commutative justice
The duty not to mess with other people's person, property, and promises; its rules are precise and accurate like grammar.
As defined in Daniel Klein on Honest Income
Other definitions
Smith's narrow, enforceable sense of justice: abstaining from what is another's—respecting others' person, property, and contracts (and sometimes reputation). It is precise like grammar and may be protected by force.
Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
Where it comes up · 4
- Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/20099 claims
- Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V5 claims
- Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/20094 claims
- Daniel Klein on Honest Income3 claims
Most important claims · 10 of 21Search all claims for “commutative justice” →
- Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules with an analogy to writing: exact, precise, indispensable rules (grammar in writing; commutative justice in ethics) versus loose, vague, indeterminate, aspirational rules (rules of the sublime or elegant in writing; all the becoming virtues like beneficence, gratitude, fortitude, and even prudence in ethics).Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Commutative justice concerns not messing with other people's stuff and is precise and accurate like grammar; distributive justice concerns making a 'becoming use' of what is your own and is loose, vague, and indeterminate like aesthetics.Daniel Klein on Honest Income
- Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules: exact, precise, indispensable rules (analogous to grammar in writing and to commutative justice in ethics—not messing with other people's property) versus loose, vague, indeterminate aspirational rules (analogous to rules of style or sublimity, and to all the other virtues like beneficence, gratitude and fortitude); the looser the rule, the more one must fall back on sentiments beyond the sense of duty.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules: exact, precise rules whose analog is grammar in writing and commutative justice in ethics (don't take other people's stuff), versus loose, vague, indeterminate rules whose analog is aspirational stylistic rules in writing and all the 'becoming' virtues like beneficence, gratitude and fortitude; the looser the rule, the more one must fall back on sentiments other than duty.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- In Smith's framework everything in the moral domain is loose, vague, and indeterminate—even prudence and beneficence—with the sole exception of commutative justice, which he treats as precise, accurate, and indispensable like the rules of grammar, in contrast to the loose, vague rules critics lay down for what is sublime in writing.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- Honest income is money made within the bounds of commutative justice—not messing with other people's person, property, and promises—extended to also exclude misleading people or jerking them around, and Klein further sets aside income derived from government.Daniel Klein on Honest Income
- Commutative justice for Smith is precise and forcibly enforceable: it consists in abstaining from what is another's—not violating people's person, property, or contracts (and sometimes reputation)—and these are black-and-white, bright-line rules, distinct from all other virtues.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- Smith's commutative justice—the only thing he simply calls 'justice'—consists in abstaining from what is another's: a person's life/body, property, and the promises due them by contract (and in one passage reputation); strictly speaking this would not require rescuing a drowning stranger, matching the low legal standard of the Good Samaritan rule.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- The decisive practical difference Smith draws between commutative and distributive justice rests on enforcement: commutative justice can be established and protected by force, and its violators may be coercively punished (even hanged), whereas distributive justice and beneficence carry only moral obligation—failure can be socially frowned upon but not physically punished, taxed, or coerced without violating the liberty principle.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- Smith's commutative justice consists in abstaining from what is another's—not harming a person's person, property, and promises-due (contract), and (in some passages) reputation. Significantly, Smith calls only this 'justice' (later qualifying it 'commutative' after Grotius and the schoolmen) and never calls beneficence or distribution 'distributive justice,' implying he wants 'justice' to mean only commutative justice—a fact revealing his political sensibilities.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009