constant conjunction
In Hume's philosophy of causation, the repeated, regular association between two events or types of events that leads us to expect one when we observe the other; Hume argues this constant conjunction, not necessary connection, grounds our idea of causation.
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Where it comes up · 4
- A History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?7 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 30 Thomas Hobbes1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism1 claim
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- Hobbes regarded Bacon's inductive empirical method as simplistic because it only identified constant conjunctions and regularities for practical application, but failed to provide the overall theoretical understanding necessary as a basis for ethics and political philosophy.A History of Philosophy | 30 Thomas Hobbes
- In our experience we do not have immediate awareness of causal connections or the force exerted by a cause in producing an effect; we are only aware of constant conjunctions—an antecedent followed by a consequent with regularity—which are associated in our thinking but tell us nothing about actual causal connectionA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
- Belief is acquired through psychological habit induced by repeated occurrences of constant conjunction, not through rational assessment of evidence; we become accustomed to regularities and habitually expect their continuationA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
- A necessitarian who asserts that all human choices and actions are causally determined is logically only claiming that there is constant conjunction (uniformity) between will and action, not actual causal necessity, since we have no knowledge of causal necessity itselfA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
- The free will debate between necessitarians and libertarians is ultimately a terminological dispute about the meaning of the word 'causation' rather than a substantive disagreement about empirical facts, since both must admit they only have knowledge of constant conjunction, not of causal necessityA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
- We feel a spontaneous impression of will when initiating action, but we are not aware of any antecedent force causing that impression; this lack of awareness of causal antecedents makes us feel that the act of will is free, even though there may be constant conjunctions with motives that we simply do not perceiveA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
- Mill develops a theory of belief similar to Hume's: beliefs are not freely chosen but are psychologically produced by constant conjunctions that accustom the mind to expect certain things and believe in necessary connection.A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism
- Human behavior exhibits uniformity and predictability across different age levels and characteristic ways of acting; this uniformity of behavior can appropriately be extended to include the aspect of human freedom, providing much more reason to believe in determinism than in indeterminismA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
- David Hume will argue that the idea of causal power is reducible to the idea of constant conjunction—we have no empirical basis whatsoever for affirming any actual causal connection beyond the observed conjunction of events—making Hume a skeptic about causal power.A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas
- A libertarian who asserts freedom of the will cannot rationally deny causal necessity (since nobody can assert it anyway), but is perfectly happy to accept that there is constant conjunction and regularity between acts of will and what one doesA History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?