What this covers

Tyler Cowen and Andrew Ross Sorkin dispute whether the speculators of 1929 and 2007 were fundamentally wrong or right. Cowen argues that long-run stock returns vindicate the optimists: even investors who bought at the 1929 peak earned roughly 6 percent real returns over the next 30 years, suggesting prices were not simply inflated but roughly correct for patient capital. Sorkin counters that [leverage](concept:Leverage as Liquidity Destroyer) is what transforms correct long-term valuations into catastrophic short-term collapses. When stocks fell 50 percent by mid-1929, investors borrowing at 10-to-1 ratios faced margin calls that forced them to liquidate not just stocks but homes. The real problem, both agree, was not mispricing but the mechanics of forced selling under debt pressure—and the policy choices that followed, from Herbert Hoover's weak response to decisions about monetary supply and gold standard management.

The conversation ranges across the legitimacy of New Deal reforms, the structure of modern credit markets, and whether self-regulation is possible. Sorkin traces how John Raskob at General Motors transformed American attitudes toward debt from moral vice to everyday tool in the 1920s, a shift that made the era foundational to modern finance. He examines Glass-Steagall critically, revealing that its drafting involved competitive sabotage between banking families and that it would not have prevented 2008's first failures. Cowen counters with evidence from Randall Kroszner and Raghuram Rajan that the conflict-of-interest justification for Glass-Steagall was unsupported by data. Both identify the unresolved contemporary risk: shadow banking and private credit now represent 80 percent of lending, operating outside core regulatory structures, while traditional banking shrinks under pressure. Sorkin argues that deposit insurance and flexible exchange rates—not credit restriction—would have been the better Depression response, and that the obsolescence of 1930s regulation has left policymakers without clear answers.

Sharpest takeaway

Cowen argues that the so-called speculators of 1929 (and 2007) were largely vindicated by long-run returns, and that the real damage came not from inflated prices but from leverage and bad policy choices; Sorkin counters that leverage and the inability of humans to self-regulate make euphoria-driven crashes recurring and partly unavoidable.

  • Over 30-year horizons even buying at the 1929 peak yielded ~6% real returns, so prices were not simply a bubble
  • Leverage (margin loans, subprime debt) is what forces liquidation and turns correct long-term prices into short-term collapses
  • New Deal banking regulation is obsolete and the shift to shadow/private credit is the central unsolved risk

The argument · threads6 threads · 34 claims
0.79

Modern shadow banking and private credit systems operate outside regulatory protection, creating systemic risk no one fully understands or can mitigate.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The most worrying development is a bifurcated, post-2008 credit market in which formal banks are only about 20 percent of lending while the other 80 percent flows through the rapidly expanding private credit / shadow banking system (partly tied to insurance), which is not protected by core regulatory structures and whose risks are poorly understood; imposing more capital requirements and FDIC premia on banks only shrinks the regulated portion further, and no one knows how to solve it.

    “we now are living in a very bifurcated world as it relates to the loan market and credit market in America... The private credit business has just exploded. If you're a company seeking credit, you're oftentimes not getting it from the bank. You're getting it from, effectively, the shadow banking system.”

  • The US should consolidate most of its banks to look more like the Canadian banking system, because allowing local banking at its current scale presents likely unnecessary systemic risk; no Canadian banks failed in the Great Depression, and the claim that local banks serve communities better is unconvincing—though consolidation requires threading the needle to avoid underserving communities.

    “if it was left to me, if I was king for the day, I would consolidate most of the banks and make the country look much more like the Canadian banking system. I think it is slightly insane that we have allowed local banking to happen at the scale that we do because I do think it presents a risk to the system that's likely unnecessary.”

  • Because the GENIUS Act requires stablecoins to be backed by Treasury bills, it effectively removes T-bills from the market and reduces credit to the system; the safe-backing requirement is likely a first baby step to establish that stablecoins are safe, after which standards will probably be loosened over time to allow riskier backing assets.

    “because the stablecoins are going to require the backing of these Treasury bills, that effectively you're taking that out of the market, which means less credit to the system ultimately... I imagine over time that we will loosen those standards... this is the first baby step so that people can say these stablecoins are safe, and then over time, we will maybe shift gears slightly.”

  • Glass-Steagall would not have saved the banking system in 2008, because the banks that failed first—Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns—would not have come under the bill at all; at most it might have made things marginally better for later-troubled firms like Citigroup and Bank of America.

    “I have never been convinced by the argument that Glass-Steagall somehow saved us... When you go back and look at the banks that failed first in 2008 — Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns — none of them would have come under the Glass-Steagall bill to begin with.”

0.71

Business leaders across eras share the same underlying insecurity and FOMO driving them to accumulate wealth without satisfying their psychological need.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Top business leaders today are shockingly similar to those of the 1920s—Raskob resembles Elon Musk, Charlie Mitchell resembles Jamie Dimon or Jensen Huang—because they are all driven by the same underlying insecurity, FOMO, and 'YOLO' hole they are trying to fill, with money being merely how they measure it.

    “I think they're still driven by the same things, which is, at some level, I've always thought that people are driven by an insecurity, a FOMO, a YOLO kind of a hole that they're all trying to fill. Money is just one example of how they measure it all.”

  • A core lesson of 1929, the financial crisis, and similar episodes is that humanity is not good at self-regulating or controlling itself—that is the essence of greed—captured by the Wall Street 2 line where, asked his 'number,' the character answers 'More.'

    “We, humanity, us, people — we're not great at self-regulating ourselves. We're not great at control. That's what greed is... He looks back at him, and he doesn't give him a number. He says, 'More.'”

  • Before roughly 1919-1920 taking on debt was viewed as a moral sin and debt holders were socially scorned, but John Raskob at General Motors shifted this by lending people money to buy cars, transforming debt into something Americans now treat as water—making the 1920s a foundational decade that shaped how we live today.

    “Prior to 1920, 1919, it was a moral sin for many Americans to take on debt... That really shifted, I think, in 1919 when John Raskob, who was running General Motors at the time, wanted more people to buy cars. He said, 'How are we going to get people to buy more cars? We're going to lend them the money to buy the cars.' That really shifted the mindset around debt.”

  • In both 1929 and 2008, sellers were not dumping assets out of panic but because excessive leverage forced them to: when stocks fell 50 percent by mid-November 1929, investors levered 10-to-1 got margin calls and had to liquidate stocks and even their homes, just as 2008 homeowners underwater on subprime mortgages could not pay; so leverage, not mispricing, is what undermines value in temporary moments even when long-term prices are correct.

    “It wasn't that the people were selling their stocks out of panic or fear... They were selling the stocks because they had taken out too much money and had too much leverage. So, when stocks fell by November 13th of 1929 by 50 percent from their high... they were levered 10 to 1. The bank had called them... Therefore, they had to liquidate not just their stocks, but oftentimes their homes.”

  • Credit is the lifeblood of the economic system, and you actually need some speculation in the system to create innovation; the challenge is not eliminating speculation but preventing it from tipping into euphoria and excess.

    “you want some speculation in the system, going back to where we started this conversation. You need speculation in the system to create that innovation... The question is how do you prevent it from becoming euphoria and crazy and too much?”

0.71

Policy inaction and timidity—fear of political consequences—prevented authorities from controlling speculation before 1929 and allowed crises to deepen.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The 1929 crash was the first domino in a series of policy decisions and non-decisions by Hoover, the Federal Reserve, and others in Washington that ultimately led to the Great Depression, with 25 percent unemployment by 1932 and roughly 9,000 banks failing by 1933; the crash itself was not a straight line to that outcome.

    “the crash of '29 was really the first domino of a series of dominoes that led to the Great Depression. It wasn't that the crash itself was somehow a straight line. It was a series of decisions that were made... that led to, ultimately, unemployment of 25 percent in 1932 and 9,000 banks, I think, by 1933 failing.”

  • By spring 1929 the Fed knew speculation was out of control and wanted to tamp it down, but having been scarred by being blamed for the 1920-21 downturn after raising rates, and anxious about being hauled before Congress, board members convinced themselves they would have to raise rates so much to curb speculation that they would by default tip the economy—so they lacked the courage to act.

    “they were so new. The Fed had just been created in 1913... Benjamin Strong... used to write back in 1925 about the possibility of them getting hauled up in front of Congress... they had almost pretty much convinced themselves that to really tamp speculation down, you have to raise interest rates so much that you, by default, would tip the economy, and they didn't have the courage to do that.”

  • Hoover (and later Biden on inflation) treated economic distress as a psychological problem that could be solved by telling people to be confident or happy, but you cannot persuade an entire country to feel good when they directly experience high costs, and combining this rhetoric with poor policy choices makes the situation worse.

    “He thought that this was a psychological problem and that if he could just tell people to put a smile on their face, that somehow they would put a smile on their face... we had a president, President Biden, who used to tell people all the time, 'Don't worry about that.'... 'You can tell me all day long that things are better than they really are, but I'm the one living with these costs.'”

  • The US Fed has never been a genuinely independent central bank: from the 1920s diaries showing members were always conscious of political implications, to presidents physically manhandling Fed chairs, to Trump today, political concern has always been present; central bank independence matters because some necessary decisions are politically unpopular, but in practice Fed and Treasury always act jointly (as in 2008 and COVID), so much hand-wringing over independence is miscontextualized.

    “the lesson of what was happening in the 1920s and reading all those diaries suggests that they never were, that they were always concerned about the politics in some regard.”

  • Deposit insurance (the FDIC) was deeply unpopular among both Republicans and Democrats—including Carter Glass, Hoover, and even Roosevelt—because they feared it would let weaker banks become effectively too big to fail by giving them the same support as strong banks.

    “Carter Glass and Hoover, and by the way, even Roosevelt did not want to implement the FDIC. This idea of deposit insurance was super unpopular — both Republicans and Democrats — because they believed that it was going to effectively allow banks to almost become too big to fail.”

0.44

Context and narrative—timing, editorial choices, political reputation campaigns—shape how crises and leaders are remembered and misunderstood over time.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Charles Merrill told people to get out of the stock market in 1928 and was later seen as brilliant after the crash, but between early 1928 and September 1929 the market rose about 90 percent, so at the time his call looked like a major mistake.

    “in 1928, Charles Merrill, who had founded Merrill Lynch, was telling people to get out of the stock market... between the beginning of 1928 when he said this and September of 1929, the stock market was up like 90 percent. You would look at what he said and say what a mistake that was.”

  • John Raskob spent an extraordinary amount of money over roughly two years, starting in May 1929 (before the crash), paying off journalists and running a secret campaign to undermine Herbert Hoover's reputation, which is part of why Hoover's reputation remains so dim even today.

    “I actually think that part of the reason that Hoover's reputation is so dim, even today, is a result of this very influential, wealthy individual in America who spent two years paying off journalists and running this secret campaign to do such a thing... He started this campaign effectively in May of 1929, just three months after Hoover took office.”

  • The Glass-Steagall bill of 1933 was not the pure reform the public imagines: parts were written by a member of the Rockefeller family who owned Chase in order to 'shiv' competitor J.P. Morgan, and Carter Glass himself was not interested in breaking up Morgan and sided so closely with it that some thought he was in the pocket of the bankers.

    “the Glass-Steagall bill was not as pure as I think most people in the public thought it really was... Parts of the bill were ultimately written by effectively a member of the Rockefeller family who owned Chase, and it was done in large part to shiv, if you will, J.P. Morgan, its competitor.”

  • A story can be changed dramatically for the better in the editing room after it is shot—the narrative is crafted not just by what is filmed that day but by what is done later—and in television virtually every episode is directed by a different director.

    “how much a story can be changed for the better in an editing room, after it's shot. It's not just what's shot that day, it's what can be done and crafted later on in terms of creating that narrative.”

  • In 1929, when people lost money they largely blamed themselves—there was genuine personal accountability, as with Groucho Marx who ultimately blamed himself despite faulting his broker—whereas today there is always finger-pointing and it is never our own fault, a shift in how people approach responsibility.

    “in 1929, when people lost money, for the most part, at least initially, they blamed themselves. There actually was personal accountability... he ultimately blamed himself, which I think is a very different approach to life than we have today, where there's always finger-pointing. It's never our own fault.”

0.40

Central bank independence matters but is overstated; political pressure on the Fed is historical and perpetual, including during necessary emergency interventions.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Ben Bernanke learned the lessons of the Fed's 1929-era inaction during his PhD work at Princeton and applied them in 2008 by deciding to flood the system with money; although politically controversial amid bailout questions, on a practical economic basis it worked.

    “Ben Bernanke, I think, learned a lot of these lessons when he was doing his PhD at Princeton and took some of those lessons into the 2008 financial crisis, where he did decide to flood the system with money... on a practical economic basis, it worked.”

  • Trump's framing of wanting a 'majority' on the Federal Reserve as if it were the Supreme Court is newly political; a political majority could be used to replace even the regional Fed presidents, creating a lasting, decades-long generational shift in economic policy based on politics.

    “President Trump has talked about having a 'majority' on the Federal Reserve as if it's the Supreme Court... if you have a political majority on something like the Fed... It could create a lasting, decades-long generational shift based on politics in terms of what our economic policies are.”

0.38

Some speculation and risk-taking is necessary for economic dynamism, but restraint against euphoria and excess is the perpetual challenge.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Over the last hundred years it has paid far more to be a professional optimist or speculator than to be a professional Cassandra or skeptic, but the verdict depends entirely on time horizon: at 30 years the optimist is right, at 18 months to a decade (as in 1929) the optimist can look badly wrong.

    “it has paid to be a professional optimist, a professional speculator, if you will, way more over the course of the last hundred years than it has ever paid to be a professional Cassandra or professional skeptic. No doubt. The question is what the time horizon is, always.”

  • Public utility shares may have played a large role in both the 1920s run-up and the crash because people regarded utilities as reliable at a time when everything else was go-go, leading them to be inflated alongside the rest of the market.

    “I wonder whether they were pushed up in large part because people thought that they were reliable. They were utilities... and therefore, they were inflated at the same time.”

  • A little naivete when you are young can carry you very far, because not knowing any better lets you attempt things others would dismiss as impossible—as when Sorkin, as a teenager who had started a sports magazine, persistently pursued and landed work at the New York Times.

    “Because I didn't know any better. That's why. A little bit of naivete, when you're young, I think, actually can go very, very far.”

  • The 2020 SPAC craze turned blank-check companies into lottery tickets with misaligned incentives between promoters and investors, and like real lottery tickets most participants lose; while Sorkin warned paternalistically, investors told him such warnings actually protect the promoters ('the man'), and he concedes people should have access to the lottery ticket even if they lose.

    “In 2020, there was a real phenomenon around SPACs... Everybody was excited about SPACs. They were the new lottery ticket... the truth is that they were like lottery tickets in that most lottery players lose. So, I recognize that people should have access to the lottery ticket.”