What this covers

Russ Roberts talks with Thomas Rustici of George Mason University, author of Lessons from the Great Depression, about why economists' view of the 1930 tariff changed. Most economists at the time called it destructive, and a May 1930 petition from 1,028 of them warned Hoover about it. The modern profession, working from a Keynesian aggregate demand model, has largely downgraded it. Rustici walks through the chronology: the Senate vote on October 21, 1929, with its vote-trading among free-trade senators, then the market slide, retaliation by trading partners, and the collapse of farm income. He ends at the first runs in six Midwestern farm states in late 1930, when about 600 banks failed in two months.

The middle of the conversation is about money and institutions. Rustici distinguishes illiquidity from insolvency, and he criticizes the Federal Reserve for acting procyclically under the real bills doctrine and for raising the discount rate in 1928–29. He traces the failures from American farm country to Austria's Creditanstalt, Germany, France, and England. The Canadian comparison is the most contested claim: Canada took a similar tariff shock, yet no banks failed and its money supply fell less. Rustici credits branch banking, and he argues that the antebellum free banking era was steadier than its reputation suggests. He extends the point to Keynes, whose savings argument he treats as an empirical question and whose diagnosis he reads as institutional collapse rather than a flaw in the price system.

Sharpest takeaway

Rustici argues Smoot-Hawley mattered far more than its trade share suggests because it triggered a banking collapse through export-dependent banks, which failing central banks then failed to contain, so trade-volume arguments miss the transmission channel.

  • Trade was only about 5-7% of the US economy, but the tariff's effects concentrated in export-dependent farm, mineral, auto, and steel regions.
  • Bank failures spread in a pattern that tracked export-dependent borrowers, then spread across Europe.
  • Canada faced the same tariff shock but avoided bank failures because of its branching-friendly free banking system, while US deposit insurance, branching limits, and Fed passivity amplified the damage.

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0.86

Insolvency and illiquidity are different problems: a central bank can prevent illiquidity through open market operations and lender-of-last-resort lending, but insolvency cannot be solved with liquidity, so liquidity support only prevents insolvency from becoming a secondary aggravating factor.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“you can't solve an insolvency problem with a liquidity solution and I and I agree with that all you can do is use a liquidity just to grease the wheels”

0.86

The first catastrophic bank runs occurred in November and December 1930 in six Midwestern farm states, including Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Indiana, and Illinois, where export-dependent agriculture collapsed; about 600 banks failed in those two months, versus an average of about 50 per month in 1920 to 1929.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“the very first catastrophic bank runs occur in November and December of nineteen thirty November in December and they occur in six Midwest farm states”

0.81

Most economists in 1930 argued that Smoot-Hawley was destructive and central to the Depression, while the modern profession has largely downgraded it, so the change in consensus is itself something to explain.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“at the time it was passing most of the world's economists monetary economist and non monetary columnist gave it a central role in the Great Depression”

0.80

Depositors care about getting their principal back, not the interest rate differential between banks, so without deposit insurance and a lender of last resort, bank runs became rational responses in panics, as illustrated by George Bailey's run in It's a Wonderful Life.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“if I'm worried the bank shuts down and I'm gonna lose you know seventy two percent of my principle yeah the seven percent don't matter yeah that's not it's a saw getting the security of your principal back”

0.80

Bank failures spread in a domino pattern from rural farm regions to cities and from Eastern to Western Europe: the Creditanstalt in Austria failed in May 1931 after a forced merger, and runs then spread to Hungary, Germany's Danatbank, France, and England.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“they migrate north and they migrate east over the next three years and they go from rural to cities in Europe you see the same pattern of bank failures”

0.80

Canada retaliated specifically against US iron and steel exports, cutting US iron and steel exports to Canada from about 200 million dollars a year to 29 million dollars, an 85 percent drop.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“we were exporting about 200 million dollars a year in iron and steel to Canada after smoot-hawley when the Canadian government then retaliated”

0.79

Canada, the largest US trading partner and reliant on foreign trade for a third of its GDP, suffered a comparable tariff shock but had no bank failures and its money supply fell only 13 percent versus 29 percent in the US, because its branch-banking system absorbed the shock.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“they had no bank failures we had 10,000 421 bank failures in other words their financial system didn't become an aggravating factor”

0.79

The US free banking era (roughly 1837 to the Civil War) was more stable than the regulated system that followed, with less inflation, no major catastrophic downturns, and faster growth; in the free banking states, losses were tied to forced purchases of state bonds, which caused defaults.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the era of free banking was actually vastly more stable that had less inflation they didn't have any major catastrophic downturns”

0.78

The banks that failed first had loans tied to export-dependent sectors, such as subsidized farm credit and export lending: when world trade collapsed, borrowers' expected profits vanished, they could not repay, and banks lost the cash flow they depended on.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“the farmers who had borrowed the money on the basis of future profits those profits disappeared when world trade collapsed and as a result they couldn't repay their loans”

0.78

The Keynesian account of saving by tradition and investment by animal spirits ignores price incentives; in pre-1933 conditions with no deposit insurance and no lender of last resort, depositors cared about protecting principal, not the interest rate differential.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“if I'm worried the bank shuts down and I'm gonna lose you know seventy two percent of my principle the seven percent don't matter”

0.76

The Senate passed Smoot-Hawley on October 21, 1929, after 16 free-trade senators traded their votes for tariff protection for their own states' industries, raising average tariffs from about 38 percent to about 60 percent.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“then in October specifically the date is October 21st 1929 the 16 free trade senators basically log rolled”

0.76

European banks lacked deposit insurance and the newly created central banks failed to inject liquidity into solvent institutions, so the failure to act as lender of last resort turned bank runs into a systemic contagion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“none of the european banks had Deposit Insurance didn't have deposit insurance most of the governments of Europe created central bank's after 1920”

0.75

The Federal Reserve's policy was procyclical under the real bills doctrine, which tied money supply to the volume of trade: it reduced currency in downturns and added it in upturns, and the Fed was also selling assets during the 1931 bank runs.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“this is a procyclical view of the world and Meltzer has argued the Fed was dominated by that real bills doctrine”

0.74

When Smoot-Hawley passed the Senate on October 21, 1929, the stock market began its slide; by October 29 it had lost more than a third of its value, while newspapers printed the market decline and the tariff passage on the same front page without connecting them.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“October 21st 1929 the 16 free trade senators basically log rolled and said we'll join in if you give tariffs for our states for our industries and the Senate then supported the smoot-hawley bill”

0.74

Under fractional reserve banking, small changes in base money have massive effects on money and credit, so a central bank that fails to supply liquidity in a panic can trigger secondary deflation, as depositors pull cash out of banks they distrust.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“small changes in base money at the base have massive effects for money and credit throughout the entire structure of the economy”

0.73

Keynes was observing institutional collapse rather than an inherent flaw in the price system: markets based on competitive incentives work unless institutions have collapsed, and the policies that structure those institutions are the real failure point.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“what Keynes is observing is institutional collapse and not giving proper weight and criticism on the policies has structured those institutions the price system doesn't have inherent flaws that make it fail”

0.73

Agricultural income fell from about 6 billion dollars to 2 billion dollars after Smoot-Hawley, a real shock that the Fed could not offset with liquidity alone because the banks serving those regions faced insolvency.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“agricultural income drops from six billion net net income from six billion to two billion following smoot-hawley so that's a real shock”

0.73

A petition signed by 1,028 professional economists in May 1930 warned Hoover that Smoot-Hawley would turn recession into worldwide depression and have monetary effects, and Rustici suggests the economists may have seen real effects that aggregate models miss.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“1028 professors of economics professional economists from the American Economic Association signed a petition Arbor over said do not sign this bill”

0.73

Pre-Fed US banking instability, such as the 1907 Knickerbocker Trust panic and state bank failures in the 1920s, reflected government policy failures, and the unit-banking and branching restrictions amplified losses rather than market forces causing them.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“most of those crises that we like to attribute to the banking system most of those in economic history you can actually look at the policies of the federal government”

0.72

Losses under free banking were a tiny fraction of a percent of deposits, far lower than losses under the Federal Reserve System through 1933, because the worst free-bank losses came from state bond requirements in a handful of states such as Indiana and Michigan.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the losses in the free banking were in percentage terms relative to deposits not even a fraction of a percent”

0.70

The Federal Reserve raised the discount rate from 3.5 percent to 6 percent between late 1928 and September 1929 to squelch stock speculation, a monetary contraction that slowed the economy even as the market was not overvalued by financial criteria.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the Federal Reserve in the fall of 1929 raised interest rates relatively dramatically they had started in late 1928 raising it the discount rate was three and a half percent that raises to six percent by September of 1929”

0.70

Foreign retaliation against US tariffs was anticipated in markets: speculators priced in the coming trade war, causing export-related stock prices and commodity prices for grains and cotton to collapse on the same day the Senate passed the bill, because the expected cost of tariffs falls on exporters.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“speculators are acquiring future information and they're processing this and of course here you have a tariff you have the world's largest economy taking a hugely protectionist”

0.70

Ben Strong, as head of the New York Fed in the 1920s, prevented contagion and did not target stock speculation, so the 1920s banking system was stable until the 1930 failure wave, which Rustici attributes to policy changes after Strong.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the main person that the Fed was Benjamin strong who never let the contagion happen he was he was a fairly good fed German and he wasn't under any illusion of squelching stock market speculation”

0.68

Keynes's savings argument, written during 1936 when banks were reluctant to lend and borrowers were risk-averse, may describe real episodes where increased saving sits idle, but whether it holds is an empirical question that the classical view can test by checking whether interest rates equilibrate savers and investors.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“there are times when that Keynesian worry about savings could be correct or no what do you think”

0.66

The stock market fell 23 percent in the first two weeks of June 1930, around the time Hoover signed Smoot-Hawley, and Rustici argues that markets across ten countries collapsed simultaneously, implying a systemic worldwide cause rather than a local speculative bubble.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“in my book I plan out that in 10 different countries at the exact same time you have this massive collapse of stock prices”

0.66

Keynes blamed the price system for failures actually caused by government policy, such as tariffs, central banking monopolies, and fractional reserve rules; Rustici argues these are government failures, and that fractional reserves per se are not unstable but a monopoly central bank makes them so.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“instead of blaming government policy he blames the price system”

0.66

The stock market recovered about 85 percent of its October 1929 losses during the months when the tariff was being reconciled, then lost roughly 23 percent in the first two weeks of June 1930 after Hoover signed the bill, showing the market responded to tariff politics.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“in the first two weeks of June leading up to his signing and after signing stock market lost 23 percent of its value”

0.66

The Fed did not understand the trade shock's effects: it thought it was running an easy money policy while the money supply was contracting, and it lacked the data needed to see where the economy was.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“they thought they had an easy money policy at the same time the money supply was contracting”

0.64

Money demand is volatile and the real empirical question is how it behaves under normal versus abnormal circumstances; Keynes treated the abnormal state of panic as the normal condition of economic life.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the real empirical question is that volatility of money demand under normal and abnormal circumstances Keynes will see normally he will think the abnormal circumstances is the normal condition”

0.63

Institutional collapse, not a normal business-cycle shock, can explain why people hold cash and do not lend: in 2009 a prudent entrepreneur might rationally avoid borrowing amid uncertainty, but the sharp rise in precautionary hoarding and the stalling of bank lending reflect systemic breakdown and risk absorbed by public policy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Thomas Rustici

“we can talk about the current monetary crisis that we're in actually it's a financial institutional crisis”

0.62

Unit-banking and branching restrictions, along with state-required bond purchases in free banking states, undermined the diversification banks needed, so most instability came from regulation that prevented diversification rather than from unregulated banking itself.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“those states had a requirement for anyone who opened a quote free bank that they had to have a certain percentage of their assets in state bonds”

0.61

Modern economists make two mistakes when assessing Smoot-Hawley: a macro dissipation effect, which spreads a concentrated shock across the whole economy until it looks trivial, and a micro trivialization effect, which counts only direct deadweight losses such as Harberger triangles while ignoring monetary and financial channels.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“we have a tendency to do one of two mistakes when we look at this we do what I call a macro dissipation effect or a micro trivialization effect”

0.61

Roberts challenged that bank runs occurred before the Fed existed, and so instability cannot be blamed solely on the Fed; Rustici replied that pre-Fed panics were mostly small state and unit banks, while the 1930s failures were systemic and the Fed's policy made them worse.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“how can you claim that the bank runs of the late 20s and early 30s were the result of failure of the Federal Reserve”

0.61

Alan Meltzer (1976) and Larry White argued that Smoot-Hawley may have had a significant monetary effect that triggered a much worse depression, because the tariff's channel runs through banking rather than trade volume.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“Alan Meltzer at Carnegie Mellon who in his article in 1976 in the journal monetary economics pointed out that smoot-hawley may have had a very significant monetary effect”

0.60

The Detroit banking crisis of February 1933 shows the auto export channel: auto exports to countries retaliating against Smoot-Hawley fell about 85 percent, and a rescue plan of roughly 12 million dollars, including 7.5 million from Henry Ford, was not completed when Ford withdrew his money, leading to the banks' collapse.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“the Reconstruction Finance Corporation examined the banks in Detroit all the main banks directly tied to the auto industry they went to Henry Ford and asked for seven and a half million”

0.57

Smoot-Hawley's effects were regionally concentrated: a 2 percent aggregate output loss hitting five to ten states can reduce their real income 10 to 15 percent, which is catastrophic for those states even though it looks small nationally.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“if you have a two percent loss in your real economy but it's showing up in five or ten states that is catastrophic for those states”

0.56

The 2009 financial crisis is a financial institutional crisis in which the system locked up because public policy had encouraged banks to absorb risk far beyond what a free market would allow.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Thomas Rustici

“those systems lock up and they lock up precisely for public policy that has encouraged them to lock up by absorbing enormous volumes of risks anything way beyond what a free market would dictate”

0.55

Rustici acknowledges his tariff thesis is a connecting argument rather than a fully quantified one: most economists reviewing his book did not dispute the pattern, but a referee asked for much more local research into why individual banks in other cities and countries failed.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the main criticism they had that was they weren't sure that the tariffs could have had that much effects”

0.54

Smoot-Hawley's effects propagated through micro connections: inefficiencies in investments and export-dependent sectors show up in bank solvency, so treating Smoot-Hawley as a trivial sideshow is misleading and disaggregated analysis is needed.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the notion that smooth Holly was just as a little trivial sideshow is totally misleading you have to start disaggregating”

0.54

Keynes's model is a macro theory with no micro price system: it treats the interest rate as failing to coordinate savers and borrowers without asking why the price system would break, and in Rustici's view this is Keynes's central mistake because the failure is a government and institutional failure rather than a flaw in prices.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“he's doing a macro with no micro price system”

0.52

Pittsburgh's banks failed 17 months after Smoot-Hawley: eleven banks became insolvent, with depositor losses of about 69 million dollars, after the lost iron and steel exports to Canada hit the city's economy.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“17 months later 11 of Pittsburgh's banks go insolvent and have to shut their doors 11 the Pittsburgh banks had depositor losses of 69 million dollars”

0.50

Modern economic models decompose spending into consumption, investment, government, and net exports, so a trade shock appears as a small net-export change, which is part of why modern analysis tends to dismiss the tariff.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“we model the economy is the C plus I plus G + X - am you have minus M”

0.50

Whether savings fail to reach investment in a downturn is an empirical question, and the Keynesian claim that the interest rate does not equilibrate savers and investors implies a broken price system, which would require asking why financial intermediation fails rather than assuming it.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“it's an empirical question when we look at where this notion that the interest rate does not equilibrate savers and investors if we're making an empirical proposition”

0.50

Between Roosevelt's election in November 1932 and inauguration in March 1933, about 4,000 banks failed in four months, and the largest concentration was in Detroit, where auto-tied banks needed roughly 12 million dollars to be rescued, which the RFC tried to raise from Henry Ford and the other automakers.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the big collapse occurred four thousand banks went down in four months four thousand banks four months”

0.48

Protectionism appeals to the general public through a Keynesian-style demand argument that keeping foreign goods out will keep domestic factories running, even though the same logic invites retaliation that shrinks export demand.

causalestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“on the surface it had an attractiveness to the general citizen that protectionism always has which is let's keep out their stuff and that way people will buy more of our stuff”

0.48

Smoot-Hawley raised the average US tariff from about 38 percent to about 60 percent, a near doubling, and Hoover had campaigned on tariffs to protect farmers even though farm exports were the sector most hurt by retaliation.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“what kind of magnitudes are we talking about in tariff increases from 38 percent average suitable tariff to 60% it's almost a doubling”

0.47

Several Federal Reserve Board members in the early 1930s had no economic training; one was a farmer, one a former politician, and one a used car salesman, so the Fed lacked both expertise and the data needed to read the economy.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“three of the Federal Reserve Board members had no training economics at all one was like a farmer one was a former politician one was like a used car salesman”

0.47

Bank failures in the 1920s averaged about 62 million dollars in depositor losses per year, and the failures were mostly small unit farm banks; the 1930 failure of Bank of United States, a New York bank with 200 million in losses, was one the Fed could have prevented.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“the yearly lost for depositors was sixty-two million dollars a year on average”

0.44

Keynes's paradox of thrift reverses the classical view: classical economists held that saving flowed through banks into productive investment and raised real wages, while Keynes argued that aggregate saving drains spending from the circuit of transactions, so savings act like a black hole that shrinks real income.

causalestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“you can think of savings in the Keynesian models like a black hole things go in nothing comes out and therefore that puts pressure to contract the whole real economy”

0.41

The Smoot-Hawley tariff passed in 1930 set off reciprocal tariff increases by trading partners, which reduced economic exchange between the US and the rest of the world, and it attracted support because protectionism appeals to the intuition that buying domestic goods keeps domestic factories running.

definitionestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“passed in 1930 which set off a round of reciprocal tariff increases by our trading partners”

0.40

In the decade after the 1920s, the US averaged about 600 bank failures per year, roughly 50 per month, mostly small farm and unit banks scattered across the country, which made them look like a routine pattern rather than a systemic crisis until 1930.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“when you look at the years 1920 to 1929 we had an average of about 600 banks per year nationwide closed their doors about 50 per month average these were small farm banks”

0.39

In the simple Keynesian model, downturns arise from a lack of aggregate demand: people panic and hoard money instead of spending, so spending rather than output determines the actual size of the real economy, a view often called overproduction under consumption.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“in the simple kind of Keynesian model what we have is a lack of aggregate demand total spending usually arises from an increase in the demand to hold money”

0.38

Savers respond to higher interest rates by saving more and borrowers respond to lower rates by borrowing more, so the interest rate mechanism should coordinate savings and investment in a normally functioning institutional setting, and failures of that mechanism require explanation.

causalestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“at higher rates of interest savers are willing to save more because they get rewarded more”

0.37

The monetary system's brittle structure, including deposit insurance with moral hazard, branching restrictions, unit banks, and a dual regulatory system, made the economy's shocks aggravating rather than absorbed, so free trade and free banking both matter.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“we have this very brittle rigid system with all the wrong incentives whether it be Deposit Insurance and moral hazard”

0.37

The Smoot-Hawley thesis fits a generic pattern in which the monetary transmission of a tariff matters more than its direct trade volume; Rustici's evidence is a relatively small empirical window, and he notes that a similar claim could be made about the Great Moderation.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“you could say the same thing about the Great Moderation that proves that the Fed does great”

0.36

The Depression began in July or August 1929, before the Senate passed Smoot-Hawley, so the tariff could not have caused the downturn's start but could have deepened it.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“we actually started the the depression actually started at the beginning of the third quarter 1929 which is August the end of July somewhere in July August is when it begins”

0.35

Keynesian-style explanations of 1930s deflation treat both prices and wages as sticky downward, so quantities rather than prices adjust, which is why unemployment rises and why the framework cannot explain the adjustment process.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“if prices don't adapt to this shift of aggregate demand then quantities have to adapt and the whole Keynesian system is just about quantities adapting not prices”

0.35

Smoot-Hawley's standard dismissal rests on arithmetic: trade was roughly 5 to 7 percent of the US economy in 1930, so even a dramatic cut in trade cannot explain a 36 percent real output decline from 1929 to 1933.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“it was something on the order of what about 7 / 7 percent economy 5 to 7 percent so if you pass a tariff and that number falls to zero”

0.35

The failure of the Bank of United States in New York in December 1930, the sixth-largest US bank, was a symbolic and unique event that marked a break from the pattern of small rural bank failures and signaled a broader crisis.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the one big bank that went down was Mackey United States and that was in New York and that was the six largest bank in America”

0.34

The dominant economic-history account, from Friedman and Schwartz, holds that the monetary collapse was central: about 40 percent of banks (roughly 10,421 of about 25,000) failed in three years and the money supply fell 29 percent.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“the institutional collapse of 10,000 421 banks in a period of 3 years the straw out of roughly how many out of 25,000 it was 40% decline in the number of banks the money supply declined 29% in a period of three years”

0.33

A small share of world trade can still be critical: just as the Panama Canal carries a tiny fraction of ocean water but a large share of world trade, a small trade shock can be pivotal at a chokepoint.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Thomas Rustici

“we know a large amount does go through that canal so it's very critical water at that point at that point of juncture”

0.29

Keynesian policy is to stimulate consumers, investors, and government spending to fill the spending gap, and the Keynesian view treats the money supply as endogenous so that it adapts to money demand.

normativeestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Thomas Rustici

“the Keynesian have a view of the monetary money supply itself as an endogenous variable in other words that money supply adapts to money demand”

0.26

Rustici opposes central banking altogether and believes the Federal Reserve should be abolished, because a fractional reserve system with a central bank's monopoly on money creates structural instability even when the Fed behaves well.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Thomas Rustici

“this is why I oppose central banking I think we should get rid of Federal Reserve the entire concept of central banking I think is structurally flawed”

0.21

Keynes's savings and investment theory is a pure theory with little empirical support: he did not test whether money demand volatility or failed bank intermediation explained downturns.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Thomas Rustici

“Keynes never does this this is his big mistake he's would like to say he's not an empiricist in this regard it's a pure theory without much evidence underneath it”