Glass-Steagall
The 1933 law that separated commercial banking from investment ('casino') banking; largely repealed under the Clinton administration.
As defined in Andrew Ross Sorkin
Where it comes up · 15
- Andrew Ross Sorkin3 claims
- Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/20103 claims
- Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism2 claims
- John Quiggin on Zombie Economics 11/01/20102 claims
- Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/20092 claims
- 1. Introduction, Financial Terms and Concepts2 claims
- Convexity Resilience and Building Better Brakes with David Dredge1 claim
- Are We on the Cusp of a New Political Order?1 claim
and 7 more
Most important claims · 10 of 23Search all claims for “Glass-Steagall” →
- The Glass-Steagall bill of 1933 was not the pure reform the public imagines: parts were written by a member of the Rockefeller family who owned Chase in order to 'shiv' competitor J.P. Morgan, and Carter Glass himself was not interested in breaking up Morgan and sided so closely with it that some thought he was in the pocket of the bankers.Andrew Ross Sorkin
- Repealing Glass-Steagall was not itself the problem. It was on its last legs because financial innovation had outrun it. The New Deal regulations (the SEC, Glass-Steagall) kept US finance safe for about 50 years, which is about as long as regulation can be expected to work, because innovators inevitably find holes or the rules become outmoded. The real failure was not building a modern framework that allowed innovation while tracking systemic risk and enforcing capital requirements.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- Glass-Steagall would not have saved the banking system in 2008, because the banks that failed first—Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns—would not have come under the bill at all; at most it might have made things marginally better for later-troubled firms like Citigroup and Bank of America.Andrew Ross Sorkin
- In the 1990s beneath apparent bitter polarization and cultural battle between Clinton and Newt Gingrich lay deep bipartisan agreement on deregulation: both signed the Telecommunications Act (1996), repealed Glass-Steagall (1999), and abandoned the Fairness Doctrine, advancing the neoliberal project further than Reagan himself, as evidenced by the fact that both men, despite hating each other publicly and privately, recognized they were on a similar political economy mission.Are We on the Cusp of a New Political Order?
- A version of narrow banking—a Glass-Steagall-style separation between guaranteed deposit-taking banks and unguaranteed investment banks, with no significant financial dealings (joint ownership, large credit extension, securitization) allowed to cross that boundary—is the only way to make a credible no-bailout promise for the second category.John Quiggin on Zombie Economics 11/01/2010
- Repealing Glass-Steagall had little direct effect on causing the financial crisis: the banks that failed were pure investment banks that would have existed and failed anyway, while the repeal actually enabled rescues like JPMorgan buying Bear Stearns and Bank of America buying Merrill Lynch, and let Goldman and Morgan Stanley restore confidence by filing as commercial banks.Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism
- The conflict-of-interest justification for the Glass-Steagall Act was never supported by the data: Rajan and Kroszner's work (notably a 1994 paper, plus a later one) ran controlled analyses and found the story was basically imagined, suggesting the whole Act was a mistake.Andrew Ross Sorkin
- The Glass-Steagall repeal actually helped resolve the crisis: it allowed Bank of America to buy Merrill Lynch and JPMorgan Chase to buy Bear Stearns, and let Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding companies in September 2008, gaining depository funding and Fed access—each stabilizing the system—so the deregulation had zero effect on the risks taken but a positive effect on resolution.Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/2009
- The crisis cannot be blamed on deregulation: the three main post-1980 deregulations—removing Regulation Q (deposit-interest ceilings), eliminating branching restrictions (culminating in the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act), and removing Glass-Steagall barriers on corporate-securities underwriting (phased out 1987-1999)—all stabilized banking and had nothing to do with subprime; underwriting carries little risk, and standalone investment banks (Merrill, Bear, Lehman) were never covered by Glass-Steagall yet were central to the problem.Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/2009
- The shift from a Savings-and-Loan/Glass-Steagall mortgage regime—with thousands of small, geographically dispersed lenders producing middle- and upper-middle-class bankers—to a mortgage-securitization regime concentrated the gains among a far smaller, geographically concentrated group of securities traders, while the move from employer pension funds to 401ks/IRAs raised asset-management fees, both increasing returns that firms distribute internally.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy