
A History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?
What this covers
This is a single university lecture, given by an unnamed lecturer in a history-of-philosophy series, on David Hume. It starts from his bundle-of-perceptions view of the mind and from the split between relations of ideas and matters of fact. That split is why his skepticism is "mitigated": logical relations stay secure, while contingent claims about the world cannot be demonstrated. The lecturer stresses that Hume is not denying that bodies, causes, freedom, mind, or immortality exist. His claim is that our belief in them rests on impression and habit, not on proof. Along the way the lecture sets Hume against the representational theory of knowledge and John Locke's idea that belief tracks the weight of evidence.
The middle of the lecture applies this to other topics. "Probability" is read as psychological expectation, not as mathematics, and custom is the guide of life in place of Joseph Butler's rational probability. A "pre-established harmony" between nature's course and the sequence of our ideas is offered as the reason custom serves us. The free-will dispute between necessitarians and libertarians is recast as a quarrel over the word "causation," since both sides know only constant conjunction. The lecture also gives an account of why an act of will feels free.
The last stretch turns to religion, where the lecture gets most contentious. Hume's a priori argument against proving God's existence follows from the same split between logical necessity and contingent fact. His mockery of analogical arguments includes the suggestion that God might resemble a cosmic cabbage. The Natural History of Religion traces a path from polytheism to monotheism, and monotheism is said to lose the psychological grip that personified gods have. The treatment of the miracle turns on whether natural law means necessity or uniformity. On the uniformity reading a miracle is unbelievable but not impossible. The lecture closes with Richard Whateley's 1819 satire on Napoleon Bonaparte, which tests whether Hume's canons of belief fit historical evidence.
Hume's epistemology denies we can have demonstrative knowledge of matters of fact beyond present experience; instead, we acquire beliefs through psychological habit induced by repeated uniform experience, not through rational evidence evaluation.
- Causal connections cannot be directly observed—only constant conjunctions; therefore, knowledge beyond present experience rests on inference from effects to causes, which has no logical foundation
- Beliefs arise from forceful and steady impressions created by customary habit, not from weighing positive evidence as Locke suggested
- Hume's mitigated skepticism eliminates intuitive and demonstrative knowledge of contingent facts while preserving knowledge of necessary logical relationships
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Reasoning about matters of fact depends on cause-effect relations because to know anything beyond present experience—external realities—we must argue from present experience as the effect to external things as the cause
“if we're going to know anything about things beyond present experience present experience being the present content of the consciousness present perceptions if we're going to know anything beyond present experience external realities it must be by arguing from the experience as the effect to external things as the cause”
Hume is not denying the existence of material bodies, causal connections, freedom of the will, mind, or immortality; rather, his skepticism concerns what we can know about these things—claiming that our beliefs in them rest on psychological habit and impression rather than logical proof or empirical evidence
“he's not denying the existence of material bodies skepticism says we don't know he believes there are material bodies he's not denying the existence of causal connections skepticism says we don't know he himself seems to believe there are causal connections he isn't denying freedom of the will...he's not denying the existence of mind he just doesn't see any way to know it...he's not denying immortality he sees psychological basis for belief in immortality but we can't prove it rationally”
All of Hume's major beliefs—in material bodies, causal connections, freedom, mind, and immortality—are based on impressions and psychological processes rather than on the logic of evidence or argument
“notice that all these beliefs are based on impressions yes a on a psychology of belief rather than on the logic of evidence an argument”
Hume's skepticism is mitigated, not absolute, because we do have knowledge of relations of ideas (analytic judgments with logical form); skepticism applies only to matters of fact, which are contingent rather than logically necessary and therefore cannot be demonstratively proven
“he calls his skepticism a mitigated skepticism not absolute but mitigated its mitigated because we do have knowledge of relations of ideas and so the skepticism is limited to matters of fact not all just knowledge of matters of fact it's applicable then to what is not capable of demonstrative knowledge and what you cannot demonstrate is facts that are contingent that is to say if it's not necessary logically necessary but contingent well how can you demonstrate that follows with logical necessity”
In our experience we do not have immediate awareness of causal connections or the force exerted by a cause in producing an effect; we are only aware of constant conjunctions—an antecedent followed by a consequent with regularity—which are associated in our thinking but tell us nothing about actual causal connection
“in our experience we do not have any immediate awareness of causal connections of the force exerted by the cause in producing an effect we're only aware of uniformed is there's an antecedent is followed by a consequent with some sort of regularity that he calls constant conjunctions”
Mind is nothing but a succession of ideas and a bundle of perceptions appearing and disappearing on a theater stage; we have no knowledge of any other basis before a personal identity
“mind it turns out is nothing but a succession of ideas nothing but a bundle of perceptions appearing and disappearing is on a theater stage Yuriko we have no knowledge of any other basis before or a personal identity”
Hume notes a problem in the historical development from polytheism to monotheism: while polytheistic deities remain psychologically compelling through constant presence and personification, monotheistic God becomes merely an idea lacking the compelling power of concrete divine figures
“monotheism becomes an idea without the compelling power of the polytheistic deities around you all the time and so he's not quite sure beyond saying that there is a psychological process at work in the history of religions”
Hume's Natural History of Religion argues that religious belief historically develops from an early polytheism (belief in multiple gods for various natural phenomena) toward monotheism, which develops through contemplation of nature's organized unity
“in the natural history of religion on the other hand he argues that there is a gradual historical development of belief from an early parlor theism that belief because of the constancy of various things towards a monotheism that arises when there is contemplation of nature and it's organized unity”
Belief is acquired through psychological habit induced by repeated occurrences of constant conjunction, not through rational assessment of evidence; we become accustomed to regularities and habitually expect their continuation
“his answer in simplest form is to say it's a psychological habit that's induced by repeated occurrences we're so accustomed to in the morning at getting light that we say sure we can make predictions about it getting right”
A necessitarian who asserts that all human choices and actions are causally determined is logically only claiming that there is constant conjunction (uniformity) between will and action, not actual causal necessity, since we have no knowledge of causal necessity itself
“the person who is a necessity Rhian and says that all human choices and actions are causally determined the necessity Rhian is in reality only talking about constant conjunctions that's all he can logically ofoh regularity there may be some constant conjunction between will and action between what you decide and what you do but you don't know any causal connection”
Custom is the great guide of life because it operates through psychological habit induced by repeated behavioral reinforcement, making it the practical basis for human conduct, while Joseph Butler's formula that 'probability is the guide of life' suggests rational calculation of probabilities, which Hume rejects in favor of felt impression
“custom is the great guide of life...Joseph Butler...said and it became sort of a classic dictum in English thought from that time on probability is the guide of life probability is the guide of love Nancy Hume isn't satisfied with that not satisfied of that yeah probability helps but it just reinforces mental habit...but Butler was trying to say that we make choices decisions...guided in those choices and decisions but the probabilities that we calculate not him not here you don't calculate probabilities you feel it's the feeling that is the kind of life”
Probability, in Hume's usage, does not refer to mathematical/statistical probability but to psychological expectation: probability increases belief because repeated uniform experiences strengthen the steadiness and forcefulness of the impression that constitutes belief
“probability increases belief how come because what probability amounts to is repeated occasions which reinforce them in habit they strengthen the steadiness and forcefulness of the impression so he's not talking of statistical probability in that section but simply of psychological probability expectation”
Richard Whateley's 1819 satirical essay 'Historical Doubts Concerning Napoleon Bonaparte' applies Hume's criteria of historical credibility against belief in Napoleon's exploits and by analogy questions the sufficiency of Hume's canons of evidence for belief in historical miracles
“there's this one a classic kind of response to this that's a little bit amusing goes back to 1819 an English writer by the name of Richard Whateley published an essay called some historical doubts concerning Napoleon Bonaparte...Whateley argues this way all sorts of the most extraordinary exploits are attributed to this man Napoleon...is this believable...the testimony well it comes from soldiers...they're untrained observers...superstitious obviously and they expect us to believe...”
There is a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas such that through custom (repeated behavioral reinforcement), our thoughts and conceptions align with the workings of nature, which is necessary for the subsistence of our species and regulation of our conduct
“there is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas and though the powers and forces by which the form our nature is governed be wholly unknown to us yet our thoughts and conceptions still we find go on in the same train with the other work of nature custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been affected”
The free will debate between necessitarians and libertarians is ultimately a terminological dispute about the meaning of the word 'causation' rather than a substantive disagreement about empirical facts, since both must admit they only have knowledge of constant conjunction, not of causal necessity
“what's the quarrel between the two well the only dispute you see is whether you call causation necessity or uniformity it's a cement achill debate about the meaning of the word causation”
Empirical arguments for God's existence (cosmological and teleological) depend on analogies between divine and natural causation, and Hume makes fun of such analogies by noting that if we reason from the earth's biological life to God's nature, God might be as much like a cosmic cabbage as a rational being
“the empirical arguments cosmological teleological seem to depend on analogies and so they try to say that the cause must be like the effect analogous to the effect well Hugh makes a lot of fun of that since there's so much vegetative existence on this earth does that mean God is gonna be like a cosmic cabbage you say but in any case the most you would get is some sort of entropy morphic deity by analogy to the highest kind of existence on the earth”
If natural law is understood as the operation of causal necessities—a rigid, mathematically determined causal mechanism throughout creation—then a miracle would be logically impossible; but if natural law is understood as uniformity of experience, then a miracle is not logically impossible but merely unbelievable
“the view of natural law as a matter of causal necessity ability argues really the impossibility of a miracle whereas the question of uniformity is poses the unbelievab ility of a miracle it's a tremendously important distinction”
Hume believes that simply holding the propositional belief that God exists makes no moral difference to how people behave or what they do, since ideas (as opposed to impressions) do not move the will to action
“his view that simply believing that the proposition God exists is true makes no moral difference to people in the light of what he said about cause and effect on the human that's certainly the case ideas don't cause anything it's impressions that produce results”
Hume's argument against miracles concerns believability rather than logical possibility: no evidence can be sufficiently steady and forceful to produce belief in a miracle because miracles, by definition, do not come with the uniformity needed to induce habitual belief
“his concern is with the believability of miracles for the simple reason that no evidence can be sufficiently steady and forceful to produce belief in to produce the habit that is belief is he custom and have it is only induced by repeated uniform it is gained at the game but if a miracle is an exception it doesn't come with uniformly so how can the exception induce belief”
Whateley's satire questions whether Hume's epistemology—which restricts belief to what is uniform and well-witnessed in ordinary experience—is adequate for historical evidence, suggesting something may be wrong with Hume's canons of belief
“the point of the piece of satire is is simply that there is something wrong with Humes canons of historical evidence because nobody doubts that Napoleon are Bonaparte existed...there must be something wrong with the canons of belief the criteria for how belief is induced so Whateley lifted at that what he's really doing is questioning Humes epistemology”
Hume argues that relations of ideas (a priori arguments) cannot establish matters of fact conclusions about God's existence because logical necessity does not carry over to contingent reality
“as far as demure is concerned the argument is simply that relations of ideas get us nowhere on matters of fact which you would expect”
Hume's skepticism about the possibility of a priori proof of God's existence is based on the distinction between relations of ideas (analytic, logically necessary) and matters of fact (contingent, empirically known); since God's existence is contingent, not logically necessary, no a priori proof is possible
“as far as demure is concerned the argument is simply that relations of ideas get us nowhere on matters of fact which you would expect it's difficult to know just where Humes at in that”
A belief is distinguished from fiction or imagination by the character of the impression associated with it: belief involves a forceful and steady impression that is persistent and does not come and go, whereas fictional impressions lack this force and vivacity
“a belief itself is an impression what I'm aware of when I say I believe is a forceful and steady impression that's his way of putting it...sometimes forceful and vivacious but particularly talking of belief he says forceful and steady doesn't come and go it's for stated persistent and it's the force of the impression which distinguishes belief from how vivid for the moment maybe your impression of my fairy giraffe with butterfly wings”
We feel a spontaneous impression of will when initiating action, but we are not aware of any antecedent force causing that impression; this lack of awareness of causal antecedents makes us feel that the act of will is free, even though there may be constant conjunctions with motives that we simply do not perceive
“we're not aware of Enda seed and causes of that impression we think that act of will is free because we're not aware of any uniform causes...it may be that I get a certain feeling in the pit of my stomach and relate afternoon which comes in constant conjunction with starting to think about what's for dinner but causal connection no I'm not aware of any and so I think it's free”
Hume's metaphysical argument against the immortality of the soul derives from the concept of substance itself: there is no logical basis for the concept of substance (as 'something I know not what'), and thus there can be no a priori reasoning or causal arguments built on that concept
“the metaphysical argument is from the concept of substance and you know what he thinks about the concept of substance there's no logical basis for it there is nothing in impressions and simple ideas that can give rise to the concept of something I know not what so it's a confused idea and so there can be no a priori reasoning related to that concept”
Human behavior exhibits uniformity and predictability across different age levels and characteristic ways of acting; this uniformity of behavior can appropriately be extended to include the aspect of human freedom, providing much more reason to believe in determinism than in indeterminism
“the way humans behave constant conjunctions between motive and action characteristics general ways in which adolescents behave and the same with human beings generally there's a predictability about the characteristic behaviors actions ways of thinking that different age levels...the uniformity of things is what normally incites belief in necessity in any case the uniformity is of human behavior can appropriately be extended to this aspect of human behavior so there is much more reason to believe in determinism than there is to believe in in determinism”
Hume maintains that reason does not provide moral direction and does not direct the will; instead, the passions and emotions direct the will, and reason is merely a tool of passion
“reason does not provide moral direction the reason does not direct the will it's the passions that direct the will it's the patients that direct the will”
A miracle is a violation of natural law, and natural law should be understood as either the operation of causal necessities or simply the experience of uniform regularity
“his definition of a miracle is significant a miracle is a violation of natural law...what do you mean by natural law by a law of nature do you mean the operation of causal necessities or do you mean simply the experience of uniform Innes that's the issue”
Hume observes that belief in immortality arises from our aversion to death—our natural revulsion against it—which is a psychological impression that induces wishful thinking rather than rational belief
“death in the end is unavoidable but the human species couldn't be preserved if nature hadn't inspired within us enough version towards death and it's that impression that of version that we feel towards death which induces belief in immortality wishful thinking”
We have no knowledge of any causal connection in the mind-body relationship and no knowledge of causal connection between God as creator and creation; Hume is inclined to believe both exist, but only as a concession to mental habit rather than as a rationally justified position
“he points out that we have no knowledge of any causal connection in the mind-body relationship no knowledge of it in the relationship between God as creator and this earth this creation nature he is however inclined to believe that there is causal force but this is simply a concession to mental habit”
In Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the three main characters (Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo) represent different epistemological approaches to knowledge of God's existence: Cleanthes employs empirical arguments (cosmological and teleological), Demea employs a priori arguments from relations of ideas, and Philo is skeptical of both
“D Mia and firo those three Klien fees argues empirically wants to argue from empirical evidence cosmological teleological arguments to a matter-of-fact conclusion d mia is something of a playtest with a priori arguments from the relation of ideas...the third is final who is skeptical of both”
A libertarian who asserts freedom of the will cannot rationally deny causal necessity (since nobody can assert it anyway), but is perfectly happy to accept that there is constant conjunction and regularity between acts of will and what one does
“the libertarian who asserts freedom of the will the libertarian is trying to deny that there is causal necessity well that's fine because nobody can really assert it but the libertarian is perfectly happy to say that there is regularity and constant conjunction between acts of will and what you do”
Hume argues that natural religion alone cannot long activate the mind, and some historical act of God is necessary to affect the imagination and elicit genuine religious belief
“he has another little work about the same time called the skeptic in which he says that natural religion alone cannot long activate the mind we have to find some method of affecting the imagination there must be something historical as well as philosophical about the divinity”
It would take a miracle to create belief in miracles—an ironic formulation suggesting that the conditions needed to generate belief in miracles (steady, forceful impression) are themselves miraculous and thus unattainable
“it would take a miracle to create belief in miracles say something of force and velocity otherwise don't get to produce belief”
Because Hume denies that the mind is an immaterial substance independent of the body, he concludes that immortality of the soul is not logically possible, unlike the traditional Cartesian view which held that an immaterial substance is capable of existing independently and thus can survive bodily death
“the traditional view of immortality in his day thanks to Descartes was that if the mind the soul is an immaterial substance and entity that is independent and functions independently of the body there is capable of existing independently of the body so immortality is logically possible not so human because he doesn't think that way about mind”
Relations of ideas are analytic judgments with the logical form 'a equals a', which include definitions, tautologies, and mathematics
“relations of ideas which are analytic judgments with the logical form of a equals a they are for things like definitions tautologies mathematics”
The will is simply an impression we feel when we initiate a new physical movement or mental perception; there is nothing more to will than a kind of impression of starting something going in the mind or in action
“the term will refer simply to an impression which I feel when I give rise to some new physical movement or some new mental perception...there is nothing more to will than a kind of impression of starting something going in the mind or in over an action”
Material bodies are believed to exist not because we can prove their existence by causal reasoning, but because our experience of them is so steady, forceful, and consistent that the belief is readily elicited as a matter of psychological habit
“human self seems to believe in the existence of material substances material bonds simply because the experience is so steady get that input that impression forceful and steady so consistent coherent in our experience the belief is readily elicited”
Descartes, John Locke, and Berkeley all argued for the existence of God or material bodies by reasoning from the present experience (as effect) to external things (as cause), exemplifying the method Hume analyzes
“that's the way Descartes argued the existence of God meditation three that's the way John Locke argued not only the existence of God but of material bodies matter that's the way Berkeley argue the existence of God cause of passive ideas”
The analogical argument for immortality (as the body falls asleep and wakes, so the soul may awaken after death) fails because natural analogy shows that all things in the physical world are perishable, not perpetual; therefore, the idea of undying immortality is contrary to any natural analogy
“the argument from the physical world is usually an argument by analogy namely that as the body goes to sleep and wakes up so eventually we all fall asleep to awake later well his point is obvious that in the physical world of nature if you want an analogy nothing is perpetual everything is perishable so the idea of an undying immortality is contrary to any analogy”
Hume's moral argument against the immortality of the soul asserts that the belief in divine moral justice rewarding goodness in an afterlife implies knowledge of God's moral attributes, which cannot be obtained by empirical means and thus cannot support a logical argument for immortality
“the moral argument for immortality namely that goodness moral goodness in this life will of a necessity be rewarded in a life hereafter implies the goodness of God attributes of God that empirically are unknown we have no matters of fact knowledge about God's arteries by empirical means and so there is no logical possibility of a moral argument for the existence of God”
In the inquiry, Hume addresses five key questions: what is the nature of reasoning about matters of fact, what is the foundation of reasoning about cause and effect, what is the foundation of reasoning from experience, how do we acquire beliefs, and how do we distinguish beliefs from fictions
“he enumerates these five questions in the second part of it what is the nature of reasoning about matters of fact...what is the foundation of reasoning about cause and effect...how we know about factual relationships...and to make his point...how then do we acquire beliefs...how do we know that these are not fictions”
Hume claims that mathematics deals with ideas rather than real things; mathematical ideas are logical relations between number and geometrical concepts, and these relationships are purely ideal, not about extra-mental reality
“no it's dealing with ideas the idea of - the idea of three logically together give you the idea of five mathematics according to human is not about real things it's about melodical relationships between number concepts geometrical concepts so forth...it has to do with ideas you don't know whether the real world is like that as a matter of fact not in his sense of real”
Hume notes that witnesses reporting miracles tend to offer contradictory evidence, so even their testimony about miracles does not have the steadiness and forcefulness needed to produce belief
“he talks about the way in which witnesses who report a miracle tend to offer contradictory evidence so that even their testimony about a single miracle or a rash of miracles does not have the steadiness the forcefulness that is needed to produce belief”
Hume is a nominalist who holds that mathematical ideas labeled with names do not refer to abstract ideas (conceptualism) or to real universals (realism) but only to collections of similar particulars
“he's a nominalist in the sense that our mathematical ideas labeled with names words do not have a refer to abstract ideas in the conceptualist sense nor to real universe Matan accent' but just two collections of similar particulars that general ideas that's all”
Scottish realism, discussed in the following lecture, rejects Hume's representational theory of ideas and maintains that we have direct awareness of material bodies and causal force, offering an alternative to Humean skepticism
“next week we'll be looking at Scottish realism which rejects that theory of ideas rejects the representational view and maintains we have a direct awareness of material bodies of causal force and so forth but his skepticism follows very naturally”