
What this covers
John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, sits down with EconTalk host Russ Roberts to argue that four pillars of market-liberal economic thought—the Great Moderation, the efficient markets hypothesis, micro-founded macroeconomic models, and trickle-down economics—have been intellectually defeated by the 2008 financial crisis yet continue to shape policy and academic practice. The conversation, recorded in 2010, centers on why these ideas persist and what structural reforms might prevent future crises. Quiggin contends that the crisis itself resulted not primarily from monetary error but from a combination of implicit government bailout guarantees and unrestricted financial innovation, which together created irresistible incentives for institutions to arbitrage between protection and risk-taking.
The discussion ranges across the architecture of financial regulation, the nature of market rationality, and the proper scope of government. Quiggin proposes narrow banking—a strict Glass-Steagall-style wall between guaranteed deposit banks and unguaranteed investment institutions—as a way to restore credible no-bailout commitments. Roberts challenges several of Quiggin's claims, particularly on social mobility and the failures of securitization, and raises concerns that proposed alternatives might perform worse than existing arrangements. Both speakers contest whether macroeconomic models built on micro-foundations can accumulate genuine knowledge, whether individual market prices reflect broader macroeconomic wisdom, and whether the financial sector has grown beyond its productive size. The conversation also touches on inequality, the role of technological change in wage divergence, and whether Australia's banking oligopoly offers lessons for crisis prevention—questions where their empirical readings diverge.
Quiggin argues that several economic ideas central to the market-liberal era—the Great Moderation, the efficient markets hypothesis, micro-founded business cycle theory, and trickle-down economics—are 'zombie' ideas that were discredited by the 2008 crisis yet persist, and that financial deregulation combined with implicit bailout guarantees, rather than bad monetary policy alone, drove the crisis.
- Implicit bailout guarantees plus permissive financial innovation create incentives to take socially destructive risks that are arbitraged against regulation
- Narrow banking with a strict wall between guaranteed deposit banks and unguaranteed investment banks could restore credible no-bailout commitments
- Macroeconomic micro-foundations models are inherently non-progressive and failed to predict or explain crises
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The recurring belief that the economy has reached a permanently stable footing ('this time is different') has a timeless appeal and has reappeared in the 1920s with monetary policy, in the 1950s-60s with Keynesian fiscal policy, and again with the Great Moderation.
“that kind of claim isn't new of course it was made in 1920s when we first discovered monetary policy... and more strongly again in 1950s and 1960s when Keynesian fiscal policy seemed to be able to stabilize the economy”
Because even highly sophisticated people cannot encompass all possibilities, markets collectively consider some scenarios while ignoring others; when something forcibly brings the ignored possibilities to attention, there can be a sudden shift in 'animal spirits' moving the economy from one macroeconomic equilibrium to another.
“if something forcibly brings those other possibilities to our attention we can have I think a very sudden shift in so-called animal spirits of the market shift potentially from one kind of macroeconomic equilibrium to another”
Macroeconomics built on micro-foundations is inherently non-progressive because each new paper restarts from general equilibrium plus one or two twists rather than building cumulatively, so the field keeps doing the same thing without genuine accumulation of knowledge.
“every new paper starts with the next paper we write doesn't take that and add more things it goes back general equilibrium and starts from there and add something else”
Cross-national studies of the same people show US social mobility is declining, not increasing, and someone born in the bottom quintile in the US is much more likely to stay there than someone born in other countries—contradicting the belief that America trades inequality for high mobility.
“somebody born in the bottom quintile in the u.s. is much more likely to end up there than somebody born in other countries and that partly just reflects the fact for the distance between those”
Venture capital is a desirable model of finance—a high-upside, bad-downside market that emerges where individual wealth exists, in which individuals bet on emerging companies; it 'works' precisely because it produces many failures, since the world is genuinely hard to predict, and a financial system encouraging more venture-style betting and less abstract derivatives layering would yield better outcomes.
“venture capitalists which is a market that emerges in when there's great individual wealth you get individuals putting bets down on emerging new new companies... it works pretty well it doesn't work well in the sense that there's a lot of failures but it's right”
A large actor betting on whether another large entity will fail (e.g., via credit default swaps) faces an insurance-like moral hazard: like betting your neighbor's house will burn down, it creates an incentive to act in the market to increase the chance of the bad event occurring.
“if you're a large actor and you're betting on somehow other large exodus file... it can't be beyond the pant bounds possibility that you could act in the market in a way to improve the chance that happening”
Static decile snapshots overstate stagnation because they are statistical artifacts: following the same people in panel data shows those at the bottom do much better over 10-30 year periods, and apparent stagnation reflects rising divorce rates changing household composition and immigration adding many people at the bottom.
“if you look at panel data that people actually at the bottom do much better at the end of the ten twenty and thirty year periods and a lot of what appears to be stagnation... our statistical artifacts from an enormous increase say in the divorce rate”
The correlation between what people contribute to socially valuable innovations and what they extract from them can be very small—the internet was largely built by universities operating with slack in the system and no expectation of payment, while its commercial rivals failed, so high private wealth is a poor proxy for social utility.
“there's a correlation between what people put into things like the Internet and what people got out is very very light... the people actually built internet really with the universities”
Long-Term Capital Management was bailed out in 1998 despite being a 'sophisticated professional investors only' fund because it had borrowed from guaranteed institutions—so the professionals were effectively gambling with the deposits of ordinary people, which is the connection that makes narrow-banking firewalls essential.
“what they allowed was long-term capital management to borrow from institutions they had been guaranteed... these people weren't giving with own money they were gambling with in effect the deposits of you and I”
A version of narrow banking—a Glass-Steagall-style separation between guaranteed deposit-taking banks and unguaranteed investment banks, with no significant financial dealings (joint ownership, large credit extension, securitization) allowed to cross that boundary—is the only way to make a credible no-bailout promise for the second category.
“a cast-iron guarantee of the banks in the first category combined with the most credible promises and make not to rescue banks in the second category and... you can have no significant financial dealings across that boundary”
The 'too big to fail' problem is really a 'too interconnected to fail' problem—Goldman Sachs's danger is not its size but that it is connected to everybody and everything else, and leverage (using borrowed money to finance risky bets) is what makes interconnectedness dangerous.
“it's not so much too big to fail as two interconnected defilers the problem that the problem isn't that goldman sachs i as an institution is so big... it's connected to everybody and everything else”
Because the financial system cannot be allowed to collapse, any financial innovation that is not tightly controlled will be arbitraged against regulations; once bailouts are expected, every actor's incentive is to take risks that fail precisely in the bailout event, so the only way to stop this is to regulate the range of activities protected banks can undertake.
“the incentive for all financial sector actors is to take risks which will fail precisely in that event so everybody effectively wants to bet on that... the only way to stop that is by regulating the range of activities that protect the banks can undertake”
There is a meaningful distinction between micro-level and macro-level efficiency: an individual stock price (e.g., GM vs Ford) is probably the best available estimate, but it does not follow that the entire market is processing all information correctly—similarly individual decisions can be rational while macro-level problems still emerge.
“most of the time if the market says that GM is worth more than forward it's probably right... but you might struggle to make the case then that the entire markets processing all information correctly”
Defenders of markets erred by treating securitization's market success as proof of its value, neglecting that it emerged so successfully partly because of explicit guarantees (Fannie and Freddie) or semi-explicit ones (LTCM and similar institutions).
“part of the reason it emerged so successfully is because of a guarantee either a little literal guarantee in the case of Fannie and Freddie or a semi literal guarantee in the case of long term capital management”
Empirical attempts to explain rising inequality with 'skill-biased technological change' did not actually identify technological factors—they ruled out imports and other explanations, leaving a residual that was then labeled 'technology,' so the explanation is essentially the unexplained portion.
“what they really meant wasn't we've gone out and identified tech module factors... what they meant was we've looked at imports and we've looked at this... and none of them seem to work very well as explanations and I've got a residual and we call those digital technologies”
There is little evidence that securitization channeled productive funds into productive uses—it was valuable for Wall Street but its broader social value is unproven, and the older-style mortgage markets suppressed problematic activity that securitization unleashed.
“where is the evidence that it channeled productive funds into productive uses I don't see it”
A financial sector accounting for 40 to 50 percent of corporate profits cannot possibly be the right size, so regulation should aim to keep the financial sector in proportion to its sensible role in the economy and require innovators to demonstrate their innovations are productive and not undermining existing regulations.
“I don't believe that a financial sector accounting for 40 or 50 percent of corporate profits can possibly be of the right size”
Australia's concentrated 'four pillars' banking oligopoly, which prevents the four major banks from merging, paradoxically protected it during the crisis because cozy oligopolists did not have to push as hard for high-risk profits and so were less exposed to toxic assets.
“the fact with our banks were pretty cozy oligopoly turned out well because it meant that... they didn't have to push as hard for high-risk profits as banks elsewhere”
Crises are predicted, when at all, only by less formal reasoning—the idea that when behavior gets way out of whack relative to historical values something bad will happen—so economists must abandon claims of model precision and return to a pragmatic approach of tracking imbalances and many indicators.
“we really can't model things with the kind of precision that the theoretical models suggest we have to start going back to a more pragmatic approach of looking at these imbalances trying to hit things a lot of indicators roughly on track”
The crisis was driven primarily by 'bad bailout policy'—Greenspan's willingness to bail out institutions and the 'Greenspan put' encouraged firms to believe they would be rescued while financial innovation went unrestricted, fueling huge growth in the financial sector.
“the willingness of Greenspan in particular to bail out the institutions and encouraged them to believe that they will be barreled out while not restricting their initial innovation”
The mixed economy is here to stay and governments will play a significant role; the central challenge is to resist the temptation to poke government into things where it does not belong, and the more expansive one's view of proper government, the more important it is not to overload it with tasks the market does better.
“the mixed economy is here to stay the government's are going to play a significant role in the economy the challenges from my perspective is is to try and stop the temptation to just poke up and into things where it doesn't belong”
The Great Moderation—the apparent reduction in economic volatility from the mid-1980s—was wrongly attributed to deregulated financial systems and Taylor-rule monetary policy, and this belief encouraged a benign attitude toward financial imbalances and asset markets that led directly into the financial crisis.
“that idea I think encouraged the view that we shouldn't worry about developments in asset markets... and so that encouraged the kind of benign attitude to financial imbalances that led us into the counter crisis”
The major impediment to narrow banking is the political power of Wall Street, which profits from living off taxpayer guarantees—as evidenced by their resentment of even modest regulation and bonus cuts while taking government money.
“the reason we're not going to move in that direction is that Wall Street likes living off of you and me”
Even if individual losers are not bailed out, governments cannot take a truly neutral stance toward a major stock market crash because tax revenues fall and unemployment rises, so when the whole market gets way out of whack the efficient market hypothesis does not hold up.
“it's impossible for governments in some sense to take a neutral stance in response to something like a stock market crash... when the whole market gets way out of whack the the kind of reasoning that least efficient market hypothesis I think doesn't stand up very well”
The Lucas critique drove macroeconomics toward fully-specified micro-foundations whose first versions implied business cycles are impossible unless governments cause them; Keynesians responded with more sophisticated models that worked during the Great Moderation but explicitly bracketed and could not explain the Great Depression.
“the kind of Lucas critique that said well... if you want a proper understanding you have to go to fully specified micro foundations and the first versions of that gave very strongly classical conclusions that really the business items are impossible unless government's brought them about”
Even ex-post, economists cannot agree on what caused the Great Depression or the current crisis, which suggests deep pessimism about economics making cumulative advances.
“even ex-post after the fact as we look back on it we can't agree as economists on on these issues and that to me suggests a great deal of pessimism about advances”
The dramatic increase in income and wealth concentration at the top of the distribution over the past 30 years is concentrated within the top 1% (or smaller groups), and reflects political institutions, tax-system form, and prevailing attitudes about what is reasonable—not merely differences in underlying economic forces—showing that ideology matters.
“it really does seem as if both both subtle details are political institutions as well of course as the groceries... like the form of the text system and also adjust the kind of attitudes of people as to what what's reasonable”
After 30 years that largely tried to explain away the category of market failure, we must recognize that market failure does happen, that there are things governments do better, and that a large government sector can produce more stable outcomes than the minimal-state ideal—while still understanding and welcoming the strength of markets.
“after thirty years of which was largely tried to explain away the category of market failure we have to recognize that that does happen and that... there are things which governments are going to do better and that having a large government sector in there is life is to produce a more stable outcome”
The dot-com bubble is a clear test case refuting the efficient markets hypothesis because valuations implied absurd outcomes (e.g., the procurement division of GM allegedly worth more than GM itself), people who tried to bet against it lost, and the assets clearly could not be defended.
“it was alleged possibly that at that time the procurement division of GM was worth more than Jam itself... there were people who try to bet against it and that last of them”
Letting Lehman Brothers fail revealed that an institution's collapse would take down the entire Wall Street investment banking sector (notably via AIG, whose primary creditor was Goldman Sachs), so the alternative of no bailout would have been even worse than the bailout itself.
“the discovery within a matter of days that letting Lehman go under would take the entire at least in hi Wall Street investment banking sector... the alternative will bail that was even worse than the bailout itself”
The 30-year market-liberal era functioned as a natural experiment that failed to deliver positive externalities to people outside the top 20% of the income distribution, who did worse than in the postwar Keynesian decades (roughly 1945-75).
“we really don't see the kind of improvements in in welfare for people outside say the top certainly... the top 20% of the income distribution... they did in the post county in the kind in 30 years from say 45 to 75”
The repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 was merely making official a shift toward integrated full-range banking that had been occurring in practice for decades, so the legislative act itself was not the crucial point—the move from a system governed by the spirit of Glass-Steagall to interconnected banking was.
“the repeal of glass-steagall in 99 was was just yeah making official something that had been in practice in place for quite a few decades before that”
The key open question left over from the Great Depression and the Japanese era is whether a one-off stimulus can push the economy back onto the right path or whether ever-increasing fiscal stimulus and debt are needed.
“the big question which in a sense is left over from this oppression and the China and the Japanese era is can we get a once-off stimulus that will push us back on the right path or do we need to keep on having more and more fiscal stimulus running more and more debt”
Government's handling of the current crisis, though imperfect, was in some ways better than during the Great Depression, so the emergent neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis represents some progress, even if at best 'three steps forward and two steps back.'
“I think government's hands in some ways you're still better than what happened during the Great Depression... at best you'd have to say three steps forward and two steps back”
Fiscal stimulus worked, as evidenced by Australia's experience: a country with plenty of warning that applied a large stimulus (a cash handout of about 1% of GDP plus a larger February 2009 package) suffered almost no recession, with only one quarter of negative growth and unemployment peaking near 6% before recovering.
“coming from Australia it's sort of its we had plenty of warning of the crisis at a big stimulus and I had to almost almost no recession”
Even after hedonic and household-size adjustments, the proportion of Americans below the absolute (fixed-consumption-basket) poverty line set in 1962 fell dramatically through the 1950s but has not fallen much since, and is higher now than in the recent past.
“the proportion of people below that poverty line hasn't changed very much it was falling pretty dramatically from the fifties... it hasn't fallen very much since then”
Financial markets are like fire: a good servant and a dangerous master, so the right stance toward financial innovation is to require innovators to demonstrate it won't undermine existing regulations.
“markets are are really important to the vital part of the economy but like fire they're a good servant and a dangerous master”
The economics profession was taken by surprise by the current crisis, and those who claimed to foresee it were largely 'broken clocks' who had been predicting catastrophe for a long time, though some had legitimate points about imbalances.
“it's pretty clear that the economics profession was taken by surprise by the current mess... a lot of people were predicting catastrophe for a long time... broken clock that's right twice a day”
A reason Australian banks were less exposed overseas is that Australia is a deficit country whose primary business is borrowing rather than lending, though its gross overseas investment was still substantial.
“Australia's a a deficit country and... one of the reasons we didn't invest very much ever sees is because our primary business is borrowing not not not lending”
Today is October 28th 2010 in Virginia and the guest is John Quiggin of the University of Queensland.
“today is October 28th 2010 and my guest is John quicken of the University of Queensland”