What this covers

Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins and the Cato Institute joins Russ Roberts to examine the inflation risks facing the United States and the mechanics of hyperinflation worldwide. Hanke's central claim challenges a widespread anxiety: despite the Federal Reserve's dramatic expansion of high-powered money since 2008, serious inflation risk in the U.S. remains low. The reason, he argues, lies in a structural split within the money supply. State Money vs Bank Money tells the story—high-powered money has grown substantially but accounts for only about 15% of broad money, while bank money from the commercial and shadow banking systems makes up roughly 85% and is what actually drives economic activity. Regulatory pressure from Basel III and Dodd-Frank has crushed bank money creation, leaving broad money supply well below its historical trend. The real peril, Hanke contends, is not inflation but the unsustainable fiscal path—government spending persistently outside the post-World War II range.

The conversation ranges across hyperinflation's anatomy and history. Hanke documents 57 recorded cases, from Hungary's catastrophic 1946 episode (prices doubling every 15 hours) to Zimbabwe's 2008 collapse and Weimar Germany's lower ranking than commonly believed. He explains hyperinflation as fundamentally a fiscal-monetary phenomenon: governments finance enormous deficits by printing money, triggering currency substitution and eventual dollarization. The episode also covers the distinction between Solvency vs Liquidity, using Northern Rock's 2007 bank run to show how regulation intended to force banks into safer postures—holding government bonds and excess reserves—paradoxically starves lending and creates Non-Price Rationing of credit despite low posted rates. Iran's ongoing hyperinflation at roughly 70% monthly serves as a case study in how sanctions and collapsing currency demand interact. Hanke critiques Ben Bernanke's stewardship for ignoring key price signals like the yield curve and gold, and discusses how the Money Multiplier collapse and potential recovery poses medium-term risks if Markets Run on Expectations shift.

Sharpest takeaway

Hanke argues that despite the Fed's dramatic expansion of state (high-powered) money, the U.S. faces little inflation risk because tight bank regulation (Dodd-Frank, Basel III) has crushed bank money, leaving broad money below trend; the real danger is the unsustainable fiscal path, not hyperinflation.

  • State money is only ~15% of the broad money supply; bank money (~85%) dominates and is being suppressed by regulation
  • Basel III and Dodd-Frank incentivize banks to hold government bonds and excess reserves rather than lend, shrinking the money multiplier
  • Hyperinflation is always a fiscal-monetary phenomenon driven by deficits financed by the printing press, which is not the U.S. situation

The argument · threads8 threads · 26 claims
0.85

Hyperinflation is always rapid monetary growth driven by fiscal deficits financed by central bank money printing, causing currency substitution and economic dysfunction.

7 pointscentrality 5/5
  • High inflation throws a monkey wrench into the economic system because costs cannot be calculated properly, leading to barter and especially currency substitution; in extreme cases like Zimbabwe people spontaneously abandon the local currency for the U.S. dollar, eventually forcing the government to officially dollarize.

    “the hyperinflation throws a monkey wrench into the economic system because you can't calculate costs properly... the other thing that happens is that foreign currencies start being substituted for the local currency.”

  • During hyperinflation, the unit of account ceases to be the hyperinflating currency and becomes a solid currency (historically gold, now typically the U.S. dollar); merchants price goods in dollars first and then translate to local currency, often adding a premium to cover the cost of changing money.

    “The unit of account you are using is solid currency. It was gold in Greece, for example. Now, it's typically the U.S. dollar. So, anything that a merchant wants to sell you, they will first think in terms of how much in dollars, and then they'll translate.”

  • Hyperinflation is always a monetary phenomenon caused by very rapid money supply growth, but the ultimate cause is the fiscal situation: governments finance huge budget deficits with the printing press, as in Yugoslavia where about 90% of government expenditures were financed by the central bank and tax receipts covered only 10%.

    “Yugoslavia for example, at the end, about 90% of all the government expenditures were being financed by the printing press. By the central bank.”

  • Iran is experiencing hyperinflation of about 70% a month, measured by tracking changes in the free black-market exchange rate of the rial against the dollar and applying purchasing power parity to derive the implied inflation rate—the same method validated for Weimar Germany by Jacob Frenkel—cross-checked against commodity prices like chicken.

    “if you know the change in the value of a local currency vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, then you can impose what's called purchasing power parity, and make a calculation and easily determine what the rate of hyperinflation is.”

  • There have been 57 documented cases of hyperinflation; the worst was Hungary (July 1946) where prices doubled every 15 hours, followed by Zimbabwe (Nov 2008, 79 billion percent monthly, doubling every 27.4 hours), Yugoslavia (Jan 1994, 13.3 million percent, doubling every 1.4 days), and Weimar Germany (Oct 1923) ranked only 5th at 29,500% monthly.

    “In Zimbabwe in mid-November of 2008, it peaked out at 79 billion percent, in a month. And then Hungary has got the number 1 spot, July 1946...peaked out at a daily equivalent rate of 207% in a day.”

  • Iran's hyperinflation stems from rapid money-supply growth since 2010 plus episodic collapses in demand for the rial—akin to bank runs in currency markets—where Iranians panic-sell rials for gold or dollars expecting the rial to lose purchasing power; sanctions feed this by shifting expectations, though historically sanctions tend to be counterproductive and entrench the regime.

    “you've had what's kind of akin to bank runs in currency markets... Everyone wants to get out of the rial and get into gold or U.S. dollars because they anticipate bad times down the road... It's an expectations thing.”

  • Hyperinflation is traditionally defined as any rate of price increase that exceeds 50% in one month, a benchmark established by Phillip Cagan.

    “Traditionally it's been defined as any rate of price increase that exceeds 50% in one month. The person who did the work and eventually defined it was Professor Phillip Cagan, who was at Columbia.”

0.72

Basel III capital requirements and Dodd-Frank regulation have imposed tight monetary policy on bank money creation despite loose Fed policy on state money.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • While Fed policy has been ultra-loose with respect to state money, financial regulation (Dodd-Frank) and the Basel III capital requirements have imposed ultra-tight monetary policy on bank money, so that broad money has been very anemic and sits about 7.5% below its post-2009 trend line.

    “These two things--financial regulation and Basel--have in effect imposed ultra-tight monetary policy on the banking system and bank money... relative to trend we've got a deficiency of about 7.5% in broad money.”

  • The Fed pays interest on excess reserves to let banks earn good money on Basel-defined risk-free assets, enabling them to recapitalize and raise their capital-asset ratios—in effect a mechanism that compensates banks for complying with Basel III rather than raising dilutive equity.

    “It allows them to make good money on risk-free assets, basically. And with these profits, to recapitalize themselves and increase the capital-asset ratio. And it gets back, yeah, to the Basel thing.”

  • Instead of letting broad money shrink, Bernanke could have opposed the Dodd-Frank financial legislation and put a freeze on Basel, which directly drives bank capital requirements; the U.S. embraces Basel III partly because it forces relatively undercapitalized European banks to shrink faster than better-capitalized American banks.

    “He could have put a freeze on Basel. Basel has a direct input into the capital requirements of the banks... by imposing Basel III, you are mandating... that the European banks have to shrink faster than the American ones.”

  • Because bank share prices are below book value, issuing new shares to raise capital dilutes existing shareholders, so profit-maximizing banks instead meet Basel III's higher capital-to-asset ratios by reducing risk-assets—cutting commercial loans, mortgages, and interbank lending—while loading up on Basel-defined risk-free government bonds and cash/excess reserves on which they earn a profitable yield spread.

    “the price of shares for banks now is much below the book value of the shares; and if you actually issue more shares and try to raise capital, you are diluting the existing share holders... So what you try to do is reduce the assets that you have and specifically what you want to do is reduce the risk-assets.”

0.58

Bank money created by commercial and shadow banking now comprises 85 percent of broad money supply while Fed state money remains only 15 percent of total.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Since the Lehman collapse in September 2008 and the start of Quantitative Easing, the Federal Reserve has been purchasing roughly 75% of total U.S. Treasury issuance, and its balance sheet has increased roughly three and a half times.

    “Since they started the so-called Quantitative Easing. I think roughly since the Lehman collapse in September of 2008; I think it's about 75% of the total is being purchased by the Fed.”

  • The money multiplier associated with high-powered money fell from about 12 before the crisis to roughly 5 or 6 now (relative to M3), about half its former level; Meltzer worries that when banks regain optimism and the multiplier returns to normal, state money will bleed through the fractional-reserve system and produce significant inflation.

    “the money multiplier that is associated with high powered money is let's say about 5 or 6... What it was before the Crisis, it was about 12. So, the money multiplier is about half of what it used to be.”

  • State money (high-powered money produced by the Fed) more than doubled from about 6.5% of the broad money supply (M3) at Lehman's collapse to about 15% now, but it remains small relative to bank money created by the commercial and shadow banking systems, which makes up about 85% of total money and is what really drives the economy.

    “state money has increased from about 6.5% of the total money supply... until now it's about 15%... state money is 15% of the total amount of the money supply--meaning that state money is peanuts. What really is important is bank money”

  • The eurozone periphery suffers far larger broad-money deficiencies than the U.S.—Greece's money supply is around 45% below its trend level and other southern countries run big deficiencies—while Germany is the only European country on trend.

    “you have places like Greece--where the deficiency is something like 45%... all these countries in Europe that are really in trouble, the southern countries, they have huge monetary deficiencies. The only country in Europe that is on trend is Germany.”

0.54

U.S. government spending above its post-WWII historical range of 20–25 percent of GDP is dangerous because markets will eventually recognize unsustainable deficits and raise interest rates.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Operating above the historical spending range is dangerous not because borrowing a trillion a year is currently hard—the capital market easily absorbs it—but because markets run on expectations; if persistent borrowing with no spending restraint is expected, markets will eventually see through it, interest rates will rise, and private activity will be squeezed out, making the transition (like going over Niagara Falls) the dangerous part.

    “the markets run on expectations. And if you expect this kind of borrowing as far as the eye can see and no dialing back on government expenditures... eventually you will have a problem with the markets... interest rates will simply go up... and you get a lot of squeezing out of private activity.”

  • Fiscal prudence is non-partisan; Clinton was the most fiscally prudent recent president, reducing government expenditures as a percent of GDP by 3.9% over his two terms and running a surplus in his last two years—a reduction no other president comes close to.

    “President Clinton actually reduced government expenditures as a percent of GDP over his two terms by 3.9%. Now, there's no other president that even comes close to that.”

  • The U.S. fiscal problem is that government expenditures relative to GDP are outside the post-WWII range (around 25% federally); the solution is cutting spending back into the historical zone (toward ~22% or ~20%) rather than raising taxes, because the danger comes from operating in a new, higher regime.

    “government expenditures relative to GDP, they are outside the range that we've observed in the United States since the end of WWII... the problem isn't not enough taxes. The problem is cutting government expenditures”

0.50

The U.S. faces a genuine credit crunch where money is rationed through strict lending standards rather than price, preventing qualified borrowers from accessing credit despite low posted rates.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Despite record-low mortgage rates and seemingly abundant money, the U.S. is in a credit crunch: money is hard to get because supply is rationed through non-price rationing—standards to obtain mortgages and loans (e.g., Fannie/Freddie comparable-sales requirements) are far more onerous than in the past, so qualified borrowers cannot access credit at the low posted rates.

    “Mortgage rates are at record low levels. But the problem is getting one. Because you have to meet standards. There is non-price rationing going on, to use economic jargon.”

  • A bank can be solvent on paper—holding good assets and running a profitable operation—yet fail if all depositors demand their money at once, because it must liquefy its entire asset side in a few days; this liquidity problem, distinct from insolvency, is what doomed Northern Rock absent a government bailout.

    “You've got a liquidity problem; you have to liquidate everything that you have to pay everybody off; and even though on paper it looks like you are solvent... you are forced to cough up the money.”

0.36

Bernanke repeated Depression-era mistakes by allowing bank money to shrink and ignored key price signals like exchange rates, yield curve, and gold.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Bernanke is one of the worst Fed chairmen because he is an inflation targeter rather than a monetarist or supply sider; he does not even watch key price signals such as the dollar exchange rate, the yield curve, or the price of gold on his dashboard, and he repeated the Great Depression mistake of letting bank money shrink.

    “he's probably one of the worst chairmen we've ever had at the Fed. He's strictly not a monetarist... He's an inflation targeter.”

  • A supply-side approach to monetary policy keeps its eye on prices—foreign exchange rates, the yield curve, gold, a basket of primary commodities, and asset prices like the stock market—whereas a monetarist watches the quantity of money; Hanke says he watches both.

    “the supply siders, they like to look at prices, not quantities... foreign exchange rates; the yield curve; gold; maybe a basket of primary commodities... The monetarists would be looking at the quantity of money, mainly. I'm actually looking at both”

0.22

Hyperinflation can be halted through dollarization or currency board systems with 100 percent anchor-currency reserves and fixed convertibility at absolute exchange rates.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Hyperinflations can be ended through dollarization (spontaneous, then official, as in Zimbabwe 2009) or via a Currency Board System that issues local currency only with 100% anchor-currency reserve backing at an absolutely fixed exchange rate with full convertibility; in Bulgaria a Currency Board pegging the lev to the Deutschmark stopped 242%-monthly hyperinflation within a day and brought interest rates to single digits within 30 days.

    “we installed a Currency Board and the Currency Board issued Bulgarian lev. The lev were backed 100% with Deutschmark reserves... the hyperinflation, it stopped within a day. And within 30 days the interest rates in Bulgaria were down to single digits.”

  • After Zimbabwe officially dollarized, the Zimbabwe dollar is gone and its banknotes are worthless as currency, though they fetch more on eBay as collectibles than they ever did in circulation.

    “Well, on e-bay it has a lot more value than it ever did when it was circulating.”

0.22

Tightening sanctions on Iran are counterproductive and dangerous because Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz through which vital global oil and gas pass.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The leaked BBC report that solvent-but-illiquid Northern Rock was seeking a Bank of England lender-of-last-resort loan caused the first UK bank run in a century; the political fallout led Gordon Brown to champion an international campaign to recapitalize banks everywhere, which accelerated the Basel push and was later embraced in the U.S. by Treasury Secretary Geithner.

    “the trap at the Bank of England leaked the information that Northern Rock was going to get a substantial lender-of-last-resort loan... So you had the first bank run in a hundred years in the United Kingdom... he led, then, this campaign to recapitalize banks. Everyplace. And it became an international mantra.”

  • Tightening sanctions are not only potentially counterproductive but dangerous because Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz; if oil can no longer be sold, Iran has little to lose by shutting the Strait, through which about 35% of the world's crude oil and 20% of its liquefied natural gas pass, which would create an economic catastrophe.

    “if the sanctions get tighter and tighter and tighter, and oil can't be sold... they have virtually nothing to lose by shutting down the Strait. If they did that, 35% of the world's crude oil comes through the Strait; and 20% of the liquefied natural gas”