354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality
What this covers
Christian List, a philosopher and political scientist at LMU Munich, joins Sean Carroll to defend compatibilism—the view that free will is real and entirely compatible with physical determinism. The core of List's argument rests on a distinction between levels of description: what appears determined at the microphysical level can be indeterminate at the macroscopic level of human agents. List defines free will through three portable criteria—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control—and argues these capture what matters for responsibility and genuine choice without requiring that fundamental physics be indeterministic.
The conversation spans several territories. List develops the technical foundations of level-relative determinism, showing why the question "is the universe deterministic?" only becomes well-defined once you specify which level of description you mean. He defends non-reductive physicalism against strict reduction, arguing that high-level properties genuinely supervene on physical facts yet resist reduction to lower-level language and explanation. On group agency, List extends his framework to corporations and collective entities, arguing they can be genuine intentional agents with their own beliefs and goals. A distinctive move separates his position from standard compatibilism: he argues that free will and agency fit naturally within third-person science, whereas phenomenal consciousness poses a genuinely first-person problem that physicalism cannot solve. The conversation also considers whether AI systems—should they satisfy his three criteria and the explanatory indispensability test—would qualify as having free will, independent of whether they are conscious.
List argues that free will is real and fully compatible with physical determinism once we recognize that determinism is a level-relative notion: agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control are genuine, ontic features at the macroscopic level of agents, irreducible to the microphysical level.
- The determinism/indeterminism distinction is only well-defined relative to a specified level of description, so micro-level determinism is compatible with macro-level (agential) indeterminism
- High-level properties supervene on but are not explanatorily reducible to low-level ones, granting the agential level genuine autonomy
- Free will is defined by three portable criteria — intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control — that can apply to humans, groups, and potentially AI
Free will is meaningful at the level of human action even if lower physical laws are deterministic or indeterministic.
- Even if there is determinism at the lower physical level, one can still talk fruitfully about free will at higher levels — the level of people and their actions — which is the compatibilist position Carroll endorses.
“Compatibilism is just the idea that even if there's determinism at the lower level, you can still talk very fruitfully and should talk very fruitfully about free will at higher levels, the level of people and their actions.”
- Whether the laws of physics are deterministic or indeterministic has nothing to do with whether free will exists; even under indeterministic laws like quantum mechanics, one could still believe in or reject free will, and the common move of starting from disbelief in free will to assert determinism is backwards.
“it doesn't matter whether the laws of physics are deterministic or indeterministic. That's an interesting question to ask, but has nothing to do with free will.”
Belief or disbelief in free will produces no observable difference in people's actual behavior, responsibility, or blame.
- Carroll has never noticed any difference between people who say they believe in free will and people who say they don't in how they act, behave, or place responsibility or blame on others for making choices.
“I've certainly not noticed any difference between people who say they believe in free will and people who say they don't believe in free will in how they act, in how they behave, in how they treat what it means to make a choice, or to place responsibility or blame on anyone else”