compatibilism
The view that free will is compatible with the laws of physics (and determinism), rather than requiring an exemption from them.
As defined in ms_215
Where it comes up · 38
- 39 - Free Will Revisited8 claims
- 318 - Physics Philosophy4 claims
- 115 - Sam Harris Lawrence Krauss And Matt Dillahunty 14 claims
- AMA | May 20214 claims
- 354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality3 claims
- 360 | Marc Berman on the Science of Touching Grass3 claims
- 10 - Faith Vs. Fact2 claims
- 227 - Knowing The Mind2 claims
and 30 more
Most important claims · 10 of 69Search all claims for “compatibilism” →
- Compatibilism is like saying Atlantis exists because Sicily exists: people are infatuated with a mythical underwater kingdom with advanced technology, and compatibilism points to a real geographical antecedent (Sicily) that conserves much of what people care about, but the underwater-kingdom feature people are actually attached to remains fiction; by purifying free will, compatibilism stops interacting with the subjective piece that motivates the whole discussion.39 - Free Will Revisited
- Free will is best understood through the engineering notion of degrees of freedom and control theory: humans have uncountably many degrees of freedom and, crucially, the competence to control that complexity and be moved by reasons on any topic; free will is the capacity to respond to circumstances with all the degrees of freedom needed to do the right thing, and this has nothing to do with determinism or indeterminism.39 - Free Will Revisited
- The most challenging objection to compatibilism that does not merely misunderstand the argument is the consequence/manipulation-style worry that if all our actions are fully determined by prior states we did not choose, then the kind of freedom compatibilism preserves may not be the morally significant freedom people actually care about.AMA | April 2025
- Free-will debates founder on undefined terms (like the Zen koan about a falling tree making a sound); if free will is defined as the decisions my brain makes at conscious and unconscious levels then I have it (since I am my brain), but if it is defined as libertarian free will above the laws of physics then scientists must deny it—and the very question is suspect because it presupposes a kind of cryptodualism the brain is biased toward.140 | Dean Buonomano on Time, Reality, and the Brain
- There are diplomatic choice points where one can say either 'consciousness exists, it just isn't what you think it is' or 'consciousness doesn't exist' — these look doctrinally opposed but are two ways of dealing with the same issue: if consciousness means a mysterious, magical, ultimately insoluble problem then it doesn't exist, but in a more presentable sense it of course exists; the same dual strategy applies to free will.39 - Free Will Revisited
- The best emergent effective theory we currently have for describing human behavior inevitably involves treating humans as agents who make choices and necessarily includes probabilities, because we lack a deterministic way to predict humans from available information; therefore it is useful to talk about free will at that level—but if a better theory emerged that predicted human behavior from the same data without invoking agency, Carroll would abandon free will entirely.124 - In Search Of Reality
- Free will is just what we call the biology that hasn't been discovered yet; over the last 500 years science has repeatedly shown that behaviors once attributed to choice are actually biological phenomena outside our control, so the space left for free will keeps shrinking and will eventually disappear.134 | Robert Sapolsky on Why We Behave the Way We Do
- Christian List argues that the levels-of-description framework dissolves the incompatibilist threat to free will, allowing determinism to hold at the fundamental physical level while agency remains real and non-determined at a higher level of description.AMA | June 2026
- A Laplace's demon embedded in the universe cannot predict the behavior of an 'anti-predictor' who knows the demon's predictions and deliberately acts to confound them; this feedback between prediction and self-modeling creates 'emergent underdetermination', suggesting genuine unpredictability is a real feature of sufficiently complex self-representing systems rather than mere epistemic limitation, leaving the manifest image with real causal efficacy.AMA | September 2025
- Compatibilists like Dennett don't defend the free will people actually believe in; they redefine free will into something else, analogous to insisting Atlantis is real but is actually just Sicily—answering some claims while ignoring that the original concept (libertarian free will) is incoherent.360 - We Really Don T Have Free Will