
Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
What this covers
This is a one-hour conversation between Russ Roberts and New York Times columnist Joe Nocera, drawn from Nocera's book with Bethany McLean. The book sorts the crisis's participants into devils and a few angels who failed to stop it. Nocera starts with the history of securitization: Lou Ranieri and Larry Fink bundled mortgages into bonds, and Fink's tranching created a ladder of risk. He then follows that machinery forward. Falling interest rates pushed yield-hungry, AAA-dependent investors to demand worse loans, and Wall Street integrated into subprime origination to supply them. Because subprime lenders were not banks, they relied on Wall Street for funding and for buying their loans, so Wall Street effectively set the riskiness of what got written.
The range is wide. Nocera discusses how GSE power was exercised in practice, including the sidelining of a GAO study. He covers Basel capital rules that let banks hold AAA assets against no capital, and how models came to be treated as reality, a point he ties to John Breit being pushed off the trading floor. Synthetic CDOs get their own treatment, including Goldman's Abacus deal. He also explains how AIG's Joe Cassano confused credit risk with liquidity risk, which turned collateral calls into a fatal run. On the policy side, he blames Rubin for failing to make derivatives transparent, criticizes Alan Greenspan for using ideology to excuse inaction, and argues that Glass-Steagall was already obsolete, so the real failure was the lack of a modern replacement.
The sharpest disagreements come late. Roberts presses the moral hazard argument: Lehman's Dick Fuld had watched Bear Stearns rescued and reasonably expected the same. Roberts goes further, suggesting firms rationally ran risk together expecting rescue and that Greenspan's rescues amounted to crony capitalism. Nocera accepts part of this but keeps the focus on structural failures in both markets and government.
Joe Nocera argues that the 2008 financial crisis had deep roots going back decades. It required both a faulty market mechanism (Wall Street securitization funding and dictating subprime lending, short-term pay, and blind faith in models) and faulty government policy (bullying GSEs, ideological non-regulation, opaque derivatives), so single-villain explanations from the left or the right are wrong. Russ Roberts largely agrees but stresses moral hazard from past bailouts and crony capitalism as a deeper driver.
- Wall Street funded, owned, and set the standards for subprime originators, and synthetic CDOs amplified the losses from a disaster into a crisis
- Regulators under Greenspan and Rubin refused to police underwriting or make derivatives transparent, and Glass-Steagall died without a modern replacement
- Capital rules that let banks hold AAA assets without capital, plus short-term incentive pay, left the system undercapitalized and reckless
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Bethany McLean's insight: it doesn't matter whether subprime loans were predatory, which consumer activists claimed, or what borrowers wanted, which regulators claimed. Making tens of millions of loans to people who can never pay them back will inevitably produce a credit crisis.
“who cares whether a loan was predatory or not when you're making tens of millions of loans to people who can never pay them back”
According to John Breit, Wall Street came to view models not as approximations of reality to be stress-tested with different assumptions but as reality itself. So a AAA security, even one with 60 percent subprime mortgage bonds in it, was believed absolutely to hold no risk, and money market funds held such paper. Roberts compares this to trusting a bridge because smart engineers designed it.
“they came to view it as reality itself”
MBIA, the bond insurer, told the New York Times that its models were actually accurate. If they plugged in a 20 percent decline in housing prices, the models showed the world blowing up, but MBIA assumed that could never happen. The failure was in assumptions, not the model mechanics.
“if we plugged in a 20% decline in housing prices they showed the world blowing up but we just assumed that that could never possibly happen”
Capital requirements are at the heart of the financial crisis but get too little attention because Basel is complicated. Banks were undercapitalized when the crisis came because they didn't have to hold capital against AAA assets deemed risk-free, and those assets turned out not to be risk-free.
“capital requirements is one of the it's really at the heart and soul of the financial crisis it doesn't get the credit it deserves because Basel is complicated”
Joe Cassano, head of AIG FP, fundamentally confused credit risk with liquidity risk. He insisted AIG shouldn't pay Goldman a penny because the underlying securities would ultimately be fine. On Wall Street, though, what matters is what securities are worth today, not what they are ultimately worth. AIG was forced to post escalating collateral ($1 billion, then $3, $5, $7 billion) and ultimately collapsed because it owed so much collateral to so many counterparties that it lacked the cash.
“Joe Cassano was completely misunderstood between underlying credit risk and liquidity risk”
Near the end, about a year before the crisis, everyone was stuffed with AAAs and other banks no longer wanted them. The only way to keep the securitization machine going was to sell to short sellers and keep the AAA tranches on your own books. Bankers kept going because they were making so much money personally, even though every fiber of their being said collapse was coming.
“you have to put the Triple A on your own books it's the only way to keep the Machine going”
Private-label mortgage securitization could not have happened without federal action. The government had to pass laws exempting mortgage-backed securities from state-by-state securities regulation (blue sky laws) and resolve tax issues, so securitization was a joint creation of Wall Street and government.
“you couldn't just do this without the federal government passing laws”
Evidence of GSE bullying came from reporting. James Bothwell of the GAO wrote a study saying Fannie and Freddie posed risks to the economy, which they did, and was submarined in a congressional hearing. Fannie's David Maxwell threatened Lou Ranieri that First Boston would never get a Fannie mortgage bond again unless Ranieri sided with him, which was raw business power rather than political power.
“if you don't side with me on this we will never you know first Boston will never get a mortgage bond from us ever again”
During an Asian crisis, Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin asked an aide what the US financial system's credit default swap exposure to Korea was, and the answer was 'we don't know.' Nocera blames Rubin more than anyone for failing, at minimum, to make derivatives transparent so the government could see counterparties and danger points. Rubin's circle instead held that all smart people knew derivatives made the world safer and dismissed dissenters as idiots.
“I actually blame him more than any other person for the failure to at a minimum make derivatives more transparent”
Another McLean insight: very little of the subprime boom was about homeownership. Much of it was people turning their houses into piggy banks through cash-out refinancing, plus speculation on second homes. New Century openly admitted that 85 to 90 percent of its loans were cash-out refinancings.
“between 85 and 90 percent of the loans that they made with cash out refinancing”
For many years Fannie and Freddie wouldn't touch subprime and dominated prime, so Wall Street's incentive was to escape GSE control. Because subprime companies weren't banks, they depended entirely on Wall Street for warehouse loans (up-front cash) and for buying their loans. They were creatures of Wall Street, and Wall Street ultimately dictated the riskiness of the loans by deciding which loans it would buy and finance.
“Wall Street was actually ultimately dictating the riskiness of the loans because Wall Street got to decide what loans it would buy”
Wall Street vertically integrated into subprime origination to secure the raw material for its securities. Bear Stearns ran its own subprime originator, Lehman had a very large originator, Merrill Lynch under O'Neal bought one, and Goldman had a servicer. The extent of interconnection between Wall Street and subprime companies was a major revelation even to the authors.
“everybody wanted to be in the origination business because everybody wanted their own they wanted to make sure they had enough of the raw material”
Because Fannie and Freddie for many years refused subprime and dominated prime 30-year fixed mortgages, Wall Street's incentive was to escape the GSEs through subprime; subprime lenders, not being banks, were entirely dependent on Wall Street for warehouse funding and for buying their loans, making them creatures of Wall Street.
“because the subprime companies weren't banks they were entirely dependent on Wall Street both to make the wholesale loans that you know was basically there upfront cash and then to buy their loans once they made them”
Lou Ranieri and Larry Fink developed the core idea of bundling mortgages into securities that could be sold as bonds. Fink invented tranching, which created a ladder of risk (AAA, A, B and so on). Before tranching, investors had to accept interest rate, credit, or prepayment risk wholesale, with no tiered structure, so tranching made mortgage bonds far more appealing to Wall Street.
“Larry Fink in fact invented the process of tranching which was really important”
As interest rates kept dropping, the hunt for yield among money market funds, pension funds, and other AAA-dependent investors became urgent. Wall Street therefore needed ever more degraded loans to bundle, because worse loans generated higher yield that could still be packaged into AAA-rated securities.
“it was important for Wall Street the cat to have evermore degraded loans to bundle because those degraded loans you know generated higher yield”
Whether conscious or not, many on Wall Street correctly realized that if they all went down together they'd be saved. If most firms were going to go down in flames, you'd be a fool to be prudent in the meantime. That is why prudent risk managers like Merrill's John Breit were shunted aside, creating systemic risk.
“if most people were going to go down in flames you'd be a fool to be prudent in the meanwhile”
Repealing Glass-Steagall was not itself the problem. It was on its last legs because financial innovation had outrun it. The New Deal regulations (the SEC, Glass-Steagall) kept US finance safe for about 50 years, which is about as long as regulation can be expected to work, because innovators inevitably find holes or the rules become outmoded. The real failure was not building a modern framework that allowed innovation while tracking systemic risk and enforcing capital requirements.
“that's about as long a time as you can really expect regulation to do its job because inevitably financial innovators will find holes in it”
Goldman's collateral demands on AIG can be viewed as a run on AIG while it was still somewhat solvent; simultaneously Goldman bought credit default swaps against AIG's own default because the collateral battles revealed AIG was in more trouble than anyone realized—making Goldman the 'smart devils'.
“Goldman at the same time with buying credit default swaps against the possibility to AIG itself might default because they they kind of realized from these battles they were having over the collateral that AIG was in more trouble than anyone realized”
Embarrassing pre-crisis analyses tend not to be discussed. A paper by the Orszag brothers and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz showed how remote the chance of a Fannie or Freddie bankruptcy was. Gary Gorton has had a career rehabilitation, with a crisis-causes paper praised by Bernanke, while his role building the models behind AIG's credit default swaps is forgotten.
“there's this famous paper by the Orszag Brothers and Joseph Stiglitz”
Synthetic CDOs greatly amplified the crisis. Because they reference existing mortgage securities rather than hold them, they removed the constraint of needing real mortgages as raw material, effectively betting on the bets. A single tranche that shorts like John Paulson were sure would fail could be referenced 15, 20, 30, or 40 times. Goldman's Abacus deal, in which Paulson allegedly helped pick the worst-of-the-worst bonds, is the example. The rise of synthetics turned what would have been a disaster into a crisis.
“would get bet on 15 20 30 40 times”
Once an institution decides to take on more risk than it should, it doesn't want good risk managers looking over its shoulder. Merrill's John Breit was pushed off the trading floor and exiled to another floor without access to data that would have alerted him to the problem. This likely happened at Citi, UBS, and other firms that got hit hardest.
“he gets shunted aside and basically gets pushed off the trading floor and exiled on to another floor”
Dick Fuld is perhaps the best example in modern history of moral hazard. Having seen Bear Stearns saved, he reasonably expected Lehman would be saved too. He was wrong, but the expectation was not unreasonable.
“a walking talking example of moral hazard”
Time magazine's late-1990s cover story 'The Committee to Save the World' (Greenspan, Rubin, Summers) celebrated them for solving the Mexican, Russian, and Asian crises and LTCM one after another. Nobody stepped back to ask why there were so many crises and what was fundamentally wrong with the system, and when asked, the answer was glib. This shows a lack of willingness to question the framework they had created.
“nobody steps back to ask you know why we having all these crises what is fundamentally going wrong with the system”
Greenspan used free-market ideology to defend regulatory inaction but was in practice a lousy free marketer and even a destroyer of capitalism. Through the rescues after the 1987 crash, the 1995 peso crisis, and LTCM, he helped insulate Wall Street from its mistakes, subsidizing it like any other special interest. More generally, officials such as Treasury secretaries and central bankers serve the powerful interests that keep them in place, which reflects a problem of crony capitalism rather than real capitalism.
“he was a lousy free marketer he was if anything a destroyer of capitalism”
Josh Rosner's 2001 paper ('a home without equity is just a rental with debt') was the deepest early warning of the crisis. It recognized not only rising hidden risk and refinancing driving the housing bubble but also its ramifications, including the corruption of the appraisal process. Rosner is an underappreciated seer.
“he saw how was corrupting the appraisal process you really he's an underappreciated seer”
Goldman's collateral calls can be seen as a run on AIG: getting cash out while AIG was still somewhat solvent, without knowing a bailout would come. At the same time, Goldman bought credit default swaps against AIG's own default, because the collateral battles revealed that AIG was in more trouble than anyone realized.
“Goldman at the same time with buying credit default swaps against the possibility to AIG itself might default”
Roberts' insider sources say Fannie and Freddie never did anything they didn't approve of. The affordable-housing mandates, at least early on, were good for the GSEs' business, and they would have stopped them otherwise.
“all the the affordable mortgage stuff at least in the early days as you point out it was really it was good for them they did and they were if they had if it hadn't been good for them they would've stopped it”
Most Americans view Fannie and Freddie warmly as agencies that make homeownership affordable, but most studies suggest they don't make much difference to homeownership. The book reveals how powerful their lobbying was, largely below the public's radar.
“turns out most study suggests doesn't make that much of a difference”
Documents released by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission show that AIG Financial Products was actually a fairly cautiously run division. It made one terrible mistake, insuring AAA mortgage securities with credit default swaps, based partly on Yale economist Gary Gorton's risk models and partly on its own reading of the mortgage market.
“AIG FP financial products division it was actually a pretty cautiously run division that that made this one terrible terrible mistake”
The conversion of investment banks from partnerships to public companies, with Goldman among the last around 1999, contributed to the crisis. Once partners' own money wasn't at stake, they were far more willing to take risks they never would have taken with their own capital, because losses came out of shareholders' pockets.
“once the partners money was not at stake you could take they were much more willing to take risks that they would never would have taken with their own money”
Calling AAA misjudgments a 'mistake' or hubris is too generous. Most players paid little price because bailouts insulated them, as past bailouts had: Continental Illinois in 1984, the Mexican peso crisis in the mid-1990s, the savings and loan crisis, and Long-Term Capital Management. Creditors of large institutions were repeatedly saved, so public policy may have been subsidizing Wall Street's risky behavior and inattention.
“you have to be open to the possibility that we have been subsidizing Wall Street's risk risky behavior”
A core idea over the prior 20 years was that you could model away risk. Greenspan's apology noted that Nobel Prizes were won for work that turned out to be flawed. Larry Summers' faith in mathematical models was partly about proving he was smarter than everyone. Nocera says he has become much less sanguine about economic modeling in the past five years.
“the core idea that you could model away risk”
The biggest mistake people make about the crisis is searching for a single villain. The right blames Fannie and Freddie because that lets it blame government rather than the market. The left blames Greenspan and Wall Street because that lets it blame the market rather than government. In reality the crisis required both a faulty market mechanism and faulty government policy.
“you needed both a faulty mechanism and you needed a faulty government policy to make all this happen you needed both”
Fannie and Freddie were not just powerful but bullies. They used the mantra of homeownership to steamroll anyone in their way and enjoyed bipartisan support, with very few naysayers in Washington. They kept local offices that counted the mortgages they guaranteed in each congressman's district, and they went out of their way to bludgeon critics into submission, which ultimately contributed to their downfall.
“they used the mantra of homeownership to get anything they wanted to steamroll anybody who got in their way”
Much of the crisis might have been averted if Bear Stearns had been allowed to fail. Bear was one-fifth the size of Lehman and posed less systemic risk, and its bankruptcy would have signaled that not everyone would be bailed out, forcing firms to get their houses in order fast. Saving Bear sent the wrong signal and let bigger firms with similar balance sheets, like Lehman, keep funding themselves.
“Bear Stearns was one-fifth the size of Lehman it just didn't have the kind of it didn't create the kind of systemic risk”
Nocera accepts the bailout history but argues that the prospect of government bailouts was not consciously, or even subconsciously, on bankers' minds. What was consciously on their minds, amounting to 'almost overt corruption,' was short-term incentive compensation for making deals without having to care whether the bonds turned out good.
“what I do think was consciously on their mind and I think what was a kind of almost overt corruption was the short-term incentive compensation”
Treasury secretaries and central bankers in practice serve their masters—the people in power who keep them in power and keep their benefits in place—so the US has a problem of crony capitalism rather than real capitalism; this is not sinister or specific to Greenspan but general to people in power.
“what they did is they serve their masters they serve the people in power who kept them in power kept their benefits in place whether they were secretaries of Treasury or central bankers and we've got a problem with democracy in the United States and crony capitalism not the real thing”
Power struggles between Ranieri and Fannie Mae's David Maxwell produced a system in which Fannie and Freddie dominated prime 30-year fixed-rate securitization. Their guarantee made bonds most attractive, so mortgages had to conform to GSE standards, which is the origin of the term 'conforming.' Before subprime, Wall Street could not securitize mortgages at scale without Fannie and Freddie in the middle taking 'the vig.'
“that's where the word conforming comes from it means conforming to the GSEs”
We are stuck with securitization. If banks had to keep whole loans on their books, capital rules would require so much capital that they wouldn't make home loans at all. Securitization per se isn't bad, and prime 30-year securitization was probably fine, but the device became dramatically abused. The current problem is that nobody trusts the market, so nobody buys.
“I think that we are stuck with securitization whether we like it or not”
The counterargument is that without going public and raising capital, US investment banks might have been swamped by Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and other big European banks without Glass-Steagall-type rules, echoing earlier fears about Japanese and now Chinese banks. The felt need to get big to compete globally had the unintended consequence of increasing moral hazard 'a hundredfold,' because risk-taking losses no longer came from the risk-takers' own pockets.
“you increase the moral hazard by a hundredfold”
The real question is whether the world needs American investment banks at all. If Goldman disappeared and Deutsche Bank took its role, why should Americans care whose name is on the capital allocator, any more than whether their cellphone is a Finnish Nokia? If foreign banks allocate capital poorly, foreigners pay for it.
“why should I care whose name is on the people who allocate the capital if they do it wisely”
The most important untold story is the future of housing. The country has become utterly dependent on the federal government for housing finance, and the fight over Fannie and Freddie will be ideological. How the US figures out how to create a private housing market is crucial for the country's future.
“we have become a country utterly dependent on the federal government”
Fannie and Freddie were not the victims they portray themselves as, but they were not the driving force moving the country into subprime lending either. Free-market supporters have to acknowledge that Wall Street was the driving force.
“those of us who who were friends of the market have to deal with the fact that Wall Street was the driving force”
Wall Street has been a poor allocator of capital, as shown by putting trillions into housing so people could own two homes. The IPO market is another example: underwriters maximize proceeds to favored investors rather than to issuing companies, and operate as a cartel taking 7.5 percent off the top.
“it's a cartel so they take seven and a half percent off the top”
Fannie Mae did buy subprime securities in non-trivial amounts, but it was not the cause. The underlying cause of the precipitating events was Wall Street channeling trillions of dollars into lousy mortgages, and the crisis cannot be explained without that phenomenon.
“the underlying cause of the precipitating events came from Wall Street channeling trillions of dollars into lousy mortgages”
Regulators didn't crack down on lending because Greenspan was an ideologue who believed all regulation was bad and simply wasn't interested. Because he was so powerful, his mindset permeated the whole regulatory apparatus, so nobody would buck his will.
“Greenspan was an ideologue who believed firmly that all regulation was bad”
For the housing market to recover, a healthy securitization market is needed, because the old model of a bank holding your loan with 25 percent down is gone. Roberts counters that we know what that world looks like (roughly the 1950s-60s), it was a pretty good world, and homeownership was not much lower.
“we know what that world looks like it's called 19 any six or so and it was a pretty good world the homeownership was lower but really not to have much lower”
Nocera rejects the reasoning that 'if I go down everyone goes down.' He argues the actual driver was competitive envy: a firm like Merrill Lynch saw Goldman making huge money and took on the same risk, even though it had nowhere near Goldman's risk management capabilities.
“Goldman's making so much money I want to make the same amount of money so I'll take the same amount of risk”
The 'angels' who had it right included Brooksley Born, Josh Rosner, the community activists screaming about subprime loans, and Ned Gramlich at the Fed. Gramlich urged Greenspan to look at subprime, but he was so polite he couldn't press aggressively and was easy to dismiss.
“Ned Gramlich at the Fed who is the one person who went to Greenspan and said we were honored to take a look at this”
A collateral call is an agreement by an insurer (here AIG, writing credit default swaps) that if the insured security drops in market value, it will turn over cash to the counterparty to make up the loss in value. It is analogous to a homeowner with negative equity being asked to post the difference.
“a collateral call is an agreement by the insurer in this case AIG that if the security drops in value in the marketplace that they will make up the difference”
When CFTC head Brooksley Born asked to examine OTC derivatives for risk, officials 'dumped all over her.' She lost on the technicality that these weren't futures, though the real issue was not technical. At the tail end of the Clinton administration, laws were passed that made derivatives effectively unregulatable and abolished Glass-Steagall.
“a law was passed that basically made it impossible for jurors to be regulated and law was also passed abolishing glass-steagall”
Doing social policy, such as expanding homeownership, through Fannie and Freddie was a bad idea because it was opaque rather than transparent and ended up being an expensive way to increase homeownership. Insiders say the affordable-mortgage push only happened because it was good for the GSEs themselves.
“I don't think it's a good idea to have Social Policy done in the way that we did it through Fannie and Freddie”
The Federal Reserve, OCC, and OTS should have focused much more on underwriting quality in the banking system. Even though originators like Countrywide were outside the banking system, the Fed could have taken broader powers to crack down on inappropriate lending, and it never did.
“the OCC and the OTS should have been much more focused on the quality of underwriting”
John Taylor and others at Stanford have criticized Greenspan's low interest rates from 2002 to 2005, which encouraged subprime lending through teaser rates.
“John Taylor and others have Stanford have been very critical of his policies in the 2002 to 2005 period”
Ignorance about the scope of the problem pervaded the system. Paulson told President Bush at Camp David he was nervous, but when asked how much exposure there was, he didn't know exactly. Whether the cause was borrowers thrilled by no-money-down loans or originators signing people up for products they didn't understand, those loans were going to blow up.
“there was a lot of ignorance about the potential scope of the problem”
Executives like Richard Fuld and Jimmy Cayne presumably cashed out options before the collapse. Stan O'Neal was pushed out of Merrill Lynch before the crisis because of his mistakes but walked away with $160 million in retirement.
“walks off with 160 million dollars in retirement”
Nocera is unsure about the 'serve your masters' thesis. People act subconsciously more than they acknowledge, but he doesn't think Greenspan consciously maneuvered to stay in power, and he believes Greenspan sincerely saw himself as a free-market champion. Greenspan's congressional mea culpa that his worldview needed re-examining may have been sincere, but he should have looked earlier.
“people act subconsciously more than we like to acknowledge”
Paulson would have been tough on whichever firm came next after Bear, with the possible exception of Goldman Sachs, because his empathy for Goldman would have overridden his concern about moral hazard.
“I think Paulson would have been just too tough on whoever was next in line with the possible exception of Goldman Sachs”
Early journalism on the crisis focused narrowly on the period from the Bear Stearns collapse through September 2008. A 'second draft' of history needs to go further back and deeper, to the evolution of CDOs, synthetic CDOs, the housing bubble, and an out-of-control subprime industry. It should not treat those elements as simply existing and then blowing up out of nowhere.
“we thought that the second draft of journalism should go back further and go a little deeper”
Nocera admits he doesn't know how to fix Wall Street's capital allocation and thinks it is somewhat hopeless. Firms have already returned to their old ways and make money hand over fist simply by borrowing from the Fed at nearly zero and buying Treasuries at 3 percent.
“they borrow from the Fed at nothing and buy Treasuries at 3% and pocket the difference”
Nocera responds that the case for American investment banks is not national security but jobs: Wall Street generates many jobs, and New York would be a very different city without it. Roberts replies that this is not an argument about capital allocation.
“if Wall Street disappeared tomorrow this would be a very different city”
The book does an excellent job explaining complex securitization processes to non-specialists, weaving together the homeownership push and securitization's growth.
“the book does a very nice job explaining to a non specialist how many of these complex processes worked”
Nocera thinks the book's conclusion about Fannie and Freddie probably differs from what Roberts' biases would predict, and he was himself surprised by where the reporting led.
“I was surprised that where we came out on Fannie and Freddie”