What this covers

This lecture, number six in a history of philosophy series from Wheaton College, follows Plato's thinking about the divine across his dialogues. It moves from the Republic and Parmenides through the Statesman, Timaeus and Laws. The speakers are a lecturer, with a professor of philosophy and another lecturer weighing in. They ask what the form of the good is, how it relates to the cosmos, and whether it deserves to be called God. Along the way the lecture sets Plato against his predecessors. Anaxagoras is praised for appealing to cosmic reason but faulted for not going far enough. The pre-Socratic opposites and the boundless apeiron of Anaxamander are treated as part of Plato's inheritance. Thales' claim that the world is full of souls and divinities is another.

The middle of the lecture covers the metaphysical vocabulary. The Analogy of the Sun is presented as a model for how the good makes forms intelligible. The distinction between being, becoming and non-being is explained, with non-being read as "nothing in particular" rather than absolute nothingness. The one-and-many contrast in the Parmenides is set beside the Jewish Shema. The lecture also stresses that Plato's god shapes and organizes. It does not create from nothing. The demiurge is described as an architect who hands the work of ordering to the world soul. The lecture compares this living cosmos with the mechanistic picture of Newton and notes the Romantics' later interest in Plato.

The most contentious material concerns evil and interpretation. Evil appears as Natural Evil as Privation: the disharmony of changeable bodies, absent from the eternal realm. The Statesman's myth of reversing cosmic rotation, a Cyclical Cosmology, is paralleled with Plato's cycle of political regimes. The lecture says this account would not satisfy Christian theodicy, though it prepares the problem. It also contrasts a dualist reading with a monistic one that leads toward Neoplatonism. Finally, it cautions against reading Plato as Christian, citing the complaint that A.E. Taylor made him "a good Episcopalian."

Sharpest takeaway

Plato develops a conception of God and cosmic order through the form of the good, progressing from the good as an abstract ideal in the Republic to a theistic world soul actively ordering the cosmos in the Laws, with evil understood as natural disharmony arising from the finite, changeable nature of material existence rather than from moral fault.

  • The form of the good unifies all forms and serves as the source of being, knowledge, and truth, functioning analogously to the sun in the cave allegory
  • The demiurge (cosmic artificer) and world soul execute the good's ordering principle through cosmic reason, creating rational structure in the cosmos and moral order in human life
  • Evil is inherent to finite becoming rather than a separate principle; it arises from the cosmos's material nature and necessary resistance to eternal ordering, depicted cyclically as periods of divine guidance alternating with periods of increasing chaos

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0.80

If form is what gives particularity and reality to things, then the multiplicity of forms itself requires unification; there must be a form of all forms—a form of formness, an ideal of idealness, and since to be a form is to be good, this unifying principle is the form of the good.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“There must be relationships of some sort between the various forms, something that unifies them in which they all, as it were, participate. You see, um, there must be, in other words, a form of all the forms, a form of formness. an ideal of idealless. And since to be a thorn is to be good, an ideal, Plato conceives of a form of the good, not a form of a good this, a good that, a good the other.”

0.75

Plato's analysis of political degradation (how different forms of government succeed one another in endless cycles) parallels his cyclical cosmology; a benevolent tyranny breeds its antithesis when the benevolent ruler is gone, as exemplified by the chaos in Russia after a 'heavy hand'.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“it's echoed later on in Plato's uh political thinking as he thinks about alternative kinds of government that succeed one another in endless cycles through which a society moves. You [49:04] see, so that a benevolent kind of tyranny breeds the very antithesis when the benevolent ruler is gone. Look at the chaos in Russia after a heavy hand. Cycle cycle cycle.”

0.75

Plato conceives the demiurge as primarily an architect or planner (reflecting the aristocratic Greek view that mental conception is superior to manual labor) rather than a literal workman; the demiurge assigns the work of ordering the cosmos to the world soul, which then actualizes this rational order throughout all things.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“The Greeks had a rather aristoilian view of things. Did I say Aristotilian? Aristocratic view of things. So that being actually a workman and doing the work with with your hands was below the dignity of the aristocrat. But to conceive of it and [23:00] plan it that's another manner you see. So he seems to think of the the artifer as a planner as an architect who assigns to the world soul. World soul.”

0.74

The sun analogy in Plato's Republic establishes that the Form of the Good is to intelligible reality (the forms, knowledge, truth) as the sun is to sensible reality (visible things, sight, light)—both are sources of reality and intelligibility that transcend what they make possible

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Professor of Philosophy

“What is it? The sun. And in the cave analogy, he he pictures [10:57] the the prisoner released going out into the daylight and climbing the hill to get a vision of the sun, the source of light that makes it possible for us to know, to see with the eye of the mind, the forms. You see, so that which gives truth to the objects of knowledge, the power of knowing to the knower, is the form of the good, the idea of the [11:27] good... But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration, it's right to deem light and vision sunlike like the source of all. You see, [12:02] but never to think that they are the sun, the source of all.”

0.74

The recommendation to flee from the mortal world and become like the divine means becoming righteous and just with the help of wisdom; the true spirit and power is shown in this achievement, whereas ignorance of this is blind and base.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“That's why we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other. And that means becoming like the divine as far as we can. That is to become righteous just with the help of wisdom. To be like God is the good we must seek... It's here that a man shows his true spirit and power or lack of spirit and nothingness. To know this is wisdom and excellence of a genuine sort. Not to know it is blind and base.”

0.74

An alternative monistic interpretation of Plato views matter not as a second eternal principle but as non-being (nothing), and interprets all existence as manifestations of reason, soul, and form; this idealist interpretation (that everything that exists is of the nature of reason, soul, thought, form) led to the Neoplatonic movement.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“The main line of thought after Plato interpreting him was more monistic um as if there is not two ultimate realities but only one. Matter really is non-being. Nothing. And uh what you have then is um form trying in um particulars to manifest itself in a world of um conflicting particulars. Necessity of that sort that becomes an idealist interpretation rather than a dualist interpretation. Everything that exists is of the nature of reason. soul, thought, form, you see, but there are manifestations of that which are phenomena, appearances, but not themselves realities. Well, that direction comes out in the neoplatonic movement”

0.74

Forms are eternal and unchanging; humanness as a form is the unchanging ideal nature of humanness, whereas particular embodied humans manifest counter-tendencies and defects; similarly, the ideal form of an apple is uncorrupted, but particular embodied apples rot because they are particulars subject to change.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“In the forms which are eternal and unchanging. There is no evil. The form of humanness is the unchanging ideal nature of humanness. Okay? It's when you get particular humans, embodied humans, that you get the counter tendency. Yeah. The ideal apple isn't one that's rotting. It's only when you get particular embodied apples that they rot.”

0.74

Plato's view of evil in Christian theology would not satisfy Christian theodicy, but it helps set up the problem of evil that Christian theologians must subsequently address.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“obviously that view of evil isn't going to satisfy Christian theologians, but it helps to set up the problem of evil that they have to face as we'll see in a little [50:41] while.”

0.74

Anaxagoras was praised by Plato for thinking in terms of cosmic reason (nous), but Plato believed Anaxagoras did not go far enough in developing this insight.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“in fact it's in this sort of the context that in the phibus he applauds [27:54] an exageras for thinking in terms of that cosmic reason the noose even though anexagoras didn't go far enough you'll see”

0.74

Plato distinguishes between being (the unchanging eternal realm of forms), becoming (the state of change in the physical world of particulars), and non-being (total privation of form, not absolute nothingness but 'nothing in particular').

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“He distinguishes between being, becoming and non-being. Where of course um becoming is the state of change characteristic therefore of the world of particulars. This physical natural world being is the realm of the unchanging, the eternal. The realm therefore of forms and nonbeing is what? It is total privation of four.”

0.74

The body's changing nature entitles it not to the permanence of the divine but to change; the cosmos, having received blessed gifts from its maker yet possessing bodily form, cannot abide forever free from change, though its movement remains uniform and invariable in one place—it has received reverse rotation as the least possible variation of its proper motion.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“Ever to be the same, steadfast and abiding is the prerogative of the divinest of things only. The nature of the bodily doesn't entitle it to this rank. No, the bodily things are worlds of change. They don't stay put. The heaven or the universe, as we've chosen to call it, has received many blessed gifts from him who brought it into being. But it's also been made to partake of bodily form. Vince, it's impossible that it should abide forever, free from change. Yet its movement is uniform, invariable, in one place. Thus it is that it has received from God a rotation in reverse. The least possible variation of its proper motion.”

0.74

Pre-Socratic philosophers (like Anaxamander) who recognized opposing qualities (wet/dry, hot/cold) refused to identify any single element as ultimate and instead posited the 'apeiron' (undefined, boundless something); Plato appears to inherit this framework, conceiving of opposing properties in the physical cosmos.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“It's rather as if you have the interplay of opposing qualities in the physical world. You see all the way from the prescratics when they were talking of elements they were talking of opposing elements. Uh you remember like um an axamander who because he found not only [42:45] wet like water but also dry and um not only heat but also cold refused to identify any one of the elements as ultimate and talked instead of his apiron that undefined something.”

0.73

Plato does not anticipate the later Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo (creation out of nothing); instead, Plato's god is a shaper and organizer rather than a creator in the Judeo-Christian sense.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“Plato does not himself anticipate the later Christian doctrine that creation is ex nei out of nothing out of non-being. No, that's not Plato. Whatever god Plato may be trying to conceptualize is not a god who is creator exne as the Judeo-Christian god is Plato's god is more of a shaper an organizer”

0.73

In the Parmenides, the one (identified with the good) is distinct from the many (the particulars and world of change); this one-many distinction parallels the Jewish theological concept of God's oneness expressed in the Shema: 'Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one.'

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“The good becomes of course the one whereas the world of particulars the world of change represent the many... Incidentally, Platonism appealed not only to early Christianity but to Judaism as well. And if you want to get the point of connection, remember the famous shama in the book of Deuteronomy. Here, O Israel, the Lord our God is one.”

0.73

Plato's later writings develop in two directions that are ultimately unified: cosmology (the rational order of the cosmos, echoing Heraclitus's logos) and moral order (the good to be imitated by humans); both are manifestations of the form of the good across the macrocosm (cosmos) and microcosm (individual soul and state).

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“His later writings push in two directions. At least on the surface, they seem like two directions, though in reality they're one. The first is in the direction of cosmology. The second is in the direction of moral order... There is order to the cosmos rational order when Heraclitus called logos structure. But by virtue of the fact that the form of formness is the good, the good is to be imitated. We are to be like the good and you get a notion of moral order as well as cosmic order. The macrocosm, the cosmos, the microcosm, the city state and the individual moral life. And the source of order in both is the good, the form of the good.”

0.73

Plato's theology transitions from earlier quasi-pantheism and dualistic suggestions to explicit monism by the Laws, but these alternatives (pantheism, deism, dualism, monism) were not clearly delineated in Plato's thinking; he was groping in the dark, anticipating rather than systematically developing these philosophical alternatives.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“Some see in it um well, as I've said, a kind of dualism in the later neoplatonic development out of this. There's a oh, a kind of pantheism. Now, come on, Plato, make up your mind. Well, no. Um, poor Plato, he anticipates, he preeds all of the clear delineation of those alternatives. He's groping in the dark.”

0.73

The Romantic movement of 19th-century Berlin was drawn back to study Plato precisely because the Romantics, like Plato, conceived of nature as alive rather than dead, seeing Platonism as offering a philosophical foundation for their rejection of mechanistic Newtonian cosmology.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Plato never heard of Newton's mechanistic universe. A thing so dead. You [25:40] see the universe for the Greeks was not dead. It's alive with its own powers, its own vitality. You see, that's why the 19th century romanticists in Berlin went back and studied Plato. You see, because they saw nature as alive too.”

0.73

The relationship between the forms and the Good is one of participation and dependence rather than creation ex nihilo; forms have their being through continuous relationship to the Good, not through a historical act of creation at a particular moment

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Professor of Philosophy

“when he says source does he mean the originator in the sense of source as beginning or source is that on which everything is constantly dependent. Well I think it's clear he means the [14:09] latter that they have their being by being in relationship to the form of good. uh if um he means it literally that the various forms are themselves eternal and the question of origin doesn't arise”

0.73

The notion of non-being involves a logical paradox: to say 'there is non-being' contradicts itself because you cannot predicate being of non-being; the resolution is that non-being means 'nothing in particular' (no determinate form) rather than absolute nothingness

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Professor of Philosophy

“But if you say there is such thing as a non-being, then you're speaking backwards. You're saying if there is something as a non-being, you can't say there is a non-being. Yeah. To say to say there is [53:50] nonbeing in that case would not mean that non-being is identical with nothing but just with nothing in particular.”

0.66

A.E. Taylor, a Cambridge philosopher, wrote a book on Plato that was criticized for making 'Plato into a good Episcopalian,' suggesting that some interpreters may anachronistically assimilate Plato's theology too closely to Christian theology.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Uh there's a book on Plato by a Cambridge philosopher A.E. Taylor and it said of that book that he makes Plato into a good episcopalian. It uh maybe overstating it. Uh but Plato's groping for this conception of a supreme transcendent good being is plainly groping in the [9:21] direction of some sort of a good God.”

0.66

Evil is a natural disharmony arising from the physical world's necessary instability and changeability; evil must always have a contrary to good in the particulars (as light has darkness, heat has cold), but in the divine eternal realm there is no evil.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“Evils can never be done away with because the good must always have its contrary. In the world of particulars, there are always opposite qualities. Light and dark, hot and cold, dry and wet. Okay. The good must have its contrary evil, nor have they any place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt this region of our mortal nature. In the realm of the eternal is no evil. It's in this world.”

0.66

The concept of 'good' in Plato is not restricted to moral goodness but encompasses excellence broadly understood—a good day, a good dog, a good meal represent different manifestations of quality and excellence alongside moral goodness

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Professor of Philosophy

“Um now he doesn't want to name a particular good you see but what is fine what is good what is excellent he's not thinking just of moral good you see but of nonmoral good as well notice how broadly we use the term good you see [35:52] um we say good day. We speak of a good dog, a good meal, you think, as well as a good deed and a good person. So the word good means simply excellence, quality, ideal quality.”

0.66

The concept of soul (Greek psyche) is ambiguous and means both soul and life; Plato follows the ancient Greek view (dating to Thales: 'the world is besouled and full of divinities') that the cosmos is alive with its own powers and vitality, not dead matter as in Newtonian mechanics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“The concept of of soul, the uh the Greek uh word psyche is um very um ambiguous. Um it's used for life as is the Latinma used for both soul and life... in any case, what he has is um a world soul as if the cosmos is a living thing. Plato never heard of Newton's mechanistic universe. A thing so dead. You see the universe for the Greeks was not dead. It's alive with its own powers, its own vitality... that's why the 19th century romanticists in Berlin went back and studied Plato. You see, because they saw nature as alive too.”

0.66

In the Statesman, Plato likens God to a statesman shepherding his people, thereby making God analogous to a caretaker concerned with the people's well-being.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“In um the statesman the statesman where he's talking about politics he likens God and he uses the term God to a statesman shephering his people likens the statesman to a shepherd You see, and therefore likens God to a statesman shephering his people. That type of care for their well-being.”

0.66

To revolve ever in one sense belongs only to the divine Lord and leader of all things; even the divine cannot move the universe in one sense only and then in the opposite sense—therefore Plato explicitly rejects the view that a pair of opposing deities makes the cosmos revolve in alternate senses.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“To revolve ever in the same sense belongs to none but the Lord and leader of all things and even he cannot move the universe now in the one sense now in the other. For all these reasons there are many doctrines were forbidden to affirm concerning the universe... We may not say that a pair of divinities make it revolve alternatively in the opposed senses. He seems explicitly to reject dualism there.”

0.66

Platonism appealed to both early Christianity and Judaism because Plato's philosophical monotheism (the One that unifies all reality) could be mapped onto religious monotheism (one God), providing a philosophical framework for expressing Christian and Jewish faith

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Professor of Philosophy

“Incidentally, Platonism appealed not only to early Christianity but to Judaism as well.”

0.65

Plato's reference to 'a likely story' (eikos mythos) when discussing the demiurge and cosmic generation acknowledges that literal conceptual language may break down when attempting to speak of divine causation, and that personal/mythological language may be the best available tool even if not perfectly literal.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Plato seems to leave aside his method of [20:24] having Socrates engage people in dialogue and pull the girl out in conversation. Instead, Plato makes a speech and tells what he calls a likely story. As if the capacity for clear conceptualization and literal statement is um as it were um running into all sorts of mist and cloud and conceptual [20:55] barriers. And and so it could be that um the way in which he personifies this dunai urge is not to be taken literally as if this is a personal deity. It's hard to say, but at least he finds the language of personal deity the best for saying what he wants, however literally he wants it.”

0.62

In the Timaeus, in addition to the operation of reason and world soul, there is also the operation of necessity (Greek: ananke)—a blind causal necessity or fate—suggesting that evil arises from matter's recalcitrant resistance to rational ordering, analogous to how the human body's compulsive forces resist soul-directed action.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“He uh gives different accounts at least what superficially at different accounts in different places. In the timus he notices that in addition to the operation of reason the world soul there is also the operation of necessity the um the Greek term um anank I guess we can transliterate it that way necessity sort of the um the causal necessity of some blind fate. Uh so there are as it were blind forces at work in nature in addition to the good and some um put that together with what he says about non-being as if it were some primal material stuff unruly with its own wanttonness. Okay. As if Plato is a metaphysical dualist. You have eternal matter which you can't completely control and you have eternal soul rais and evil occurs because matter recalcitrant resists reasonable ordering. um analogous to the way in which the human body driven compulsively subject to forces we don't control gets out of hand.”

0.61

The universe receives virtues from God's ordering but receives wrongs and evils from its primal chaotic condition; when guided by divine pilot, it produces good and little evil, but when released it moves by its own innate forces, and as forgetfulness of God arises, the ancient chaos reasserts itself, leading to increasing disorder until God resumes control to prevent dissolution.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“It's from God's act when he set it in its order that it received all the virtues it possesses. While it's from its primal chaotic condition like that primal chaos, that primal glop that all the wrongs and evils arise in it... When it's guided by the divine pilot, it produces good but little evil in the creatures it raises and sustains. But when it must travel on without God, things go well enough in the years immediately after he abandons control. But as time goes on and forgetfulness of God arises in it, the ancient condition of chaos begins to assert its sway. And at last, as this cosmic era draws to a close, this disorder comes to a head. A few good things it produces. It corrupts so forth. And then the god looks on it again... beholding its troubles, anxious, lest it sink, racked by storms and confusion, be dissolved again in the bottomless abbby of unlikeness.”

0.34

Natural forces can be understood as necessary causal factors in the physical universe; falling out a window and breaking one's neck exemplifies natural necessity—this isn't irrational but rather demonstrates natural forces one must respect and be careful of.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“If you like, you can take necessity to be natural forces. And so he's saying that if you um fall out of a window and break your neck, what causes it? This isn't a rational universe, is it? Well, there are natural forces that get you into trouble if you're not careful.”