
What this covers
Michael Belongia, an economist at the University of Mississippi and former researcher at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, sits with EconTalk host Russ Roberts to diagnose what he sees as structural dysfunction at the Federal Reserve. The conversation traces how the institution systematically confuses the tools it actually possesses with the outcomes it claims to manage. Belongia's central claim is that the Fed operates with one instrument—control of the money supply through open market operations—yet pursues two independent objectives, a logical impossibility. He shows how this confusion plays out in practice: policymakers mistake falling interest rates during downturns (driven by collapsing loan demand) for evidence their own policy has been too loose, when reserves are actually contracting. The discussion moves from economic mechanics into institutional politics, examining how Fed chairs accumulate unchecked power while regional bank presidents and committee members become window dressing.
The conversation ranges across several distinct indictments. Belongia argues the Fed's published monetary aggregates are scientifically meaningless, adding dollar-for-dollar accounts without weighting for actual monetary service consumption. He attacks interest-rate targeting as the core error, contrasting it with a simpler alternative: maintaining a stable growth path in properly measured money supply to achieve price stability alone. On governance, he documents how strong chairmen—Volcker shutting down dissenting regional bank research, Greenspan circumventing committee votes through discount-rate maneuvers—have rendered the FOMC ceremonial. He cites New Zealand's central bank reforms as a model, tying accountability to specific consequences for missing a clearly defined price-stability target. Throughout, Belongia returns to a recurring theme: the Fed persists not because it works, but because both public and insiders benefit from the illusion that someone competent is steering the economy.
Belongia argues the Fed is structurally dysfunctional: it confuses interest-rate proxies for the money supply it actually controls, is run autocratically by the chairman while regional banks act as cheerleaders, and is saddled with impossible multiple mandates—so it should be shrunk, given a single achievable price-stability mandate, and made genuinely accountable.
- The Fed has one instrument (open market operations) and so can pursue at most one objective, making the dual mandate logically impossible.
- Targeting interest rates causes the Fed to mistake demand-driven rate changes for its own policy stance, leading it to tighten in downturns and loosen in booms.
- Regional banks and the FOMC are effectively powerless against a strong chairman, who can subvert committee votes via discount-rate maneuvers.
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Congress's dual mandate is impossible because, per Tinbergen's rule, an authority with one instrument can pursue at most one independent objective; the Fed has a single lever (control of reserves) and cannot simultaneously achieve both full employment and price stability.
“Tinbergen gave us the mathematical result more than 70 years ago the Fed has one instrument one lever to control the quantity of reserves and with one instrument you can at most pursue one independent objective”
The Fed systematically misreads its own stance because it assumes every change in the federal funds rate is caused by its actions, ignoring that the rate (a market price of reserves) shifts with the public's demand for loans: in a downturn loan demand falls, reserve demand falls, and the funds rate falls—leading the Fed to wrongly conclude it has been too easy and to drain reserves, exacerbating the slump (and the reverse in booms, adding fuel to the fire).
“the trouble with the Fed is they believe every change in the federal funds rate is it's because of their actions and they don't make allowances that the price of reserves the federal funds rate might change because of something change in the public's demand for loans”
The Fed's published monetary data (M1, M2) are scientifically meaningless because they simply add together dollar-for-dollar accounts that should be weighted differently—especially once banks pay interest on deposits—analogous to how the CPI weights components rather than averaging prices equally; a proper monetary aggregate would weight components by expenditure shares on monetary services.
“They are publishing data on money none of which is scientifically valid it's all meaningless they meet on her data it publishes comply with no economic or statistical standards”
New Zealand's central bank reform of the early 1990s is the clearest model of accountability: the bank was given a price-stability goal and told that failure would first reduce the governor's salary, then require him to explain the miss, and ultimately lead to removal from office.
“the central bank of New Zealand was reformed more than a decade ago and you said here's a goal you have price stability and if you don't achieve that we're gonna reduce your salary first and if you don't tell us why you missed your target and after we've reduced your salary we're gonna remove you from office”
In practice the chairman and board staff run monetary policy and regional bank presidents have little real input, because if a chairman cannot get his policy passed he does not remain chairman long—more than one or two dissents at a key turning point would spark speculation he wasn't in charge and should be replaced.
“the Chairman and the board staff tend to run the show and appearances aside the regional bank presidents really do not have all that much input into the making of policy”
In summer 2008 the conventional view held the Fed had been very easy because the funds rate was low, but the five-year growth rate of bank reserves was slightly negative—meaning the Fed had actually been restrictive for five years and was strangling monetary policy, contributing to the recession.
“I had sent a little bed to the Wall Street Journal that didn't get accepted pointing out that the five-year growth rate of bank reserves was slightly negative at that point the Fed had been restrictive for a five-year period it was no wonder the economy was on the verge of entering a recession”
With good monetary data, the Fed should keep the supply of reserves on a slow, stable path to hit an intermediate target of an appropriate measure of money that keeps inflation low and stable, enabling long-term planning—the only thing monetary policy can legitimately do.
“keeping the supply of reserves on a fairly slow and stable path to hit an intermediate target or an appropriate measure of money that would keep the inflation rate low and stable so that people can make long-term planning decisions”
The Fed has a single tool—open market operations injecting or withdrawing reserves—with which it can hit only one intermediate target, either an interest rate or the quantity of money; choosing an interest rate as the intermediate target is precisely how the Fed gets into trouble.
“the Fed has a single tool open market operations where it injects or takes out reserves from the banking system with that it can try to hit an intermediate target that intermediate target can be an interest rate like the federal funds rate or the quantity of money”
Properly weighted (expenditure-share) measures of the money supply behave nothing like the official simple-sum accounting data and give 'fantastically different' inferences about testable hypotheses such as the future course of inflation and the relationship between money and the business cycle.
“what you find out when you look at these data is that they don't behave anything like the official accounting some data that the central banks still routinely publish and they give you fantastically different inferences about testable hypotheses”
Monetary policy should have only the single goal of price stability because it cannot influence real variables in the long run or fine-tune the cycle, and by pretending it can do more it introduces uncertainty into the world; other levers (tax rates, etc.) should handle the real economy.
“the only thing that monetary policy can deal with is price stability so let's get on with the business of that and leave other things to other people”
The Fed should not target asset bubbles because no one can reliably define a bubble or predict one in advance, and attempting to deflate bubbles imposes unaccountable costs on the Fed's other supposed targets.
“first of all define a bubble tell me the last time anyone has been able to predict one in advance and then tell me if you're gonna start trying to deflate bubbles in advance what are the cost to all of the other targets that you presumably have”
Independence and accountability lie at opposite ends of a continuum: the Fed should be independent only in the sense that, once given a clear mandate, it is free to pursue it by any method it chooses (Taylor rule, money supply, or even a Ouija board); accountability means real penalties for failing to achieve the mandated result.
“independence and accountability are at opposite ends of a continuum the only way that the Fed should be independent is that once you give it a mandate the feds free to pursue that mandate any way that it chooses”
The Taylor rule should be discarded the way the economics profession discarded monetary aggregates in the early 1980s, because there is no single agreed Taylor rule (Taylor's version and Glenn Rudebusch's give wildly different answers) and some interpretations imply the Fed was targeting implausibly high inflation rates that no one believes.
“if the economics profession applied the same impatience that they applied to the monetary aggregates if they apply that impatience to the Taylor rule we'd have stopped talking about it a long time ago”
Nominal GDP targeting fails in stagflation: as Friedman challenged Bob Perry's proposed 6% nominal GDP target, if you face 7% inflation and minus 1% real output you are in a recession with high inflation and cannot say everything is fine—exposing the same impossibility as the dual mandate, since monetary policy cannot resolve both objectives at once.
“tell me what you do with your at your target for nominal GDP is 6% but you have 7% on prices and minus one unreal yeah that's awkward”
Greenspan's 'irrational exuberance' speech was a serious error because it implicitly made the Fed responsible for predicting equity markets, when the Fed neither knows the right value for the Dow nor has any tool to act on it—creating a spurious new monetary policy target.
“when you have someone like Greenspan running out and saying things about irrational exuberance and all of a sudden now the feds responsible for making a prediction about equity markets when first of all how in the hell does he know what the right value for the Dow is”
The Fed is not genuinely transparent: despite announcing the funds-rate target after meetings, there is no ex ante or ex post account of how decisions are reached (we cannot even confirm it follows the Taylor rule), and at any moment the public has no idea what weight the Fed places on full employment versus price stability.
“I have no idea how they're arriving at anything that they do there's talk that the Fed follows the Taylor rule well we don't know that”
The persistence of the dysfunctional Fed is explained by a 'bootleggers and Baptists' dynamic: the public thirsts for the comforting belief that someone is steering the economy (Baptists), while economists within the Fed and politicians reap personal benefits from sustaining that fantasy and have a natural incentive to keep the myth going rather than strip out their own power (bootleggers).
“it's a bootleggers and Baptists theory of of the Fed it says basically we like the idea that the Fed could steer the economy and the people at the top get to reap the benefits from that personally by indulging us in that fantasy”
Volcker vetoed the appointments of monetarists Jerry Jordan and Lee Hoskins as regional bank presidents because he wanted to silence dissenting voices—particularly St. Louis's nearly three-decade record of publishing research disagreeing with official Fed positions, and he wanted that research department shut down.
“he vetoed the choice of Jerry Jordan to be president at Atlanta and he vetoed the choice of Lea Hoskins to be President at st. Louis now why did why do you think he did that well both of them were well-known monetarists”
Greenspan subverted the will of the FOMC by, after a no-change funds-rate vote on Tuesday, convening just the Board of Governors on Friday to change the administratively-set discount rate (using a pre-arranged proposal from a regional bank board), then instructing the desk to make a 'technical' pass-through change to the federal funds rate in the same direction and amount—effectively setting the funds rate himself without committee consent.
“for quote technical reasons you would do a corresponding pass-through change in the federal funds rate so if you moved 25 basis points on the discount rate you would instruct the desk that for technical reasons they should move the funds rate in the same direction by the same amount so what you've done is subvert the will of the FOMC by this trick of changing the discount rate”
Regional Fed economists largely avoid working on monetary policy and instead write on unrelated academic subjects (jokingly 'ice fishing'), a bureaucratic capture arrangement that serves both the staff—who enjoy freedom to write what they want—and the Board of Governors, which prefers regional banks not get involved in monetary policy so that function rests exclusively with the chairman and his staff.
“the Board of Governors would like nothing better than to have the 12 regional banks work on ice fishing but to do anything except get involved in monetary policy unless that function exclusively to the Chairman and his staff”
Having five independent, strong-willed, thoughtful members who could openly disagree about Fed policy would pull back the curtain on the charade that the Fed is led by an all-seeing maestro, exposing that there is no clearly 'right' federal funds rate to be calculated.
“The idea that there might be five independent strong-willed thoughtful intelligent folks who could disagree about the direction of Fed policy would really pull the curtain back from this the charade that that the Fed is led by this all-seeing wizard of monetary policy”
Bernanke transformed from a first-rate academic economist into a first-rate bureaucrat skilled at getting along, and would have said five years earlier that he'd never do what he is doing now—illustrating that the office's incentives, not the individual's prior beliefs, drive behavior, so changing incentives matters more than who holds the job.
“Ben Bernanke was the first straight academic economist and now he's a first-rate bureaucrat he's really good at going getting along...he faces a different set of incentives and I think unless we change through political pressure what those incentives are I don't think it matters who's in the job”
Alton Gilbert used confidential New York Fed trading desk data to show that during the period the Fed claimed to be doing monetary targeting (October 1979 onward) it was 'doing anything but'—and Volcker ordered all copies of the paper destroyed on the pretextual ground that individual trades could be reconstructed from a table of means and variances, a justification Belongia argues is not credible.
“he used what were confidential data from the New York Fed's trading desk to demonstrate that at the time the Fed was allegedly doing monetary targeting it was doing anything but that”
The number of Fed districts should be reduced from 12 to 5 because the price-services (check clearing, cash distribution) volume has declined enormously and branch offices are already cut, and because sound bank supervision only requires the Fed to oversee roughly the hundred largest holding companies rather than all member banks.
“the reason for shrinking the number of districts from 12 to 5 is motivated by a couple of things the price services function...has declined enormous”
Greenspan controlled the FOMC duplicitously: he would poll members in turn, only propose a funds-rate change if he had the votes, and otherwise leave policy unchanged—using the going-around-the-table procedure to read whether he had support before committing.
“Greenspan exercised his control in a very duplicitous way what would happen at FOMC meetings is that each of the members of the committee's...would take their turns going around the table”
Reading St. Louis Fed research from 50 years ago (e.g., Jim Meigs's essay honoring Homer Jones) shows the Fed was making the same mistakes—confusing tight for loose policy and vice versa—and that there is little difference between then and now in how the Fed conducts and misinterprets policy.
“if you read what was going on 50 years ago you'll see that there's not much difference now from what was going on back then it's really remarkable”
You cannot write legislation that makes an institution function well because outcomes are idiosyncratic to the individuals who take office; you cannot make a Volcker or a Greenspan behave a certain way, but you can change incentives at the margin and look for people willing to say 'that's not our responsibility' or honestly 'I don't know.'
“you can't write legislation that will make an institution function all of these things are idiosyncratic to the individuals who take office”
This discount-rate pass-through maneuver happened roughly half a dozen times over a three-year period around 1989-91, and it is verifiable by examining the record for instances where the Tuesday FOMC made no funds-rate change but a Friday discount-rate change was followed by a funds-rate pass-through.
“my recollection that there's about a half dozen maybe more occasions where this happened over about a three year period between about 89 and 91”
Professionals—doctors, scientists, economists—get into trouble when they oversell what they can do, and the Fed's troubles are largely self-inflicted wounds from overpromising; it would be in the Fed's own self-interest to retrench and tell the public this is what you can reasonably expect, but once public trust and credibility are severely damaged the path is downward rather than back up.
“all of the professions and individuals in those professions get into trouble when you oversell what you can do”
Homer Jones, as St. Louis Fed director of research from 1957 to 1971, introduced practices the modern Fed now takes for granted—hiring economists to write scientific articles, holding conferences, and publishing data—so the modern Fed owes much of its research vision to him.
“he's the guy who introduced so many things that the modern Federal Reserve accepts as given such as hiring economists to write scientific articles and holding conferences and publishing data the modern Fed owes really everything to the vision that Homer Jones started to put in place in st. Louis”
Bank presidents have embarrassingly embraced the impossible dual mandate—'running around embracing this dual mandate like little schoolgirls'—instead of telling Congress they cannot achieve it and asking to be given an achievable goal such as price stability, and they do so to keep their jobs.
“you've had mostly the bank presidents running around embracing this dual mandate like little schoolgirls we have this dual mandate we have this dual mandate instead of saying to Congress we can't do this tell us to pursue something that we can achieve which is price stability”
Regional bank presidents who vote only every third year cannot be expected to take their FOMC function seriously; making the five presidents permanent voting members would make them more serious, and they should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate (like governors) rather than by regional boards subject to chairman veto.
“some bank presidents now get a vote only every third year well you know it's at least to me bizarre it's kind of hard to take things all that seriously if you've got a vote every third year”
The federal funds rate is the competitively-determined market rate banks charge each other for overnight loans to meet reserve requirements, which the Fed influences by injecting or withdrawing money, whereas the discount rate is administratively set (posted, not a market rate) at which member banks can borrow directly from the Fed's discount window.
“federal funds rate is the rate that banks charge each other for overnight loans to comply with their regulatory responsibilities with the Fed and the Fed intervenes to affect that rate”
There is still significant input into policy meetings from local offices, and regional bank presidents publicly voice a variety of opinions on whether the Fed should stay the course, ease, or tighten, creating an appearance of genuine difference of opinion about policy.
“there is still a great deal of input in policy meetings from local offices and all you need to do is turn on your television...and you see a variety of opinions coming from the regional bank presidents”
The Fed has responsibilities in three broad areas: monetary policy (most scrutinized), bank regulation and supervision, and the least-discussed provision of bank price services such as check clearing and cash distribution, all carried out through 12 regional banks with oversight from the Board of Governors.
“the Fed has responsibilities in three broad areas the most attention is given to its responsibilities for monetary policy its receiving greater scrutiny now for its responsibilities for bank regulation and supervision and the least attention is given to its third area of responsibility and that's the provision of bank services”
Members of the Board of Governors have varied and often weak qualifications—some are former bankers, some appointed as political payoffs with little economics training—rather than being uniformly noted macroeconomists or monetary theorists.
“they could be someone who's been appointed as a political payoff they might have not have very much experience it might have very little economics training you can look at the people who have served on the board of governors over time there are backgrounds very”