What this covers

This is a conversation between host Jack Farley and Perry Mehrling, drawing on his book on Charles Kindleberger and the dollar system. Mehrling starts from the claim that the Dollar system is mostly a private offshore arrangement, built from the balance sheets of global banks rather than from the Fed's own liabilities. He then works through what a Reserve currency needs: use in invoicing trade, reserves that can be accumulated, financial-account surpluses because the world wants the issuer's assets, and deep markets backed by rule of law and a central bank that serves both banks and government. Europe's lack of a unified Treasury-bill equivalent is one of his examples of what is missing elsewhere.

The history section is where the conversation turns contentious. Mehrling calls the pre-1971 "gold standard" a sterling standard and then a dollar standard, and treats Bretton Woods as a political blessing of a system that already existed, not its creation. He contrasts sterling's collapse in 1931 with the dollar's survival after 1971, when the eurodollar market kept the currency in use even as Nixon cut the gold link. The 1970s inflation and the 2020s inflation are set against each other, with the recent episode read as a relative-price adjustment that should not require another Paul Volcker-style shock.

The contemporary material centers on the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort to the world. Mehrling contrasts its hesitation in 2008 with the swap lines reopened immediately in 2020. He also covers the globalization of shadow banking, credit growth in the global South since 2008, and why the end of the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP)) cycle could be "a little rocky." On the dollar's future he is dismissive of near-term dethronement, citing the lack of an alternative and the burdens no rival wants. He also argues that Triffin's dilemma persists in textbooks despite misdescribing how money works, a point he ties to the Money View as a minority position.

Sharpest takeaway

Perry Merkling argues that the global dollar system evolved organically through market forces and institutional adaptation rather than by deliberate design, and that understanding it requires abandoning misleading frameworks like Triffin's Dilemma in favor of a 'key currency' view that sees the dollar's persistence as dependent on its utility to the rest of the world and the Fed's willingness to backstop it.

  • The dollar system arose organically through private market actors' choices and crisis-driven institutional innovation, not through treaty or deliberate U.S. policy
  • Triffin's Dilemma misunderstands how reserve currencies work by treating dollar accumulation as a problem rather than a service sold by the financial center
  • The Fed's role as international lender of last resort, demonstrated in 2020 but absent in 2008-09, determines whether the system holds together during stress

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0.81

The hierarchical character of the dollar system arose organically, not through treaty creation, and it grows through crisis as new institutional mechanisms are discovered and built in response to breakdowns

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“it seems that the hierarchical character of it pleases no one okay that that the people who are not in dollar countries are are unhappy about dollar hegemony as they call it and and the US is not happy that it has responsibility for the global dollar system so it it arose I suppose it's important to appreciate that it seems to have Arisen organically it was not it was not created uh by a treaty or anything like that um the uh and and this hierarchical character is also or organic and it grows through crisis maybe that's another thing to mention”

0.80

The elasticity of money creation in banking is disciplined by the holders of money through their choices about what form to hold their dollar wealth—whether as deposits, treasuries, mortgage-backed securities, or other assets.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merling

“you keep moving back and forth elasticity and discipline disciplining by the holders of money what what in what form would they like to hold their their dollar wealth”

0.80

Foreign banks can create dollar assets and liabilities just as U.S. domestic banks can, expanding their balance sheets on both sides—what Merkling calls 'the alchemy of banking'—but they lack direct access to the Fed so they must develop institutional mechanisms to manage withdrawal and stress risk

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“what I call in my class is the Alchemy of banking um expanding the balance sheet on both sides yes that's that's correct um the there is a difference in the sense that the uh foreign Banks um don't have direct access to the Fed so it they have to worry about well what if somebody wants to move that deposit to some other bank or withdraw it or something so the offshore dollar system has developed mechanisms for for that”

0.80

The dollar system is largely a private offshore system, not a government system—the dollar liabilities clearing international transactions are primarily liabilities of global banks, not the U.S. Federal Reserve, making it fundamentally a business thing rather than a government thing

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the dollar system is largely an offshore system okay um and it's it's not just an offshore system it's largely a private dollar system that the the liabilities the dollar liabilities that are clearing International transactions are the liabilities of global Banks okay not the liabilities of of the U.S Central Bank um and so it's a it's a private system it and it is an offshore system so it's not really you know a government thing it's a it's a it's a it's a business thing”

0.80

The Fed's response to the 2008 financial crisis versus 2020 COVID crisis demonstrates the importance of the lender of last resort function: in 2008 the Fed hesitated to act immediately as international lender, asking repeatedly about 'unusual and exigent circumstances,' causing the crisis to worsen; in 2020 the Fed immediately reopened swap lines and acted as international lender, preventing financial crisis despite pandemic shock

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“you could compare what happened in the global financial crisis with what happened in the covet crisis of March 2020 many of your many of your listeners will say what covert crisis you know well why it's because the FED quite immediately stepped in as International lender of Last Resort it reopened the swap lines um and so nobody noticed the wheels did not come off the financial card there were lots of other problems you know it was a pandemic um but the financial uh uh shock okay was probably not evident except to people who were really in the financial markets in the global financial crisis very different you know it took it took years you know that the Fed was always asking is it is it you know unusual in exigent circumstances yet you know can we do something you know and and so they intervened sort of as the wheels were falling off the card um and uh and so things got a lot worse so they've learned the lesson and the FED is in fact operating as International lender blast Resort”

0.80

The collapse of sterling in 1931 and potential collapse of the dollar in 1971 were qualitatively different events: Sterling collapsed when the Bank of England lacked central bank cooperation to support it and had massive debt overhang from reparations; the dollar survived because even though Nixon tried to kill the gold standard, international actors chose to support the dollar offshore through the eurodollar system

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the Trade surplus of India was was was quite important in supporting the pound sterling the world began to look for an alternative um and uh the dollar seemed seemed the the eligible um and so there started to be to move in that direction um 1931 the collapse of the story was was really the date that that Sterling when Sterling went off gold just basically there wasn't a facility for Central Bank cooperation to support Sterling um there was all of this debt overhang from the reparations and all of that so there were so many stresses on the system and the bank of England was just not able to support it all”

0.80

The payment system is inherently a credit system, not a commodity system; this is why central bank liabilities (elastic money that can expand and contract) are better than gold (inelastic commodity) as international money because they can adjust to changing payment needs while gold cannot

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“why is it why does it work better to have the have the international uh International money um the liability of a Central Bank of a Nation as opposed to a metal yellow metal or something like that and and it's because the payment system is inherently uh a credit thing okay and so it's not an out money is there is a form of credit the best money because it's elastic it's elastic um uh outward and also and also inward if it's working well so you can expand and contract both gold is not elastic at all you know it's it it's there's just a certain quantity of it um and you can mine more of it you know it takes a while um once it's there it's there forever really it doesn't it doesn't um rust that's why we like it um but it's it's not a good it's not a good money”

0.80

The Fed's ability to control price level inflation directly is much lower than its ability to manage financial conditions; the Fed can force debt settlement through interest rates but cannot directly control commodity/goods prices, which depend on supply conditions, geopolitical shocks, and international factors outside Fed control

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the central Bankers are in this Communications business you know so um interest rates are are a lot higher now okay than people are used to you know for the last 10 years and so it feels and they've moved very rapidly that's true too so that's a big shock you quite correctly point out that the link between that sort of action and the price level you know is not direct okay”

0.80

The necessary characteristics of a global reserve currency are: (1) the currency must be used to invoice global trade, (2) countries must be able to accumulate reserves denominated in that currency, (3) the issuing country must run persistent surpluses in financial flows (not necessarily goods) because the world wants to buy its assets, and (4) there must be deep and liquid financial markets supported by rule of law, a sophisticated banking system, and a central bank that simultaneously acts as both the banker's bank and the government's bank

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the balance of payments of an individual country um is settled in in some International Reserve okay so the it's the the question is um peop people the uh Surplus countries countries where people want to want to buy your goods or buy your assets okay have no difficulty issuing a monetary liability okay because people need to make payments to you so that's the that's the key now and I have to emphasize it's also Financial payments because we know that the U.S is running trade deficits has run trade deficits for a long time and that doesn't seem to get in the way okay and and it's because the world wants to accumulate our assets um as as well and so they're making payments to us”

0.80

Developing countries that need capital for development should be understood as countries structurally running deficits for capital accumulation, not as countries with temporary payment imbalances, and thus should be funded through long-term capital markets (10-20 year bonds) rather than short-term interbank credit.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merling

“there are some countries who you know who should be running deficits all the time you know that so developing countries that are borrowing for a lot for for Capital development or something like that um we wanna we don't want to think about that as a as a as a deficit that needs to be solved with with short-term uh Bank flows because they're not going to pay it back you know in the short run they can't pay it's not for that it's for Capital development so that should be funded by access to global Capital markets so 10-year bonds 20-year bonds”

0.80

Par is the exchange rate between private banking system liabilities (bank deposits) and public central bank liabilities (Fed reserves/cash), not between different banks; abandoning par (as Bank of England did with gold in 1931) is sometimes necessary during crisis; currently central banks are trying to return to par after abandoning it during COVID, creating a new implicit price level target

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“what you said about par isn't exactly right you're you're saying that's about One bank account being being traded for one for one with another bank account the the idea of part is rather that bank accounts liabilities of the private dollar system traded par with liabilities of the public banking system meaning the fed you know being meaning reserves meaning cash okay so that that's the that's the par relationship there not not between Banks but between layers of the hierarchy but between between Banks and central banks”

0.78

What most people think of as a 'gold standard' before 1971 was really a sterling standard before WWI and a dollar standard after WWII, not a gold standard for everyone; there was never a true global gold standard—gold was only the reserve for the reserve currency issuer

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“well that would be my tradition my that what you just said okay that there was gold standard for Sterling okay but really Sterling was the global was the global uh money and similarly Bretton Woods you know sort of tied the dollar to Gold um but not everyone else was tied to the dollar um so the the there was never a gold standard for it was a dollar standard we shifted from a sterling standard before World War One to a dollar standard after World War II”

0.78

Bretton Woods has achieved a 'mythic' status in economics education where it's portrayed as the moment the global dollar system was deliberately created through benign multilateralism, when in reality Bretton Woods was just a political blessing of a system that had already grown organically and was already operating

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the middle quality was the notion that somehow Bretton Woods um uh created the global dollar system as an act of multi of benign multilateralism okay that's the myth okay the truth okay the empirical truth is that the global dollar system grew organically and was being blessed at Bretton Woods was being politically blessed um multilaterally so so that that U.S would be the leader and everyone else would be the followers”

0.75

The probability of the dollar being dethroned as global reserve currency in the near term (5-15 years) is very low because: (1) Nixon tried to kill the dollar system in 1971 but failed because the world wanted it, (2) no viable alternative exists, and (3) being a reserve currency requires accepting responsibilities that no other country wants to take on

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“remember that Nixon 1971 I tell this in the book he tried to Dethrone the dollar he didn't want the dollar to be have that responsibility and he failed you know because the world wanted the dollar okay and so that was the growth of the offshore dollar system so when the world doesn't want the dollar anymore then we won't have the dollar anymore okay but the uh it doesn't I don't see any any move any substantial move to to an alternative I don't see an alternative really that exists that once you understand this too understand that being the global Reserve currency comes with responsibilities who wants to take that responsibility the United States didn't okay and it's been sort of forced to do that”

0.75

Deep and liquid financial markets supported by legal systems and sophisticated banking (particularly in New York) are crucial for reserve currency status, and Europe lacks an equivalent to the U.S. Treasury bill market because each European country issues its own bills with different signatories, lacking standardization and range of maturities.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“some of that has to do with deep and liquid markets um that are are supported by a legal system and by and by uh sophisticated banking system largely in New York Europe has nothing comparable to the market for treasury bills in in the United States for example um there each individual country has their own has their own”

0.75

The previous use of 'shadow banking' to mean unregulated or illicit activity was analytically unhelpful because it lumped together different financial structures, whereas defining it by funding structure clarifies which activities are actually risky.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“at the time the word Shadow banking was coined many people used it to mean sort of unregulated or banking I don't like or things that should be illegal um and uh there that didn't seem useful analytically and so things were being lumped together that were not like each other at all okay um and so to try to understand this phenomenon you have to ask yourself what what what is an analytical distinction”

0.75

Global credit expansion since 2008 has been largely in the global South and in shadow banking (market-based credit), not traditional bank lending, making it more difficult to backstop and creating new challenges for maintaining system stability that are currently being tested

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“the expansion of Global Credit since the global financial crisis has been largely in the global South um so that's an extra Challenge and it's and it's also the shadow banking system it's the market-based credit system not Bank lending so developing mechanisms to backstop that expansion of the global dollar system is is uh has been a challenge um as as well and it's being tested right now as a matter of fact”

0.74

In 2008 the Fed initially tried to refinance (rather than liquidate) mortgage-backed securities by expanding the money supply to create new mortgages, which wound up on the Fed's balance sheet; this refinancing strategy stabilized the mortgage market but took years of intervention rather than immediate action

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“a lot of those mortgage-backed Securities you know wound up uh on the balance sheet of the fed or rather they were refinanced um and the was the refinancing that liquidated the mortgage-backed Securities and then the new mortgages wound up on the live on the on the balance sheet of the Fed so that stabilized the mortgage Market”

0.74

Bretton Woods allowed exchange rate adjustments when fundamental imbalances developed, distinguishing between temporary deficits (to be managed through bank borrowing) and structural imbalances (requiring currency revaluation).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merling

“Bretton Woods allowed there to be um exchange rate movements for fundamental imbalance okay the the the the so leave that aside the you asked how are how do fix exchange rates work they work essentially through um interbank borrowing or between countries Global borrowing um to absorb temporary uh deficits and surpluses”

0.74

International money is the dollar pretty much exclusively, and all other currencies are tied into the dollar through a set of FX swaps and international lender of last resort arrangements that create a hierarchical system

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the important thing to understand is that International money is the dollar pretty much exclusively um and uh all of all other current is sort of tied into the dollar through a set of FX swaps and and international lender blast Resort”

0.74

The BIS was subsequently used to stabilize European currencies by moving money from surplus to deficit countries on its balance sheet, effectively functioning as a central bank for central banks of different European countries during the period when currencies were not yet convertible (before 1958)

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the bis which was dealing with interbank balances Central Bank balances so the bis stabilized the European currencies um they weren't convertible until 1958 but the way it stabilized them was precisely by moving money from the deficits to to the surpluses on the balance sheet of the of the bis um and acting as a kind of Central Bank for the central banks of the different European countries”

0.73

The recent inflation was a relative price adjustment caused by pandemic and war disruptions (service-to-goods shifts) combined with monetary accommodation, not true ongoing inflation driven by wage-price cycles or exchange rate spirals like the 1970s; the international monetary system remains stable unlike the disordered 1970s, so the inflation should resolve without requiring catastrophic interest rates like Volcker's

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“this is maybe relevant for understanding um even thinking about the inflation uh scare a little bit today you know that if if kindergarten is right okay people have been analogizing today to the 70s okay and I think it's not true you know the international monetary system seems very stable today okay it is it is not at all like the 1970s okay so if he's right then this is not this is not really inflation it's a kind of post-war price shift price level shift okay and and uh that will because of the disordered conditions of the pandemic and also the war you know Ukraine war and so forth and you know shift shifting from you know service economy to a Goods economy and then back again and then so there's there there's going to be price and stability cause there's plenty of reasons for that but that doesn't need to be that doesn't need to become um ongoing inflation”

0.72

The globalization of shadow banking over the past decade—extension of market-based credit funding across the world, not just in the U.S.—is a natural and permanent form of banking for a global economy because bonds travel better than loans across borders

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the expansion of the the shadow banking system that broke in the global financial crisis was really just a U.S thing you know residential mortgage-bike Securities um and uh booked uh offshore in in Europe to a great extent um but now now it's Global so it's uh that's been a big big change in the last 10 years um globalization of Shadow Banking and the global an extension of the dollar system to the global South right um and I suppose and important distinction there too is the new regulation that that only government funds can promise par so that the liabilities of those funds are are close substitutes for Bank deposits um whereas Prime not so not so much”

0.72

Kindleberger's intellectual achievement is establishing and demonstrating a 'key currency' view of international monetary systems that explains how reserve currencies emerge, persist, and fail based on provision of liquidity services and central bank cooperation rather than gold backing or deliberate design

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“he is a representative of this key currency tradition of of thinking of of international monetary system that was also John H Williams um um and and and others a different John H Williams than the one who currently is Chairman of the New York yes yes yes yes he he he was he was vice president at the New York fed um when when when Charlie was in graduate school in 1931.”

0.72

The Triffin Dilemma wrongly assumes that a reserve currency issuer must run trade deficits to provide the world with dollars; Kindleberger correctly argued that a financial center can supply dollars through financial intermediation (borrowing from some countries and lending to others) without running goods trade deficits, and this is what the U.S. has actually done as 'banker of the world'

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“certainly you do not need to run a trade deficit in order to supply the rest of the world with liquid balances because um you could just do a swap of ious with them and in fact the the New York was right we were lending to Europe in dollars long term by buying buying uh bonds okay and they were lending to us buying you know having deposit accounts um in and so you can increase the global holding of dollar deposit accounts simply by lending the money not by selling them Goods um and that's what was happening that the US heal he would always say that the U.S is a financial intermediary it's the bank of the world okay it's expanding its balance sheet on both sides”

0.72

The gold crossing point that Triffin identified (European dollar holdings exceeding U.S. gold holdings) was not actually a problem because fractional reserve banking is the normal state—dollars don't replace gold; both can exist and grow because dollars represent claims that grow with economic activity while gold is inelastic

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“banking is not it's not that the dollars are somehow in the place of the gold a fractional Reserve banking is the nature of the game you know and they're it's not a the the dollar uh the dollar Holdings of the rest of the world are increasing because the rest of the world is growing and they need more dollar reserves and so they will be increasing every year you know and there's no that's not right to think of that as a deficit um that's selling liquidity services to the rest of the world”

0.72

Kindleberger advocated for maintaining fixed exchange rates longer than the world did because he believed a global trading system requires a global currency (or fixed rates), just as individual U.S. states don't have separate currencies floating against each other; his teacher at Columbia was involved in creating the Fed, which provided this model for why unified currency works better

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“Charlie was against that because he thinks you know this is a we don't want to have every United States every state having its own currency and then fluctuating against each other there's an advantage to having the dollar system in the United States having it unified okay his teacher at at Columbia was part of creating the fed and so he saw that and he just played that same logic Works globally too that a global trading system requires a Global Currency and uh or fixed exchange rates are sort of like that”

0.72

The fundamental difference between the economics profession (which thinks about policy as a national matter) and Kindleberger (who thought globally about the dollar system) explains their disagreement: Triffin and mainstream economists tried to solve 'the U.S. dilemma' while Kindleberger tried to make the global dollar system work, a difference in perspective that leads to opposite conclusions

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“the fundamental difference between triffin and kindleberger is that and in fact between the economics profession in kindleberger is that the economics profession is generally thinking about Economic Policy as a national thing you know they're trying to think about advising governments about monetary policy and and fiscal policy and so forth and Kindle Booker is always thinking globally okay he's thinking about the dollar system not about what's best for the United States okay but about the dollar system and so making the dollar system work okay was what he was trying to do”

0.72

The money multiplier and other textbook concepts like the Triffin Dilemma persist in teaching despite not accurately describing how money works, because concepts in textbooks are hard to remove; the fact that a majority of economists accept a theory doesn't mean it's right—the minority view (Kindleberger, money view) might be correct

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“things like the money multiplier too you know they we still teach it you know this is that are not actually very helpful for understanding how money money Works um and once they're in the textbooks it's very hard to get them out of the textbooks so um that's that's uh that's a problem um it's my problem I teach I teach money banking so the uh it's that's that's the nature of the Beast and I can't fight that uh so I would just say that the fact that uh the fact that the majority of economists uh adopt one way of thinking doesn't mean that they're right okay it just it just uh it may well be that the minority view is actually right”

0.72

The global South's integration into global capital markets over the past decade—ability of developing countries to borrow in capital markets, not just through government channels—is exactly what Kindleberger wanted to happen 50 years earlier but took until now; this permanent integration is one of the most important achievements of the post-2008 period

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“he was thrilled okay that the last 10 years have shown have have have meant access to global Capital markets by the global South that's what he wanted to happen um 50 years before okay it just took a long long long long time um it was always for him and his friends the key institution at Bretton Woods was not the IMF the key Institute tuition was the word Bank okay because it was lending for development”

0.71

The key currency view explains how crises and shocks strengthen rather than weaken the dollar system: when the dollar was counted out (in 1971 and after), the system consolidated and came back stronger, demonstrating the self-reinforcing nature of reserve currency dominance.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“that in retrospect it seems that this way of thinking about about International money has a lot going for it and should be it should be more more widely uh discussed and considered um uh and and I think it's largely unknown um world of depression is his first sort of big history book okay and mania's Panasonic crashes that's coming out in its eighth edition right now um with a new co-author uh Bob McCauley who was a student of of kindleberger as a matter of fact so the uh so that's another uh and then his and then his great great uh treatises the uh the international money essays and and the financial history of Western Europe so that was his that was the beginning of his third career writing that book uh and and a lot of his thinking once he was out of Academia he was forced to retire in 1976. he had complete freedom and so he he took advantage of that freedom and and wrote much more easily and freely um in his later later life but people don't understand those things because they don't understand what what came before and I'm hoping that my book will will provide an easy entry point um it's uh it's not a long book okay it's not it's amazing how much you managed to pack in there for how long it's pretty dense but it's a pretty dense book but but it's it's a story too so that you know I always tell uh you know my student just just read it you know you don't have to you know it it has a certain narrative Arc to it”

0.71

Dedolarization rhetoric from Russia, India, and Brazil is fundamentally expression of peripheral discontent with the hierarchical dollar system, similar to French complaints about 'exorbitant privilege' in the 1950s-60s; however, peripheral countries don't have realistic alternatives and benefit from access to the dollar system even while resenting it

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“it's a hierarchical system and nobody's nobody's really happy about that um and what you're hearing right now are the discontents really in the in in the periphery mostly the the countries that you are that you are mentioning in the book I tell the story about the the building of the dollar system immediately after the war it was really all about uh about extending the dollar system to Europe okay and and integrating the the recovering economies um after World War II um with the United States um and there was a lot of discontents about that you know the exorbitant privilege word you know was was invented by in France”

0.69

Money market funds shifted from 'prime' (holding commercial paper) to 'government-only' funds after regulation required that only government funds could promise par (stable net asset value), causing a structural shift toward safer funding but also raising questions about credit availability

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“the new regulation that that only government funds can promise par so that the liabilities of those funds are are close substitutes for Bank deposits um whereas Prime not so not so much um and that caused a big shift of of corporate funds from into government only because they they are not interested in having a non-par non-par instrument”

0.69

U.S. monetary policy is global monetary policy for better or worse, putting strains on the system as it causes tightening globally, and we are currently discovering where the system will break through stress testing.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“U.S monetary policy is global monetary policy for Better or For Worse um and uh that that's putting strains on the system and we're finding out uh where it's gonna break”

0.69

The 2008 global financial crisis' asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) funding crisis illustrates maturity mismatch risk: money market funds refused to roll short-term ABCP backed by illiquid mortgages, forcing European banks holding mortgages to find alternative funding and eventually requiring central bank swap line support.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“what happened when the money market funds refused to roll basically the asset-backed commercial paper um this caused a funding crisis okay for the the for the European banks that were holding residential mortgage-backed Securities okay so they had to find some other way of of funding this and the money market mutual funds had to find some other uh asset to replace it with okay”

0.69

When the Federal Reserve raises interest rates to 4%, it creates a follow-the-leader dynamic where other central banks and emerging markets must also raise rates to avoid capital flows and currency depreciation; this global synchronization creates synchronized stress across all economies.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Jack Farley, host)

“when the U.S has a zero interest rate policy it allows Europe to have a zero interest rate policy um and you know Japan Industries have been you know very low for a long time but you know suddenly Brazil can have interest rates at six percent but oh if the Federal Reserve raises to four percent in you know less than a year suddenly you know India has to raise rates but still has to raise rates so it's it's always sort of Follow the Leader”

0.69

In the money view, the rate of interest is understood as the price of rolling over debt coming due—a survival constraint—so higher interest rates create incentives for people to settle debt rather than roll it over, imposing discipline that reveals whether businesses are truly viable.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merling

“in the money view we we understand the rate of interest as really being about the price of of rolling over your debt debts that are coming due you know that so it's the survival constraint and and what what higher interest rates do higher overnight your interest rates do is to really give a big incentive for people to settle okay instead of instead of rolling over”

0.68

The U.S. rejected having New York as the new London (center of global banking) after WWII, driving global banking business offshore to London, where the eurodollar system grew up; this was a self-inflicted policy mistake that paradoxically strengthened the global dollar system by creating a more resilient offshore infrastructure

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“the US government kept being worried you know so they they drove a lot of this business out of New York offshore back to London which London was perfectly happy to have because they they knew how to do global banking they had done it for a long time you know so that the knowledge of how to do global banking was was was was there and so the euro dollar system grew up um because the U.S rejected you know having having uh New York as the new as the New London um but uh so that's how the dollar system expanded um frankly um by the U.S refusing uh so”

0.68

The Fed resolved the political problem of being an international lender of last resort by lending to foreign central banks rather than directly to foreign commercial banks, operating in cooperation with other central banks.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“the FED is in fact operating as International lender blast Resort but really really in cooperation with other central banks okay so the that's how the politics got worked out really you know so that the FED is not lending to foreign Banks it's lending to foreign central banks”

0.68

The Fed faces a transition from the elasticity phase (expanding credit) to the discipline phase (consolidating credit) after the long zero interest rate period; some credit expansion during ZIRP was justified (productive) while other parts were not, and the discipline phase will involve painful consolidation as unviable ZIRP-dependent businesses fail and resources reallocate

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“but I think the next couple years are going to be a little rocky because we are coming to into the discipline phase of this system um we will be figuring out what parts of those credit expansion that we did in in during the zero interest rate policy were a good idea and what parts were not a good idea um and there's going to be a a consolidation um of of of that”

0.68

The Fed is a hybrid entity that serves as both the banker's bank (providing liquidity to the banking system) and the government bank (supporting government finances), and this dual role—particularly ensuring the liquidity of the treasury market—is something no competitor has, making the Fed's support of the dollar system unique.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“the FED is this hybrid entity that is the Banker's Bank um and we've been talking about the sense in which it's the Banker's bank that it is providing liquidity to the banking system but it's also the government Bank um so that it is uh supporting the government finances um and and that means that means ensuring the liquidity of the treasury market that's part of it you know that's one of the reasons that it that it that it works as it does um and that's not something that that other that really there's any competitor to um at them at the moment”

0.66

Moving from the sterling system to the dollar system took 30 years and required two world wars and a great depression; therefore, dedolarization advocates should be careful what they wish for because the transition costs are enormous and the current system, while imperfect, is better than the chaos that could result from transition

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“moving from the Sterling system to the dollar system I will remind you okay it took from 1914 to 1944. so 30 years and two world wars and a Great Depression so be careful what you wish for you know I do not wish for 30 years two world wars and a Great Depression um this dollar system you know it's not perfect but it seems to be holding together let's make it work”

0.66

The 1979-1981 Volcker disinflation was extremely painful, with the dollar moving 50% against the Deutsche Mark and Yen, creating great instability, but this period of intense pain lasted 2-3 years before stabilization.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merling

“when the dollar moves against the German against the Deutsche Mark and the Yen you know by 50 you know it was it was uh it was a time of great instability um compared to present present time seemed like nothing um so uh probably that shapes my yeah shapes my optimism uh is it just it seems pretty it seems like the system is pretty is holding together um at the core like the core okay”

0.65

All banking systems have inherent instability because they involve the creation of credit; when crisis hits and people want to flee to liquidity, a lender of last resort can prevent system collapse by creating the means of payment, but providing international lender of last resort function is primarily a political problem, not a technical one

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“I come from a tradition of monetary thought um where we speak of the inherent instability of credit um this is from Ralph hawtry once things come unglued and people people want to there's a flight to liquidity to to Dollars that's when the lender of Last Resort can prevent the system from unraveling um because it can create the the the the most the means of payment um and so it can satisfy that need um in a time of Crisis that's true of all banking systems and and as I say the the the the offshore the euro dollar system is a banking system so that that the difficulty of providing lender of Last Resort come is really largely political okay because the the monetary system is global but political system is National okay and so whether the FED can be the international lender of Last Resort is kind of a in question”

0.62

The core of the dollar system is holding and is likely to continue holding; the periphery will experience consolidation and instability, but as long as the center (U.S., Fed, major financial markets) remains functional, the system as a whole will remain functional

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“the periphery is another matter okay there's there there have been extensions of the system in directions that will that are in retrospect will will prove ill-advised okay and so those things will will be pruned off and Consolidated and it's it's not going to be pleasant um but I think the system will hold um and uh I'm not I'm not worried about it you said there's this spectrum of people who hate the dollar and wish it would go away and people who love the dollar and say it will be with us you know to Eternity I'm I'm kind of in neither group because I'm saying this this is an organic system that grows”

0.52

Being the global reserve currency comes with responsibilities, not just privileges; the United States didn't choose to be reserve currency but was forced into it, so one should be hesitant to raise one's hand for that role once understanding what it actually entails.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“once you understand this too understand that being the global Reserve currency comes with responsibilities who wants to take that responsibility the United States didn't okay and it's been sort of forced to do that um so once you understand that you're you're maybe a little a little less eager to raise your hand”

0.52

The BIS and World Bank were the key institutions at Bretton Woods from Kindleberger's perspective, not the IMF, because the BIS handled interbank stabilization for developed countries while the World Bank financed development for developing countries.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“it was always for him and his friends the key institution at Bretton Woods was not the IMF the key Institute tuition was the word Bank okay because it was lending for development um and the bis already existed so the bis which was dealing with interbank balances Central Bank balances so the bis stabilized the European currencies”

0.52

Kindleberger did not write in mathematics and statistics, which made his work seem old-fashioned to modern economists, but his approach actually led him to see different and correct things about the world that mathematical economists missed.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“he wasn't understood largely because he didn't write in in math and Stat statistics and so forth and so it seemed like he was an old-fashioned Economist who really didn't understand modern economics or something that's not really I think that's not really right okay he he had another way of doing economics that led that led him to see different things in the world which happened in retrospect to be patient and correct”

0.52

The mission of Merkling's book is to make Kindleberger's key currency tradition and money view framework more accessible to modern audiences who have only learned mainstream economics, providing an entry point to understand an alternative framework that has proven correct about many things the mainstream missed

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“so part of part of me is translating for a modern audience so that people can understand and then they can decide what they want to do with their teaching of driven dilemma in their classes um and similarly flexible exchange rates you know that chapter eight chapter seven is about that about Harry Johnson and a lot of the economists thought oh we should just abandon fixed exchange rates”

0.48

Shadow banking can appear on any balance sheet—banks, non-banks, offshore entities, or distributed across multiple balance sheets—and the key is identifying money market funding of capital market lending regardless of legal form, as is happening with global South development finance.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“it could be on a bank you know and in fact it was on the balance sheet of of of UBS for example um during in the in the global financial crisis um it was an offshore in these sieves these you know Citibank sieves um when you see money market funding of Capital Market lending you're talking about shuttle banking whether it might also be spread across multiple balance sheets that's what's happening with the global South now really that the funding it it it's it's all offshore it's offshore on the margin um but it's not in one institution you know you could have part of the term funding here and then overnight funding over there”

0.46

The pivot from ZIRP to positive real rates marks a structural inflection point in the global dollar system, and unlike before, there will be no return to ZIRP as monetary policy normalizes permanently.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“and I think we are not returning to serp I think this is a pivot moment um in in the global dollar system um and so there's businesses everywhere you know in the world um and they're all they're all going to be uh shrinking or going out of business and and releasing releasing resources for other kinds of businesses um that's that's what happens in a in a recession”

0.45

Understanding shadow banking and its globalization is not yet common knowledge—perhaps only 10% of the population understands how it works—but central banks and financial practitioners understand it, and academia lags behind practitioners in incorporating this knowledge.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“I don't I don't think we're near anything like that today I think we understand much more how the Brave New World of Shadow banking works okay and also how it's globalization um and an extension of the to the global South how that works I think this is probably not common knowledge in the sense that maybe maybe the number of people who understand how this works is is maybe 10 of the population or maybe less than that but they're the people who need to know it”

0.45

The period of post-1971 monetary uncertainty took 8-10 years to stabilize with the development of forward markets, FX swap markets, and the Eurodollar system, suggesting the current adjustment period may take several years before the system fully stabilizes.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“it takes time to create the to create the foreign exchange markets the forward markets the euro dollar system all this stuff these institutions have to grow and in retrospect so you know it took it took eight nine ten years um I guess that's actually not long in in geological time um but uh it's uh it's it's long in the in the life of a teenager right”

0.42

ZIRP-dependent businesses have not yet capitulated to rate increases, likely because they accumulated large cash reserves during the pandemic that allow them to survive without profitability, but this cash buffer will eventually deplete.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“it does not look to me like the zerp businesses have capitulated yet okay but that just may be because they have lots of cash reserves and those cash reserves may have come from some of the pandemic features you know that that there there are large cash reserves in around so that businesses that are really unprofitable are running on fumes can still survive”

0.42

It is unclear whether current interest rate levels of 4-5% will prove sufficient to restore discipline, and it may take higher rates or several more years of tightening before the full impact on ZIRP-dependent businesses is apparent.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“is four percent five percent is it is it enough will I doubt out that we're going to have to go to 20 you know like volcker you know because things had gotten way out of hand you know by 1979 um and I think a lot of Powell's uh he he remem he remembers that okay that we don't want to let we don't want to let it to get to the point where to put the wheels back on the cart takes that much”

0.39

The expansion of global capital markets to the global South over the past decade is a good thing for the Global South and for the world, but it is not painless—it has winners and losers, and current stress plays this out as conditions have tightened.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“I I think that that's that's a good thing in general for for the global South and for the world um to to have that expanding uh exp integration of these countries into the global system um but it's not a painless thing um and it has winners and losers and it it has and that's what we're seeing play play out”

0.34

Kindleberger could not attend Bretton Woods because he was fighting in Europe during the war, so he was not part of those discussions and didn't have direct influence on the conference; this is why his views developed later as he reflected on what actually happened versus what was supposed to happen

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Perry Merkling

“kindleberger was not there um couldn't have been there he was fighting the worry in in Europe um so the importance of Bretton Woods it ha is is this has it has this political importance you know that we are now going to continue to work together in peace”

0.29

Kindleberger's early works include 'Manias, Panics, and Crashes' (now in its eighth edition with new co-author Bob McCauley), 'The World in Depression,' and his treatises 'International Money Essays' and 'A Financial History of Western Europe,' with the latter two representing his third career of writing after being forced to retire from academia in 1976.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Perry Merling

“world of depression is his first sort of big history book okay and mania's Panasonic crashes that's coming out in its eighth edition right now um with a new co-author uh Bob McCauley who was a student of of kindleberger as a matter of fact so the uh so that's another uh and then his and then his great great uh treatises the uh the international money essays and and the financial history of Western Europe so that was his that was the beginning of his third career writing that book uh and and a lot of his thinking once he was out of Academia he was forced to retire in 1976.”

0.25

Central bankers and practitioners have understood the 2008 crisis and adapted their frameworks; they haven't fallen behind in understanding how the world works, which is why the wheels didn't come off in 2020 despite pandemic shock

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Perry Merkling

“the practitioners and Central Bankers have not fallen behind they're they're paying attention to how the world works and I I think they mostly understand it so um I'm not I'm not worried that the wheels are going to fall off the cart anytime soon um there because again a key currency view says as long as the center holds okay the system will hold okay and I think the center will hold okay”

0.22

The host notes that modern experience with flexible exchange rates means young people have not experienced how fixed rate systems work, making Kindleberger's analysis of them less immediately relatable but still empirically informative.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“it's interesting that you should ask how however would a fixed exchange rate system work um because your experience has has been entirely uh in your life with with uh flexible exchange rates”

0.17

The book 'Money and Empire' is dense but has a narrative arc and can be read at multiple levels: quickly as a biography, slowly as a critique of modern economics, or at middle level as an alternative view of what happened in the international monetary system over Kindleberger's lifetime.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“it's not a long book okay it's not it's amazing how much you managed to pack in there for how long it's pretty dense but it's a pretty dense book but but it's it's a story too so that you know I always tell uh you know my student just just read it you know you don't have to you know it it has a certain narrative Arc to it you know you can read this at different levels you can read it um quickly as a biography okay you can read it very slowly as a critique of of modern economics okay or you can read it at a middle level”

0.17

Kindleberger's thinking became freer and more powerful after his forced retirement in 1976 because he had complete freedom to pursue ideas without institutional constraints, allowing him to write more easily and freely in his later life.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Perry Merling

“he was forced to retire in 1976. he had complete freedom and so he took advantage of that freedom and and wrote much more easily and freely um in his later later life”