What this covers

This is a university lecture on Leibniz's Theodicy, built around the logical problem of evil: if God is all-wise, all-powerful, and altogether good, evil's existence seems to contradict at least one of those claims. The lecturer places Leibniz between two rivals. Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza treat the experience of free choice as a confused idea, while René Descartes's mind-body dualism leaves the will working in something like a causal vacuum. Leibniz's own position follows from The Perfect Concept of an Individual, in which every predicate, future actions included, is contained in the individual's nature. That creates an apparent problem of inner determinism for a system of pre-programmed monads.

The middle of the lecture works through how Leibniz tries to escape that problem. Causes incline the will without compelling it, so choices are certain from God's standpoint but not necessary. The lecturer uses Peter and Judas as test cases, and the example of extreme thirst to show that the soul keeps a power of contrary choice. Reflection and deliberation clarify confused appearances of the good, and divine grace is itself part of an individual's possible concept. The lecture also gives the objection from Hasker, an indeterminist, who says that freedom caused by one's own nature is merely inner causation and so still determinism.

The last stretch moves to evil and history. The lecturer reads sections of the Theodicy on the greater-good argument, on evil as a limited and purposeful privation, and on God's free creation. The best-of-all-possible-worlds claim is presented as an a priori result, tied to the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the hierarchy of being, not as an empirical one. The lecture then ends with the City of God, an eschatology Leibniz shared with figures like Francis Bacon and Hobbes, and with the way a kingdom of God on earth feeds Enlightenment ideas of progress and the philosophy of history. Voltaire's satire of Professor Pangloss in Candide closes the account.

Sharpest takeaway

Leibniz develops a compatibilist account of human freedom and divine foreknowledge that preserves both human moral responsibility and God's omniscience by distinguishing between metaphysical and moral necessity, while addressing the problem of evil through a teleological framework where God creates the best of all possible worlds.

  • Leibniz rejects both Hobbesian determinism and Cartesian indeterminism in favor of a position where choices are determined by individual nature but can be modified through rational reflection and divine grace
  • God's foreknowledge of contingent truths does not necessitate those truths; God knows what will happen as certain but not as necessary, preserving creaturely freedom
  • Evil is permitted as part of God's creation of the best of all possible worlds because it serves greater goods and contributes to the perfection of the whole through an eschatological vision culminating in the City of God

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0.75

Leibniz argues in the Theodicy that causes incline the will without compelling it, meaning inclinations determine choices with certainty (from God's perspective who knows all things) but not with absolute necessity, preserving a residual freedom to act otherwise.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the cause is inclined of a will without compelling it okay Sam sir is some residual freedom causes incline the will without compelling it this is why the determination in question is not necessitate it is certain to him who knows all that the effect will follow the inclination but the effect of which implies contradiction it is also by an internal inclination such as this that the will is determined without any necessity”

0.75

Even when one has a great passion such as extreme thirst, the soul retains the power of contrary choice by finding reason to resist, such as demonstrating its power to resist the inclination, and this power of contrary choice is never rendered absolutely necessary by any inclination.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“supposing one has the greatest passion in the world a great thirst for example you'll admit that the soul can find some reason for resisting it if only that of showing its power to resist it thus although one may never be in a perfect indifference of equilibrium yes a there's that causal vacuole you're never in an indifference of equilibrium there may be always a preponderance of inclination for the side taken it never renders the resolution taken absolutely necessary”

0.75

Other possible individuals could have been created in place of Peter and Judas—there are other possible worlds in which Peter would not sin or Judas would not betray—but God did not decree that Peter should sin or that Judas be damned; rather, God decrees that Peter will sin certainly yet not necessarily, but freely, and that Judas will suffer damnation freely.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“so there are many other individuals that could have been created than Peter who were denying Judas who had betrayed him okay other possible worlds this isn't the only possible world there are other possible worlds in which there would be no Peter and no Judas so more suited to God's wisdom not that he decrees that Peter should sin or that Judas be damned but rather that he decrees in preference to other possible individuals he decrees the Peter who will sin certainly yet not necessarily but freely and decrees to create Judas who will suffer damnation they should come into existence”

0.75

The future salvation of Peter is contained in the eternal possible concept of Peter, and this does not exclude the intervention of divine grace; God's grace acts to make God Himself desirable to Peter more than sin, and the aids of divine grace are also contained within the possible concept of Peter.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“granted the future salvation of Peter is contained in the eternal possible concept of Peter still this doesn't exclude the intervention of divine grace how come Peter who denied him would be served by virtue of divine grace making god himself desirable more than in the case of the denial is he so by God's grace God acting in that case yes Peter could be saved so that the aides of divine grace are also contained under the aspect of possibility that is to say in conception of Peter that includes all of his acts and choices”

0.75

Nature is harmonized not just once at creation but continually through God's intervention and adjustment, such that this is the best of all possible worlds, not on an empirical basis but on an a priori basis given Leibniz's conceptions of the hierarchy of being.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“nature is harmonized not just once and for all at the beginning have been messed up that's almost a deistic conception but nature is continually being harmonized by the intervention of God as well as his continued activity and there are repeated times when he uses the word intervention adjustment so that this is the best of all possible worlds for others which God has conceived yeah worlds without Judas's Peters the best of all possible worlds and that seems to be an a priori truth he's not arguing empirically that this is the best of all possible worlds but Donnelly priori basis granted the conceptions that he's been building here in terms of the hierarchy of being”

0.75

The notion of a kingdom of God on earth gives rise to the idea of progress, which becomes increasingly dominant in the Enlightenment, generating optimism about the course of history moving toward some sort of ideal society.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“so the notion of a kingdom of God on earth is is very common in the 17th century movement towards it historically is what gives rise to the idea of progress which is one of the increasingly dominant ideas in the Enlightenment Yesi optimism about the course of history a progress toward some sort of ideal society some kingdom of God on earth the inevitability of progress it's sometimes inevitability of progress it sometimes comes out of out as”

0.69

Descartes's mind-body dualism produces an indeterminist view of the will because mind and body are two separate entities with no necessitating connection between them, allowing the mind to operate in something of a causal vacuum where will exercises freedom independently of physical causation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“by virtue of the mind-body dualism two separate entities there is no necessitating the mind in its concepts as distinct from persons in its conceptualizing its reasoning or in the assertion or denial that the will makes in relationship to what it knows the human will according to Descartes seems to up operate in something of a causal vacuum a completely in determinist situation which is only possible because mind of which will is a function mind is a separate entity functions independently not causally dominated though cause effect connections between mind and body do occur in relationship to physical stimuli producing since responses emotional feelings so forth but the will remains free”

0.69

The principle of sufficient reason implies a final cause outside the sequence of contingent events, and that final cause is a necessary and perfect being that is altogether good and desirable.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the principle of sufficient reason implies a final cause outside the sequence of contingent events a teleological argument that final cause is a necessary and perfect being all together good all together desirable in nature”

0.69

Sections 6 and 7 return to the nature of God, affirming that God is good, while section 8 affirms that God is unrestrained in His creation and creates freely since He could have done otherwise.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“six and seven coming back to the nature of God God is good the chapter 8 section 8 coming back to the power of God God is unrestrained in his creation creates freely since he could do otherwise and he does”

0.69

To avoid being enslaved by appearances of what is good, the will must exercise itself through firm reflection and mature deliberation to attain clear understanding, because clarity of thought dispels confusion about deceptive appearances, enabling desire for something other than what appeared desirable.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“what what seems to be good but really isn't is he by means of a firm will and to reflect to reflect to refuse to act or decide in certain circumstances except after maturer deliberation so he seems to be saying that we can be confused by appearances unless and this sounds like Descartes and Spinoza unless we make sure of clear understanding there's a result of reflection to err deliberation okay so in that sense what would happen is that clarity of thought will dispel the confusion about appearances and you'll see that it's a deceptive appearance and therefore you will desire something other which were quite free to do free meaning out of your natural inclination for what now are people's good”

0.69

The perfect concept of an individual substance includes all its predicates—past, present, and future—so that everything that will happen to an individual, including future actions, is contained within and expressed through the individual's essential nature.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the perfect concept of an individual okay there's the essence the nature includes all its predicates past present and future so everything about an individual is contained within the nature of the individual future predators that is to say actions which are predicated of an individual choice is predicated on an individual all of those things about an individual are contained within the nature of the individual as when it's clearly understood”

0.69

There are imperfections that are part of the very nature of things—apples that rot and recyclable bodies—on the other hand, God pre-conceives eternal truths and concepts of everything in nature as archetypes in the mind of God.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“there are imperfections imperfections that are part of the very nature of things there are apples that rot and our bodies to a recyclable imperfections in nature on the other hand he speaks of eternal truths concepts of everything in nature in the mind of God pre conceives everything he uses the word archetypes the Augustinian tradition the very essence of God is to exist and there's an implicit ontological argument there”

0.69

Voltaire satirized Leibniz's claim that this is the best of all possible worlds in his novel Candide, where the character Professor Pangloss mutters as he walks through the ruins of Lisbon after a devastating earthquake that this is the best of all possible worlds.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“it's that notion that this is the best of all possible worlds which came under satirical attack by Voltaire in his Candide are you familiar with that work Voltaire's Candide in which he pictured somebody traveling the world around and discovering all of the horrible things and in a catastrophic earthquake in the city of Lisbon meeting who is it professor Penn gloss which means all talk you can imagine who that stands for professor paint glass and muttering as he walks through the ruins this is the best of all possible worlds the satirical criticism of lightness best of all possible worlds”

0.69

The philosophy of history as a discipline itself emerged from increased interest in time and historical process rather than treating history as mere narrative or entertaining writing.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“it generates interest in what now we call the philosophy of history and so that the philosophy of history as a discipline itself history used to be treated more as what they call Bell let good writing interesting right then more interest was in time historical process hence the idea of progress in history you see and that blossomed in the 19th century in romanticist ways”

0.69

Section 1 of the Theodicy presents the greater good argument: evil is part of a larger inclusive teleology and like every other thing and property contributes to the perfection of the whole within the hierarchy of being.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“section one of the theodicy and we have numbered sections in the abridgement section one is dealing with the greater good argument evil simply is part of this larger inclusive teleology it like every other kind of thing and property of things that emerge within the whole hierarchy of being contributes to the perfection of the whole”

0.69

Section 5 clarifies that evil is a privation of good but a limited and purposeful privation, distinguishing Leibniz's view from the classical privation theory.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“section 5 evil yes it's a privation of good but a limited and purposeful privation of good”

0.69

Hobbes and Spinoza reject a realistic view of freedom of the will, treating the experience of free choice as a confused idea when choices are actually caused by causal processes that determine everything else, making them anti-realists about human freedom.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“we see to ourselves to make free choices that experience of a free choice is simply a confused idea of a choice itself is caused by the causal processes that dominate everything else”

0.69

Leibniz develops a teleological metaphysical system based on intrinsic essences and pre-established monads, where every monad's actions are determined by its inner nature which is pre-programmed to function as it does, creating an apparent problem of inner determinism.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“he's developing a teleological metaphysic he talks of intrinsic essences for every moment so that it has its own potency pre-established to be actualized and you get the the picture from thinking about his theory of monads that everything our monad does is due to the inner nature of that mode which is as it were pre-programmed to function as it does”

0.68

The classic formulation of the logical problem of evil is that if propositions one through three are true—that God is all-wise, all-powerful, and altogether good—then proposition four (evil exists) is logically incompatible with the first three, requiring that at least one of the other premises be false.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“now if you take these as propositions one two three and add a fourth proposition you have the classic formulation of the logical problem having to do with evil because of the claim that proposition 4 is logically incompatible with the first three if God is all-wise he had no what to do about it if he's all-powerful he could do it if he's altogether good he would want to do it evil exists so at least one of the other premises must be false”

0.61

Through knowledge of necessary truths and their abstraction, humans rise to acts of reflection that enable self-awareness, observation of one's own nature, and contemplation of God as the unlimited good that should be desired, with reflection giving an idea of that which is far better than ourselves.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“by knowledge of necessary truths and their abstraction we rise to acts of reflection that's what he was saying earlier that we need it we need to reflect we rise to acts of reflection which make us think of that which calls itself I to observe that this or that is within us it is thus that in thinking of ourselves we think of a being of substance of the material and of God himself conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits so reflection gives us an idea of that which is far better than we which should be desired”

0.61

Leibniz sees the whole process of nature and grace as culminating in the City of God, following the Augustinian conception, and this eschatology is not an oddity in the 17th century but common among thinkers like Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the next line and the Monod ology statements refers to the City of God that's the tell us that is to say he sees the whole process of nature and grace as culminating in the City of God there's the Augustinian conception now don't don't assume that that's an oddity in the 17th century remember that Francis Bacon with his view that knowledge is power and his building on the creation mandate in wanting to bring scientific knowledge to bear on the human condition to improve it repeatedly speaks of the kingdom of God his scientific utopia is his vision of the kingdom of God and the same is true of Thomas Hobbes you see what he is talking about in the Leviathan is a civil society which enforces the law of God through civil law and he sees this as the kingdom of God on earth”

0.61

God in cooperating with ordinary actions follows the laws he has established, continually preserving and producing human being through an ongoing creative process that imparts the power to exist and the freedom expressed in the particular sequencing of ideas reflecting our individual substance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“God in cooperating with ordinary actions only follows the laws that he is established and what he seems to have been saying in the other passage in this one as well is that God having established laws also has complete for knowledge complete for knowledge and because he knows what will be done it can be said to be pre-determined but that does not mean it's necessitated hypothetically it could be otherwise it's as if there is sufficient reason but not necessary reason making that distinction there so back to the passage then on to 29 he follows the laws he's established that is to say he continually preserves and produces our being remember that the process of creating is an ongoing one full duration is a continuous imparting of the power to be taneous lee there's that inner determinism or with freedom in that order which the concept of our individual substance carries with itself”

0.61

Hasker, an indeterminist, argues that any compatibilism in which freedom is caused by one's own nature, even if that nature is itself capable of modification through feedback from our reactions, is really no more than determinism—merely inner causation rather than external causation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“any kind of compatibilism in which one's free choices are caused by one's own nature which nature is itself caused even if there is some feedback from our reactions which are caused which modify our nature you see any kind of compatibilism in which freedom is caused by our own nature's really is no more than determinism it's simply a matter of inner causation rather than external causation that's the complaint”

0.61

Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan describes a civil society that enforces the law of God through civil law, and Hobbes sees this as the kingdom of God on earth

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“and the same is true of Thomas Hobbes you see what he is talking about in the Leviathan is a civil society which enforces the law of God through civil law and he sees this as the kingdom of God on earth”

0.52

The relationship between contingent and necessary truth is crucial: contingent truths depend on certain things happening and do not logically have to be, while God's own knowledge consists of necessary truths, so from our standpoint what happens to Peter is contingent but from God's pre-knowledge standpoint it is logically necessary to the perfection of the whole.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophy Lecturer)

“when he's talking about epistemology as we've noted he distinguishes between those two contingent truths two pinned on certain things happening they don't logically have to be now there there is a passage we don't have it in the anthology where he speaks of God's own knowledge and seems to say that God's own knowledge is all of necessary truth they see from our standpoint what happens to Peter is contingent on certain things happening contingent on God in His grace reaching Peter from our standpoint it's contingent but from God's pre-knowledge standpoint what we regard as contingent is something which is logically necessary to the perfection of the whole”

0.52

The natural inclination is entirely tied to clarity of thought and to the rule of reason, meaning that when reason is clear and dominant, our natural inclinations are transformed accordingly

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the whole natural inclination is tied to clarity of thought and to the rule of reason”

0.52

The lecturer proposes that Leibniz may have provided a fourth alternative between the disjunctive argument that forces a choice between strict necessitarianism and indeterminism.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“so haskers point is if in determinism no take it back if necessity rien ism is wrong if compatibilism reduces to a kind of necessity rien ism then the only alternative is you see and I guess I'd want to at least try out the hypothesis that lightness is providing a fourth alternative you know anytime you get a disjunctive argument A or B or C and somebody argues a is wrong B is wrong therefore C well LD provisionally until some smart aleck comes up with D and I think it may have come up with it all right”

0.48

Part of the building nature of things is that in the course of nature, even sin has its own punishment built into the whole prearrangement, indicating that Leibniz incorporates the classical Christian principle that sin carries its own consequences within the natural order.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophy Lecturer)

“well then you have some comments on sin and Punishment so that part of the building nature of things is that in the course of nature even sin has its own punishment that's built into the whole prearrangement okay”

0.48

The speaker suggests that Descartes's picture of human freedom as libertarian indeterminism is a form of unintentional predeism that is theologically inadequate because both Calvinists and Arminians believe God continues to be actively involved with us.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophy Lecturer)

“and it seems to me that what Descartes has given us is sort of a deistic picture of human freedom now he's pre a ISM and I think it's unintentional on his part but the picture seems to be alright God gave you a free will now it's up to you well you know no no Calvinists is gonna be happy with that you see and I don't think a good Arminian should be happy with that either no because God continues to be active involved with us so lighten it doesn't want the in determinism of Descartes that's very clear”

0.39

Whitehead may be influenced by Leibniz through the 19th-century idealists (Hegel and Bradley) and through Bertrand Russell, though the speaker notes similarities between Whitehead's ultimate constituents and Leibniz's monads that may be striking, but he is uncertain whether Whitehead explicitly expresses debt to Leibniz.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophy Lecturer)

“Whitehead influenced by this you know I'm inclined to say wait till we read Whitehead there are similarities I don't think of anything in Whitehead that appeals to lightness he is much more influenced by the 19th century idealists like Hegel and Bradley on the other hand Whitehead worked for a long time with Bertrand Russell and one of Russell's first books was on Whitehead well take it back was unlike nents so it's hard to say the ultimate constituents of reality for Whitehead rather analogous to Lydon it's monads and it's an analogy that may be rather striking no I say I don't think of anywhere in Whitehead where he expresses debt to lighten it but I you know as I say that there's one section of his major work that I'd want to check where he may when he's reviewing some historical matters but there are similarities that are interesting”

0.26

The lecturer recommends to students to go and do likewise—to try to be thoroughly Christian in one's thinking, integrating faith and reason as Leibniz attempted to do.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“since there's this last day of the class I'm tempted to say go and do thou likewise in other words just try to be a thoroughly Christian and you're thinking”

0.21

A student questions whether middle knowledge (a doctrine developed in the late Middle Ages) bears on Leibniz, and the speaker responds that he doesn't think Leibniz follows that route.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophy Lecturer)

“I don't think that at least I've never thought of limits as following that route it seems to me that was a route which who was it in the late Middle Ages developed which has been resurrected more recently I don't know if there's anybody in the book that's going on on middle knowledge who has tapped into live knits on this or not I don't know”