem of evil: if there are no physical causes, pain and cancer must come directly from God. Responses include Berkeley's view of pain as a schoolmaster and the proposal of a finite God. The other is the consequence for science, since the claim that Isaac Newton's matter, force, space, and time lack empirical grounding is flagged as contested. The lecture closes on Hume, who extends the skepticism to minds, causation, and God. With human nature unknowable, he cannot defend Locke's natural law and turns to ethical subjectivism grounded in moral sentiment.

Sharpest takeaway

The speaker traces the development of British empiricism from Locke through Berkeley to Hume, demonstrating how Berkeley's idealist metaphysics logically follows from empiricist principles about knowledge and evidence, and how this framework undermines traditional metaphysical claims about matter, mind, and causation.

  • Berkeley's denial of matter as a substatum is sustainable once empiricism's core commitments about abstract ideas and primary/secondary qualities are accepted
  • Berkeley resolves the apparent implausibility of idealism by showing how God's orderly provision of passive ideas accounts for the uniformity and predictability of nature
  • Hume extends Berkeley's skepticism about material substance to skepticism about minds, causation, and God, forcing ethics to relocate from metaphysical knowledge of human nature to empirical observations of moral sentiments

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0.81

Berkeley's idealism has far-reaching implications for science: if the Newtonian concepts of matter, force, space, and time all lack empirical basis and scientific justification, then Newton's claim to be doing empirical science is fundamentally compromised—the ground was thus ready for post-Newtonian science to develop alternative frameworks.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“I think the question is whether the Newtonian conception of matter has any empirical basis any scientific basis now we've been concentrating on what he says about madame but in his reply to objections that you've been reading you may notice he speaks not only about matter but about force and space and time now if all four of these key Newtonian concepts are without empirical basis what happens to Newton's claim to be doing empirical science yes is there any empirical basis for Newtonian science Berkeley says no David Hume says no Immanuel Kant says no which means when post-newtonian science began to develop the ground was ready for it”

0.80

Berkeley's nominalism entails that the word 'matter' has no reference and lacks meaning because it is an abstract idea, and as a nominalist Berkeley maintains that we have no abstract ideas; therefore when people speak of the reality of matter, they do not know what they are talking about.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“if he can support those three basic philosophical positions that are involved then his denial of the existence of matter sub stratum independently of any mind that denial seems to be sustainable insofar as the concept of matter is an abstract idea rather than an empirical notion and as a nominalist he maintains that we just don't have abstract ideas the word matter has no reference”

0.80

The distinction between active (voluntary) ideas that we choose to have and passive (involuntary) ideas that come to us uninvited and unwanted provides the foundation for Berkeley's argument that passive ideas must have a cause external to our minds, and since they are mental phenomena they must be caused by another mind.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“among our ideas we have to distinguish between active and passive ideas if you like voluntary and involuntary ideas because there are some ideas that I have that I choose to have my idea of a fairy giraffe with butterfly wings it's a voluntary idea because I thought it up I put it together on the other hand there are other ideas that are involuntary namely most of the sense impressions which come to us simply register uninvited on the consciousness involuntary ideas”

0.80

When I act—voluntarily choosing to utter words to communicate—I am the active agent; but when someone hears the sounds I produce, God causes that hearing experience. This is an example of 'occasionalism': my intention to speak is the occasion upon which God causes auditory experiences in others.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“insofar as you're hearing sounds you see is God's doing God doesn't you see that's like that occasional ism we were talking about my wanting to utter words is the occasion on which God causes you to hear not just wanting to be choosing to acting to”

0.74

The classical philosophical problem 'does a tree that falls in the forest with no one around make a sound?' is directly addressed by Berkeley's idealism: the tree does not pop in and out of existence when unobserved, but rather exists endlessly in God's mind from the moment God first thought it up.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“it's not that the world pops in and out of existence no it he cysts endlessly in God's mind from the moment he first thought it up”

0.74

Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley have roughly similar views of how we know other minds: we observe physical changes in another's body, which causes brain states and sensory stimuli in our body, producing mental states in us; by analogy with our own body-mind correlation, we infer that the other person has mental states correlated with their bodily states.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“Descartes Locke and Berkeley have roughly similar view of how we know other persons okay now go back to Descartes because there it's the obvious one what you're having Descartes is a combination of mind and body right and so with the other person you have combination of mind and body now we intake heart what occurs is that a physical change in the appearance or action of body two has a causal influence produces changed physical States brain states sensory stimuli in body one which because of mind-body interaction produces mental states”

0.74

Mind and soul are immaterial entities; in Descartes they are synonymous terms referring to an immaterial entity; medieval philosophers used 'soul' more broadly, but the rational soul capable of independent existence is what Descartes labeled 'mind,' and this terminology persists in empiricist philosophy.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“No immaterial entity mind soul Descartes a synonymous terms mind soul is an immaterial entity now that's not true necessarily for the middie evils of the Ancients because the word soul had a much wider use in the Greeks and the many evils nice but what are the many evils and ancients was called rational soul that's capable of independent existence by Descartes got labeled simply mind and that's the way it's used in Locke that's the way it's used in Berkeley”

0.74

Hume maintains that we know no matters of fact about reality as it is in itself—nothing about things beyond present experience; we know nothing about external things and nothing about mind as a reality beyond experience; all we know is our experience, and we are skeptical about knowing even the causes of our experience.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“humor is a sceptic about all metaphysical knowledge so he does not argue for any metaphysical position he does not argue for mind-body dualism he does not argue for materialism he does not argue for idealism he maintains that we we know no matters of fact that is to say nothing about reality as it is no matters of fact beyond present experience in other words if the model is that the mind has its ideas its experience which represent to us external things you see now Hume who says we no mo matters of fact beyond experience he's going to say we know nothing about external things and further that we know nothing about mind which would be a reality beyond our experience so all we know is experience”

0.74

Berkeley's philosophical position becomes substantially more plausible once his three basic positions are understood: nominalism (matter is an abstract idea with no reference), mentalism (all we know are minds and their ideas of primary and secondary qualities), and the claim that God's orderly provision of ideas explains the uniformity of nature.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“I would hope that after last time the philosophical position that he develops comes into focus rather readily along with his argument for it you may have thought initially that the thing he was trying to establish was pretty implausible but by the time you see how he does it I think the plausibility rating improves almost a hundred percent”

0.74

All empirical knowledge of material objects derives from ideas of primary and secondary qualities; we never have primary quality ideas independently of secondary qualities or vice versa; both primary and secondary qualities are relative to observation conditions; therefore both kinds of qualities are subjective features of our ideas, with no evidence for unchanging or objective qualities existing in a material substrate.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“if it is the case that all we know about material objects derives from our ideas of primary and secondary qualities and if it is the case that we never have primary quality ideas independently of secondary qualities or vice-versa and the both primary and secondary qualities are relative to all sorts of observation conditions then it seems to follow that both primary and secondary quality is in the same condition namely those subjective there are simply equalities of our ideas”

0.73

The uniformity and predictability of nature—the fact that multiple minds have roughly the same sensory experiences, that we live in a world of common sense and common order—requires as its cause a supreme intelligence or infinite spirit that alone can coordinate the passive ideas of all finite minds.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“the next step in his thinking though is to take note of the uniformity x' of nature that is to say the uniform it is of our experience the fact that there are predictability x' within the experience that we have made up of our ideas the fact that everybody in this room is hearing roughly the same things at this juncture the fact that we live in a world of common sense experience common order common predictability public evidence so forth so there must be as the cause of this sort of uniformity there must be some some greater mind some supreme intelligence some infinite spirit and God”

0.73

The problem of evil is one of the major problems for metaphysical idealism from a theistic standpoint: if there is no real material substance and no real physical forces, then physical evils like pain, cancer, and death cannot be explained as caused by physical processes in the environment as is traditionally claimed; instead they must be directly caused by God.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“I think one of the major problems for metaphysical idealism is the problem of evil at least from a theistic standpoint for the obvious reason that if there is no real materiality no real physical forces then all of the things the part of the problem of evil physical pain cancers and tornados all the rest of it including death yes they don't have the kind of explanation that has traditionally been given namely that they are caused by physical processes which are part of the physical environment in which God has put if we run afoul of its processes we break our necks well if you don't have physical causes to explain physical evils you've got a problem”

0.73

Some Continental philosophers, following Hegel, object that the analogical and representative theories of knowledge of other minds are inadequate because self-awareness itself is not primary but arises dialectically through relationship with another self: the master knows himself as master only in confrontation with the slave, and the slave knows himself as slave only in confrontation with the master.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“some in the more Continental tradition coming out of the 19th century that will begin to get out as we get into Hegel Yesi who wants to say that I don't even have self-awareness except in some sort of a dialectic with another self my alter ego yes so that the master knows himself as master only in the face of the slave and the slave knows himself as slave only in the face of the master”

0.73

There is a distinction between matter conceived as passive and inert versus matter conceived as having active power and potentiality; Berkeley emphasizes matter as purely passive, while Continental thinkers later developed conceptions of matter as active; this reflects the loss of the teleological Platonic-Aristotelian view of nature.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“there's another little tidbit that comes into this which is the question of whether matter itself is conceived of as being passive inert or having some some power some potentiality that's in process whether it's active or passive you'll see and it seems pretty plain that in Berkeley the emphasis is on passive yeah very passive some of the Continental thinkers it became more active”

0.73

Because Hume denies that we can have knowledge of human nature—the metaphysical essence of human beings—Hume cannot defend Locke's natural law ethic, which was based on knowledge of human nature; instead, Hume becomes an ethical subjectivist, grounding moral judgments in moral sentiments and feelings rather than in rational knowledge of human nature.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“now that has further implications because the ethic which Locke developed as you recall was a kind of ethic which he thought was demonstrable from our knowledge of the nature of the human self from human nature no if we don't have knowledge of human nature what can we do with that you see so John Locke's kind of natural law ethic is also ruled out by him and in as far as he still wants to be an empiricist what is he going to turn to not empirically derived knowledge of human nature metaphysically speaking but only experience of our Moral Sentiments moral feelings so in ethics he becomes what we call an ethical subjectivist”

0.69

Some idealists attempt to address the problem of evil by affirming a finite God who has all power that exists but whose power is not infinite—that is, there may be limits to what is conceivable in terms of worlds without evil, which even God could not create.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“there are idealists who try to handle it by affirming a finite God that while he has all the power there is it's not infinite power that there is a limit to what is conceivable in terms of a world without evil Yesi so that even God could not come up with that sort of an idea to share with us”

0.69

Berkeley further argues that natural evils serve a pedagogical function: pleasure and pain provide contrasts that accent beauty and enable humans to recognize and pursue the good, and pain serves as God's schoolmaster teaching us how to behave through reward and punishment mechanisms analogous to those Locke identified in human learning.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture instructor (philosophy professor)

“problems of this sort natural evils are necessary in bringing out the contrasts accenting Beauty shading the fit the picture so that we can really see what's good and pursue it in other words the fact that there is pleasure and pain involved in human experience serves as God's pedagogue schoolmaster in teaching us how he wants us to live teaching us how to behave which of course is one of the things that John Locke sent in talking about ethics the pleasure and pain provide sort of reward and Punishment provide a kind of building discipline in learning what's right and wrong”

0.66

Martin Buber's philosophy breaks with 18th-century atomistic individualism by arguing that the primitive, basic experiential form is not 'I' or even 'I-Thou' but rather 'We'—emphasizing that human consciousness is fundamentally dialogical and relational rather than individual and solipsistic.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“that comes Martin boobers I thou yes a I though he says is the primitive basic would not I not thou I though we and what they're doing is breaking but the individualism of the 18th century that made us all atoms social atoms”

0.66

For Hobbes, 'soul' or 'spirit' simply refers to some rarefied, gaseous physical substance, showing that materialism can be more subtle than denying immaterial entities—it can define supposedly immaterial things as rarefied matter.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“for some that we met for semester you remember for that matter for people like Hobbes all it means is some rarefied physical gaseous soul”

0.66

The 20th-century history of science often describes the 'dematerialization of matter': in the 18th century matter was conceived as atoms—indivisible pellets of stuff; but with developments in atomic physics (E=mc²), the principle of conservation of matter was replaced by the principle of conservation of energy, and contemporary physics recognizes that matter is not an ultimate substance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“sometimes the the history of scientific thought through the 19th century into the 20th is captioned like this the dematerialization of matter the dematerialization of matter and you can see the change that's gone on because back in the 18th century matter was composed of atoms atoms a little pellets of manner of indivisible stuff well that changed as we began to talk about the structure of the atom as we began to see that e equals MC squared that matter is not an ultimate the principle of the conservation of matter that it cannot be created and cannot be destroyed of Newtonian physics gave way to the principle of the conservation of energy”

0.66

The three great British empiricists differ in their metaphysical conclusions: Locke is a dualist (mind and body both exist); Berkeley is an idealist (only minds and ideas exist, matter does not); Hume is skeptical about all metaphysical knowledge (skeptical about proving dualism, materialism, or idealism).

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“the three great british empiricists Locke Berkeley and Hume and it might help to try and identify quickly what distinguishes them Locke seems to be metaphysical duelist that is to say mind and body both though not as definite about bad as Descartes Berkeley was a Mentalist not mind and body both but only mind and its ideas humor is a sceptic about all metaphysical knowledge”

0.66

Hume argues that human nature itself prevents us from being philosophical skeptics—despite philosophy suggesting we should disbelieve in external objects and the self, something about human nature draws us back to belief; the tension between philosophical skepticism and natural human belief is irresolvable.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“be a philosopher but amidst all your philosophy be still a man a woman well he doesn't say woman I had that he says be still man woman in other words there's something about human nature that doesn't let us and let us away without believing even though there's something about philosophy that reminds you deal and have logical proof so he tries to balance these two”

0.66

The concept of God historically carries with it the meaning of perfect goodness: 'the good' is understood as the ideal that all nature yearns for, traced back through the Middle Ages to Plato; therefore, to speak of a malevolent God is a contradiction in terms—to speak of a non-good God is not to speak of God at all.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“the concept of God is good also as a history that goes back through the Middle Ages to Plato God as V good what is the good well the good in that sense is is the ideal that we all that all nature yearns for yeah and so I suppose you'd say that Berkeley might well be saying God is good because that by definition is what the term God entails well concept of God is of the good to speak of a malevolent God is not to speak of God”

0.66

Hume's ethical subjectivism grounds moral judgments in moral sentiments: when we say something is unjust, we mean that observing the similarity between ourselves and others and seeing how they are treated causes us pain (moral sentiment), which leads us to cry out that it is unjust.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“that is to say the basis for our moral judgments is in our moral feelings yeah when I say something's unjust I mean when I see the similarity between me and you and see the way you were being treated I feel pain because I know it would hurt me and so I cry out just what that means is it hurts ethical subjectivist”

0.60

Will is a functional term referring to the faculty or capacity for voluntary action rather than an entity term; will is the capacity to act intentionally and initiate active ideas.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“of course is one of the faculties of the mind will intellect faculties of the night well will is simply acting voluntarily yeah so will is the active agent so that if I will to to do something to to one of you I'm really gonna get my own back Christine here I am going to I'm gonna get an examination if I do something malicious malicious of that sort yes well that's an act of well is involved there it's not just entertaining the idea but it's willing”

0.56

For Berkeley, Christ's incarnation as 'God in the flesh' means Christ appeared as a being receiving certain ideas and certain experiences passively, just as any human does, making Christ as fully human as anyone born of a woman while remaining fully divine.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“namely that Christ appeared among us God in the flesh and what his flesh flesh in Berkeley is yes he is certain ideas certain experience passively received so that Christ was as fully human in that regard as anyone else born of a woman yes as really as you are”

0.51

Berkeley's response to the problem of evil through the 'greater good argument' is structurally identical to the theodicy Christian theists have used throughout the centuries, so idealists who use this argument are in no worse position than non-idealist theists regarding the problem of evil.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“so that while you might say that this is particularly a problem for an idealist all right if an idealist can use a great a good argument he's in no worse case than anybody else”

0.47

'Spirit' is an undefined word in philosophical discourse whose meaning in this context is simply something that is not material—it has no positive definition, though it implies immateriality and lack of spatial extension.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections [_P6nNM0aLWo]

“spirit undefined word really about all it means in this sort of context is something that isn't material it has no positive meaning actually”