What this covers

Chris Blattman presents a sustained argument about the deep roots of violence and poverty, drawing on fieldwork across Uganda, Ethiopia, Colombia, and other settings. The conversation weaves together economics, psychology, and history to challenge several fashionable development narratives. His core claim rests on two pillars: War As Bargaining Failure, where conflict arises from uncertainty and commitment problems between parties who have every rational incentive to negotiate instead, and the overwhelming importance of State Capacity As General-Purpose Technology as the single strongest predictor of where countries prosper over the long term.

The discussion covers a wide empirical range. Cash transfers emerge as temporary poverty accelerators rather than permanent solutions—a 10-year Uganda study shows recipients converge with non-recipients once the latter accumulate capital slowly. Blattman reconsiders sweatshop work in Ethiopia not as a stepping stone but as a Multiple Equilibria phenomenon: factory jobs serve as a social safety net, with workers drifting back once better informal opportunities appear. On premature deindustrialization in Africa, he argues that automation and technology play minor roles; East Asia's hypercompetitiveness and state-capacity gaps better explain why the continent industrializes slowly. He also challenges charter cities on risk grounds and questions the misdrawn-borders thesis by noting how quickly new national identities solidify. Throughout, Blattman sets conflict and violence as the puzzle to explain—since incentives generally favor bargaining over fighting—and traces waves of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa to shocks and Equilibrium Search after decolonization rather than to primordial causes.

Sharpest takeaway

Blattman argues that violence and underdevelopment are best understood through a bargaining-plus-psychology framework and durable state capacity, and that fashionable development interventions (cash transfers, charter cities, premature-deindustrialization fears) are often overrated relative to deeper structural and institutional factors.

  • Cash transfers accelerate poverty exit temporarily but converge with non-recipients over a decade, so they are not a permanent solution.
  • Conflict is best explained by a game-theoretic bargaining model (uncertainty, commitment problems) melded with human emotion and systematic mistakes.
  • Historical state capacity is the single best predictor of long-run development, functioning as a general-purpose technology.

The argument · threads11 threads · 42 claims
0.81

War results from bargaining breakdown caused by uncertainty, commitment problems, and power shifts, not from resource scarcity or emotional irrationality alone.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The Peloponnesian War illustrates the bargaining commitment problem: massive power shifts can lead to war because it becomes difficult for the temporarily powerful party to credibly be paid off not to exercise its advantage through a first strike to eliminate the rising rival.

    “massive power shifts can lead to war, partly because it becomes difficult for the temporarily powerful person to be paid off not to exercise their advantage and, through a first strike, eliminate”

  • Economic risk factors like droughts or commodity price collapses make it cheaper and easier to mobilize fighters, but they do not explain why war breaks out, because changes in the size of the contested pie do not by themselves change the incentives to fight over it versus bargain.

    “it’s much easier to tempt people away from whatever middling economic opportunity they had to join a rebellion. And you can get more of them for your money”

  • The incentives in human affairs are generally aligned for peace, so war is the puzzle to be explained rather than peace; observed waves of violence are reactions to political and economic shocks and the search for a new equilibrium.

    “I usually think of the incentives as aligned for peace, so war is the puzzle to be explained”

  • While individual fight-or-flight reactions are distinct, violence at the level of small groups, large groups, and nations can be unified by a single framework: a game-theoretic view of bargaining where conflict arises from uncertainty and commitment problems, melded with psychological factors like emotions, self-versus-social interest, and systematic mistakes—and this framework explains an astonishing and growing range of phenomena.

    “This combination of this more game theoretic view of bargaining, where we see conflict as arising from uncertainty, commitment problems, and melded with a set of more psychological issues around emotions, levels of self versus more social interest, and the mistakes people systematically make. That framework, for me, explains an astonishing amount of violence.”

  • Because wars are long and costly, parties have strong incentives to find bargains, which is why stable regimes form broad coalition governments that include and pay off many ethnic groups; when the pie shrinks it initiates a risky new round of bargaining that can break down into conflict.

    “Very stable regimes bring together lots of people and pay them off. All of that bribery is a way to keep a peaceful bargain.”

  • As societies become much richer, the rising cost of war strengthens the incentive not to fight, making war much less likely, but also meaning that when war does happen it is far more catastrophic—a pattern seen over the past century—so violence is something strenuously avoided rather than an equilibrium that simply occurs.

    “The richer we are... and the more costly war is... It makes it much less likely. If war happens, then it’s going to be that much more catastrophic”

0.63

Micro-level violence stems from individual threat perception and instinctive reactions, while macro violence follows from institutional and equilibrium dynamics.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Micro-level violence is best understood as individual, instinctive fight-or-flight reactions to threat, and a nonhostile crowd might reduce that sense of personal danger, though the effect depends on whether the individual perceives the crowd as in-group, out-group, or part of the threat.

    “What little I’ve read thinks of those reactions as very individual, instinctive reactions to a threat. They invoke the fight-or-flight mechanism.”

  • The roughly 20-fold fall in New York City murder rates is best explained by stories like getting guns off the street, more police per capita, and many eyes on the street—none of which help explain the civil war violence, child soldier recruitment, and conflict that Blattman studies, so he treats it as a fully separate phenomenon.

    “None of that really helps me understand civil war violence or recruitment of child soldiers or any of the things that I’ve worked on in the past.”

  • Exposure to a violent act can make people more cooperative—possibly via psychological reevaluation or cooperative in-group interactions—but the evidence suggests this enhanced pro-sociality applies mainly to one's in-group while potentially reducing cooperation with out-groups, so there is no clear reversion to a peaceful mean at larger political scales requiring inter-group interaction.

    “you’re much more cooperative with your in group, people who are like you... the little we have suggests that you’re potentially less cooperative with your out group”

  • Predatory urban violence spreads via a multiple-equilibria mechanism: once a small group proves that a violent criminal vocation can be done and made profitable in a city (as in Nairobi versus Kampala), others copy and professionalize it until it becomes entrenched as a thing people do.

    “once you had people prove that it could be done and it could be profitable, then you had this relatively small group who professionalize it and do it. And now it becomes a thing, and it’s entrenched. It’s sort of a multiple equilibria story.”

  • The Moscona-Nunn-Robinson claim that segmentary lineages (many extended relations needing defense) raise conflict risk does not resonate with Blattman's field experience, and he would have predicted the opposite—that more horizontal ties to society cause people to internalize more of the costs of conflict and thus reduce it.

    “it doesn’t seem to be a first- or even second-order determinant of what’s going on when I think about the conflicts I know”

0.58

Political instability and failed institutional experiments during decolonization drove African civil wars, which subsided as workable state systems consolidated.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The rise and fall of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 1990 reflects a period of political instability and gradual consolidation following rapid, unexpected decolonization, compounded by failed experiments with economic and political systems, with peace emerging once workable systems were identified.

    “They compare this period in Africa to the late 19th century and a period of war and instability and gradual political consolidation after a period of rapid and unexpected decolonization”

  • Contrary to the misdrawn-borders thesis, many African countries have successfully built strong national identities in a short period—eastern Congolese think of themselves strongly as Congolese—suggesting that borders that were unnatural in 1950 or 1960 are no longer so unnatural, even though misdrawn borders were one source of post-war political instability.

    “a lot of countries have been very successful at building national identities in a short period of time”

  • If forced to pick one variable in 1800 to bet on where development would later occur, Blattman would choose historical levels of state capacity, because it is the most apparent cross-country correlation in his experience and serves as a proxy for general social organization—the ability to solve collective action problems and make collective decisions without devolving into conflict—functioning like a general-purpose technology.

    “if you asked me, like I get to make just one bet, and to go back in 1800... one bet about where you’re going to see development, I’d probably pick historical levels of state capacity”

  • Rwanda and Uganda, built on long-standing coherent historical kingdoms whose borders roughly match modern ones, have reasonably effective states and warrant optimism, but unlike Ethiopia they lack political parties or systems to manage difficult political transitions, so they could fall apart at the next leadership change.

    “they don’t have political parties or political systems to manage these difficult political transitions, so they could fall apart. But if they manage those transitions, I’m very bullish.”

0.58

Cash transfers accelerate poverty exit temporarily but do not permanently solve poverty because recipients and non-recipients converge through gradual capital accumulation.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • For someone without personal connections to deserving recipients, sending unconditional cash transfers to individuals in poor countries is probably the most effective impersonal way we currently have to give aid.

    “as an impersonal way to give effectively, it’s probably the best way we have”

  • Poor people's economic lives are incredibly volatile, marked by a litany of terrible shocks, and convergence between cash recipients and non-recipients occurs because young people with a future need time to slowly accumulate capital and eventually reach similar outcomes.

    “you’ll get this incredible litany of terrible shocks and unexpected events that’s really quite amazing. It’s amazing that anybody succeeds at all”

  • A 10-year follow-up of a Uganda cash transfer RCT found that recipients, who initially saw big income gains, converged with non-recipients who caught up by saving and accumulating slowly, meaning cash transfers are a temporary acceleration of poverty exit rather than a permanent solution to poverty.

    “this means that cash transfers are much more of a temporary acceleration than they are some sort of permanent solution to poverty”

  • Religion as a development force is probably overrated and has no strong predictive or explanatory power for long-run differences in income, with no strong prior on the direction of effect if a region becomes Christian or Muslim.

    “I don’t think of it as having any real strong predictive or explanatory power for long-run differences in income.”

0.58

Historical state capacity predicts long-run development better than any single variable because it reflects ability to solve collective action problems.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Botswana is the most underrated national development story—the growth miracle of the late 20th century—yet the standard pat explanation (idiosyncratically establishing parliamentary government before discovering diamonds, then maintaining good governance) is unpersuasive, and a better account remains to be told.

    “Botswana, in the sense that this is the growth miracle of the late 20th century. There’s a few explanations, but there’s really only a handful of people who’ve paid any attention to what happened there.”

  • At Ethiopia's level of industrialization, the binding constraints on industrial development are not the availability of labor but the availability of management talent and high-quality financial services like banking and accounting needed to buy, split, merge, and grow businesses—so going to Ethiopia as an investment banker or accountant would be a far more effective individual development strategy than sending cash transfers.

    “the availability of management talent, the availability of high-quality financial services... these are binding constraints on industrial development”

  • The Liberia experiment by former American slaves was relatively successful until the mid-1970s but ultimately struggled because it was founded as a very naive development project on a point of the continent with the least central organization or social coherence—unlike places with hundreds of years of civil service and developed social structures.

    “if you had to put your finger on a point on the continent where all of those things were least together, you could do worse than put your finger on Liberia in 1821”

  • Premature deindustrialization in Africa is not first-order driven by automation or technological change; the first-order explanation is a peculiar set of circumstances making East and Southeast Asia hypercompetitive in manufacturing, drawing industry there from places like Mexican maquiladoras, and Africa will industrialize little until its state development catches up and Chinese real wages rise—just as most of a subdivided Canada would look prematurely deindustrialized like Newfoundland.

    “I don’t think the technological change is the first-order thing.”

0.49

Unconditional cash and cognitive therapy can work better than expected when true believers run interventions; testing such counterintuitive programs reveals how violence actually functions.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Helping poor people think through and reevaluate their paths and options is unusually powerful because most people lack a good sense of their opportunities, and reframing those options can dramatically change their returns to investment.

    “reevaluating those opportunities suddenly changes all of their returns to investment. So that kind of advising and mentoring and connection is unusually powerful.”

  • In Liberia, Blattman studied a true believer running what turned out to be cognitive behavioral therapy that attempted to take criminal adults and totally turn their lives around—an intervention most observers, including Blattman, did not expect to work, making it valuable to test.

    “it was somebody doing something that turned out to be cognitive behavior therapy that was trying to take these criminal adults and totally turn their lives around”

  • Blattman's production function is to follow genuine personal interest regardless of others' advice, immerse for months in a place to understand it qualitatively, then study questions where no data exists by creating the data himself—often running an experiment as an excuse to be there to evaluate a true-believer's intervention that, if it works, challenges how we think about violence and development.

    “Most people look for existing data to analyze. I look for data I can create.”

  • The biggest update from studying Ethiopian factory workers (80 percent women) was that their outside options were much higher quality than Blattman expected, contrary to his very low prior opinion of those options, and unlike Mexico the dominant motives were not rural boredom or escape from abuse.

    “The thing that I learned as a result of this was mostly that the options for these young women were much better than I expected.”

  • Contrary to Blattman's initial expectation that sweatshop jobs were like winning the lottery with upward trajectory, Ethiopian factory jobs turned out to be like McDonald's or Walmart jobs functioning as a social safety net—people earned more in their own riskier businesses or temporary wage labor and used factory work as a fallback when those failed, then left after a few months for something better.

    “The factory jobs were their social safety net. They were able to make more money doing their own business or working for a firm... but all of these things were risky and volatile.”

0.44

Institutional design, informal norms, peacekeeping capacity, and spousal intellectual complementarity all shape development and conflict outcomes in measurable ways.

7 pointscentrality 2/5
  • New Zealand's highly centralized political institutions (a near-rubber-stamp upper house and a powerful prime minister) work not because of openness as a check but because of extremely strong informal social norms, with a populace that has shown willingness to wipe out an entire party in one election cycle if it oversteps.

    “It’s the fact that there’re extremely strong informal social norms that govern what the government can and can’t do.”

  • Despite cynicism and scandals like cholera in Haiti and harm to local sex-work trades, UN peacekeeping is overwhelmingly effective in the data because the everyday job of a peacekeeper is precisely to solve the drivers of conflict—creating commitment, reducing uncertainty, and tempering emotions—as illustrated by a Liberian town where a Pakistani battalion ended Christian-Muslim riots within hours.

    “if you look at the data, they’re overwhelmingly effective”

  • Coauthoring with a spouse works well when each is a complete expert in a different domain so they complement rather than compete in the same space, deferring to each other's expertise; being coauthors before spouses serves as a good selection mechanism, whereas two economists might be too close.

    “It’s very useful for that other person to be a complete expert in their domain... So you’re complementing — not competing — in the same space.”

  • The University of Chicago's distinctive advantage is an intellectual atmosphere where people are constantly talking about and pushing each other on ideas—a culture Blattman wrongly assumed existed everywhere but found rare even at Yale and Columbia, surviving in few places beyond Chicago and somewhat at George Mason.

    “it has this intellectual atmosphere of... people are constantly talking about ideas”

  • Fair trade coffee is probably overrated, striking Blattman as more of a marketing device than an effective, large-scale strategy for improving the welfare of people.

    “It strikes me as one of these things that is more of a marketing device than really an effective and large-scale strategy for improving the welfare of people.”

  • Charter cities carry a large risk of becoming the Cabrini-Green housing projects of the 21st century, going awry when high-risk development strategies are imposed on someone else's life; an attractive feature of good development strategies is low downside risk, and a depopulated coastal site near trade networks could be a fair experiment but the actual proposals targeted established settlements rather than building a Singapore in a swamp.

    “there was some risk, maybe a large risk, that these would be the Cabrini-Greens, like the housing projects of the 21st century”

  • Working two years cooking chicken under a drill-sergeant boss demonstrated to Blattman that a lazy teenager could grit his teeth through gruesome, disgusting tasks, either revealing or creating his perseverance.

    “It demonstrated my perseverance to me or created my perseverance. I don’t know which one.”

0.36

Forced recruitment and abduction harm economic outcomes unevenly depending on individuals' alternative labor-market options and prior training trajectories.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Whether conscription or abduction into war helps or harms someone economically depends on their alternative labor-market and training experience; in Uganda women were not adversely affected economically (reflecting how terrible their marriage options were) while men lost time in the civilian labor market gaining useless skills, mirroring findings that Vietnam conscription raised black wages but lowered white wages.

    “it was really down to, what was your alternative labor market and training experience in the absence of this war?”

  • The most harmful experience for an abducted child soldier is the transition from abduction to fighter, during which rebel organizations force recruits to commit heinous acts not only to desensitize them but to convince them their outside option is gone and they can never go home, locking in their commitment to the group.

    “it was to try to convince you that your outside option was really terrible. The idea was to convince you that there’s no way you can go home.”

0.36

Most people show remarkable resilience to trauma, but resilience narratives gloss over real pain and problems not yet visible in available data.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Most people subjected to horrible things are incredibly resilient, a stylized fact Blattman saw firsthand with child soldiers, but we may be too glib about resilience because there is much pain and many problems that don't show up in our data yet turn out to be really important.

    “people are subjected to horrible things, and most people are incredible resilient. This is a big, stylized fact”

  • Captives identifying with captors (Stockholm syndrome) requires deliberate, dedicated effort by the organization; the Lord's Resistance Army succeeded at indoctrination because it had time, many people to experiment on, and worked harder at it, and the process works better with children.

    “this really happens when the organization really, really dedicates itself to trying to do that. It works better with children, too.”

0.36

Urban violence in Latin America and Africa is driven primarily by police scarcity and predatory crime vocationalization, not by cultural or ethnic factors.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • High urban murder rates in Latin America are largely explained by very low police per capita compared to American and Asian cities, with violence concentrated in specific predatory crime against strangers; though Blattman is skeptical of knee-jerk pro-policing arguments, he treats policing as a major first-order factor.

    “Latin American cities have very few police per capita when you compare them to American cities, and certainly if you compare them to Asian cities”

  • A microcosm of the last hundred years of Colombian history is Medellin, where urban elites allowed the migrating peripheral slums to be quasi-governed by violent criminal groups providing order and services, becoming concerned only when violence grew into an existential threat to the cities, at which point they got serious and largely eradicated it.

    “The state essentially decided not to govern. In the absence of any kind of government... those communities started to govern themselves, and often that meant criminal groups.”

0.18

Academic economists overweight rationality while policymakers overweight emotion; neither alone captures how conflict actually works.

1 pointcentrality 2/5
  • Academic economists and political scientists ignore the human, emotional, and erroneous drivers of conflict, while experienced policymakers vastly overestimate those passions, mistakes, and greed; each holds one piece of the puzzle but neither balances reason and emotion correctly.

    “They’re both right, they both have a piece of the puzzle, but they both only have one piece of the puzzle. One’s not looking at it with enough reason, and one is not looking at it with enough emotion.”