utility
In economics, a measure of wellbeing or satisfaction, classically modeled as a function of consumption of goods.
As defined in et_799
Where it comes up · 16
- Johnathan Bi on Mimesis and René Girard6 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics4 claims
- 220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality3 claims
- Maeve Cohen on Rethinking Economics2 claims
- 337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning2 claims
- 53 | Solo -- On Morality and Rationality2 claims
- Scarcity, Abundance and Bubbles1 claim
- Adam Smith's Warning About Wealth, Fame, and Status (with Ross Levine)1 claim
and 8 more
Most important claims · 10 of 29Search all claims for “utility” →
- Gary Becker took the utility-maximization-under-constraints toolkit and applied it everywhere--marriage, allocation of resources among children, suicide, crime (criminals trade off expected gain from theft against expected loss from punishment)--and though that can be sterile applied mechanically, Becker was a nuanced practitioner; remarkably he cited Adam Smith (specifically The Theory of Moral Sentiments and its concern with opprobrium/approval) as his greatest intellectual influence, which is shocking since no other 20th-century Nobel laureate would name a 1776 economist.Johnathan Bi on Mimesis and René Girard
- If you hold that any human life has positive value, utilitarianism quickly implies the morally right thing is simply to increase the number of people regardless of anything else—Derek Parfit's 'repugnant conclusion'—showing that maximizing an aggregate utility number conflicts with our moral intuitions.53 | Solo -- On Morality and Rationality
- Utilities are typically determined by reverse-engineering them from a person's preferences over many options; for instance, observing many preferences over coin flips between dollar amounts can reveal whether someone's utility function is linear in money.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- The word utility in decision theory means just whatever you care about, so you maximize your own personal utility even if you are perfectly altruistic; an altruist simply has a utility function that assigns higher utility to things good for others, which is distinct from utilitarianism's aggregation across people.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Expected-value reasoning can recommend a 50/50 bet to lose everything versus gain 2x-plus-epsilon, yet viscerally most people would refuse, suggesting that utility does not scale linearly with wealth but is more like a logarithmic function.AMA | September 2024
- Gary Becker's 1965 framework (echoed by Kelvin Lancaster) holds that people do not get direct utility from purchased goods but produce final experiences by combining time with goods (the household as a little factory), yet this fundamental idea has had almost no impact on the teaching or conception of economics, largely because until recent time-use data there was insufficient data to test it.Daniel Hamermesh on Spending Time
- What makes Girard's view challenging for economics is that it isn't merely that there is a separate goods-and-services utility function plus a being utility function that can be added together and modeled mathematically; rather the social/being function fundamentally penetrates into how we value goods and services, as shown by crypto going from near zero to $20,000, which cannot be modeled quantitatively but must be investigated qualitatively.Johnathan Bi on Mimesis and René Girard
- Decision theory is about rationality in what you choose or prefer under risk or uncertainty, and it requires at least two ingredients: probabilities, which measure how likely you think things are to happen, and utilities, which measure how much you like various outcomes.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Von Neumann and Morgenstern's insight was to measure how much more someone prefers one thing over another by asking which lottery between a most-preferred and least-preferred option they treat as equivalent to a middle option, revealing how much risk of the disliked outcome they will accept to get the liked one.337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning
- When systematizing moral preferences into a coherent theory, there is a danger of over-simplifying—as with naive utilitarianism that would endorse secretly killing one healthy person to harvest organs for twenty—and the right response is usually not to accept the repugnant conclusion but to recognize the systematization was too crude; moral systems should be logical but may legitimately remain fuzzy, balancing aggregate welfare against individual rights as the trolley problem illustrates.100 | Solo | Life and Its Meaning