What this covers
David Laidler and Russ Roberts conduct a wide-ranging conversation about money, monetary policy, and the central bank's role in the Great Recession. Laidler traces the intellectual history from Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz's analysis of the Great Depression through the Federal Reserve's recent crisis response, arguing that the Fed's actions were neither unconventional nor toothless but rather straightforward applications of monetarist doctrine. The core of his defense rests on a crucial distinction: the money supply mattered then and matters now, not the monetary base. Where the 1930s saw the money supply contract by roughly a third, the recent recovery stabilized the price level—exactly what monetarist theory predicts when a central bank prevents monetary collapse.
Laidler diverges from pure monetarism, however, when explaining why both 1929 and 2008 unfolded with such severity. The austere money-tightening narrative, he argues, cannot account for the speed of those downturns. Instead, he draws on the Austrian Business Cycle View—specifically the insights of Dennis Robertson and the Austrians themselves—to pinpoint distortions in real asset markets as the deeper culprit. The conversation also takes up the profession's broader blindness: macroeconomists constructed models that abstracted the monetary and financial system away entirely, treating it as frictionless. When that system broke, the models broke too. Laidler examines credit deadlock versus liquidity trap, the history of lender of last resort doctrine, inflation targeting versus nominal-GDP targeting, and why a zero lower bound need not cripple monetary policy—provided policymakers understand quantitative easing not as exotic innovation but as settled technique available for nearly a century.
Laidler argues that the Fed's response to the Great Recession was neither unconventional nor impotent—it was consistent with Friedman and Schwartz's monetarist analysis and prevented a 1930s-style collapse—but that monetarism and modern macroeconomics both erred by abstracting away the monetary and financial system, and that asset-market distortions (an Austrian insight) better explain the crisis's severity than money-growth contraction alone.
- Unlike the 1930s, the money supply did not contract ~30% and the price level stabilized, matching what Friedman-Schwartz analysis predicts the Fed could prevent
- What matters is the money supply, not the monetary base—the 1930-33 base expanded while M collapsed, so today's huge base expansion need not be inflationary
- Both 1929 and 2008 look like asset-market crises that money-growth tightening cannot fully explain, vindicating the Austrians and Dennis Robertson
Political reality systematically transforms economic policy between conception and implementation.
- Economists tend to advocate the policy they think is best while neglecting that the way they want it implemented and the way it actually gets implemented—shaped by political reality—are not the same thing.
“the tendency we have as economists to advocate what we think is the best policy, neglecting the fact that the way we want it implemented and the way it actually gets implemented is not the same thing.”
Financial sector subsidies and moral hazard create unhealthy political economy through systemic rescue expectations.
- Because large creditors of large financial institutions know they are part of a tangled system in which the presumption is intervene, lend, rescue, and bailout, the financial sector is effectively heavily subsidized, producing an unhealthy political economy—and the move away from bank partnerships toward limited liability was itself subsidized.
“the presumption is: Intervene. The presumption is: Lend. The presumption is: Rescue. The presumption is: Bailout. We're in a world where that sector of the economy is effectively being highly subsidized by this inevitable decision. It seems like a very unhealthy political economy.”
Home ownership subsidies result from organized interest-group power, not mere policy oversight or accident.
- The US subsidizing home ownership so perilously is a public choice problem driven by powerful realtors and home builders rather than mere inattention; if Canada's realtors and home builders were as politically powerful, Canada might subsidize home ownership just as dangerously.
“I do see it as a public choice problem more than a paying-attention problem. I think if your realtors and home builders were as powerful as ours, maybe you'd have the government subsidizing home ownership as perilously as we have. And I think that's a huge part of the problem.”
Economists retain prior frameworks unchanged by crises, treating disconfirming evidence as confirmation.
- It is remarkable how many economists, including Nobel laureates, have managed to keep their theological views unchanged by the crisis experience, treating it as confirming rather than challenging their prior frameworks.
“I find it remarkable how many people have managed to keep their theological views unchanged by this experience.”