state capacity
The ability of a state to administer, tax, enforce rules, and project power over its territory and population.
As defined in Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama
Other definitions
The ability of a government to exercise authority, implement decisions, and maintain order within its territory, as distinguished from mere formal existence of a state.
Trump, US decline, and global chaos - Robert D Kaplan interview | US politics | The New StatesmanThe ability of a government to implement its policies and enforce control over its territory, including policing and reaching rural areas.
Conversations with Tyler - Richard Hanania
Where it comes up · 21
- Three Visions of Where Democrats Went Wrong | The Ezra Klein Show7 claims
- Melissa Dell6 claims
- Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama5 claims
- Chris Blattman4 claims
- Daron Acemoglu4 claims
- Ezra Klein on the Abundance Agenda | Conversations with Tyler4 claims
- Jennifer Pahlka3 claims
- Conversations with Tyler - Richard Hanania3 claims
and 13 more
Most important claims · 10 of 53Search all claims for “state capacity” →
- Counterintuitively, situations with less money and fewer people often deliver services better; California, despite being tech-forward and well-funded, had the second-lowest SNAP participation rate in the country because abundant money led it to over-spec the enrollment system, gather too many requirements, hire expensive vendors, and produce a 212-question form that timed out before applicants could finish — whereas Maine spent orders of magnitude less and enrolled far more.Jennifer Pahlka
- Premature deindustrialization in Africa is not first-order driven by automation or technological change; the first-order explanation is a peculiar set of circumstances making East and Southeast Asia hypercompetitive in manufacturing, drawing industry there from places like Mexican maquiladoras, and Africa will industrialize little until its state development catches up and Chinese real wages rise—just as most of a subdivided Canada would look prematurely deindustrialized like Newfoundland.Chris Blattman
- If forced to pick one variable in 1800 to bet on where development would later occur, Blattman would choose historical levels of state capacity, because it is the most apparent cross-country correlation in his experience and serves as a proxy for general social organization—the ability to solve collective action problems and make collective decisions without devolving into conflict—functioning like a general-purpose technology.Chris Blattman
- A weak central state with federalism and fragmentation (as in Poland, where powerful nobles could protect sympathetic Protestants) is a reliable predictor of the absence of persecution, but it is NOT a strong predictor of producing a liberal state or enduring religious freedom later; durable religious pluralism instead arises after a tipping point where conformity becomes too costly to restore, launching a 150-200 year process of building a pluralist society.Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama
- The relevant variable for tolerance is not raw state strength but commitment to liberal values: a state with sufficient coercive power relative to a minority (like Tokugawa Japan, which sealed off the country to suppress Christianity despite controlling only part of its territory) can thoroughly persecute, while very weak states (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) get captured by nobles and privatized, producing feudal arrangements hostile to both markets and freedom—so liberalism requires a state strong enough but committed to liberal values.Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama
- We should resist treating the President as a god-king in charge of all activity and outcomes; public health relies on competent state capacity—federal and local bureaucracy—that no president can personally direct, so the President's real job is to build a competent bureaucracy that learns from its failures before the next pandemic, and many other countries failed just as much as the U.S.John Cochrane on the Pandemic
- Contrary to state-capacity theories that prize centralization for achieving good economic outcomes, the historical evidence shows local government was far more effective than central government at contagion control, because of superior local knowledge of cost-benefit tradeoffs, neighborly monitoring, and locally targeted welfare.Sheilagh Ogilvie
- The crucial missing link for health care in poor countries is not money but state capacity—a government capable of organizing services and regulating the private sector—because putting more money into the existing systems does not make things better; India's infant mortality is now lower than Edinburgh's was in 1945 despite India being far poorer.Angus Deaton on Health, Wealth, and Poverty
- Giving large sums directly to poor-country governments is harmful because when all government revenue comes from external donors, the social contract breaks: there is no need to tax citizens and provide services in return, so governments have no incentive to deliver health care or education and effectively use their populations as hostages to extract money from rich countries.Angus Deaton on Health, Wealth, and Poverty
- East Asia's exceptional feature is not liberty or bottom-up politics but traditions of state capacity dating to the Qin dynasty, with Confucian-influenced meritocratic bureaucracy spreading from China to Korea and Vietnam; this is not a fixed cultural or genetic trait but a set of norms and institutions that recreate themselves, shaped by political change such as the Warring States period.Daron Acemoglu