group agency
The capacity of organized collective entities (firms, courts, states) to function as genuine intentional agents in their own right, with functional beliefs, desires, and goals.
As defined in 354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality
Where it comes up · 1
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- Attributing functionalist free will to powerful corporate entities is a welcome conclusion because these entities can cause great harm and wield more power than typical individuals, so frameworks for corporate responsibility, liability, and even criminal liability are important — and if free will is a necessary condition for fitness to be held responsible, it is congenial that corporate entities can satisfy it.354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality
- Organized collective entities such as firms, corporations, courts, universities, and states can truly be intentional agents in their own right — possessing functional states qualifying as beliefs, desires, and goals, and systematically interacting with their environment on the basis of those states — a realist position about group agency reflected both in common sense and in the social sciences such as economics' theory of the firm and international relations theory.354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality
- The three free-will criteria — intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control — are portable rather than custom-made for humans, so they can in principle be applied to chimpanzees (which likely qualify), AI systems, and group agents, leading to the conclusion that corporate entities satisfying all three have functionalist free will without thereby being conscious.354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality