privation
In Platonic metaphysics, the absence, lack, or deprivation of a quality or good; evil or negative properties are understood not as positive entities but as privations or absences of positive forms.
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
Other definitions
In philosophical theology, the absence or negation of a quality or being; specifically, the Augustinian definition of evil as a lack of good rather than a positive force.
Blood Meridian: Bibliotheca Webinar
Where it comes up · 10
- A History of Philosophy | 20 Augustine and Neo-Platonism3 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 22 Early Medieval Philosophy2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 23 Problem of Universals1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 25 Aquinas on God1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 40 Leibniz on Evil1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 06 Plato on God1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 18 Middle and Neo-Platonism1 claim
and 2 more
Most important claims · 10 of 13Search all claims for “privation” →
- Evil can be understood as dependent on one stage in the hierarchy of being—a dog lacks the degree of perfection appropriate to a human, and a human lacks the degree of perfection appropriate to higher beings, but among humans those who do not live according to the logos and do not conform to the form of their human existence fail to achieve the actuality of that inherent capacity, so evil is a privation of good, a privation of the intended good of the form in actualization.A History of Philosophy | 18 Middle and Neo-Platonism
- In the Neoplatonic framework Augustine adopts, evil is understood as a privation—a perversion or corruption of something good—rather than as having a separate, independent existence as it does in Manichean dualism, because evil is parasitical on the good and derives its reality only from what is good.A History of Philosophy | 20 Augustine and Neo-Platonism
- Extreme or exaggerated realism, ascribed to John Scotus Eriugena and sometimes to Anselm, holds that forms of species and genera exist in reality separately from particulars while each particular participates in that one and the same form, and these forms exist both transcendently and in particulars such that there is a numerically identical form recurring in every particular case. Individuals are differentiated only by their degree of privation—their degree of non-participation in the full form.A History of Philosophy | 23 Problem of Universals
- Plato distinguishes between being (the unchanging eternal realm of forms), becoming (the state of change in the physical world of particulars), and non-being (total privation of form, not absolute nothingness but 'nothing in particular').A History of Philosophy | 06 Plato on God
- In Anselm's theological framework, evil is a privation of the good, and the good for all creatures is that they should seek to fulfill their natural end by imitating God in His unchanging Perfection—with degrees of such imitation appropriate to each particular creature's place in the hierarchy of being and goodness.A History of Philosophy | 22 Early Medieval Philosophy
- What makes an individual an individual (individuation) is not merely privation of form (Neoplatonic view) but rather the embodiment within the individual of not only the form of the species but of all possible qualities which the individual will develop; thus God by knowing the forms of species and all possible qualities that compose each individual can think of the particular combination of qualities that identify an individual and thereby act as efficient cause creating individuals.A History of Philosophy | 22 Early Medieval Philosophy
- Section 5 clarifies that evil is a privation of good but a limited and purposeful privation, distinguishing Leibniz's view from the classical privation theory.A History of Philosophy | 40 Leibniz on Evil
- Evil is a loss of order, harmony, and ordered unity, and in that evil is a privation of form—a failure to participate as fully as possible in form—and since a thing's essential being is measured by the form it participates in, evil is fundamentally a privation of essential being and a loss of measure.A History of Philosophy | 20 Augustine and Neo-Platonism
- The Platonic tradition addresses the problem of evil in two ways: either through eternal dualism (a realm of good forms and a realm of evil forms, as in ancient Gnosticism), or by viewing evil as a privation or deprivation of the good—a lack or absence rather than a positive force.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- The goodness of God is evident in His Providence—the good things manifest throughout creation—and all being is good in its own way; evil is a privation or deprivation of good rather than a positive principle.A History of Philosophy | 25 Aquinas on God