
A History of Philosophy | 23 Problem of Universals
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This is a single university lecture, given by an unnamed lecturer, in a history-of-philosophy course. It begins with the medieval Problem of Universals as Boethius framed it: whether genera and species exist in nature or only in the mind, whether they are material or immaterial, and whether they exist apart from particulars or within them. The lecture then sorts the answers into four positions, distinguished by whether there are real universals and whether there are universal concepts in the mind. It also separates a universal statement such as "all humans are mortal" from a commitment to real universals.
The middle section goes through the positions and their proponents. Exaggerated realism, attributed to Eriugena and sometimes Anselm, treats individuals as differing only by degrees of privation, and it was put to work defending the Trinity, original sin, and transubstantiation. William of Champeaux retreated to indifferentism under pressure from Roscelin, who argued for nominalism, and from Abelard, whose conceptualism takes a middle course. The lecture also follows the afterlife of nominalism. William of Ockham revived it and tied it to a Divine Command Theory of ethics, and Luther absorbed it. The lecturer argues, contentiously, that it threatens the metaphysical substructure of Greek and medieval thought, and that empiricist ethics without real universals tends toward consequentialism like John Stuart Mill's or toward Humean subjectivism. A. J. Ayer's emotivism serves as a twentieth-century endpoint.
The final stretch turns to the thirteenth-century response to Averroism. Bonaventure put archetypes in God's mind, while Thomas Aquinas chose to amend Aristotle rather than reject him. The lecture lists his additions: Augustinian exemplarism, God as the highest good, and creation out of nothing. It explains how God's knowledge of possibilities in prime matter yields knowledge of individual natures, and how every creature sits within a continuous Hierarchy of Being running from God down to matter.
Thomas Aquinas synthesizes Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics by positioning God as a logos who knows archetypal forms in his mind, thereby reconciling individual creation and divine knowledge with Aristotelian teleology and resolving the medieval problem of universals.
- Aquinas adds exemplarism (God as logos knowing forms) and creation ex nihilo to Aristotle's metaphysic to make it compatible with Christianity
- By knowing all possibilities in prime matter through archetypal forms, God can know and create individual creatures with particular natures
- Every individual creature has a god-given nature (proximate end) that fits into the cosmic hierarchy, actualizing possibilities and glorifying God
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When nominalism re-emerged with William of Ockham in the 14th-15th century, it was assimilated by Martin Luther and had tremendous impact on 16th and 17th century philosophy, showing that nominalism was not merely a defeated medieval position but had recurring philosophical and theological significance.
“when we get to William of Aram in the 14th 15th century we find that he revived nominalism is usually spoken of as a major nominalist and it is William of aam's nominalism that was assimilated by Martin Luther and had a tremendous impact in 16th and 17th century philosophy okay so watch for this to reoccur”
The crux of Aquinas's solution to the problem of universals lies in a twofold claim: (1) God is the logos who knows the forms/archetypes in his own mind, and (2) In knowing these archetypal forms, God knows every individual creature he has created or ever will create, because all possibilities are implicit in God's knowledge of prime matter.
“the Crux as I see it is twofold and you can see how he takes the cues from Bonaventure one God is the logos God knows the forms in his mind but in knowing the forms within his own mind those exemplars God knows every individual creature he has created or ever will create how come well you see um in knowing exemplars god knows all that is possible”
William of Champeaux initially advocated exaggerated realism but came under criticism from Roscelin and Abelard, causing him to retreat to a position known as indifferentism, in which forms exist only in the reality of particulars (not in a transcendent sense), with all members of a species indifferently participating in that one and the same form.
“one of the principal Advocates of exaggerated realism was a man named William of champo translate the French and it comes out as Bill field um does it not later on you'll come to Robert grosser test that comes out as Bobby Fathead but um okay um well sure that's the literal translation isn't it 17 16th century French didn't have the Flex it had an S instead of the Flex so uh gross test is gross fat head big head okay um well um talking of William of shampo Bill field um he um seems to have advocated this position but came under a great deal of criticism from um Roselin and abalar you can read about that in stump and so he uh retreated to an alternative position uh that is usually referred to as indifferentism”
Boethius formulated the problem of universals in three primary questions: (1) Do genera and species really exist in nature outside the mind or are they merely mental constructs? (2) If they are realities, are they material or immaterial (transcendent in a Platonic sense or materialized in particulars)? (3) Do they exist apart from particulars or within them? A fourth question was added: Are universal concepts thought separately from particulars?
“boethus formulation of the problem of universals he posed it in three questions to which in the immediately ensuing discussion a four question was added first do Genera and species really exist in nature that is to say outside of the mind or are they merely mental constructs”
Conceptualism, represented by Abelard, holds a compromise position: unlike nominalism, it affirms that universal concepts exist in the mind and that we think universal concepts separately from particulars, developing abstract general ideas. Unlike realism, however, it denies that real universals exist outside the mind in either transcendent or immanent form.
“a compromise position began to emerge represented by the conceptualism of abelard the conceptualism of abelard who was prepared to agree with Roselin that no forms exist in reality Transcendent or iminent but he disagreed with russellin about whether we think Universal Concepts abelard insisted that Universal con Concepts exist occur within our minds and that we do think them separately from particulars we develop abstract General ideas”
Extreme or exaggerated realism, ascribed to John Scotus Eriugena and sometimes to Anselm, holds that forms of species and genera exist in reality separately from particulars while each particular participates in that one and the same form, and these forms exist both transcendently and in particulars such that there is a numerically identical form recurring in every particular case. Individuals are differentiated only by their degree of privation—their degree of non-participation in the full form.
“exaggerated realism is the view that forms the forms of species and Genera Genera is the plural of genus of course um that um forms of spe species and gener exist in reality separately from particulars while each particular participates in that one and the same form uh but forms not only exist in that Transcendent fashion somehow or other they exist in particulars as well so that there is an identity between particulars by virtue of participating in that one and the same form numerically one recurring in every particular case”
Nominalism, argued by Roscelin, denies that real forms exist either in a transcendent or immanent sense and denies that we think in terms of universal concepts or abstract general ideas. Instead, there are only particular words (general terms) that refer universally to all members of a class, with universality belonging only to how the name is used, not to any real universal thing.
“according to the nominalist there are no real forms no real forms of a Transcendent sort and no real forms of an imminent sort no real forms nothing of them exists outside of the mind now within the mind moreover we do not think in terms of universals there are no abstract General ideas no Universal Concepts”
The four major positions on universals can be distinguished by their answers to two key questions: (1) whether there are real universals, and (2) whether there are universal concepts in the mind. Extreme realism says yes to both; indifferentism says yes to both but with a different relationship; nominalism says no to both; conceptualism says yes to universal concepts but no to real universals.
“let's distinguish the question of whether there are Universal Concepts from the question of whether there are real universals okay and you can begin to see how these positions line up extreme realism wants to say yes to both extreme realism wants to say yes to both and to affirm that there is a Ono one correspondence between our Concepts and real universals in as much as dialectic gets at them with illumination uh we're able to have the s of knowledge that clato envisioned on the other hand uh in differen ISM we'll say yes there are real Universal Concepts and real universals we do think Universal Concepts and there are real universals though um not as clear about the relationship it's uh much more approximate the relationship between our Concepts and things it's not as final um third the nominalist wants to say no to both and the conceptualist wants to say yes to the concepts and no to the real universals”
Thomas Aquinas, in his response to Averroism (the Muslim Aristotelian interpretation of Aristotle by Averroes), chose to modify and supplement Aristotle's metaphysics rather than reject it entirely, as Bonaventure had done. Aquinas sought to make Aristotelian metaphysics compatible with Christian theology by adding exemplarism (God as logos knowing archetypal forms) and creation ex nihilo.
“taking a cue from the things which Bon Avenger had found missing what aquinus does is to add to Aristotle's metaphysic first the exemplarism of Augustine The View that forms are exemplars archetypes in the mind of the logos”
Thomas Aquinas wrote his Summa Theologiae in explicit response to Averroism (Averroists) and their two-fold truth doctrine. The Summa begins with two foundational topics: the relation of faith and reason, and the conception of God, establishing the theological framework before proceeding to other matters.
“his summer theologica which is one of his two major works we have some excerpts from it in the Anthology his summer theologica was written in response to aists in response to people with that interpretation of Aristotle verism of course among Christians to handle um the problems in Aristotle had that doctrine of two-fold Truth so that there are truths of faith and truths of Reason what then is the first topic that he takes up in his sum theologica the relation of faith and reason yeah well the aist had this um insufficient inadequate conception of God what's the second topic he takes up in his summer theologica the conception of God”
The relationship between universal concepts and real universals can be expressed through two key distinctions: (1) a universal statement (like 'all humans are mortal') is not the same as a statement about universals, and (2) empirical generalization from particulars is different from metaphysical commitment to real universals.
“be careful because the fact that you make a universal statement May simply be a matter of generalization a universal statement logically might have this form take it back you see that's a universal statement or um another universal statement would be something like now if everybody does say that that would be a universal statement No you're not concerned about Universal stat if you're talking about universals you're talking about statements about universals you see and neither of those is a statement about universals the first one's a statement about particulars a general statement about particulars the second one is a particular statement about a particular morning neither of them are statements about universals”
Nominalism entails that there are no real universals and therefore no natural moral law inherent in the essence of human nature, because natural moral law requires the universality of human nature to establish universal moral obligations.
“if there are no real universals there is no natural moral law inherent in the essence of human nature there is no natural moral law and as you realize the theory of moral law natural moral law had been developed in Augustine and becomes very significant in Thomas aqu us but even at this stage in the 10th and 11th century it become a ma major part of the medieval philosophical tradition”
For a pure empiricist logicist like the 20th-century logical positivist AJ Ayer, abstract talk that has no direct reference to particulars is meaningless, such that ethical statements become not expressions of moral properties but merely emotional expressions or emotive utterances (booing, shouting, etc.) without cognitive content.
“if you're a pure empiricist again like John Stewart Mill or the 20th centur logical positivist you will say that sort of talk that has no no direct reference no reference to particulars directly or indirectly that sort of talk is utterly meaningless forget it which is precisely what AJ a 20th century logical positivist said and we'll be reading him at the end of second semester yeah in which case ethics become simply not even a matter of talking about yourself subjective feelings ethics becomes a matter simply of emoting so to say something is wrong doesn't say anything because the word wrong is an abstraction that doesn't have reference to anything so instead of saying something's wrong you just emote about it you shout about it you boo it so forth”
Aquinas adds to Aristotle's metaphysic the exemplarism of Augustine (the view that forms are exemplars/archetypes in the mind of the logos), which requires supplementing Aristotle's unmoved mover with a logos doctrine that embodies all eternal ideas in God's wisdom. This makes God not merely a final cause but the source of all order and being.
“what aquinus does is to add to Aristotle's metaphysic first the exemplarism of Augustine The View that forms are exemplars archetypes in the mind of the logos now you don't find the logos wandering around in Aristotle's metaphysics all you have is an unmoved mover not a logos embodying all of the wisdom of Eternal ideas you see so aquinus adds the logos Doctrine with its exemplars in the mind of God”
Aquinas further adds that God is the good (not merely a final cause or unmoved mover), making God the highest good and the ultimate exemplar for all creation. This represents a departure from Aristotle's metaphysic, where human fulfillment (eudaimonia) was the highest good, toward an Augustinian theology where God himself is the highest good.
“with that the assertion that God is the good so that for ainus you see his ethic is not going to be one in which human fulfillment is the good as it was for Aristotle a human fulfillment is not the highest good God is the highest good and aquinus wants to follow Augustine in that regard now that's the first thing he adds that exemplarism God the logos God the highest good God ultimately is the Exemplar for all creation and all creation seeks to be like God it's the inner theology”
Aquinas adds the claim that God knows his creatures (individually, in advance) and could therefore create individuals of various kinds out of nothing (creation ex nihilo) rather than out of pre-eternal matter. This resolves both Averroes's problem of eternal matter and the problem of divine knowledge of individuals.
“he also wants to add the claim that God knows his creatures and so could create individuals of various kinds and create them out of nothing rather than out of matter out of an eternal matter so God knows his creatures knows them in advance and so could create them ex hello now that's what he wants to add”
William of Ockham developed nominalism into a Divine command theory of ethics: morality is founded on obedience to God's commands. When God has not given specific commands, right reason consists in figuring out the consequences of an action to determine whether it contributes to the sort of things God tells you to contribute to.
“essentially what um uh William of aam did was to develop what nowadays we call a Divine command Theory what's your ethic well what God tells you to do it's an ethic of obedience to God's commands an ethic of loving God as he's told you to love him and what if God hasn't given specific commands then aan talked about the exercise of right reason what's right reason or it's figuring out the consequences of an action to see whether it the action contributes to the sort of things that God tell you to contribute to okay so basically it goes back to a Divine command theory of some sort”
Prime matter is potential being apart from any form—it is not eternal, nor can it exist by itself, but represents the raw potentiality that prime matter embodies. God knows all possible combinations that could be drawn out of prime matter by the imparting of form, and in actualizing some possibility that prime matter has, God brings something into being out of pure possibility into actual existence.
“Prime matter is primary matter apart from any form uh matter which already has some sort of form is called signate matter it's sort of designated matter designated matter but God understands all of the potential that there is in Prime matter the potential which can be drawn out by the imparting of form now it's not that Prime matter already exists eternally it's not the prime matter even can exist by itself he's Aristotelian matter and form are always in combination but knowing all possible combinations he knows all of the possibilities that exist in this hypothetical thing Prime man you'll see so that even matter has good possibilities and is in some degree good”
Bonaventure's response to Averroism posits that archetypal forms (exemplars) exist in the mind of God, such that God is thinking not merely on his own thinking but on archetypal ideas. Since God's mind contains archetypes of all individual qualities and possible combinations thereof, God can think every particular combination of qualities and thus know and create individuals, making God an efficient cause rather than merely a final cause.
“what Bon Avenger proposes is that the archetypes the forms as archetypes are in the mind of God so that a God who like Aristotle's God is thinking is not just thinking on his own thinking processes but is thinking on those archetypal ideas those exemplars in his own mind and in as much as those archetypes those forms in the mind of God are forms not only of species and gener but of all particular qualities as well it follows that God can think on every particular combination of qualities that is imaginable and in that sense can think on every possible individual idual God can know individuals and a God who can know individuals can be said to create individuals and isn't stuck with simply being a final cause he can be an efficient cause as well the creator of the universe”
Aquinas uses the language of 'natures' rather than 'forms of individuals' to describe the particular essential properties of individual creatures, but these individual natures include the essence of the whole species. In knowing all forms (universals), God thereby knows all individuals within each species, including every particular individual nature.
“God there knowing the forms knows the individuals and the individuals within any species of every individual yeah doesn't call them forms of individuals he calls them Natures but these individual Natures include the essence of the whole species”
Even matter (prime matter) has goodness in varying degrees within Aquinas's metaphysical hierarchy: there exists a continuous hierarchy of being and goodness extending from God at the apex down to prime matter at the foundation, with no gaps or holes, such that the entire creation imitates God and glorifies God.
“where did you hear a Greek saying that matter is good you prime matter is good so in the whole hierarchy of being there are degrees of being and goodness all the way from God down to Prime matter”
Exaggerated realism was given theological application to defend Christian doctrines: the Trinity (three personal subsistences within the essence of one godhead through participation in a universal form), the universal Church (particular individuals participating in a universal), Original Sin (as a universal evidenced in all particular cases), and Transubstantiation (particular accidents remain the same while the essence changes from bread to body and wine to blood).
“it was for a while at least given theological application which uh made it particularly attractive if three particulars can participate in the essence of one form then you can talk of three personal subsisten is within the essence of one godhead so it became the metaphysical scheme by virtue of which to articulate the doctrine of the trinity similarly with the idea of a church Universal Universal in which particular individuals all participate in the same way similarly with regards to Original Sin as the universal which is evidenced in all of our particular cases or transubstantiation where it is the particular accidents that we taste that remain the sh the same though the essence is changed the underlying reality is changed uh from the essence of braad uh to the essence of body from the essence of wine to the essence of the blood”
Nominalism in effect denies the entire classical metaphysical explanation for the orderliness of nature and cosmic justice that goes back through Anaxagoras and Heraclitus to the logos doctrine and the developing theory of forms, thereby threatening to destroy the whole metaphysical substructure of Greek and medieval thought.
“what nominalism is saying is that uh the classic kind of metaphysical explanation for the orderliness of nature and for Cosmic Justice the classic explanation that goes back to an exag noose heraclitus logos and the developing theory of forms uh that that is false so it would in effect destroy the whole metaphysical substructure for Greek and metap Greek and medieval thought it would be radically Revolutionary so understandable that it was rejected in that way”
Without the metaphysical framework of real universals, empiricist approaches to ethics typically develop in two directions: either consequentialism (like John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism) in which morality is based on whether actions contribute to utility, or ethical subjectivism (like David Hume's) in which morality is grounded in subjective moral feelings and sentiments.
“outside of theistic settings uh all you have without that metaphysic is likely to be a pure empiricism you see what does a pure empiricist do about ethics well he becomes a consequentialist like John Stewart Mill with his utilitarian or she becomes I said he on the consequentialist now I'm switching genders to the she um no you know we smile we laugh because we're adjusting to careful ways of using language but um you'll find that a lot of writers tend to alternate the uh the gender of the pronouns uh out of deference to both I think it's a good way to do it um alternatively then the the empiricist uh might turn develop some sort of um um ethic rooted in moral feelings certain kinds of sentiments David Hume does this the kind of ethical subjectivism where there are subjective feelings uh that um you're referring to when you say something is right or wrong so subjectivism consequentialism those are the typical outcomes of an empiricist approach rooted in a nominalist rejection of real universals”
Nominalism was condemned at the Council of Soissons in 1093 due to theological problems—particularly the accusation that it entails tritheism (three gods rather than one) because without real universals there is no one church Universal and no original sin as a universal sin.
“theologically and Roselin was accused of tritheism three Gods similar but not one three similar particulars tritheism and he was accused of denying that there is any church Universal or any original sin simply because those doctrines had been defended in terms of a theory of real universals but um quite apart from the theological questions which incidentally led to the condemnation of nominalism at the Council of swason in 1093 1093 the Council of swason”
Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle included the claims that matter is eternal and there is no individual immortality, both of which were viewed as making Aristotle incompatible with Christian doctrine. This led both Bonaventure and Aquinas to respond to Averroism, though with different strategies.
“what I was saying was about a ver ways the Arabian philosopher the Muslim philosopher of ver ways in interpretation of Aristotle which involves the claim that matter is eternal and there is no individual immortality and these two assertions were viewed as making Aristotle Inc compatible with Christianity so that Bonaventure said a hearty no to Aristotle and continued with his platonism”
Abstract thought, when examined closely, does not consist of thinking words themselves but rather thinking with words as tools. Words are the vehicles for abstract thinking, not the content of abstract thinking. When we first encounter new terminology in philosophy, we think the words (focusing on their meaning), but as we advance in understanding, we learn to think in abstraction with those words as tools rather than thinking the words themselves.
“when you're thinking abstractly you're not thinking the words you are thinking with the words the words are the tools for the abstract thinking they're not the abstract thinking you're not thinking the words now I grant you in the first few weeks of an intro to philosophy course you think the words do you remember that process how the words were what you were thinking what does this word mean what does that word mean how do they fit together you know that sort of process it's like learning a new language we think the words whereas by this stage you you learn to think in abstraction about theories of universals and to ask rather abstract questions question in which the words are the vehicles for doing the thinking but you're not thinking the words you're thinking the ideas”
Nominalism does not necessarily entail relativism: without real universals, one can still have a Divine command ethic that is not relativistic, or a utilitarian ethic with a fixed utility principle as a non-relative point of reference. The absence of metaphysical universals does not logically require ethical relativism.
“now you notice I didn't say relativism I didn't say relativism uh because um not all empiricism leads to relativism obviously if there's a Divine command ethic it's not relativistic you see and a utilit Ian has at least a utility principle which isn't a relative principle that's the one fixed point of reference you see so it isn't necessarily relativistic it's not fair to say that without universals it's bound to be relativistic no it doesn't follow”
Bonaventure's solution includes a doctrine of common matter: matter is conceived as neutral with respect to the distinction between bodily qualities and soul/rational qualities. This allows the combination of soul and body to survive the dissolution of physical matter because the matter that constitutes the rational soul can persist after physical dissolution, thereby making individual immortality possible.
“he conceives of a common matter that is neutral with respect to the distinct distinction between bodily qualities and soul qualities rational qualities so that the combination of soul and body is able to survive the disillusion do I say of soul and body of rational soul and matter uh and the matter that makes up the rational soul is able to survive the disillusion of the physical you'll see and so individual immortality is possible”
Each individual creature has its own nature (what Aquinas calls its proximate end) with its own particular goods and purposes, distinct from but contributing to the ultimate end of all creation, which is to glorify God by imitating God's goodness. Individual creatures achieve their particular goods in ways that fit them into the overall cosmic hierarchy and purpose.
“every particular thing then that he creates actualizes some such possibility each individual thing then has its own possibilities its own nature which God knows each individual thing has its own tell us its own proximate end approximate end is its um its own particular end as distinct from the ultimate end of all things of the creation as a whole the ultimate end of all things of the creation as a whole is to be like God to glorify God you see to glorify God by virtue of achieving those proximate ends those goods which are the proximate ends so every individ idual thing has as its own good being like God in the way that is an individual thing its own nature is designed to be like God in degree and in that way fitting into the whole hierarchy of beings”
The distinction between talking about an invisible God and talking about God abstractly needs careful attention: saying God is invisible is not the same as saying God is abstract. We know about invisible particulars (like individual souls) by looking at their behavioral manifestations, and we can similarly know about God by examining the manifestations of divine properties.
“the fact that you talking of a particular being who is invisible doesn't mean you're talking in the abstract it means you're talking about something you don't see like the question of God is Holy what is Holy I mean we know particular things about holy well what is kind you're a particular being who's kind I mean um you look for Behavioral manifestations when you want to talk of somebody who's kind and you look for Behavioral manifestations when you want to talk of somebody who's holy”
Aquinas's five proofs of God's existence establish that using Aristotelian premises, one can prove a non-Aristotelian God: a God whose essence is to exist, whose nature is to be the source of being and order and goodness, whose mind contains exemplar forms, and who directs all things for a purpose. This God far exceeds Aristotle's unmoved mover.
“when we get to those five proofs of his that are famous for the existence of God what I want to show you is that what he establishes is is that there you can use Aristotelian premises to argue for a non-aristotelian God because the god that who um in the conclusion of his proofs is a god whose Essence is to exist a God who is the source of being as well as order and good a God who um knows exemplars forms in his own mind an intelligent God who directs all things for a purpose those are things about God which Aristotle couldn't say in other words the conception of God even at the beginning of the summer theological is much more o a god open to being the Christian God than is the case of Aristotle's unmoved mover”
The doctrine of Original Sin requires more than a universal statement (that all people are sinners); it requires metaphysical commitment to the claim that all humans participate in Adam's sin through a common human nature. This participation in a universal is how the doctrine makes coherent sense and why it was defended in terms of real universals.
“the doctrine of original sin doesn't just say that all people are sinners it says that in some way we all participate in Adam's sin you see that's a different statement and to say participate in Adam's sin is like saying we're pars participating in a universal you think be particulars participating in the particular events yes could well be but what is the vehicle of participation you see is it that there is a common humanness a common human nature a real form imminent within so that what Adam did messed up that one real form that we all have a part in you see”
The view that God is a universal (like a Platonic form) is not what the exaggerated realist or even the doctrine of the Trinity requires. God is a complex particular (three in one, one in three), not a universal form in which three particulars participate. Talking about God as a particular invisible being is not the same as talking about God in the abstract.
“but you see um I have difficulty if the ex exaggerated realist I'm not sure the exaggerated realist did this but if the exaggerated realist wanted to say that God is a universal you see uh within which Universal there are three particulars what do you mean God is a universal no God is a complex particular three in one one in three you see trinitarian Doctrine doesn't say God is a universal in the sense of a platonic form does it you now somehow or rather the um the doctrine of the Trinity is saying that God is not being itself in the abstract but a particular being who's the source of all other being”
The Stoic and Tutelian traditions offer alternative mechanisms for Original Sin: in Tutelian theory, the seed of the father contains the souls of all descendants, so when Adam sinned, his seed contained all future souls in corrupted form, passing on congenital weaknesses. Jesus Christ, having no earthly father, escaped this inheritance of original sin.
“even though in the tulan tradition and the stoic tradition it would be the particular soul that contained all the souls of the successors that was messed up you see so that in the reproductive process we get messed up Souls you see because in that trucian theory the souls as well of the bodies of all of a person's descendants are contained within the seed of the parent you see yeah and so the seeds carry the congenital weaknesses”