What this covers

This is a university lecture, with occasional student questions, on David Hume's writing about religion and morals. The lecturer pairs Hume's two main works on religion as complements. The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion treats the logic of belief, and the Natural History of Religion treats its psychology. The pairing mirrors Hume's split between abstruse philosophy, which seeks proof, and practical philosophy, which asks what people actually live by. The lecture then turns to ethics, where Hume is set against John Locke, who treated moral knowledge as demonstrative like mathematics, and against Thomas Hobbes, who saw humans as selfish "ravenous beasts."

The religion half covers the claim that the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments do not deliver their conclusions, now the mainstream view. It also covers Hume's concession in the Dialogues' final section that these arguments still carry weight, because nature's order produces a psychological impression that evokes belief. One exchange has a character object that we have no impressions of the divine, and Hume replies that the universe is a unique building never seen before. The lecture also argues that purely rational monotheism lacks imaginative force and tends to slide toward polytheism. Hegel's dialectical reading of religion's history serves as a contrast.

The ethics half works through Hume's technical vocabulary, in which feeling, passion, and moral sense all name impressions of reflection). It explains how benevolence grows out of sympathy, and why Hume is called both an ethical subjectivist and a naturalist. Reason is limited to defining terms and describing consequences, with utility as the common ground between reason and sentiment. Justice rests on three laws: stable possession, transfer by consent, and promise-keeping. The lecture also covers Hume's rejection of a Lockean state of nature. It closes with the Scottish realist reply of Thomas Reid and its reach into American evangelical apologetics through Charles Hodge.

Sharpest takeaway

Hume argues that both religious and moral belief arise primarily from psychological sentiment and emotional impression rather than logical reason, though reason plays a supporting role in clarifying concepts and understanding consequences.

  • Religious belief stems from natural psychological impressions of nature's order and historical events, not from the logical validity of theological arguments which Hume critiques as inconclusive
  • Moral judgment derives from natural human benevolence and sympathy—impressions of reflection—rather than from rational demonstration, though reason assists by explaining circumstances and consequences
  • Hume consistently privileges the psychological and emotional foundations of belief across domains while treating logical arguments as secondary supports to what sentiment already produces

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0.86

Benevolence develops from sympathy, which involves feeling pleasure with another or pain with another, grounded in the association principle of resemblance—when you recognize similarities between your experience and another's, you form complex ideas involving both, and thereby feel not just for yourself but for the other.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“how does it develop and he's doing dealing with sort of a developmental moral psychology well it develops out of a feeling of simple thing develops out of feeling of sympathic sympathy which involves as I feel sympathy either pleasure for you or pain with you oh I feel for you we say I feel for you yes so that there is yourself interests involved there in the pain or pleasure that I feel but why would I feel sympathy I feel sympathy because reason tells me of factual similarities between you and me your experience and mine and remember one of the principles of Association resemblance resemblance so when there are resemblances between your experience in mine the complex ideas that develop in my mind involve both of us yes and because they involved both of us I feel not just for me but for you and there is a natural benevolence in all human beings”

0.75

Although the logical arguments for God's existence are not demonstrative, Hume acknowledges in the final section of the Dialogues that the arguments do have considerable weight, and he appears to find Clinton's position most persuasive because the order, predictability, and structure of nature produces a psychological impression that evokes belief even absent logical proof.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“Hume himself in the last section of the dialogues admits that yes they do have considerable weight and he seems to think that Clinton's position is the one he's most inclined to agree with because of the the kind of impression and impression is the word in Humes technical sense of it because of the impression that the ordinance of nature predictability and so forth has honest”

0.75

The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion deals with the logic of belief while the Natural History of Religion deals with the psychology of belief, and Hume intends these two works to be complementary, corresponding to his distinction in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding between abstruse philosophy (logical proof) and practical philosophy (what people actually live by).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“the dialogues are concerned then with the logic of belief but the natural history of religion is concerned with the psychology of belief and if you like you can see the relationship between those two as established in the first section of the inquiry concerning human and standing where he distinguishes between abstruse philosophy with its attempt at logical proofs and practical philosophy the sort of thing called things people live by”

0.74

Hume's critique of theistic arguments spurred the agenda in modern philosophy of religion, including the problem of evil, the relationship between reason and emotion in religion, the evidential value of religious experience, and the relationship between religion and morality.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“in the history of thought of the of religion has been working with for the last 200 years namely the concern to reconstruct theistic arguments that are indeed valid the attempt to reconstruct theistic arguments discussion as to what sort of a God does natural theology point towards the problem of evil much more than previously because one of Humes objections to the teleological argument arguing from the ordered purposefulness of nature is that evil represents distally ologist lack of order or at least like a purpose discernible purpose and so the problem of evil came increasingly into focus the relationship between reason and emotion in religion obviously a crucial question and that includes the question of the evidential value of religious experience”

0.73

Hume rejects natural law ethics and Locke's claim that property rights exist prior to civil society, arguing that the idea of a state of nature is a myth and fiction that is both historically false and logically incoherent, because property rights are necessarily products of organized society rather than natural facts.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“Hume disagrees he rejects natural law ethics he says that that idea of the state of nature is a is a myth a fiction not only does it historically not exist but you can't even imagine it the way Hume talk not talks about it it's so involved with logical inconsistency like on the notion of a right to property when property is a product of organized society rather than anything else”

0.73

Robert Flint's 19th-century book Theism was widely influential and influential theologian Charles Hodge at Princeton Seminary adopted the Scottish realist philosophical framework, making them more positive about theistic arguments than philosophers working within Locke and Hume's representationalist theory of ideas, and this Scottish realist tradition shaped American evangelical apologetics oriented toward theistic arguments.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“the Princeton theologian Charles Hodge who systematic theology is still studied from all about the 1860s the philosophical framework he's working with the Scottish realism yes he and so as you would expect for a Scottish realest realest he's much more positive about the the theistic arguments than somebody with John Locke's theory of David Humes theory of ideas they think they have certainties two starters so it varies with that tradition and I think the that it's the Scottish realist tradition represented perhaps by Charles Hodge but others who came to America which shaped shaped the American evangelical apologetic that is oriented towards theistic arguments for the existence of God”

0.73

In Hume's technical vocabulary, 'feeling,' 'passion,' 'sentiment,' and 'moral sense' all refer to impressions of reflection—secondary-order impressions arising from reflection on sense impressions and ideas, not to purely emotional responses.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“when he says feeling or passion or sentiment or says that we seem to have a kind of moral sense it's the vocabulary he's using what is referring to is impressions related to reflection now you remember his theory of impressions that all ideas are really arising as copies or imaginative productions suggested by original impressions sense impressions okay so that these ideas which are copies or which are result of memory perhaps imagination okay these are known by reflection on their own mental states so I may be reflecting indirectly on my impressions and these ideas themselves leave impressions which give rise to further ideas”

0.73

Ethical subjectivism means that when we judge something wrong, we are expressing our own subjective feeling or sentiment about it, not reporting an objective fact—when I say 'it's terrible that you suffered,' I am really saying 'I suffer when I think of your suffering,' not that some objective wrongness inheres in your suffering.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“to this case you see we're out of benevolence I feel with you and I say that's too bad what you had to go through what I'm really doing is saying I'm suffering when I think of what you're going through I'm not saying that it's wrong that you have to go through it I'm saying it's painful to you and it's painful to me so wrongness and rightness just have to do with the subjective feelings of those who experience it talk about it”

0.69

Hume argues against Hobbes's claim that humans are naturally egoistic and selfish 'ravenous beasts,' contending instead that there is a natural benevolence and altruism present in all human beings, though it varies in degree, and this natural benevolence is the foundation for moral sentiment and ethical obligation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“Hobbs had said we're not we're all like ravenous beasts and Hume argues against egoism Hobbs have been accused of a radical egoism and in Humes day the term hob ism there was an epithet of disdain for a view that really I don't think Hobbs held that there is not a shred of friendliness or anything else in a human being naturally yes a well Hume argues against that he's arguing that there is a natural benevolence in all human beings a natural altruism in all human beings how in varying degrees he's not saying how much it varies in degree greatly but there is some natural benevolence there sort of by Nature”

0.69

The ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments for God's existence do not logically produce their conclusions; the premises do not sufficiently or conclusively demonstrate the existence of a first cause, rational designer, or supremely good being, and this has been the mainstream position in philosophy of religion since Hume.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“the objections is that the arguments don't work the premises don't logically produce the conclusions and from Hughes day until this I think it's fair to say that there is been mainstream in philosophy of religion which is agreed with that assertion that the arguments are not sufficiently complete conclusive clear enough to prove the existence of a first cause a rational designer supremely good and so forth”

0.69

The three main laws of nature in Hume's ethics are: (1) stability of possession—without security of property there would be constant war of all against all; (2) transfer by consent—without this there would be no commerce; and (3) keeping of promises—without this there would be no alliances or treaties, and these laws apply for reasons of utility both between individuals and between nations.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“the laws about justice develop and he even talks about the laws of the nations which is the phrase used in natural law theory from the Romans and Aquinas onwards laws of nations are laws pertaining in all nations well so did these three that he spells out because without the security of possession there would be constant war of all against all without transferring by consent there would be no commerce and without keeping of promises there would be no alliances or treaties so these are laws that apply for utilities sake between the nations as well as between individuals”

0.66

Sentiments can be calm (like satisfaction with beauty) or violent (like pride, love, or jealousy)—violent not meaning they harm others but that they are strong and forceful rather than steady and subdued—and moral judgments depend on both calm and violent sentiments.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“sentiments can be calm well they can be violent and he develops that distinction in book two of the treatise which is entirely on the passions passions can become or they can be violent so that we have calm feelings about beauty but on the other hand there are violent sentiments violent passions like love patron proud pride and jealousy violent not in the sense that they are hurting somebody necessarily but in the sense that they're strong forceful rather than the calm steady satisfaction of mutti”

0.66

Hume's ethical theory is labeled both ethical subjectivism (moral qualities are not objective but expressions of subjective feeling) and ethical naturalism (morality is grounded in nature, specifically in our emotional psychology and natural development).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“this then is the is the essence of his position his is to two ways in which this theory is labeled this is an ethical subjectivism and it's an ethical naturalism now let me explain those terms the current to this day ethical subjectivism is the view that there is there are no objective moral qualities there are no objective truths of an ethical sort about objective states of affairs but rather when I say something is wrong something's good I'm talking about my own feelings my own sentiments”

0.65

Feelings are not true or false (only propositions and judgments can be true or false), so feelings make no moral judgments and there are no objective moral judgments, though there are moral sentiments that give rise to utilitarian statements and action.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“in as much as responses of feeling and not judgments feelings are not true or false only propositions judgments are true or false in as much as feelings are not true or false feelings make no moral judgments there are no moral judgments you see now there are moral sentiments there are moral feelings that give rise to utilitarian statements”

0.65

The common ground between reason and sentiment in ethics is utility: reason describes consequences and appeals to utility, while sentiment is based on benevolence (wishing what is good for others) which naturally motivates concern for utility and the common good.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“I said that the common ground is utility and you can see how reason hitches on the utility how the sentiment hit your ID on utility well you see utility they consequences that are for the common good of everybody utility is based on the feeling of benevolence benevolence is wishing wanting willing what is good for others”

0.61

Scottish realists like Thomas Reid argue that primary and secondary qualities are both objective, that aesthetic and moral values are both objective, and that moral belief represents a rational intuition rather than a merely psychological response, tracing the subjective drift in philosophy to the corrupting influence of the theory of ideas.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“the Scottish realists hold that primary qualities and secondary qualities are both objective that aesthetic and moral values are both objective that belief is a rational intuition not just a psychological response and so the issue is pretty well defined in that way and Hume is trying to formulate his view now Hume is a man of moderation he refuses to buy the idea that reason is the basis of morals he refuses to buy the idea that sentiment or feeling alone is the basis of morals”

0.61

Hegel, unlike the empiricist Hume, sees a historical dialectic at work in the history of religion with polytheism as thesis, pantheism as antithesis, and trinitarianism as synthesis—the highest form of truth.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“when you get to Hegel who suddenly no empiricist like the hume his agenda is vastly different than Hills Hegel sees a historical dialectic at work in the history of religion thesis antithesis synthesis where the thesis is pen thesis is polytheism the antithesis is pantheism the synthesis which is the highest form of truth is trinitarianism”

0.61

For Hume, reason's role in ethics is limited to two functions: providing definitions of moral terms and relations of ideas (like defining justice, comparing benevolence and self-interest), and describing factual circumstances and consequences of actions, but reason cannot approve or disapprove actions, cannot justify appeals to utility or consequences, and cannot motivate action.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“if reason has a role in relationship to ethics for human what is its role well remember that reason for Hume can produce two kinds of judgments and only two judgments about the relations of ideas the judgments about matters of fact so the question about the role of reason is what knowledge do we have related to ethics of relations of ideas that is a fact sounds simple well relations of ideas yes definitions of moral terms definitions of moral terms that is to say if we say justice is such-and-such definition there's a relation of ideas subject and predicate are agreeing in the definition so we can define moral terms we can talk for instance about the relationship of different moral concepts the relationship for instance between benevolence and self-interest... second thing has to do with matters of fact reason can describe the circumstances in which we have to act could provide us with factual knowledge about situations that we face with factual understanding of the possible consequences of actions”

0.61

In Hume's Dialogues, when a character argues that we cannot infer particulars about God because we have no impressions of the divine and are transferring earthly knowledge to an unknown medium, Hume replies that the universe itself is a unique creation or building never before witnessed, and this very uniqueness may warrant inference to a special creator.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“his friend answered yeah but the reason can do though god is because we're dealing with two different mediums here we're dealing with we're transferring our earthly knowledge was something we have no idea about we don't have any impressions to relate to God and so in that sense by him giving that friends answer or whether it's his or not I don't know it seems that he said that you couldn't infer any particulars about God but but Humes answer to that that friend latest reply was I though you may not be granted you can infer the particulars that way but because this is a unique creation or a unique unique building or whatever this is something that we've never seen before and have no explanation for we can for at least a unique and special create”

0.59

Justice is a utilitarian notion defined as giving each person what is due, and moral obligations of justice arise from the utility of stable property, fair exchange, and promise-keeping rather than from objective moral facts or rational principles.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“justice is a utilitarian notion justice is simply the utility of giving to week each what's his due”

0.59

Shaftesbury and Hutcheson argue that conscience and moral sense are more akin to aesthetic feeling and taste than to mathematical or demonstrative reasoning, making moral judgment a matter of taste where disagreements cannot be rationally settled, and they argue that aesthetic judgment, like moral judgment, is subjective rather than rationally justified.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“there is there are those among the moral saints philosophers like the famous Earl of Shaftesbury who had been Locke's patron and Francis Hutcheson also incidentally very influential in early American philosophy Shaftesbury and Hutchison who maintained that conscience our moral sense is more akin to aesthetic feeling than it is to mathematics or demonstrative reasoning that it's more a matter of moral taste sort of making rational judgments that you can no more argue about the rightness or wrongness of something then that you can argue as to whether a certain piece of music is beautiful with somebody who doesn't have a developed taste for it sentiment feeling taste”

0.56

Religious belief arises from psychological factors—historical events and experiences that arouse emotions and impressions, generating ideas about causation—rather than from logical demonstration or theological argument.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“religious belief is produced by things that happen in human experience historically and in every body's experience that arouse emotions impressions that give rise to ideas about the cause of what's happening”

0.55

For Locke, moral knowledge is demonstrative knowledge like mathematics—claims about property rights and justice can be evaluated by comparing ideas and finding agreement or disagreement between them, making morality a matter of rational relations of ideas rather than sentiment or emotion.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“John Locke had said moral knowledge is to monster ative knowledge just like mathematics yes knowledge has to do with the agreement and disagreement of ideas so if you have the idea of the right to property which according to Locke is a natural right it's not an artificial construct it's a natural right and if you have the idea of theft and then simply by comparing those two ideas you find that there is disagreement between them and you know that theft is therefore in violation of the right to product and so moral knowledge is simply relations of ideas knowledge demonstrative knowledge according to John Locke”

0.52

Monotheism develops when the rational and contemplative mind reflects on the diversity of gods and recognizes certain unresolved questions about nature's ordered unity, leading to the conception of a single being behind this unified order, following the same rational path the pre-Socratics pursued in metaphysics when choosing between the one and the many.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“lot of theism only develops however when the the rational the contemplative comes into play and reflecting on many gods and so forth seems to give rise to some unanswered questions possible problems because contemplatively we recognize that nature has something of an ordered unity about it contemplatively we recognize this and so we we come to think of one being behind the ordered unity you know that's the sort of line of thought the pre-socratics went through in metaphysics why is the one ultimate rather than many”

0.52

Polytheism develops naturally from human psychology because human beings have multiple distinct emotional concerns and needs (food, security, peace), which generate a variety of emotional impressions linked to different aspects of nature, leading naturally to belief in multiple gods corresponding to these different domains of experience.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“he has the the view that monotheism developed historically out of an earlier polytheism belief in one God developed out of a prior belief in many gods and that I think because he finds polytheism easier to explain in terms of some natural psychological development because after all as human beings we have many different concerns common to all of our lives we need to eat food we need some sort of security piece so forth so that we have a variety of emotions dimensions areas of emotional life and there are aspects of our experience within the world of nature which are likely therefore to leave impressions emotional impressions impressions to give rise to the notion of a are the cause of being who is doing this and so variety of such concerns such impressions a variety of gods polytheism is a natural psychological development”

0.52

Monotheism, conceived as a purely rational and speculative notion of natural religion, lacks the imaginative and emotional power to affect the human imagination and produce the impressions and feelings necessary for sustained religious belief, so it tends historically to give way to some form of polytheism.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“monotheism he feels as simply rational conception a speculative notion of natural religion resulting from natural theology monotheism in that sense isn't going to affect the imagination and produce those impressions feelings and consequently monotheism is likely to give way to some kind of a policy ism”

0.52

Hume's laws of nature are not metaphysical principles like Aristotle's or innate principles like Platonism, but rather artificial constructs that arise naturally through the course of human social development due to human psychological nature, and they are universal across all human societies because the psychological process of development is universal.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics [TyG2NYZnzW0]

“they're not laws of nature in some metaphysical sense like Aristotle or innate as in the Platonists they're not laws of nature in the sense of being there already when we come into the world he's very plain that these laws of nature are artifacts but they are laws of nature in the sense that they arise naturally in the course of nature because of the nature of our psychological development in relationship to other people so he has an ethic based on a natural developmental psychology the nature of psychological development the nature of emotional development is what gives rise to ethics and he's very quick to say that this is universally the same for all human beings this process of development because of the way in which God made us to function now whether he says God with tongue-in-cheek or because he really believes it of course is another question but at least he's saying if there's a theistic basis in your thinking then all right but the immediate basis is the universality of the psychological process so he's not an ethical relativist”

0.37

History as a science begins to develop around 1800, and Hume himself wrote a History of England using historical methods, making him one of the first great historical thinkers.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“historical method as a science begins to develop around 1800 in fact Hume himself wrote a history of England which is said to involve historical methods by virtue of which Hume might be called one of the first great historical thinkers the beginnings of history as a science”

0.26

A student questions whether Hume treats trinitarianism as a form of polytheism, suggesting that belief in three persons might exemplify the polytheistic tendency Hume describes.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Unknown Student

“yes to trinitarianism as a form of polytheism”

0.24

Mark Knoll, in the history department, has published extensive research on the influence of Scottish realism on American evangelicalism.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“mark Knoll in the history department has done all sorts of historical research and publishing about the influence of Scottish realism on American evangelicalism essays galore not sure if he has a book on the subject the Eason he's got parts of books on subject so if you do work with mark Noll okay you'll get into something”

0.24

Wheaton College president Joel of Abuzz, who served in the 1930s and early 1940s, was very much influenced by Scottish realism and the thought of Charles Hodge.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“the Whedon college president jail of abuzz well who was president Mitsy in the 30s early 40s was very much the Scottish realist very much the Charles Hodge sort of man very much so”

0.22

The speaker studied apologetics under Oliver Boswell's student while an undergraduate at the institution (Wheaton College), receiving introduction to Scottish realist apologetics, from which the speaker has 'considerably strayed' in subsequent philosophical development.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Philosophical Lecturer)

“when I was an undergraduate here I studied with a man who had been a student of Oliver Boswell's after Boswell left here and taught in seminar so that my introduction to apologetics in college was the Scottish real estate from which I have considerably strayed”