
A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism
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This is a university lecture on nineteenth-century empiricism, delivered by a philosophy lecturer as one installment in a history-of-philosophy series. It starts from the method. Earlier empirical generalizations and a priori premises give way to the hypothetical-deductive method, which the lecturer treats as a more mature account than Francis Bacon's induction because it admits that science needs hypotheses. The problem of induction explains the shift: generalizations can be falsified but never proved. Auguste Comte supplies the programmatic side, with his Law of Three Stages (theological, metaphysical, positive) and a hierarchy of sciences running from physics up to sociology under the unity of science.
Most of the lecture follows John Stuart Mill, presented as the most extreme of the empiricists. He reduces even the laws of logic to empirical generalizations about how minds work, a move the lecturer criticizes as psychologism. Mill's phenomenalism is set beside David Hume's bundle of perceptions, with Permanent Possibility as the point where Mill allows continuity of mind through memory. The lecture then follows these commitments into Mill's compatibilism, his utilitarian ethic, and a theory of punishment based on deterrence and reform. The lecturer sets the therapeutic theory of punishment against C.S. Lewis's objection that it dehumanizes offenders, and argues that the phenomenalist view of the self leaves respect for persons without a foundation. Instrumentalism (Scientific)) is introduced as the anti-realist reading of science in Mill and Ernst Mach.
The last stretch widens to the present. The lecturer calls scientism the result of extending scientific method to ethics, psychology, and sociology. Edmund Husserl's rigorous science is offered as a Continental answer, one that rejects the hypothetical-deductive approach, and the split between the phenomenological method and Anglo-American empiricism is traced forward. Two claims are contested: an anecdote of a 1940s English–French conference where the two sides passed "like ships in the night," and the verdict that positivism and pragmatism are the same dead end. The lecture also notes that Thomas Kuhn ended the method's reign and that Bertrand Russell changed his mind over his career.
The speaker characterizes 19th century empiricism as fundamentally rejecting metaphysics and extending the hypothetical-deductive scientific method to all domains of knowledge, including human sciences, creating a phenomenalist anti-realist epistemology that dominates English-speaking philosophy to this day.
- 19th century empiricists replaced empirical generalizations and a priori premises with hypothetical-deductive method as the basis for all knowledge
- The extension of scientific method to human sciences (psychology, sociology, ethics) creates a thoroughgoing phenomenalism where only observable sense data and phenomena are admissible
- This produces a fundamental split between Continental European phenomenological philosophy and Anglo-American empiricist philosophy that persists to the present
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19th century empiricists developed the hypothetical-deductive method, replacing earlier empirical generalizations and a priori premises with hypotheses as starting points, which then produce deductive conclusions—a more mature approach to scientific method than Bacon's inductive methods because it recognizes the necessity of hypotheses in scientific reasoning.
“instead of empirical generalizations or a priori premises the emphasis is on a hypothesis as the premise... from an empirical hypothesis if this is true what follows hypothetical deductive”
The distinction between Continental European and Anglo-American philosophy persists to this day, with phenomenological method dominating European thought while empiricist methodology dominates English-speaking philosophy, creating a fundamental divide in how philosophers approach knowledge and reality.
“it is fair to say that the dominance, the philosophical dominance in the continent of Europe is phenomenological whereas the philosophical dominance in english-speaking philosophy is empiricist”
The rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment, originating from continental philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz and developing through Hegel and existentialism, employs a phenomenological method that tries to understand reality through the lens of human self-awareness and creative freedom.
“the rationalism of the Enlightenment was mainly on the European continent Descartes Spinoza Leibnitz and the outgrowth of that as we've seen in Hegel the existential tradition to some extent people like Whitehead but the outcome a phenomenological kind of method that tries to look at reality through the lens of the human self-awareness”
Mill's utilitarian ethic, which prescribes maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain for the maximum number of people, fundamentally depends on his phenomenalist view that the self is merely a collection of painful and pleasurable experiences with no deeper personhood, creating a crisis in justifying respect for persons and individual rights.
“the ethic that Mill develops his utilitarian ethic faces a problem that is so often held... it's saying you should treat people as a collection of painful and pleasurable experiences well what else can you do if you're Mill if the self is just the permanent possibility of experiences all you can do is... regard the self that way and try to maximize the good experiences”
Mill develops a theory of belief similar to Hume's: beliefs are not freely chosen but are psychologically produced by constant conjunctions that accustom the mind to expect certain things and believe in necessary connection.
“he develops a theory of belief but rather like the theory about liberty that beliefs are not so much freely chosen as they are psychologically produced now the roots of that or in Hume as well remember Hume psychology of belief constant conjunctions accustomed the mind to expecting the certain things or the thinking there is necessary connection so he has a similar kind of psychology and police to that David Hill”
Scientism—the doctrine that science and science alone yields valid knowledge—became a consequence of extending the hypothetical-deductive scientific method to all domains including human sciences, ethics, psychology, and sociology, attempting to make these domains fully empirical and scientific.
“the extension of these kinds of methods to the human sciences... to psychology to sociology to politics the attempt also to apply to ethics... becomes known in some quarters as scientism scientism that science and science alone yields valid knowledge”
Mill's utilitarianism produces a theory of punishment grounded in reforming and deterring the offender rather than holding them morally accountable as a retributivist theory would, because utilitarian logic can only justify punishment on the basis of its usefulness in producing good consequences, not on the basis of moral responsibility.
“he developed a utilitarian theory of punishment building on Jeremy Bentham's principles of morality and legislation in which Bentham advocated providing punishment in order to reform the offender to deter the offender without holding the offender morally guilty in the classic sense”
The 'therapeutic theory of punishment' developed in Britain advocates treating criminals as emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted persons requiring psychological therapy rather than punishment, thereby minimizing individual responsibility.
“there was a few years ago development in Britain which building on a utilitarian ethic advocated a therapeutic theory of punishment lettuces they don't call it punishment at all call it therapy the idea of the being that the criminal is emotionally disturbed socially maladjusted so that what is needed is some kind of psychological therapy”
Mill's phenomenalist definitions of both matter and mind parallel Hume's view that 'mind is a bundle of perceptions,' but Mill differs from Hume in that Hume limited mind to present perceptions while Mill's 'permanent possibility' allows for continuity of consciousness over time and thus personal identity through memory.
“this is very close to David Hume who called mind simply a bundle of perceptions... but I think it's not quite as skeptical as David Hume... when Hume said that all we know of mind is the bundle of perceptions he was referring to our present perceptions... for Hume mind is simply this present bundle of perceptions beyond that present experience we have no knowledge”
A 1940s joint conference between English and French philosophers resulted in philosophical discussions that passed 'like ships in the night' because both groups were dealing with fundamentally different subject matter and employing different methodologies, despite the Frenchmen writing in English.
“there was in the 1940s the late forties a joint conference between English and French philosophers the Proceedings of which were were published and volume called the philosophy analytic analytic philosophy and as you try to read it you you you find that while the Frenchmen write in English which is of help to many of us of the English write in French they pass like ships in the night because they're they're just dealing with different things”
The hypothetical-deductive method was not definitively superseded until Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' (1960s) demonstrated that science operates according to paradigms and paradigm shifts rather than through the accumulation of hypotheses and their confirmation.
“this becomes the understanding of scientific method in John Stewart mill in Ernst mark in Bertrand Russell in 20th century logical positivism in fact it really wasn't cracked until Thomas Kuhns book the structure of scientific revolutions when it was recognized that science works more with paradigms than with hypothesis”
Retributive punishment is distinct from vengeance; it means holding a person accountable and responsible for their actions and attempting to maintain social balance, not seeking psychological revenge.
“retributive punishment is not vengeance revenge no that's a psychological process retribution is simply holding a person accountable holding a person responsible and as it were trying to maintain the balance within society something which doesn't belong to me it's an attempt in that word at a social balancing of papers”
The view that scientific theories are simply instruments for practical purposes rather than knowledge about reality in itself is known as 'instrumentalism' and represents the classic anti-realist view of science that develops in both Mill and Mach.
“now this view of science they in both ways and Mills is simply of the the view that becomes known as instrumental ISM the scientific theories are simply instruments for doing things of a practical nature rather than bits of knowledge about any kind of reality in itself this is the classic anti-realist view of science”
Mill adopts 'compatibilism' or 'soft determinism' as a middle position: affirming that we do make real choices and exercise will not constrained by external causes, while denying that choices are not influenced by internal causes (antecedent psychological factors).
“so what he has is instead a kind of compatibilism as it's sometimes called or soft determinism he wants to affirm that yes we do make decisions we do make choices in that sense yes - will a choice that's not constrained by external causes but he denies that those choices are not constrained by now he denies that they are not due to internal causes”
Auguste Comte formulated the Law of Three Stages as an empirical generalization about the history of science itself: science evolves from a theological/religious stage (dealing with imaginative fictions and divine causes) through a speculative/metaphysical stage (dealing with abstract essences and natural rights) to a positive/empirical stage (dealing with observable phenomena and general covering laws).
“his law of three stages is his formulation of an empirical generalization about the history of science... science evolves from three stages from a religious stage to a speculative stage... the second stage is the speculative dealing with abstract ideas constructs metaphysical constructs... the third stage is empirical scientific dealing with what is positively known”
Comte's thesis of the unity of science holds that all sciences follow essentially the same hypothetical-deductive method with no meaningful differentiation between natural science and human science, with the sciences arranged hierarchically by complexity: physics underlies chemistry, chemistry underlies biology, biology underlies psychology, and psychology underlies sociology.
“the unity of science is the second emphasis in Auguste Comte... the notion that all of the sciences follow essentially the same method... there's no differentiation between the study of nature and the study of human beings the same method prevails”
Bertrand Russell's position on phenomenalism and metaphysics changed across his career ('he reserved the human person's right to change his mind and did it quite successfully at times'), indicating that 20th century empiricism was less settled than 19th century empiricism in its commitment to anti-realism.
“Russell yes and no depending which decade Russell's career you're reading he reserved the human person's right to change his mind and did it quite successfully at times”
C.S. Lewis argues that the humanitarian therapeutic theory of punishment dehumanizes persons by treating them as 'cogs in an environmental machine who didn't have any choice' rather than as agents responsible for their actions, thereby minimizing the individual's human dignity.
“CS Lewis has an article on that in the collection called God in the doc an article called the humanitarian theory of punishment... it just dehumanizes the person it's not treating an individual as a person who did something but as a cog in an environmental machine who didn't have any choice”
Husserl attempted to address the crisis of the empirical sciences by creating philosophy as a rigorous science, but he rejected the hypothetical-deductive approach in favor of deriving fundamental principles through phenomenological method—a Continental response to the problems created by scientism.
“her Searles attempt to deal with what he called the crisis and they in the sciences in the light of this he wants to make philosophy into a rigorous science but not with a hypothetical rift with a pre alright principles derived by the phenomenological method”
Both positivism and pragmatism advocate methodological naturalism and confine themselves to empirical limitations, making them essentially the same philosophical approach and both dead-end streets that fail to account for irreducible dimensions of human experience.
“by virtue of this extension of scientific method he's advocating a methodological naturalism... that there was one time instituted a seminar by saying that to his mind positivism and pragmatism at both amount of the same thing and they're both dead-end streets because they confine themselves to the limitations”
Mill rejects 'necessity-realism' (hard determinism), which claims that antecedent causes are both necessary and sufficient for every human decision and action, because doing so would require knowing Hume's 'necessary connections'—something phenomenalism forbids us from claiming to know.
“he being anti-physical he has to reject necessity realism... he calls necessity realism... hard determinism that is to say there are sufficient causes for every human decision in action so such that no other decision or action could have occurred... a phenomena list he couldn't hold it would imply that we know what Hume called necessary connections and he agreed with Hume we don't”
John Stuart Mill is the most extreme empiricist among the major 19th century empiricists because he reduces all supposedly self-evident truths—including the laws of logic and the laws of thought (non-contradiction, identity)—to empirical generalizations about how the human mind actually thinks, rejecting all intuitive knowledge, innate knowledge, and foundational truths.
“Mill maintains that mathematics is an empirical science... three plus five equals eight is an empirical generalization about all sets of three and five... the laws of thought non-contradiction identity a equals a not not a empirical generalization about the way in which we think”
The problem of induction makes it impossible to verify empirical generalizations with certainty; you can falsify them but not definitively prove them through pure observation, which motivated the shift from empirical generalizations to hypothetical premises.
“empirical generalizations are awfully hard to verify you can falsify them but verifying them is empirically pretty difficulty you've got the problem with induction”
The problem of psychologism—reducing logical laws to psychological generalizations about how minds actually work—fails to provide adequate foundations for mathematics and logic because it confuses the norms of correct reasoning with descriptive facts about human psychology.
“psychologism does not provide inadequate foundation for mathematics for logic... psychologists... what her Cyril meant by psychologism which he condemned”
The uniformity of nature is not a metaphysical principle but rather the broadest empirical hypothesis—an empirical generalization extrapolated to cover all phenomena—allowing inductive reasoning to proceed without appealing to any non-empirical knowledge.
“inductive reasoning he recognizes presupposes the uniformity of nature principle of induction the uniformity of nature millon pointed that out well according to mill the uniformity of nature is simply our broadest empirical hypothesis it's an empirical generalization extrapolated to everything alright that's the hypothesis”
John Locke held that simple ideas of sensation and reflection arise from experience but was nonetheless committed to realist metaphysics—the belief that matter and mind exist as real underlying substances beyond our sensory experience.
“you see he's just building on the John Locke business simple ideas of sensation simple ideas of reflection but discarding Locke's view of the reality of matter and substance the substratum and discarding Locke's view of the reality of mind or soul is a material substance”
Comte advocated for the development of a science of social change (sociology) as the highest and most important application of positive science to human affairs, because he was living in a period of historical upheaval in 19th century France and recognized the need for empirical understanding of social transformation.
“what he is particularly anxious to see develop... a science of social change a science of social change after all he's living in the first half of the 19th century in France and if you're familiar with French history it was an age of upheavals”
Mill defines 'matter' as nothing more than the permanent possibility of sensation, meaning that when we say material objects exist, we mean only that it is possible to have sensory experiences of them if the appropriate conditions obtain—not that matter has any independent reality beyond potential sensations.
“when he asks about the nature of matter his response is very simply... that term has as its meaning empirical reference its meaning simply the permanent possibility of sensation”
Mill refined Bacon's inductive methods (particularly the methods of agreement and difference, table of presents, table of absence) to provide greater precision and clarity while maintaining essentially the same inductive logic that Bacon had developed.
“he refined bacons inductive methods... table of presents table of absence so forth he refined those essentially the same methods really but a little closer definition in order to render the kind of precision for positive knowledge that he wanted”
Ernst Mach, an Austrian physicist, developed 'sensationalism' as the view that every object of experience can be analyzed into observable sense qualities alone, with no non-empirical or metaphysical elements—a thoroughgoing phenomenalism in which science cannot make assertions beyond what can be sensed.
“Ernst Mach... one is his sensationalism... he wrote a book called the analysis of sensations in which he said we can analyze every object of experience into the sense qualities that are observable... he wants to do the same as Mill to describe phenomenal objects... in terms only of sense data”
The representational theory of knowledge, which assumes knowledge involves representations that must correctly depict reality, leaves unanswered questions about the relationship between representations and the reality they supposedly represent, creating the metaphysical problems that 19th century empiricists reject.
“the nature of metaphysics you see was viewed in terms of the distinction viewed if you like in the light of the representational theory of knowledge which left you with a lot of answered questions about the reality that it's supposed to present”
Comte advocates for a 'positive theory of the affective and intellectual functions' consisting in the experimental and rational study of phenomena of interior sense (ideas and reflections) grounded in cerebral physiology, rejecting metaphysical separation of mind from brain.
“what he's after is the positive theory of the affective and intellectual functions which is... consists in the experimental and rational study of the phenomena of interior sense ideas of reflection proper to the cerebral ganglions brain physiology apart from all immediate external rent us”
Descartes failed to fully extend his mechanistic philosophical method to the study of intellectual and moral phenomena, stopping short and treating these as requiring special metaphysical explanation rather than empirical-physiological study—a failure Comte believes he corrects through developing a physiology of mind.
“Descartes was rendering to the world the glorious service of instituting a complete system of positive philosophy... the reformer with all his bold energy was unable to raise himself so far above his ages to give it complete logical extension by comprehending in it the part of physiology that relates to intellectual and moral phenomena”
Only the empirical input available to human beings consists of physical sense data describing bodies and reflective data describing inner mental states, making these the only legitimate raw materials for any empirical philosophy that claims to deal with reality as humans can know it.
“the only way you can talk of human beings is in terms of physical sense data and reflective data the bodily story told in terms of physical sense data the inner mental story told in terms of reflective data that's all the empirical input we have is that clear enough okay”