
Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/2009
What this covers
Charles Calomiris of Columbia Business School sits with Russ Roberts to examine the 2008 financial crisis through a historical lens, arguing that banking crises stem not from timeless human failings but from specific government policies that erode market discipline. The conversation reconstructs how deposit insurance, implicit bailout guarantees, and government-subsidized housing risk created the microeconomic incentives that made the crisis inevitable. Calomiris traces this argument across two centuries of banking history, showing that crisis frequency and severity cluster precisely where governments shield banks from consequences, not where traders are greediest or populations most irrational.
The discussion spans several distinct territories. Calomiris compares the remarkably stable US banking environment of 1874–1913 (despite lacking a central bank) with the explosion of crises after 1978, when deposit-insurance coverage expanded globally—moving from roughly four major crises to 140. He examines how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's deliberate entry into no-doc subprime lending in 2004, combined with loose 2002–2005 monetary policy and broken prudential regulation, created the conditions for collapse. The conversation contests the standard narrative at several points: that deregulation caused the crisis (he argues the opposite), that ratings agencies were the root problem (he sees them as symptoms of regulatory distortions), and that institutional investors passively followed herd behavior (he traces their behavior to perverse fee structures and legal restrictions on ownership concentration). A recurring theme is how the outsourcing of risk measurement to banks and ratings agencies created a false sense of security, a failure that reform proposals continue to ignore.
Calomiris argues that the 2008 financial crisis—and banking crises generally—were caused not by inherent market psychology or 'greed' but by perverse microeconomic incentives created by government policy: deposit insurance and bailouts that destroy market discipline, government subsidization of housing risk (Fannie/Freddie, FHA), and a broken prudential regulatory system that outsources risk measurement to banks and ratings agencies.
- Banking crises with large losses cluster historically wherever governments protect banks from market discipline or subsidize real estate risk, not where 'human nature' is worst.
- The frequency of major banking crises jumped from ~4 (1874-1913) to ~140 (1978-present) as deposit insurance and bailout coverage expanded globally.
- Fannie/Freddie's 2004 entry into no-doc subprime plus loose 2002-2005 monetary policy and failed Basel prudential regulation jointly produced the crisis; deregulation actually helped resolve it.
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Banking panics and waves of large bank failures are distinct phenomena that only sometimes overlap; the Fed's 1913 founding genuinely reduced US panics by stabilizing seasonal reserve fluctuations (tied to the cotton market) made acute by America's peculiar unit-banking structure, but the US did not historically suffer the large-loss bank-failure crises seen elsewhere, so the Fed's panic-prevention role is separate from the over-speculation/large-loss problem.
“I do want to distinguish between banking panics and what the crisis phenomenon of large amounts of bank failures because they're really not the same phenomenon they do overlap sometimes but often they don't”
Britain's recurring 19th-century banking panics (1819-1857) stemmed from Parliament pressuring the Bank of England to provide an implicit put option on the London bills market—a quid pro quo for its privileges, directly analogous to Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac—and the crises ended only after the Bank publicly renounced this put in 1858 and credibly enforced it by letting Overend Gurney fail in 1866 despite having bailed it out in 1857.
“the British government was pressuring the Bank of England to basically... a put option on all bills... why did this happen because Parliament basically is a quid pro quo required that in exchange for certain privileges”
Canada, with a branch-banking system from the 1860s and no central bank until 1935, experienced none of the panics the US suffered (1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, 1896, 1907), demonstrating that US panics stemmed from the fragility of its unit-banking structure rather than from an inherent need for central banking.
“Canada just above the United States as we all know as a branch banking system from the 1860s on and this period of US banking panics... Canada is not experiencing any of that because it has a different micro economic structure and by the way Canada didn't have a central bank until 1935”
Unit banking means banks were constrained by regulation to operate in only one location, producing over 20,000 highly undiversified banks unable to coordinate responses to shocks, which made agricultural shocks systemically destabilizing.
“unit banking means that banks were constrained by regulation to only operate in one location so you had at its peak over 20,000 banks operating in the US”
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act contained a subordinated-debt requirement provision—championed by Phil Gramm and supported by academics—designed to restore market discipline by forcing large bank holding companies to fund ~2% via a class of subordinated debt explicitly excluded from any bailout, creating a 'canary in the coal mine' early-warning signal; the Fed staff confirmed it would work, but bank lobbying (via Larry Summers and Alan Greenspan) buried it with a 'more research is needed' conclusion.
“let's have banks raise a certain proportion of their funds in the institutional investor market and let's make it clear we'll make these a small portion of funds that nothing even government bailouts will never assist this particular class of investors”
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac deliberately entered subprime no-doc lending in a big way in 2004 over the explicit objections of their own credit-risk managers (who knew from late-1980s experiments that not verifying borrowers attracts bad credit risks like a magnet); as the dominant 800-pound gorillas, their decision to 'make markets' caused subprime no-doc volumes to triple in 2004.
“in 2004 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both decided to get into in a big way subprime mortgages particularly... no DOX mortgages... their risk managers say you know basically what are you crazy we know from the late 1980s”
Citibank's and UBS's disastrous behavior reflects bad corporate governance—both ranked low on value-creation and ethical-culture measures before the crisis—made possible because banks are regulated to be relatively immune to corporate governance: the Bank Holding Company Act bars hedge funds and private equity from taking large controlling stakes, and the 1940 Act limits institutional investors to 1-2% ownership, so concentrated owners who would discipline management are largely prevented.
“we've designed these institutions by regulation to be relatively immune to corporate governance because there aren't any there is a sufficient number of stockholders with large concentrated shares they can really discipline management”
Once regulation outsourced risk classification to ratings agencies, the agencies inevitably became 'ratings inflators,' which is why the ratings inflation documented by Cantor and Packer (1994) occurred specifically in securitization markets (bought entirely by ratings-regulated institutional investors) rather than in ordinary corporate debt markets bought by individuals and corporations.
“all of the great inflation starting in the 1980s was located in the securitization related markets not in the regular corporate debt markets because the institutional investors who are the ones buying all this one great inflation”
Ratings agencies are not the root problem but a symptom: the conflict-of-interest 'issuers pay' story is wrong because everyone always knew about that conflict; ratings agencies actually work for the buy side, whose investors wanted inflated ratings because ratings determine their regulatory treatment (how much they can leverage and what classes they may hold), so 'ratings shopping' could only have produced a race to the bottom because the buy side wanted it to.
“the standard argument is well they were being paid by the people who issued the securities they had a conflict of interest which I find wrong... everybody knew they had a compliment wasn't a secret”
Institutional investors (pensions, mutual funds, insurers) bought toxic securities because their fee structures pay a percentage of assets managed while law (the 1940 Act) bars them from hedge-fund-style asymmetric profit-sharing; this creates an agency problem—'we have to put our money to work'—incentivizing them to keep assets growing rather than return money to clients, unlike hedge funds whose symmetric upside/downside incentives led them to return capital when good investments dried up.
“the answer he got I'll never forget the answer we have to put our money to work... they're making their fees for managing risky investments”
The fundamental, still-ignored failure of the crisis was prudential regulation's inability to measure risk: Basel I and Basel II were in place and failed, yet reform proposals never mention this; worse, investment banks were regulated under Basel II via SEC supervision, so claims that they were 'unregulated' are false—they had capital-adequacy standards based on broken risk-measurement formulas that gave a false sense of security.
“the failure to measure risk by Basel is never mentioned you won't hear any of these g7 leaders even talking about it”
The Minsky/'madness of crowds' explanation—that banking crises arise from unchanging human frailty, greed, or panic—is refuted by the basic fact that crisis frequency varies enormously across time and place; if human psychology were the driver, we would not see such variation, so something other than human nature must explain the difference.
“if it were true that banking crises were pervasive historically and that they tended to accompany business cycles generally then we wouldn't see huge variation across time and place in the likelihood of having a banking crisis but what we do see actually is banking crises were much more pervasive in some places and sometimes than they were in other places”
Protecting banks from market discipline sells well politically (as Zingales and Rajan argue): telling depositors they are protected is popular even though it is a flim-flam, which is why introducing even a small dose of market discipline is easily smashed politically and why neither politicians nor banks want it.
“they pointed out that protecting banks from market discipline is something that popular politics sells very well”
Deposit insurance coverage expanded over time from a temporary small-deposit measure to effectively blanket protection—statutory limits rose to $100,000 (1980) then $250,000, but in practice ~99.7% of all deposits ended up insured, and innovations like CDARS let wealthy depositors swap a $50 million deposit across ~200 banks to insure the entire amount, completing the destruction of risk-based depositor discipline.
“what seed ARS did was a court create a swap concept so that banks could set up syndicates... you as far as you're concerned you have a 50 million dollar deposit”
During the first globalization era (1874-1913)—free banking entry, fixed exchange rates, large capital flows—there were only about four major banking crises (Argentina 1890, Australia 1893, Norway 1900, Italy 1893), all sharing government-policy distortions, whereas from 1978 to the present there have been roughly 140 major banking crises, with about 20 of them larger than the two biggest pre-1913 crises.
“Argentina in 1890 Australia in 1893 were really the only two big ones... when you look at the period from 1978 to the present the number of banking crises... you have about 140 of them”
Government protection policies—deposit insurance and bailouts—plus government policies promoting real estate development (analogous to Fannie/Freddie) are the key factors that changed between the two eras and that invite excessive risk by removing market discipline, since banks then take risk at someone else's expense.
“what changed was pretty obviously government policies that invite risk most importantly government protection policies deposit insurance and other bailout policies which were the exception historically”
Deposit insurance protects small banks by removing competition along the dimension of risk: without it, large stable branch banks (like Canadian banks) could win depositors by advertising their stability, but government backing of deposits eliminates that competitive advantage, which is precisely why small banks lobbied for it.
“if you protected deposits that would remove competition along the dimension of risk in other words... large banks like those Canadian branching banks we talked about before could compete with small banks by saying well look how stable we are”
Concentrated share ownership by sophisticated investors is the single most important driver of good corporate governance: an owner with a 10-20% stake (or two-three owners who can coordinate over dinner) will monitor and can oust management, whereas the dispersed ownership US bank regulation enforces leaves management undisciplined.
“no matter what you look at in terms of corporate governance score the thing that really matters for making corporations work better is to have concentrated ownership of shares by buying other investors”
The most shocking fact of the crisis is that even after mid-2006—when ratings agencies' own assumptions were being violated and delinquencies in the 2004-05 cohorts were forming, prompting Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs to protect themselves—Fannie, Freddie, Citibank, UBS, and Merrill Lynch continued to originate, sponsor, and hold subprime deals at peak levels; had just those five institutions stopped in mid-2006, the crisis would not have occurred.
“if it weren't for what Merrill Lynch ups Citibank Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did starting in you know June 2006 if they had all stopped it's just those five institutions and stopped doing what they were doing in the middle of 2006 we wouldn't be having this conversation now”
Banking crises share a cyclical timing driven by loose monetary policy or credit cycles, but timing alone is insufficient—a crisis of large magnitude requires something deeply wrong with the microeconomic incentives in the banking system, not merely a normal business-cycle reaction.
“what they're missing is the banking crises pretty much uniformly... there's got to be something wrong with a micro economic incentives in the banking system you're not going to get a crisis of this magnitude just coming from a normal business cycle reaction”
The recent crisis wave required two coinciding trends: expanding deposit-insurance/bailout coverage AND increased macroeconomic risk—the low-volatility 1950s-60s offered little risk to bet on, but rising inflation and business-cycle volatility from the 1970s provided risk to exploit, so the S&L crisis emerged in the late 1970s as expanding coverage met expanding risk.
“it's a combination of expanding coverage and expanding risk that's allowing you to see what's happening in the S&L industry finally coming together in the late 70s”
Ratings agencies served as a coordination device for plausible deniability: by giving everyone the same signal, they let every investor claim they did what everyone else did and provided after-the-fact cover (CYA), so the question of where else to invest under common compensation rules was resolved by collective conformity rather than independent judgment.
“the ratings agencies were a coordination device for plausible deniability sure everybody who's investing can say we did the same thing as everyone else”
The crisis cannot be blamed on deregulation: the three main post-1980 deregulations—removing Regulation Q (deposit-interest ceilings), eliminating branching restrictions (culminating in the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act), and removing Glass-Steagall barriers on corporate-securities underwriting (phased out 1987-1999)—all stabilized banking and had nothing to do with subprime; underwriting carries little risk, and standalone investment banks (Merrill, Bear, Lehman) were never covered by Glass-Steagall yet were central to the problem.
“deregulation meant two things let's say three things since 1980 first removing regulation queue... number two eliminating restrictions on branching... number three the remove less of restrictions on underwriting of corporate securities”
The Glass-Steagall repeal actually helped resolve the crisis: it allowed Bank of America to buy Merrill Lynch and JPMorgan Chase to buy Bear Stearns, and let Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding companies in September 2008, gaining depository funding and Fed access—each stabilizing the system—so the deregulation had zero effect on the risks taken but a positive effect on resolution.
“the fact that we had relaxed the glass-steagall barrier meant that Bank of America could buy Merrill Lynch which stabilized the system and it also meant the JPMorgan Chase could buy Bear Stearns”
Securitization itself is not the flaw: credit-card securitization used the same originate-and-distribute model for 30 years without failing alongside subprime, because the prudent incentives long applied in credit-card securitization were deliberately set aside in mortgage securitization—made possible by government programs.
“some people say this is all about securitization... well if that were true why wasn't a credit card securitization that failed alongside subprime”
The current US system has three compounding failures: deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail (first seen in the 1983-84 Continental Illinois bailout) removed depositor discipline, leaving only prudential regulators to identify risk; those regulators fail because they outsource risk measurement to the banks themselves and to ratings agencies; and the government simultaneously subsidizes huge housing risk—so when loose 2002-2005 monetary policy (negative real Fed Funds, >1-2% departures from the Taylor rule) added cheap credit, a severe banking crisis was the predictable result.
“It's the combination of subsidizing risks in the housing market and not tracking risks in credential regulation in an environment where there's no depository discipline anymore because of deposit insurance”
Roughly half of all subprime losses are attributable to no-doc lending's adverse-selection problem (not verifying borrowers attracts bad credit) and the other half to the modeling assumption that housing prices could never fall, which was built into stress tests; both assumptions were knowably unreasonable in advance.
“about half of it is assuming that there's no adverse selection problem... the other half of it is building into your stress test the assumption that housing prices could never fall”
Economists have been too congratulatory toward those who rescued failing companies, thereby helping enable the too-big-to-fail doctrine; praising Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner for keeping the system going while only nominally acknowledging too-big-to-fail's problems will create the next crisis.
“I think economists have been way too congratulatory to those who rescued so many companies and I think we've made we've helped enable the too-big-to-fail doctrine”
Deposit insurance was historically known to be a bad idea—FDR opposed it because all eight state deposit-insurance systems created in the 1910s-1920s failed disastrously with worse bank losses than uninsured systems—yet it passed in ~1933 as a temporary emergency measure with very limited coverage, pushed by Henry Steagall of Alabama as special-interest legislation to protect politically influential small rural banks from competition along the dimension of risk.
“when Franklin Roosevelt opposed Deposit Insurance... why did he oppose it because during the 19-teens and 1920s every state deposit insurance system that had been created all eight of them failed miserably”
When deposit insurance's perceived reliability falls, market discipline returns: in Mexico's 1990s crisis, nominal 100% coverage remained but depositors, doubting the government could cover the losses, withdrew from weak banks—demonstrating that depositors discipline banks whenever they actually bear risk.
“even though you had Deposit Insurance if you were in a bank that had very weak assets all of a sudden you saw people withdrawing their money from that bank... he started getting disciplined for the first time”
Government housing policies—FHA lending pressures, the affordable-housing push on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since ~1994, and a 2006 law plus 2007 SEC rules making it harder for ratings agencies to be tough on subprime MBS—distorted incentives by inducing lending to poor-credit borrowers with no money down and no documentation, which is a large part of why the US housing sector failed so severely.
“if you're telling people with very poor credit history that they can get credit with no money down and without having to verify any of their documents and you're making that a matter of government policy through a variety of channels FHA lending pressures being placed on Fannie and Freddie”
The real-estate bubble was not a US-only phenomenon, which undercuts the objection that Fannie/Freddie cannot explain global bubbles; many governments over-promoted home ownership in the prior 15 years, and Norway had a Fannie Mae-style institution before its pre-WWI crisis.
“I always like it when people say well if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had suddenly do it the current crisis how do you explain the real estate bubble elsewhere as if no other government thought it was a good idea in the last 15 years to over promote home ownership”
Even Friedman and Schwartz endorsed deposit insurance in 1963, but they were observing an unusually placid, limited-coverage period and were wrong; deposit insurance is unnecessary because small savers could be protected via postal savings (invested in Treasuries with no risk), and it has been the single most important contributor to financial-system risk by removing risk-based bank competition.
“even Friedman and Schwartz who are generally regarded as politically conservative actually thought deposit insurance seemed to be okay writing in 1963... I think that they they were wrong they were looking at an unusual circumstance”
Stiglitz and Orszag wrote a paper for Fannie Mae in 2002 claiming the chance Fannie/Freddie would cost taxpayers was essentially zero (described as one in a billion), illustrating the unreliability of such reassurances—the paper subsequently disappeared from the Fannie Mae website.
“they paid Joe Stiglitz and I think it was Peter Orszag... to write a paper in 2002 in which they said that the there was zero risk that it would end up costing the taxpayers a penny”
The Fed cleverly threaded a needle in unwinding its balance sheet by announcing it will not sell its mortgage holdings but instead conduct reverse repurchase agreements with money market mutual funds, shrinking the balance sheet while retaining all the credit risk—avoiding recognition of losses but at the cost of transparency.
“they've announced that they're not gonna sell it that what they're gonna do is engage in reverse repurchase agreements with the huge money market mutual fund industry it's a very clever way of shrinking your balance sheet by not selling”
The bailout costs are dominated by Fannie and Freddie: while all other bank bailouts may net cost taxpayers tens of billions or less, Fannie and Freddie alone are already costing about $350 billion (the current government figure), and the Fed additionally holds roughly $1 trillion of their mortgages without marking them to market.
“Fannie and Freddie alone already are costing us three hundred fifty billion that's food for thought”
Fannie and Freddie continued buying low-down-payment mortgages aggressively into 2007—23% of their home-purchase loans by number that year were low-down-payment—because, politically cornered after the 2003 accounting scandal and growing opposition (including from every Treasury Department across administrations and Alan Greenspan), they bought a political 'insurance policy' by pleasing affordable-housing advocates like Barney Frank.
“23 percent of that Fannie and Freddie activity in terms of numbers of loans was for low down payment mortgages in 2007 which is just as you say or as Gary Gordon said shocking”
The financial crisis is not unprecedented; treating it as a unique 'perfect storm' is a reverse-myopia mistake, since an extraordinarily large number of banking crises stretch back into the 19th century in the US and worldwide.
“there is a terrible mistake people make in assuming that this is sort of a reverse myopia is the first time we've ever had this kind of crisis”
Whenever there is a financial crisis there is one event but about 20 different explanations, all with some truth, so the analytical task is assigning weights to each.
“whenever you have a financial crisis you have one event... and about 20 different explanations they all have probably some truth to them and then the question is what weight do you attach to each”
Just as Britain learned from its 19th-century crises—aided by the Economist and the Bankers' magazine fomenting thoughtful public outrage that fed into parliamentary reform—the US could learn the right lessons if the public becomes more educated and channels its reaction into thoughtful policy responses rather than mere hatred of banks.
“it's conceivable that we two in the United States will learn something it's just a question of what we learn and if we learn the right thing”
We need to put the financial crisis in historical perspective.
“the point you make recently that we need to put it in historical perspective”