What this covers

George Selgin offers a revisionist account of the New Deal's actual mechanics and effects, arguing that its role in recovery has been systematically misunderstood by both defenders and critics. The conversation traces how the Depression's deepest wound—collapsed investment—persisted because regime uncertainty about shifting New Deal policies deterred businessmen from committing capital. Selgin contends that the programs most associated with the era—the National Recovery Administration's price controls, regressive taxation, and overtly hostile rhetoric toward business—actively prolonged stagnation rather than relieving it. The growth that did occur came largely from unintended sources: dollar devaluation in 1933 and gold fleeing a war-anxious Europe, not from the fiscal or monetary stimulus widely credited to the administration.

The discussion ranges across banking structure, monetary reform, and comparative economic history. Selgin examines how the 1935 Banking Act concentrated Federal Reserve power without it being deployed for expansion; how fractional reserve banking itself was not the culprit in the banking crisis, but rather regulatory restriction—with Canada's intact system offering proof. He addresses the severe 1937–38 contraction as the result of simultaneous uncoordinated tightening: the Fed doubled reserve requirements, the Treasury sterilized gold inflows, and fiscal policy retrenched. The conversation also covers the postwar period, arguing that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's shift from New Deal hostility to wartime cooperation with business—not spending levels—restored the investment boom that ended the Depression. Throughout, Selgin draws on comparative cases and institutional analysis to show how the same freedom (branching, for instance) produces opposite results depending on the surrounding incentive structure, particularly the presence or absence of deposit guarantees.

Sharpest takeaway

Selgin argues the New Deal achieved what recovery it did almost despite itself—through dollar devaluation and unintended European gold inflows rather than fiscal or monetary stimulus—while its signature reforms (NRA price controls, regressive taxes, business hostility) actively hindered recovery, mainly by generating the regime uncertainty that suppressed investment.

  • The New Deal made very little use of deliberate fiscal or monetary stimulus despite the myth that it did
  • Recovery's main barrier was collapsed investment, which regime uncertainty and business hostility prolonged
  • What growth occurred came largely from devaluation and gold fleeing a war-fearing Europe, not from New Deal programs

The argument · threads9 threads · 37 claims
0.71

Banking freedoms, free entry, and free branching work well only without deposit guarantees; guarantees create perverse incentives and make concentration inevitable, while ideal Fed reform stabilizes nominal spending mechanically.

12 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Even under nominal laissez-faire, the clamor for rescues when a major bank fails is so great that government cannot credibly commit to no big-bank bailouts; this drives depositors to large banks ex-ante, undermining true competition, though economists who advocate bailouts make even modest barriers to them impossible.

    “It may not be possible to ultimately prevent this. The clamor for rescues is so great when a major bank fails. I don’t have an answer to that. I really don’t.”

  • That stablecoins compete with and harm banks is not itself an argument for restricting them; restrictions require a third-party effect making society worse off, not just losses to one industry—replacing banks with a stablecoin industry that delivers what banks did would be like replacing horses with automobiles—though evidence of badly managed stablecoins justifies regulating their reliability, not protecting banks.

    “It’s like replacing horses and buggies with automobiles. So, there has to be some kind of third-party effect or something that’s appealed to before we can say, “Oh, well, we better not let them do this.””

  • Banking freedoms that would be entirely desirable in the absence of guarantees become dangerous once deposit guarantees exist, because banks then exploit the freedoms to take downside-protected risks in pursuit of profit—so the desirability of a freedom depends on the surrounding incentive structure.

    “things that would’ve been utterly desirable freedoms in the absence of guarantees become dangerous when you have those guarantees, because then, the banks might take advantage of the guarantees to abuse these freedoms”

  • The ideal Fed reform stabilizes nominal spending: either freeze the fiat monetary base (turning the dollar into a fixed quantity like bitcoins) or, less drastically, replace the FOMC with a computer programmed to supply just enough base money or set interest rates to keep nominal spending stable and no more—a 'night watchman Fed' guarded only against tampering.

    “replace the FOMC with a computer and program the computer so that you just get enough increase in the monetary base... such that you end up with enough money to keep nominal spending stable, but not more than that.”

  • Free banking does not require a gold standard and can rest on a fiat monetary standard; the freedom of banks—provided it includes no bailouts—creates greater robustness and less risk of financial crisis, though it does not by itself solve the separate problem of how the monetary base is managed by the central authority.

    “if you have free banking with a fiat monetary standard, then you have solved problems because I think the freedom of the banks creates a lot of greater robustness in the banking system and less risk of financial crises. Mind you, freedom has to, here, include no bailouts”

  • Deposit insurance under the Banking Act was only one of many factors that stabilized the banking system by discouraging bank runs; while it did not hurt recovery and contributed to reopening banks, other factors played a much bigger role in getting people to return or keep money in banks, so its importance is overstated.

    “deposit insurance was only one of many factors that helped stabilize the banking system by discouraging people from running on the banks... but not as much as people think.”

  • A gold standard cannot be recreated because once governments have broken convertibility commitments they cannot re-establish credibility: if the Fed offered gold for dollars tomorrow, a wise public would immediately take the gold, ending it; switching monetary standards is like switching which side of the road to drive on, requiring a coordinator, which is also why Bitcoin fails to take off as a general medium of exchange—a network problem.

    “If the government doesn’t deliberately create a gold standard, it’s unlikely that we’ll spontaneously go there, but if the government did deliberately create a gold standard, it’s unlikely we would trust it. That’s my big problem with gold standards.”

  • Allowing the price level to fall gently as productivity rises (the productivity norm) is a long-run ideal requiring gradual transition because of existing price expectations; today's central banks are nowhere near ready, since the field must first abandon positive inflation targets and move toward nominal-income stability before downward price trends could even be considered, even amid an AI productivity boom.

    “Do I think that the people at the Fed or any other central bank in the world today are ready to start heading towards such a policy? I don’t... we still have a long way to go just to convince them that they shouldn’t be targeting a positive inflation rate.”

  • The pre-World War I gold standard was the best monetary system we've had; where it appeared to fail—as in the US and England with recurrent crises—the cause was specific dumb regulations in those countries rather than the gold standard itself.

    “I thought the pre-World War I gold standard was amazing. It’s the best monetary system we’ve had. If it didn’t always look great... that was because of the specific dumb regulations in those countries”

  • Some countries should dollarize—those with long track records of failing at floating or pegged exchange rates via hyperinflation or speculative attacks—and economists err by comparing such countries to an idealized perfectly-managed central bank ('blackboard economics') rather than to those countries' actual fiscal and monetary records; for a basket-case economy the relevant question is which system is least harmful.

    “I really object to what I’m afraid is large numbers of economists who, when addressing questions like this, go to their blackboard economics... That kind of comparison is utterly irrelevant for countries of the sort we’ve been talking about.”

  • The eurozone is a mixed bag in which the common currency is itself a good thing, but member countries suffer chiefly from the regulatory bureaucracy bundled with membership rather than from the common monetary policy, which is bearable enough; a currency board issuing euros backed by Eurobonds would have been a good model.

    “countries are suffering from the bureaucracy that goes hand in hand with being in the eurozone, not just the common monetary policy, which I think itself might be bearable enough.”

  • Selgin became libertarian specifically on money by concluding governments are not needed as much as assumed in that domain, but he does not hold strong opinions on many other economic policy issues because he doesn't pretend to know enough—so being libertarian on money does not make him a hardcore laissez-faire advocate across the board.

    “I don’t hold strong opinions about a lot of economic policy issues because I just don’t pretend to know enough.”

0.70

The New Deal achieved little fiscal or monetary stimulus; recovery came from devaluation, gold inflows from geopolitical fear, confidence restoration, and specific effective interventions like RFC equity purchases.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Contrary to popular belief, the New Deal made very little use of fiscal or monetary stimulus and did not amount to a modern-style program of economic stimulus; what it actually did to achieve recovery is widely misunderstood.

    “it made very little use of fiscal or monetary stimulus. I would add that, that the New Deal, whatever it was up to, did not amount to a modern-style program of economic stimulus.”

  • The RFC's later program of buying shares in banks to raise their capital directly—as opposed to merely lending to them—worked, helping stabilize the banking system and reopen banks; it was one of the few RFC actions that genuinely helped end the Depression, though the RFC overall had more failures than successes.

    “the recapitalization program was one of the good things, one of the only things that the RFC did that helped end the Great Depression, by stabilizing the banking system and allowing more banks to reopen.”

  • The Banking Act of 1935 concentrated Federal Reserve control in Washington, giving the New Dealers greater potential influence over monetary policy, but they took no advantage of it: under Marriner Eccles—a fiscal-stimulus believer who rejected monetary stimulus—Federal Reserve credit including open-market purchases was a flat line, so no expansionary monetary policy was pursued.

    “If you look at Federal Reserve credit, including open market purchases, it’s a flat line. Yes, now Washington’s in charge... but no effort was made to take advantage of that to pursue an expansionary monetary policy.”

  • World War II ended the US Depression not mainly through fiscal stimulus—wartime spending fell back near 1939 levels quickly after the war—but by transforming government's attitude toward business from New Deal hostility to cozy cooperation, which restored businessmen's confidence and unleashed an immense postwar investment boom that offset the drop in wartime spending and prevented the depression Keynesians predicted.

    “That something else was to change the attitude of government towards business from the hostility it exhibited during the New Deal to, if anything, overly cozy cooperation... So, you get this immense investment boom that makes up for the shrinkage in wartime spending, and that’s the real key to recovery.”

  • The separation of investment from commercial banking under Glass-Steagall was totally irrelevant to recovery, because the involvement of commercial banks in investment banking was not a factor that caused the Depression, so ending it could not help end the Depression.

    “it was totally irrelevant for recovery because the involvement of commercial banks and investment banking was not a factor that contributed to the Depression, so ending it wasn’t going to help end the Depression.”

  • FDR is better understood not as a committed fascist or socialist but as a politician compromising to fend off more genuinely authoritarian rivals like Huey Long and Townsend; he stole their thunder to get re-elected, so the New Deal should be read as a sop to more extreme movements rather than an all-out move toward those extremes.

    “Maybe the New Deal has to be seen as a compromise, not an all-out move toward those extremes, but a sop being provided to the advocates of more aggressive authoritarian government.”

0.51

Regime uncertainty about future policy was a major barrier to Depression recovery by deterring investment, whereas Smoot-Hawley's direct trade effect was minor.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Unlike a certain but small policy such as Smoot-Hawley, regime uncertainty—not knowing what policies are coming—is a huge deterrent to investors, who must believe they'll reap the returns of their investments; since the central recovery problem was collapsed net investment rather than consumption, this uncertainty was a major barrier to recovery throughout the 1930s.

    “the first thing investors want to know is whether they’re going to reap the benefits of their investments. If the answer to that question depends on having a rough idea about what policies are going to be in the future — and you don’t have even that — you’re going to hold back.”

  • Deferring to Doug Irwin, the leading expert and a free-trade critic of the tariff, Smoot-Hawley was only a small factor in the Great Depression.

    “even Doug says that his opinion is that Smoot-Hawley was a small factor in the Great Depression. If he says that, I’m inclined to agree”

  • The Agricultural Adjustment Act rested on a doubtful theory—taxing food processors to raise farm-owner incomes on the assumption they had a higher marginal propensity to consume—while paying farmers to reduce output and destroy crops and livestock to raise prices; its feeble aggregate-demand component was outweighed by an adverse aggregate-supply effect, and studies show it had little to no positive effect on recovery, probably none.

    “you had this feeble aggregate demand component, which just wasn’t effective enough to matter, and then you had this adverse aggregate supply effect, which was important, but wasn’t doing something desirable.”

  • Donkeys produce strong positive social externalities—they are amicable, nuzzling animals used in therapy for psychological patients and people recovering from serious injuries, who are brought to the donkey reserve since donkeys can't be brought into hospitals like therapy dogs.

    “they are just nothing but walking positive externalities... They actually use them for therapy for this reason.”

0.49

The Depression's banking collapse stemmed from bad regulation, not fractional reserve banking itself; better regulatory design prevented equivalent crises elsewhere.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Simons's proposal to abolish fractional reserve banking was a bad response to the banking crisis because the real cause was bad regulation, not fractional reserve banking per se; Canada, with fractional reserve banks but better rules, avoided a banking collapse, demonstrating the regulatory rather than structural origin of US instability.

    “Simons only had to look north to Canada to see that you didn’t have to have a banking collapse just because you had fractional reserve banks.”

  • Two things can undermine a banking system: restricting what banks may do, or guaranteeing them. Until 1933, the US mainly undermined stability by limiting banks' freedom to diversify and branch; after 1933 it allowed those freedoms but introduced vast deposit guarantees, so the government remained to blame—just through the opposite mechanism.

    “Until 1933, the US government mainly undermined the stability of its banking system by limiting the freedom of what banks could do... since 1933, we have created a vast system of deposit guarantees, and so have introduced a huge moral hazard problem.”

  • Canadian banking concentration was not just a consequence of allowing branching but resulted heavily from absolute regulatory entry restrictions—especially from the 1920s, the number of banks shrank and authorities allowed no new ones; a system with free branching, free entry, and no guarantees or too-big-to-fail would be less concentrated and would leave room for surviving small banks with specialties.

    “It wasn’t just branch banking — the freedom for banks to branch — that resulted in all this consolidation. It was absolute entry restrictions that were imposed by regulation.”

0.49

Roosevelt's failure to promptly devalue the dollar and his months-long gold-purchase experiment delayed recovery until devaluation finally occurred and worked.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Roosevelt should have suspended gold payments and then promptly devalued the dollar; instead he ran a months-long gold purchase program based on George Warren's theory that raising gold's price would raise general prices, which failed—prices barely rose—until Roosevelt finally fixed a proper devaluation, after which recovery began.

    “What Roosevelt did was to engage in this crazy gold purchase program for quite a few months, based on a harebrained theory by a fellow named George Warren... The theory was that if you raise the price of gold, other prices will start going up. Didn’t happen.”

  • After the initial devaluation boost faded, what kept recovery going—at a slower rate—was gold rushing into the US from Europe, driven first by devaluation and then largely by fears of Hitler's rise and possible war, making the sustained recovery substantially the result of unintentional help from abroad.

    “What kept the progress going after that — though at a slower rate — was mostly gold starting to rush in from Europe... mostly rushing in because of fears of the consequences of Hitler coming to power and the possibility of war breaking out.”

  • The early burst of output in 1933 was partly an artificial boom: anticipating that the NRA would raise prices through controls, manufacturers rushed to buy inputs and build inventory before their own costs rose, so the surge reflected gun-jumping rather than durable recovery.

    “There was a boom that was based only on manufacturers’ desires to jump the gun and buy inputs and produce inventory before their own costs went up.”

0.46

The 1937-38 depression resulted from simultaneous uncoordinated tightening across monetary and fiscal policy, not from earlier stimulus exceeding sustainable levels.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The severe 1937-38 depression resulted from a conjunction of simultaneous, uncoordinated tightening: the Fed doubled reserve requirements in three steps out of misplaced inflation fears, the Treasury sterilized gold inflows so reserves didn't rise, and fiscal policy was retrenched in a budget-balancing push—monetary and fiscal contraction hitting at once.

    “the best answer to the question of how come you had such a severe decline is that you had this conjunction of monetary and fiscal tightening all happening at the same time.”

  • Because a depression is measured by the gap between actual and potential output rather than absolute output, the substantial technological innovation of the 1930s (documented by Alexander Field), which raised potential output, meant the recovery in closing the output gap was less impressive than the rebound in absolute output suggests—and where actual output stagnated while potential grew, the depression was worsening.

    “the real recovery in the sense of reduction in the output gap was less impressive than the recovery of absolute output may suggest. So, there’s a sense in which the fact that productivity was improving makes the Depression worse than it might seem”

0.35

Austrian and early Chicago economists gave policy advice inconsistent with their own theories, while Keynes privately advised Roosevelt quite soundly on recovery priorities.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The Austrians, clearest in Hayek's case, gave policy recommendations inconsistent with their own theory: Hayek's theory (in Prices and Production) held that you must stabilize the product of money stock and velocity—maintain aggregate spending—yet in practice he favored austerity, breaking the trade unions, and keeping the gold standard regardless of whether that stabilized spending.

    “there were these inconsistencies between the practical recommendations, which were for austerity, for keeping the gold standard, et cetera, with at least Hayek’s version of the Austrian theory, which said you must maintain stability of spending in the economy”

  • The early Chicago School were not the fiscal conservatives they are now made out to be; they took the lead ahead of Keynes in pushing for big public works to counter the Depression, and were not the simple-minded classical economists Keynes caricatured in The General Theory.

    “they were not the fiscal conservatives that they’re now made out to be. They took the lead well ahead of Keynes in pushing for big public works to counter the Great Depression.”

  • Although some of Keynes's 1930s writings (on protectionism, on nationalizing investment) were bad, his advice given directly to Roosevelt was very sound: he warned against attacking businessmen and creating regime uncertainty, urged prioritizing recovery over reform, and ridiculed the gold purchase program and the NRA price controls.

    “Keynes’s advice on how the US should deal with the Depression and try to get out was very sound.”

0.33

The quantity theory of money is unreliable because velocity is not constant and financial innovation shifts money-demand relationships, especially post-2008 with interest-on-reserves regimes.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Since 2008, the monetary base no longer necessarily has much to do with the overall ease of credit—because the system now operates through interest on reserves and interest rates—so the quantity theory of money is even more doubtful than before.

    “since 2008, all bets are off on this stuff because we now have a system where the monetary base doesn’t necessarily have much to do with the overall ease of credit. It’s all about the interest rate and reserves”

  • The quantity theory of money is best stated as the rate of inflation being roughly approximated by the growth rate of a monetary aggregate like M2; it is not reliably true because financial and regulatory innovation, and especially shifts in the demand for real money balances (velocity is not constant), can dramatically change the relationship between any monetary measure and inflation.

    “The quantity theory is premised in its stricter version on the assumption that velocity is a constant or very stable value, and it isn’t. That’s all there is to it.”

0.33

Federal Reserve independence from fiscal-dominance pressure is necessary but limited; current independence is both overrated and underrated in importance.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Precisely because the Fed is not very independent, the little independence it does have should be taken seriously and preserved; the concept of independence is overrated in that there is little of it, yet underrated in that people too readily say losing the remainder doesn't matter.

    “it’s precisely because our central bank, the Fed, is not very independent that we need to take seriously the preservation of what little independence it does have.”

  • Whether monetary policy falls under congressional or executive control, it tends in practice toward fiscal dominance—government officials' desire to spend more without taxing more encourages easier monetary policy than is consistent with macroeconomic stability—which is why as much Fed independence as possible from both branches is necessary.

    “both congressional control and executive control are going to turn, in practice, into fiscal dominance of monetary policy, where the fiscal considerations... is going to encourage easier monetary policy than is consistent with macroeconomic stability.”