What this covers

Johnathan Bi and host Russ Roberts discuss René Girard's mimetic theory—the claim that human desire is fundamentally shaped by imitation of models around us, not by autonomous reason or appetite alone. Bi argues that economics has systematized a fatal blind spot: it models humans as utility maximizers pursuing physical desire for goods and services, but ignores metaphysical desire, the craving for identity, being, and social recognition. This omission, he contends, leaves modern economics unable to explain major patterns of human and geopolitical behavior. The conversation traces how Western thought, from Machiavelli through Hobbes to Smith, progressively stripped the social and spiritual dimensions from human nature, collapsing the ancient tripartite soul into appetite-driven calculation.

The pair examine where Girard's framework diverges from and supplements economic reasoning. They discuss how mimetic desire operates not just in obvious status-seeking—a Michelin restaurant commanding thirty times the price of ramen—but in shaping which goods and identities we find desirable at all. A key distinction emerges: mimetic theory is not crude behavior copying but the internalization of values through models, which explains why negative mimesis—distancing oneself from objects associated with low-status figures—can be as powerful as aspiration. They address tensions within the framework itself, including whether all desire truly contains a metaphysical component, and explore rival solutions: the Buddhist and Girardian call to purge metaphysical desire entirely, the Hegelian strategy of aligning one's circle with one's values, and the challenge Gary Becker faced in trying to mathematize domains—marriage, crime, suicide—that resist utility maximization modeling. Notably, Girard's 2007 prediction of US-China trade conflict at the height of optimism for harmonious economic integration emerges as a case where his emphasis on relative position and mimetic rivalry proved prescient.

Sharpest takeaway

Bi argues that human desire is fundamentally social and imitative (mimetic): beyond physical desire for utility, we have a 'metaphysical desire' for identity and being that is shaped by models around us, and that modern economics' rational utility-maximizing model systematically obscures this 'spirit' dimension of the soul, leading to flawed analysis of human and even geopolitical behavior.

  • Girard distinguishes physical desire (for utility) from metaphysical desire (for identity/being), and the latter is anchored by imitated models, not autonomous reason or intuition.
  • An intellectual lineage from Machiavelli through Hobbes to Smith ejected the Platonic 'spirit' from human nature, reducing people to appetite-serving utility maximizers.
  • As societies grow materially prosperous, more economic behavior is driven by spirit/status than appetite, which mathematical economic modeling cannot capture.

The argument · threads3 threads · 38 claims
0.73

Economics models humans as isolated preference-maximizers, missing metaphysical desires for social acceptance and identity within communities.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Modern economics struggles with social interaction because it models human beings as autonomous and alone, with their own given (exogenous) preferences, spending their lives maximizing their own utility; this captures physical desire but largely omits metaphysical desire--the desire to be perceived a certain way and to secure identity within a social circle.

    “In modern economics, human beings are autonomous and alone. They have their own preferences. These preferences are given from the outside, meaning exogenously in the formal terms. And, I spend my life trying to make myself happy and to rack up utility.”

  • Economics' claim that we are simply self-interested leaves out two things: we have principles and moral values we privilege above our own personal wellbeing, and we want to belong--to be part of something ideally transcendent and glorious, or at least a group that makes us feel like somebody--human impulses largely omitted from economics for methodological reasons.

    “One is I think we have principles. I think we do have moral values and things that we privilege above and beyond our own personal wellbeing. And the second thing is, is that we're self-interested--yes... but we also care--we want to belong.”

  • Since we are prone to being influenced by those around us in what we respect and desire, we should choose carefully who we hang out with, because we will inevitably be shaped by them.

    “since I think we are prone to that, we should choose carefully who we hang out with, because we are going to be--”

0.73

Major life decisions rest on self-conception and social identity, not utility calculation, and transformative choices alter preference functions permanently.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • L.A. Paul's Vampire Problem shows that some choices (becoming a vampire, getting married, having children) are transformative: you cannot know in advance what they will be like, and making the leap changes not your utility but your preference function itself--what makes your heart sing becomes different--which undermines the economist's foundational assumption of fixed preferences satisfied as much as possible, raising the question of what rationality even means.

    “By making the leap, by choosing to become a vampire, by getting married... to make that leap is to say: I'm changing my preference function.”

  • When we make big life decisions--whether to have children, whether and whom to marry--we don't just calculate whether we will be happy; we consider how we will feel about ourselves as human beings, our sense of self and essence, which often trumps narrow day-to-day utilitarian happiness, and these decisions define who we are.

    “when we make big life decisions-- whether to have children, whether to marry, who to marry--we don't just look at whether we're going to be happy or not. We look at how we're going to feel about ourselves as human beings.”

  • The Hegelian solution of choosing higher-order wants (wants about wants) to align your environment with your aspirations is undermined by an infinite regress: it presumes control over your desire to have wants about your wants, and you may simply have fallen in with a group whose approval you already crave, making it very hard to wrench yourself out of your social environment.

    “The problem with that, of course, is it implies that you have control over your desire to have wants about your wants. And I think there's some sort of infinite regress there for Girard”

0.71

Economic incentives remain explanatory across many domains including trade, crime, and political choice, though motivations become radically different at higher economic levels.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Gary Becker took the utility-maximization-under-constraints toolkit and applied it everywhere--marriage, allocation of resources among children, suicide, crime (criminals trade off expected gain from theft against expected loss from punishment)--and though that can be sterile applied mechanically, Becker was a nuanced practitioner; remarkably he cited Adam Smith (specifically The Theory of Moral Sentiments and its concern with opprobrium/approval) as his greatest intellectual influence, which is shocking since no other 20th-century Nobel laureate would name a 1776 economist.

    “Becker took that toolkit and applied it everywhere. He applied it to marriage. He applied it to how many resources you gave to different children. He had an economic theory of suicide.”

  • Voting decisions seemingly irrational on economic grounds, like Brexit, are better understood by assuming voters do understand the economics but care about something more than money--national sovereignty and their identity as citizens--a phenomenon appearing worldwide and disproportionately among poorer, more grassroots supporters rather than only the wealthy, which counters the idea that only top economic echelons are motivated by spirit.

    “I'm going to assume actually that they do know the economics. They just care about something more than just about money.”

  • Roberts disputes Girard's claim that proximity breeds conflict, holding instead that most economists believe trade reduces conflict on average with empirical support; he argues the part most people ignored was national autonomy and pride, and that the history of the West imperializing the East (e.g., the Opium Wars) is probably more important than the kind of mimetic competition Girard describes.

    “So, I don't really--it's hard for me to accept Girard's argument that, because we're closer together, we're going to be more in conflict.”

  • In Smith's view of commercial dealings we look out for ourselves, but if pressed Smith would recognize that sharp dealing or hiding things in a negotiation, once revealed, would cost you not merely future monetary losses but the respect of your friends--a social consequence--so honor in trade is enforced by social cost.

    “if you did that and it became revealed later that you were not honorable and you hid something, you would pay a cost for it... That price would not be monetary... you'd lose the respect of your friend.”

  • Despite its problems with rationality and social motivation, the fundamental idea of economics still applies in many places beyond the street-cart vendor, and understanding those forces is often very helpful; the limitation is that as you rise economically, what motivates you becomes not merely more refined preferences but radically different things you care about.

    “The fundamental idea of economics still applies in lots of places, as you alluded to earlier, not just the person with the street cart. And, understanding those forces, I think, often is--it's very helpful.”