What this covers
Sheilagh Ogilvie draws on seven centuries of epidemic history—from the Black Death through modern COVID—to argue that decentralized institutions and functioning markets proved far more effective at managing contagion than state command or religious authority. The conversation centers on how local governments, armed with superior knowledge of their communities and capacity for neighborly monitoring, consistently outperformed distant central authorities in implementing quarantine, sanitation, and targeted welfare. She contrasts this with the failures of religion, which during medieval plagues often encouraged mass gatherings as spiritual remedy, and with instances where entrenched interests—medical guilds allied with churches—actually suppressed life-saving innovations like variolation.
The discussion moves through specific historical cases that reveal how institutional arrangements channeled human behavior and economic outcomes. Variolation, the practice of deliberate infection with mild smallpox to build immunity, originated spontaneously in China by the 1560s but reached Europe only in the 18th century, when Lady Mary Wortley Montagu made it fashionable in England. Enterprising families like The Suttons then built a commercial market around it, making teenage immunization a normal rite of passage. Ogilvie contrasts England's relatively flexible guild system, which permitted occupational mobility, with Continental systems that functioned as cartels, blocking entry for women, Jews, and the poor. The historical evidence consistently shows that institutional substitution—the idea that family systems and cultural practices arise to compensate for missing markets and state functions—better explains economic divergence than cultural essentialism. She argues the same institutional logic that drove pandemic response also shaped long-run growth, with England's 17th-century rise attributable not to unique cultural traits but to a cluster of market-enabling reforms, stronger legal systems, and weakened corporate monopolies.
Ogilvie argues that the historical record of 700 years of epidemics shows local autonomy and well-functioning markets and institutions, not state centralization or religion, were the most effective tools for controlling contagion, and that the same institutional logic explains long-run economic outcomes.
- Local government consistently outperformed central government at contagion control because of superior local information and neighborly monitoring
- Market-based provision (e.g. 18th-century commercial variolation in England) spread effective health interventions faster than state-rationed provision
- Institutions like guilds, religion, and family systems can entrench bad equilibria that block economic growth
Competitive markets for health technologies drive rational adoption when institutional barriers to entry and information are removed.
- Lady Mary Wortley Montagu introduced variolation to England by learning it in Constantinople and having it done to her children, and because she was an aristocrat she made it fashionable, leveraging the fact that women are often family health decision-makers to spread the practice rapidly in England but not on the continent.
“Because she was a member of the aristocracy, she made it the cool thing to do. She was an early 18th-century influencer”
- People historically and today engage in jurisdiction shopping to access banned or rationed medical interventions, exemplified by 18th-century diplomats from countries where variolation was illegal seeking London postings to get their children variolated, paralleling crossing US state lines for early COVID vaccines.
“diplomats from the Netherlands and Spain and France in the 18th century, where at home it was illegal to get variolated. They would make sure that they got a posting to London... They were jurisdiction shopping”
- Eighteenth-century England developed a McDonald's-like franchised market for variolation, with entrepreneurial families such as the Suttons advertising lower-risk and cheaper immunization, making getting variolated a normal rite of passage for teenagers before moving to cities.
“There was this incredible franchising set up in England. It was like a McDonald’s, but to get variolated.”
- Variolation carried about a 1.6 percent death risk versus a 10-20 percent risk of dying from naturally caught smallpox, so on cost-benefit grounds it was rational to do it, and 18th-century doctors and ordinary people explicitly used 'the calculus of capitalism' to make this decision.
“1.6 percent of people who got variolated died of it. On the other hand, the risk of actually catching smallpox and dying of it was something between 10 percent and 20 percent”
- Ordinary people in the 18th century understood the variolation cost-benefit logic so well that getting variolated with one's village friends before moving to a city was a normal teenage rite of passage.
“There was this incredible franchising set up in England. It was like a McDonald’s, but to get variolated.”
- Early modern medical guilds, threatened by a new technology that challenged their business model and fees from treating smallpox, allied with the Catholic Church in France and Spain to lobby the state into making variolation illegal — an 'unholy alliance' between medical associations and religion.
“the medical guilds... did not like the idea of this new thing, this new technology that they had not approved and that was also going to challenge their business model and take away their fees from treating smallpox patients”
- Britain, despite pioneering market-provided variolation in the 18th century, did not allow market provision of COVID vaccination until 2024 and instead rationed it through an age-based government queue, whereas Canada, the US, Germany, and France allowed people to obtain vaccination more freely.
“it was actually not possible to get a COVID vaccination on the market until last year. You had to wait to come up in the queue of the government deciding whether your age group was allowed to be vaccinated.”
Effective epidemic control requires local knowledge and community cooperation, not centralized authority or pure individual choice.
- People spontaneously withdraw from markets during epidemics, but they under-withdraw relative to the social optimum because they do not fully internalize the effect of their actions on others, so coordinated community-level sanitation and distancing improves on purely individual decisions.
“they probably don’t withdraw as much as they would if they were taking into account the effect of their actions on other people”
- Local governments excelled at contagion control through knowing local preferences, harnessing neighborly monitoring and altruism, and running targeted local welfare to support lockdown and quarantine, but they failed at cross-border externalities, so higher-level government was occasionally needed to 'bang local heads together' since no one is safe until all are safe.
“the problem with villages and small towns is that they only care about what’s going on inside the community. Sometimes we know there are cross-border externalities. None of us are safe until we’re all safe.”
- Contrary to state-capacity theories that prize centralization for achieving good economic outcomes, the historical evidence shows local government was far more effective than central government at contagion control, because of superior local knowledge of cost-benefit tradeoffs, neighborly monitoring, and locally targeted welfare.
“certainly the historical evidence suggests that local government was a lot more effective than central government at dealing with contagion control”
- The intense communitarian monitoring Ogilvie observed in 1979 Swabia — collective sidewalk-cleaning duties (Kehrwoche), neighbors watching compliance, and strangers feeling entitled to voice moral judgments — gave her direct insight into how medieval and early modern village social control actually operated.
“I can really understand medieval and early modern village life in a way that I probably wouldn’t have growing up in Western Canada.”
Institutional clusters—strong property rights, weak guilds, lively markets, and capable non-authoritarian local states—explain sustained growth.
- The inherent entrepreneurial nature exists in all cultures, not uniquely in English culture, and was simply 'let loose' in 17th-century England by enabling institutions, implying growth differences stem from institutions rather than innate cultural traits.
“which let the inherent entrepreneurial nature — I think, of all cultures, not just of English culture — loose in the course of the 17th century”
- Sustained English economic growth emerging in the 17th century is best explained not by a single factor but by a cluster of institutional innovations — a livelier market, rising but non-authoritarian local-level state capacity, weakening guilds, and a strong legal system with few bureaucrats — that first appeared in the 16th-century Netherlands.
“It was a cluster of different institutional innovations, if you like, that first the Netherlands and then England enjoyed”
- After about 1670 the Dutch Republic stagnated at a high income level because its domestic institutions ossified — guilds became more restrictive again in the 18th century and the Dutch East India Company gained monopolies dominating business and finance — letting entrenched groups exclude innovation.
“you can observe its internal domestic institutions getting ossified, petrifying in the course of the 18th century.”
Labor scarcity after the Black Death created wage pressure, but redistribution to workers depended on state willingness to suppress demands.
- Although the supply-and-demand logic might predict ambiguous wage effects, the actual balance after the Black Death increased wage pressure (including for women), but whether workers captured those gains depended on whether employers could get the state to suppress wage demands.
“how the society responded to it depended a lot on whether the employers could get the state on their side to help suppress the wage demands”
- The Black Death's effects diverged regionally: in Western Europe labor scarcity led to freer wage bargaining and the end of serfdom, while in Eastern Europe the same labor shortage gave feudal landlords strong incentives to coerce scarce labor, producing the 'second serfdom.'
“the shortage of labor after the Black Death actually created an incentive for the major employers who were the feudal landlords to strengthen their controls, their restrictions over their serfs”
- The narrative that the Black Death had positive long-term effects (rising wages, labor-saving innovation, European growth) is mostly a comforting story; the immediate reality was massive death with beneficial redistributional wage effects only emerging decades later in the late 14th or early 15th century.
“My personal view is that it is mostly a happy story, a takeaway from something that we all intuitively know was terrible.”
Guilds acted as cartels excluding women, minorities, and poor entrants, causing more harm than benefit to economic dynamism.
- English and Dutch guilds ran comparatively good vocational training, and the English system was uniquely flexible because once apprenticed to any London occupation one could practice any other guilded occupation, and girls could sometimes obtain apprenticeships — features absent in most European guild systems.
“once you had been apprenticed to any occupation in London, you could practice any other... This was unique. This was not the way guilds normally were.”
- Guilds fundamentally sought the benefit of existing members, and because restricting entry raises prices they behaved like mini cartels, excluding women, Jews, poor boys, migrants, and people of the wrong skin color (a Spanish cobbler's guild barred boys darker than quince jelly), so the damage they did greatly outweighed any benefits.
“the problem with guilds is that they seek the benefits of their existing members, and restricting entry always enables you to raise prices. It was quite difficult to prevent a guild from behaving like a little mini cartel.”
Economic behavior reflects rational cost-benefit calculation rather than autonomous cultural preferences or unchangeable social traits.
- Patterns of low human capital investment, early universal marriage, and large kinship groups may not stem from family culture as an autonomous force but arise to substitute for absent institutions — pensions, welfare, property-rights protection — so the right policy lever is building markets and effective non-abusive states rather than trying to change culture.
“do people have very early marriage and universal marriage and huge families partly to substitute for the absence of other institutions to get things done?”
- The European marriage pattern (late female marriage, high lifelong celibacy of 10-15 percent, and nuclear family households) cannot have caused economic growth on its own, because it also existed in extremely poor, stagnant serf economies like Bohemia and parts of Scandinavia, where extreme versions were strongly associated with stagnation rather than growth.
“the European marriage pattern also existed in extremely poor, stagnant economies... Extreme versions of the European marriage pattern were strongly associated with economic stagnation.”
Epidemics damaged medieval and early modern economies through combined voluntary withdrawal and deliberate control measures.
- Market withdrawal during plagues could reach 50-90 percent of normal activity, illustrated by merchant use of the postal system in 17th-century Italian cities dropping 90 percent during plagues.
“the merchant use of the postal system in 17th century Italian cities during plagues went down 90 percent compared to what it normally was”
- Historical epidemics damaged economies through two reinforcing channels: voluntary market withdrawal driven by fear, and deliberate contagion-control measures, creating a 'double whammy' effect on economic activity.
“they withdrew from the market voluntarily, as it were. Then on top of that, there were all sorts of measures to try to limit the spread of contagion, and that also, of course, had an impact on the economy. So, it was a double whammy”
- Voluntary market withdrawal during epidemics was higher in the medieval and early modern period than during 20th-century influenza or 21st-century COVID, even though pre-modern people were poorer and lacked savings cushions or state support to absorb the consequences of withdrawing.
“it looks like voluntary market withdrawal was really higher in past epidemics than it was, for instance, during influenza in the early 20th century or COVID in the early 21st”
- The UK's Eat Out to Help Out scheme, which subsidized restaurant dining during the pandemic, was followed by massive increases in COVID infections and deaths in affected areas, as shown by econometric analysis from a Warwick economist.
“immediately after the Eat Out to Help Out initiative was put into place, there were massive increases in COVID infections and deaths in the affected places”
Pre-modern Chinese and Indian economic history remain unexplored research frontiers offering comparative institutional insights.
- Variolation appears to have been a spontaneous invention in multiple societies, with the earliest documents suggesting widespread practice in China by the 1560s, where it was integrated into religion and supported by a dynasty of commercial variolators; Europe only learned of it in the 18th century.
“The first documents we have suggest that it was widely practiced in China in the 1560s... they had commercial variolators. There was a dynasty of commercial variolators operating in China in the 16th century.”
- Among fictional depictions of pandemics, Boccaccio's account most accurately matches the historical sources, particularly the breakdown of family and community as people abandoned relatives and neighbors, in part because he personally lived through the Black Death.
“there were passages in Boccaccio which exactly described what the historical sources were showing”
- Canada works pretty well overall, but its interprovincial trade barriers and various cartels are bad features that could be improved.
“I think the trade barriers between the provinces are a bad thing. I think there are various cartels that aren’t a great thing.”
- English academic culture tolerates eccentric colleagues well, and exposing students to eccentric teachers and modeling that it is okay to be weird is an important part of education.
“teaching the next generation that it’s okay to be weird, and I think England’s still like that.”
- The Greg Clark hypothesis that England has had persistent low social mobility is mostly wrong once cross-country counterfactuals are used: compared to German-speaking central Europe and points east, where legal social status was legally entrenched, England looks like an incredibly mobile society.
“when you compare social mobility in those countries with that in England, England looks like an incredibly mobile society.”
- When moving to a foreign culture, you should have faith that locals have established ways of being comfortable and having fun together, and the sooner you learn and adopt those practices, the happier you'll be fitting in.
“Find out what people do for fun, and then start doing it.”
- Because education is heavily influenced by parents and now matters so much, societies risk producing an oligarchy of very educated people, making low intergenerational mobility a general problem across societies rather than a uniquely English or genetic one.
“especially now that things like education matter so much. Insofar as education is influenced by your parents, you can end up getting an oligarchy of very educated people.”
- Coming from Western Canada with a short history gave Ogilvie an advantage as an economic historian by removing emotional attachment to any particular European nation's past, freeing her from the urge to either criticize or rehabilitate, and inspiring curiosity about places with deep histories.
“I have no dog in the race. I’m Canadian. I don’t have emotional attachment to the history of any particular society in Europe.”
- Pre-modern Chinese and pre-colonial Indian economic history are major uncharted research frontiers; sources for pre-colonial India do exist despite claims to the contrary and simply have not been analyzed by economic historians, opening comparative work like credit markets in eastern central Europe versus China.
“There are sources for pre-colonial India. They just haven’t been analyzed by economic historians.”
Religion functions as a bundled-service platform whose linked goods explain acceptance of embedded anti-vaccination or anti-variolation views.
- Religion functions as a platform like Amazon, offering bundled services (spiritual consolation, charitable relief, social networking), so people accept anti-vaccination or anti-variolation epistemology as the price of joining a platform whose linked goods they actually want, explaining the persistence of such views.
“religion is a platform, if you like. It’s like Amazon in the sense that you get a bunch of different services from it.”
- During the Black Death, most religious figures urged people to gather in processions and church services to induce God to lift the plague, effectively encouraging super-spreader events rather than social distancing, making religion a salient harmful institution in contagion control.
“most religious figures admonished people that, in order to induce God to take away the plague, it was essential for them to get together in processions and church services, not observe social distancing, but engage in super spreader events”