deposit insurance
Government guarantee that bank depositors will be repaid up to a limit if their bank fails, designed to prevent bank runs.
As defined in Andrew Ross Sorkin
Other definitions
Government guarantee that insures bank deposits up to a specified amount per account, protecting depositors in case of bank failure and preventing bank runs
MMT vs. Austrian School Debate
Where it comes up · 22
- Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/20098 claims
- Eugene White on Bank Regulation4 claims
- Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design4 claims
- A Masterclass In Central Banking | Professor Jane Knodell4 claims
- Thomas Rustici on Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression 01/04/20103 claims
- MMT vs. Austrian School Debate2 claims
- Andrew Ross Sorkin2 claims
- George Selgin2 claims
and 14 more
Most important claims · 10 of 45Search all claims for “deposit insurance” →
- Banking systems are fragile by design because politics cannot be removed from bank regulation: governments both regulate and borrow from banks, governments use police power to enforce debt contracts on voters who default, and governments liquidate failed banks whose depositors are voters—creating three inherent conflicts of interest that keep politics embedded in banking.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- Before deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort support existed, banks operated with much higher equity levels (40-50% in the 19th century) and often unlimited owner liability, because that was what depositors required to trust the bank; safety nets allowed equity to decline dramatically.Anat Admati on Bank Regulation and the Bankers' New Clothes
- When financial regulations are not set exactly right, deposit insurance can enable 'looting'—as Romer and George Akerlof argued about the Savings and Loan Crisis—because if people think they won't lose their money they become far less careful, illustrating that misaligned guarantees let many bad things happen.Paul Romer on Growth, Cities, and the State of Economics
- Depositors care about getting their principal back, not the interest rate differential between banks, so without deposit insurance and a lender of last resort, bank runs became rational responses in panics, as illustrated by George Bailey's run in It's a Wonderful Life.Thomas Rustici on Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression 01/04/2010
- Deposit insurance makes banks riskier because insuring someone against risk leads them to take more risk—the moral hazard problem—a point FDR himself made when opposing it in 1932, alongside opposition from the Fed, Treasury, and Carter Glass.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- Deposit insurance (the FDIC) was deeply unpopular among both Republicans and Democrats—including Carter Glass, Hoover, and even Roosevelt—because they feared it would let weaker banks become effectively too big to fail by giving them the same support as strong banks.Andrew Ross Sorkin
- Financial firms sustain extreme leverage (around 95% of assets, versus problematic at over 50% in other industries) because the government safety net—discount window, lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and repeated implicit bailouts of systemically important institutions—introduces moral hazard primarily on creditors, keeping their credit costs low enough to fund such precarious structures, making the system recurrently crisis-prone.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy
- The Keynesian account of saving by tradition and investment by animal spirits ignores price incentives; in pre-1933 conditions with no deposit insurance and no lender of last resort, depositors cared about protecting principal, not the interest rate differential.Thomas Rustici on Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression 01/04/2010
- European banks lacked deposit insurance and the newly created central banks failed to inject liquidity into solvent institutions, so the failure to act as lender of last resort turned bank runs into a systemic contagion.Thomas Rustici on Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression 01/04/2010
- Deposit insurance coverage expanded over time from a temporary small-deposit measure to effectively blanket protection—statutory limits rose to $100,000 (1980) then $250,000, but in practice ~99.7% of all deposits ended up insured, and innovations like CDARS let wealthy depositors swap a $50 million deposit across ~200 banks to insure the entire amount, completing the destruction of risk-based depositor discipline.Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/2009