lender of last resort
The central bank's role of providing emergency liquidity to solvent institutions during financial panics to prevent systemic collapse.
As defined in Austan Goolsbee
Other definitions
The central bank's role of providing emergency liquidity to solvent but illiquid banks during a crisis to prevent panic-driven failures.
George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great RecessionThe central bank's role of lending to solvent but temporarily illiquid banks (via the discount window) to prevent contagion in the payment system.
Michael Belongia on the Fed 01/11/2010
Where it comes up · 30
- Upside Down Markets5 claims
- A Masterclass In Central Banking | Professor Jane Knodell5 claims
- George Selgin on the Fed 12/06/20105 claims
- The Global Dollar Endgame Won't Play Out How You Think | Dr. Perry Mehrling4 claims
- David Laidler on Money3 claims
- Why You're Getting Poorer: Major Slowdown Ahead | Donald Boudreaux2 claims
- The Future of Blockchain and Financial Services2 claims
- Austan Goolsbee2 claims
and 22 more
Most important claims · 10 of 58Search all claims for “lender of last resort” →
- Insolvency and illiquidity are different problems: a central bank can prevent illiquidity through open market operations and lender-of-last-resort lending, but insolvency cannot be solved with liquidity, so liquidity support only prevents insolvency from becoming a secondary aggravating factor.Thomas Rustici on Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression 01/04/2010
- The United States had more frequent bank panics than Canada, Britain, or France not because Americans were more nervous but because the U.S. prohibited branch banking, producing thousands of small, undiversified, single-product banks (e.g., a Kansas bank lending only to wheat farmers) that were vulnerable to local shocks and propagated panics through the interconnected clearing system; Canada had no central bank but nationwide branching and avoided frequent panics.Eugene White on Bank Regulation
- There is a 'plain old impossibility proof' against discretionary rescue of large complex financial institutions: the lender-of-last-resort logic only works for genuinely illiquid-but-solvent firms (Bagehot/Lombard Street), but political economy always pressures officials to classify insolvent firms as merely illiquid, so the supposed 'free lunch' of intervention fails.Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011
- The Fed's response to the 2008 financial crisis versus 2020 COVID crisis demonstrates the importance of the lender of last resort function: in 2008 the Fed hesitated to act immediately as international lender, asking repeatedly about 'unusual and exigent circumstances,' causing the crisis to worsen; in 2020 the Fed immediately reopened swap lines and acted as international lender, preventing financial crisis despite pandemic shockThe Global Dollar Endgame Won't Play Out How You Think | Dr. Perry Mehrling
- During 2007-2008 even solvent institutions like Goldman were at risk because a loss of confidence about the solvency of counterparties caused everyone to demand payment before paying others, creating a daisy-chain freeze of liquidity that could have toppled firms like dominoes regardless of their actual financial health.473 - Money Power And Moral Failure
- A classical lender of last resort, per Bagehot, lends freely at high rates of interest but only to solvent firms during a crisis, in order to prevent spillovers from insolvent institutions from bringing down otherwise-solvent ones; this rests on a crucial microeconomic distinction between illiquidity and insolvency.George Selgin on the Fed 12/06/2010
- A bank can be solvent on paper—holding good assets and running a profitable operation—yet fail if all depositors demand their money at once, because it must liquefy its entire asset side in a few days; this liquidity problem, distinct from insolvency, is what doomed Northern Rock absent a government bailout.Steve Hanke on Hyperinflation, Monetary Policy, and Debt
- Walter Bagehot's principle for central banks facing a crisis is to lend freely, at high rates, on good banking collateral—the high rates serving both to combat an external drain of gold by attracting foreign capital and to discourage banks from borrowing merely to arbitrage cheap credit—so that the central bank provides liquidity to illiquid but solvent firms rather than cheap credit to relend.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- Financial firms sustain extreme leverage (around 95% of assets, versus problematic at over 50% in other industries) because the government safety net—discount window, lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and repeated implicit bailouts of systemically important institutions—introduces moral hazard primarily on creditors, keeping their credit costs low enough to fund such precarious structures, making the system recurrently crisis-prone.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy
- The establishment of a lender of last resort and deposit insurance erodes bank capital because both are substitutes for capital in the eyes of depositors, which is why bank capital must now be regulated whereas before the Fed banks commonly held capital equal to 30% of liabilities.George Selgin on Free Banking 11/17/2008