Anat Admati on Bank Regulation and the Bankers' New Clothes
What this covers
Anat Admati of Stanford discusses her book The Bankers' New Clothes with Russ Roberts in this EconTalk conversation about the structural fragility of modern banking. Admati's central claim is that banks fund themselves with dangerously low equity—often under 3% of total assets—and that requiring them to hold 20–30% equity would make the system far safer without meaningful economic harm. The discussion moves through the mechanics of how debt amplifies both returns and losses for individual banks, how government guarantees and deposit insurance have eliminated the natural creditor discipline that once constrained risk-taking, and why bankers' objections to higher equity requirements are economically unfounded but politically powerful.
The conversation covers several concrete mechanisms of fragility: netting practices that hide true balance sheet size (illustrating how JP Morgan's actual assets may be nearly double its reported figures), the repo exemption from bankruptcy's automatic stay that lets creditors grab collateral ahead of other claimants, and the domino effect created by massive counterparty exposure between banks. Admati addresses the historical puzzle—that 19th-century banks operated with 40–50% equity without modern safety nets—and contrasts this with the claim that higher equity would cripple lending, which she argues misconstrues equity as idle cash rather than a funding mechanism used routinely by non-financial corporations. The discussion also examines how regulation through risk weights enables banks to treat risky assets as safe if officially blessed, and how banks used credit default swaps not to actually transfer risk but to appear to do so while accumulating hidden exposures. Roberts and Admati debate the tension between deposit insurance's necessity (to prevent inefficient runs) and its moral hazard costs, and Admati emphasizes that meaningful reform ultimately requires public political pressure rather than technocratic coordination, since banks hold sufficient sway over regulators to manipulate any rules written behind closed doors.
Admati argues that bank fragility stems from excessive debt financing, and that requiring banks to fund themselves with far more equity (20-30%) would make the system dramatically safer at little social cost, with bankers' objections being self-interested rather than economically valid.
- Debt magnifies both returns and losses, making each bank fragile while benefiting bankers via compensation and subsidies
- Government guarantees and deposit insurance remove creditor discipline, so regulation must enforce equity
- The costs of higher equity to society are small while the benefits are substantial
Government guarantees let banks borrow cheaply and at extreme leverage by eliminating creditor risk perception.
- Government guarantees subsidize banks in two ways: they let banks borrow at lower interest rates (like a rich aunt guaranteeing a mortgage), but more importantly they let banks borrow far larger amounts on thin equity cushions, because no rational creditor would lend to an institution with a 3% equity cushion unless they believed it was implicitly guaranteed by the government.
“lenders would never lend to Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers if there only is a 3% equity cushion unless they thought it was guaranteed.”
Absent downside risk, creditors cannot discipline banks, but higher equity would make equity holders bear losses and curb excessive risk-taking.
- Normally debt holders discipline firms because they bear the downside without sharing the upside, but in banking the dispersed creditors and deposit insurance remove this downside, leaving no one to discipline risk-taking; higher equity would restore discipline by making equity holders bear more of the downside, reducing incentives to compensate managers for risk-taking.
“the debt holders are the people who care about the downside because they don't get the upside. So, they're the ones to make sure that banks don't act too recklessly. And if you take out their downside, there's nobody else.”
Bank subsidies draw talent and capital away from more productive uses, creating resource misallocation and empty buildings worldwide.
- Bloating banks with subsidies misallocates resources: it draws people who could be productively employed elsewhere into finance, and channels capital toward subsidized uses like excessive housing rather than higher-value goods such as better medical care, cars, or fuel efficiency, leaving empty buildings around the world.
“if you bloat them with subsidies then they end up taking people who might be productively employed elsewhere.”
In competitive markets, banks profit as simple intermediaries by reducing savers' search and vetting costs.
- A debtor or creditor is someone who receives a fixed return through a legal promise; they do not share in the upside, only bearing the downside risk if the borrower cannot pay, which distinguishes debt from equity.
“a borrower is somebody who gets a fixed return. They don't share in the up-side. They only get the down-side; and they are promised a fixed amount on their bond.”
- In its simplest form a commercial bank is just an intermediary that takes deposits from savers and lends to borrowers, sparing savers from having to find, vet, and check the credit risk of borrowers, and profiting from a small spread kept competitive by competition among banks.
“all a bank is is just an intermediary. It finds borrowers for the lenders who put their deposits in the bank.”