
Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
What this covers
Dan Klein and Russ Roberts continue their examination of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments by working through the book's final three parts. The episode traces Smith's argument that human conduct is regulated by two parallel invisible-hand mechanisms: one economic, one moral. In the economic sphere, self-interest produces wealth and industry; in the moral sphere, divinely-implanted sentiments of propriety and spectatorial sympathy guide behavior toward virtue and social utility. Dan Klein and Roberts explore how Smith believed these mechanisms could operate without state coercion, creating a natural alignment between individual motive and collective good.
The conversation moves through Smith's account of how propriety—not raw utility—mediates moral approval, and how people refine their understanding of virtue by aspiring toward higher standards of conduct within imagined superior communities. They discuss Smith's treatment of justice as black-and-white moral law, akin to grammar, and contrast it with looser aspirational virtues like beneficence and fortitude. Smith's condemnation of slavery receives particular attention, as does his critique of materialism and the empty satisfaction of wealth. A recurring tension surfaces between Smith's 18th-century optimism about culture's self-correcting mechanisms and Klein's worry that modern conditions—politicized morality, pervasive government involvement in cultural life—could systematically pervert moral sentiments on a large scale, rendering Smith's confidence in natural moral progress obsolete.
Klein and Roberts argue that Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments posits parallel invisible-hand mechanisms in morals and economics—where propriety (not raw utility) mediates moral approval and divinely-implanted incentives align self-interested behavior with social good—but that this Smithian optimism about culture may not survive the politicized, big-government conditions of the modern democratic age.
- Smith claims the world has built-in incentives (industry yields wealth, honesty yields esteem) that produce virtue and prosperity without state coercion, paralleling the economic invisible hand.
- Moral approval is always mediated by a sense of propriety (spectatorial sympathy), which tends to but does not perfectly conform to social utility.
- Klein worries political religion and pervasive government involvement in culture can grossly pervert moral sentiments on a broad, lasting scale, contra Smith's optimism.
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Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within a given community, average conduct is respectable, above-average is praiseworthy, and below-average is blameworthy; people can move up to an 'exalted propriety' belonging to a more select, wiser, higher-standard community, where what was praiseworthy in the lower community is merely average—a dialectic of unending refinement toward the wise and virtuous man.
“each notion of propriety as it were corresponds to a referent community... within community sub I propriety sub I is what is normal yes respectable middle above propriety sub I would be praiseworthy”
Economics was labeled the 'dismal science' by Thomas Carlyle not because of a gloomy view of life but because economists like Smith and Mill stood up for the fundamental equality of human beings—their ability to lead their own lives and make their own moral and economic decisions—against contemporaries who defended slavery and oppression.
“it's really what's called the dismal science by Carlyle because it was the Economist who stood up for the fundamental equality of human beings with respect to each other”
Smith argues the deceptive belief that wealth and greatness bring happiness is beneficial: it is precisely this 'deception'—taking false gold as gold—that arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind, prompting people to cultivate the ground, build cities and commonwealths, invent and improve the sciences and arts, and transform the face of the globe, thereby obliging the earth to support a far greater population.
“it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner... it is this deception which arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground to build houses to found cities and Commonwealth's”
Justice must be treated as black-and-white like grammar partly because of a slippery-slope danger: once a person begins to 'chicane'—to rationalize that a particular violation does no harm (the thief who steals from the rich who won't miss it, the adulterer who hides his intrigue)—he becomes untrustworthy, and there is no enormity so gross of which he may not become capable.
“a man often becomes a villain the moment he begins even in his own heart to chicane in this manner... when once we begin to give way to such refinements there is no enormity so gross of which we may not be capable”
The opening of Part IV Chapter 1 is a remarkable indictment of empty materialism that contradicts the parody of Smith as a free-market champion of greed: Smith mocks the frivolous gadgets of his day (tweezer cases, watches), arguing that power and riches are 'enormous and operose machines' contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences that must be maintained with anxious attention and are ready to burst into pieces and crush their possessor, so material excess is fool's gold that does not lead to happiness.
“the first part of chapter one of part four is really a remarkable indictment of empty materialism and it would come as a surprise I think to the readers who see Smith is this free-market right-winger”
Justice must be treated as exact and black-and-white precisely because of the slippery slope and self-deception: once a person begins to 'chicane'—to rationalize that a particular violation does no real harm (the thief stealing from the rich, the adulterer who is undiscovered)—he becomes a villain who can no longer be trusted, because there is then no enormity of which he may not be capable.
“a man often becomes a villain the moment he begins even in his own heart to chicane in this manner”
Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules with an analogy to writing: exact, precise, indispensable rules (grammar in writing; commutative justice in ethics) versus loose, vague, indeterminate, aspirational rules (rules of the sublime or elegant in writing; all the becoming virtues like beneficence, gratitude, fortitude, and even prudence in ethics).
“he talks about two different kinds of rules one kind are exact and precise and indispensable and those kinds of rules in writing have their analog in grammar and in ethics in justice and commutative justice”
Part IV concerns the effect of utility (social usefulness, beneficial outcomes) on moral approbation; Smith disagrees that moral approval is based directly on utility, holding instead that approbation is always enshrouded in a sense of propriety based on spectatorial sympathy, so the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stopover at propriety, while propriety nonetheless tends to conform to utility by providential design.
“approbation or moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of spec to toriel sympathy that spec tutorial sympathy is almost an aesthetic reaction to the beauty of the conduct and so it is based on a notion of in the action”
There is a striking absence in Smith's book—a 'dog that doesn't bark'—of any class, national, or racial stereotyping: across his sweeping claims about propriety, morality, conscience and prudence, Smith never says these differ among the classes or among groups like the Irish, making him a remarkable egalitarian for 1759 who attributes equal moral capacity (not just rational self-interest) to all human beings.
“there's not a single class statement that those are different among the classes he never says of course this is among me and my friends among the poor... he doesn't say that”
Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within a given community, propriety is what is normal and respectable, with deviation above counting as praiseworthy and below as blameworthy; people can mentally move up to an 'exalted propriety' of a higher, wiser, more select community, so what is merely average in the superior community was praiseworthy in the lower one—a dialectic of unending refinement toward the wise and virtuous man.
“each notion of propriety as it were corresponds to a referent community... we then sometimes move up to an exalted propriety okay i'm a more select community a higher richer wiser in our mind”
Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within community-i, propriety-i is normal/respectable, above it is praiseworthy and below is blameworthy; but people can move up to an 'exalted propriety' of a more select, wiser, higher-standard community-j, where what was praiseworthy for community-i becomes merely average—a dialectic of unending refinement that also describes how an individual develops more self-command and prudence over time, becoming a different person in twenty years.
“each notion of propriety as it were corresponds to a referent community okay so you've got sort of if you will community sub I and within community sub I propriety sub I is what is normal”
Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within a given community, the average behavior is respectable, above it is praiseworthy and below it is blameworthy; but Smith identifies that people sometimes move up to an 'exalted propriety' belonging to a more select, higher-standard community, so that what was praiseworthy in the ordinary community becomes merely average in the select one—a dialectic of unending refinement toward the wise and virtuous man, paralleled within an individual who develops more self-command and prudence over a lifetime.
“each notion of propriety as it were corresponds to a referent community... within community sub I propriety sub I is what is normal... above would be praiseworthy... below would be blameworthy”
Justice must be treated as grammar-like and black-and-white not merely as a moral absolute but because of a slippery-slope and self-deception danger: once a person begins to 'chicane'—to rationalize a particular violation as harmless (the thief stealing from a rich man who won't miss it, the adulterer who hides his intrigue)—he is no longer to be trusted and there is no enormity of which he may not become capable, because the incentive effects of that delusion are destructive.
“a man often becomes a villain the moment he begins even in his own heart to chicane in this manner”
Smith's condemnation of slavery is remarkably strong and egalitarian: he writes that there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not possess a degree of magnanimity which his sordid master is scarcely capable of conceiving, casting the European slave traders as the 'refuse of the jails of Europe' whose levity, brutality and baseness justly expose them to the contempt of the enslaved—an inversion that makes the enslaved the morally superior judges.
“there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not in this respect possess a degree of magnanimity which the soul of his sordid master is too often scarce capable of conceiving”
Smith offers a strong indictment of empty materialism: the gadgets and trinkets people crave (tweezer cases in his day, analogous to iPhones today) and great wealth are 'enormous and operose machines' that produce few trifling conveniences while demanding anxious maintenance and threatening to crush their possessor—happiness does not come from acquiring such material excess.
“power and riches appear them to be what they are enormous and operas machines contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences to the body... in spite of all our care are ready every minute every moment to burst into pieces and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessor”
The term 'dismal science' originated not as a critique of economics' bleak view of life but from Carlyle, because economists stood up for the fundamental equality of human beings; classical political economists like Smith, Mill and Spencer affirmed that all people could fend for themselves and make their own moral and economic decisions, while their literary contemporaries (Carlyle, Ruskin, Dickens, Tennyson) defended slavery and oppression of Africans and the Irish on paternalist grounds that they were incapable of self-direction.
“it's really what's called the dismal science by Carlyle because it was the Economist who stood up for the fundamental equality of human beings”
Part IV argues that moral approbation is not based directly on utility (beneficial social outcomes) but is always enshrouded in spectatorial sympathy and a sense of propriety—an aesthetic reaction to the beauty of conduct—so the path from utility to approval necessarily makes a stop at propriety, with propriety tending (by providential design) to conform to utility but imperfectly.
“approbation or moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of spec to toriel sympathy that spec tutorial sympathy is almost an aesthetic reaction to the beauty of the conduct”
Smith does not ground good behavior in fear of divine punishment or hell, nor in God directly watching us; rather the man within the breast is your awareness of how others view you, divinely implanted but operating through social sentiment rather than supernatural surveillance.
“it's fascinating to me that he doesn't argue that God is watching us and that's why we behave well... he could have said the reason people do the right thing is they're afraid they're gonna be punished and go to hell he doesn't say that either”
Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules: exact, precise rules whose analog is grammar in writing and commutative justice in ethics (don't take other people's stuff), versus loose, vague, indeterminate rules whose analog is aspirational stylistic rules in writing and all the 'becoming' virtues like beneficence, gratitude and fortitude; the looser the rule, the more one must fall back on sentiments other than duty.
“one kind are exact and precise and indispensable and those kinds of rules in writing have their analog in grammar and in ethics in justice and commutative justice”
Smith locates the main motivator of human decency not in fear of divine punishment but in our awareness of how others view us—the man within the breast is your own awareness of others' judgment, not God standing over you in judgment.
“it's fascinating to me that he doesn't argue that God is watching us and that's why we behave well... he could have said the reason people do the right thing is they're afraid they're gonna be punished and go to hell he doesn't say that either”
We practice prudence and self-command not because we are sensible of the long-term utility of taking care of ourselves, but because of a sense of propriety and a developed habit—e.g., refraining from chocolate cake comes from a habit of prudence rather than direct calculation of being thinner next week.
“prudence and self-command are things we often do not because we're actually sensible to the long term utility of taking care of ourselves... it's a sense of propriety that have developed in a habit of prudence or self command”
The Smithian invisible hand is far broader than the Hayekian economic invisible hand—it encompasses morals, culture, history, and political institutions—so that the Wealth of Nations' economic invisible hand is only one part of a broader Smithian notion operating across all of social life.
“this invisible hand is a lot broader than the Hayekian invisible hand it's sort of everything morals culture history political institutions”
In part four Smith argues that moral approbation is never based directly on utility (beneficial social outcomes) but is always 'enshrouded' in a spectatorial sympathy and an almost aesthetic sense of the beauty/propriety of conduct; the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stopover at propriety, and propriety tends to conform to utility only because God set up the sentiments so that our notions of propriety serve utility—though imperfectly.
“approbation or moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of spec to toriel sympathy that spec tutorial sympathy is almost an aesthetic reaction to the beauty of the conduct”
Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules: exact, precise, indispensable rules (analogous to grammar in writing and to commutative justice in ethics—not messing with other people's property) versus loose, vague, indeterminate aspirational rules (analogous to rules of style or sublimity, and to all the other virtues like beneficence, gratitude and fortitude); the looser the rule, the more one must fall back on sentiments beyond the sense of duty.
“he talks about two different kinds of rules one kind are exact and precise and indispensable and those kinds of rules in writing have their analog in grammar and in ethics in justice and commutative justice”
Part four argues that moral approval (approbation) is never based directly on utility (useful social outcomes); rather, the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stop at propriety—approval is always enshrouded in a sense of propriety arising from spectatorial sympathy, an almost aesthetic reaction to the beauty of conduct—while God-given sentiments tend (imperfectly) to make propriety conform to utility.
“approbation or moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of spectatorial sympathy that spectatorial sympathy is almost an aesthetic reaction to the beauty of the conduct”
Smith illustrates that propriety, not utility, drives behavior: the ambitious person pursues wealth from a sense of beauty in the means of happiness and ends up with burdensome 'opulent machines' that yield little direct happiness, yet this very illusion is good for utility because it makes him industrious and sustains a larger population; similarly prudence and self-command operate through habit and propriety rather than direct sensibility to long-term benefit.
“this notion of propriety which drove the guy is actually good for utility because it led him to produce to be industrious and to generate things that sustain mankind”
Smith argues it is 'well that nature imposes upon us in this manner'—the deceptive belief that wealth and greatness bring happiness is good because it arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind, prompting people to cultivate ground, build cities, found commonwealths, and invent the arts and sciences that have transformed the face of the globe and enabled the earth to support a greater multitude of inhabitants.
“it is this deception which arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground to build houses to found cities and Commonwealths”
In the moral sphere there is nothing like a price or medium of exchange—at best an implicit 'shadow price' (in Becker's sense)—so the alignment of honesty with esteem is not analogous to the equilibrating harmony of buyers and sellers in a market; the only equilibrating mechanism Smith gestures toward is that harder work and greater prudence yield commensurately greater material return.
“there's no medium of exchange there's no property right you can't sell your... it's not analogous to the harmony that takes place in a market setting”
Economists and policy analysts must develop notions of a more beautiful social system but must be careful not to confuse their model with reality—a tendency to create a beautiful model and assume it would create a beautiful social organism, which is the danger embodied in Smith's later 'man of system.'
“we have to develop as economists public policy analysts whatever social scientists notions of what is a more beautiful social system we just have to be careful though... we don't confuse our model with reality”
The natural course of things is too rapid and strong for the impotent endeavors of man to stop; rules established for the wisest purposes sometimes produce effects that shock our natural sentiments—an articulation of the law of unintended consequences applying broadly to markets, politics, parenting and business, not only to free markets.
“the natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it though the rules which directed appear to have been established for the wisest and best purposes they sometimes produce effects which shock all his natural sentiments”
The natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man—the current is too rapid and strong to stop—so that well-motivated political solutions are often overwhelmed by reality, an early statement of the law of unintended consequences applying broadly to politics, parenting, and business, not just free markets.
“the natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it”
Even if people pay their bills and lead private lives, their political opinions are often misguided, based on broad theories that are wrong and unsupported by evidence; combined with government's huge role in cultural institutions (running K-12, employing ~70% of college professors), this means policy opinion can be very off-base and durable, creating a strong role for the challenger (Mises, Friedman) that Smith's framework neglects because Smith frowns on those who make waves and challenge groupthink.
“they do have opinions about it they do participate in it... which are often misguided often based on very broad theories which are wrong and foolish at least not supported by any real evidence”
The opening of Part IV Chapter 1 is a remarkable indictment of empty materialism: Smith mocks the 'trinkets of frivolous utility'—tweezer cases and gadgets that stuff men's pockets—and warns that power and riches are 'enormous and operose machines' that produce few trifling conveniences while requiring anxious maintenance and threatening to crush their possessor, so material excess is fool's gold that does not bring happiness.
“the first part of chapter one of part four is really a remarkable indictment of empty materialism”
Smith's condemnation of slavery is strikingly strong and egalitarian: he asserts there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not possess a degree of magnanimity the sordid master is scarcely capable of conceiving, and that the slave traders—the 'refuse of the jails of Europe'—possess neither the virtues of their home nor their destination, exposing them to the just contempt of the very people they enslave.
“there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not in this respect possess a degree of magnanimity which the soul of his sordid master is too often scarce capable of conceiving”
The phrase 'invisible hand' appears only three times in all of Smith's works—once in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, once in The Wealth of Nations, and once in the History of Astronomy.
“there's only three in all of smith's works three occurrences of the phrase this is the only one in this book yes and the other two are in no one's in wealth and one's in the history of astronomy”
Smith offers a strikingly egalitarian condemnation of slavery, declaring there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not possess a magnanimity that his sordid master is scarcely capable of conceiving, and that fortune never exerted her empire more cruelly than in subjecting these nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe—whose levity, brutality, and baseness justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished.
“there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not in this respect possess a degree of magnanimity which the soul of his sordid master is too often scarce capable of conceiving”
By acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind and may be said to cooperate with the deity to advance the plan of Providence—Smith's claim that the impartial spectator was implanted by God within the fabric of the universe to induce us to make the world better.
“by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind and may therefore be said in some sense to cooperate with the deity and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence”
There are only three occurrences of the phrase 'invisible hand' in all of Smith's works: one in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, one in The Wealth of Nations, and one in his History of Astronomy.
“there's only three in all of smith's works three occurrences of the phrase this is the only one in this book yes and the other two are in no one's in wealth and one's in the history of astronomy”
Smith argues it is 'well that nature imposes upon us in this manner': the deception that wealth and greatness will bring happiness is a beneficial illusion because it is precisely this deception that keeps the industry of mankind in continual motion—prompting cultivation, building of cities, sciences and arts that transformed the globe and enabled it to sustain a far greater population.
“it is this deception which arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground to build houses to found cities”
Smith develops an 'invisible hand of morals' that runs parallel to the invisible hand of economics, affirming invisible-hand mechanisms in both the commercial realm and the moral realm, though the two may be distinct.
“James audicence 2002 book on Smith Adam Smith's marketplace of life picks up on exactly this he's saying that Adam Smith is declaring developing an invisible hand of morals very parallel to a fear an indivisible hand theory in economics in the market”
Smith's invisible hand is far broader than the Hayekian economic invisible hand—encompassing morals, culture, history, and political institutions—so the economic version is only one part of a broader Smithian notion.
“this invisible hand is a lot broader than the Hayekian invisible hand it's sort of everything morals culture history political institutions”
In the only use of the phrase 'invisible hand' in this book, Smith argues that the rich, though they pursue only their own vain and insatiable desires and consume little more than the poor, are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life as if the earth had been divided equally, thereby advancing the interest of society without intending it.
“they are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants and thus without intending it without knowing it advance the interest of the society”
Smith argues the world contains built-in incentives—set in motion by God—that align behavior so that virtue meets its proper reward: industry, prudence and circumspection are recompensed by business success and wealth, while truth, justice and humanity are recompensed by the confidence, esteem and love of those we live with.
“the world has been whether it's been created or just happens to be it has these built-in incentives that align our behavior in classic economic census incentives that create the the production of virtue and prosperity”
Smith is a remarkable egalitarian for his time: across his observations on propriety, morality, conscience and prudence he never makes a class, national, or racial distinction in moral capacity—the 'dog that doesn't bark'—treating the destitute, the poor, and stereotyped groups like the Irish as equally capable of moral judgment, in contrast to contemporaries like Carlyle, Ruskin and Dickens who used such distinctions to justify oppression.
“there's a dog that doesn't bark in this book... there's not a single class statement that those are different among the classes”
The world has built-in incentives, set in motion by the deity, that align behavior with classic economic incentives so that virtue meets its proper reward: industry, prudence and circumspection are rewarded with wealth and worldly success, while truth, justice and humanity are rewarded with the confidence, esteem, and love of those we live with.
“the world has been whether it's been created or just happens to be it has these built-in incentives that align our behavior in classic economic census incentives that create the the production of virtue and prosperity”
Most human beings act with tolerable decency primarily out of a sense of duty to general rules rather than from genuine internal sentiment, because their actual sentiments (e.g., the weak spark of benevolence) are too much at variance with propriety to reliably motivate proper conduct.
“the course clay of humanity needs really to follow this sense of duty because their other sentiments you know apart from a sense of duty will be too much at variance with propriety”
Smith argues it is well that nature deceives us into pursuing wealth and greatness: this deception—taking false gold as gold—is what arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind, prompting them to cultivate the ground, build cities, found commonwealths, invent the sciences and arts, transform the globe, and enable the earth to maintain a far greater multitude of inhabitants.
“it is this deception which arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground to build houses to found cities and Commonwealth's and to event and improve all the sciences and arts”
The 'dog that doesn't bark' in the book is that Smith makes no class, national, or racial distinctions in his sweeping claims about propriety, morality, conscience, and prudence—he never says these differ among the classes or that the poor or Irish lack virtue—making him a remarkable egalitarian for 1759, in contrast to contemporaries like Carlyle, Ruskin, Dickens and Tennyson who defended oppression on the grounds that subject peoples could not fend for themselves.
“there's a dog that doesn't bark in this book... there is no mention of Smith by Smith of any of distinction and all of his observations about human nature... there's not a single class statement that those are different among the classes”
Those we live with—family and neighbors—function as the closest non-governmental monitors of conduct because they have the most information about us, whereas the police officer knows the least and has his own incentives, making good behavior ultimately a bottom-up matter of self-monitoring rather than state enforcement.
“a stranger who you interact with doesn't know your full story but your family your neighbor knows a little bit more your family knows a little bit more and the cop knows the least because the cop is got his own incentives and is a stranger of a different kind”
Smith's conception of law is anti-legal-positivist because he counts as 'laws' the duties enforced through internal sentiment and social norms (approbation and disapprobation), not merely what government or the police enforce—making moral order a much broader, bottom-up phenomenon.
“the way he speaks of law in this way is a very anti legal positivist approach because he's essentially saying I count as laws duties that are enforced in this internal sentimental right moral way social through social norms approval and disapproval approbation dissipation not only what the cop is going to enforce”
Smith argues there is an 'invisible hand of morals' parallel to the invisible hand in economics: the world has built-in incentives, implanted by God, such that industry, prudence, and circumspection are rewarded with business success and wealth, while truth, justice, and humanity are rewarded with the confidence, esteem, and love of those we live with.
“the world has been whether it's been created or just happens to be it has these built-in incentives that align our behavior in classic economic census incentives that create the the production of virtue and prosperity”
Economics was called the 'dismal science' by Carlyle not because of a crummy view of life but because economists like Smith, Mill, and Spencer stood up for the fundamental moral and rational equality of human beings—insisting that Africans and the Irish were just as capable of making their own moral and economic decisions—against contemporaries like Carlyle, Ruskin, Dickens, and Tennyson, whose paternalism condoned oppression in the name of helping those deemed incapable of fending for themselves.
“it's really what's called the dismal science by Carlyle because it was the Economist who stood up for the fundamental equality of human beings”
Just as false religion can grossly pervert morals, a 'political religion'—an encompassing politicized culture of the democratic age that invites everyone to identify with government and a political mission—can grossly pervert moral sentiments on a very broad and lasting scale, where the whole society becomes a sect or competing factions of a sect; this makes Klein less confident than Smith that invisible-hand mechanisms keep the upper hand over culture and morals.
“what about political religion what about the political culture when a society is sort of more politicized more infused with the public and maybe has a kind of politics which invites everyone to think themselves much more part of the government”
Klein argues that even if people pay their loans and lead self-reliant private lives, the modern democratic age creates a distinctive problem Smith did not face: ordinary people from the bottom are invited to revere and identify with government, hold strong but often misguided opinions about policy based on wrong broad theories, and cultural institutions (government-run K-12, ~70% of college professors employed by government) are heavily shaped by the state—conditions that increase the need for challengers like Mises and Friedman, whose wave-making Smith's book conspicuously fails to celebrate.
“they do participate in it it does make them... take interests in politics and actually develop affections and loyalties... which are often misguided often based on very broad theories which are wrong and foolish”
Smith argues the world has built-in incentives that align behavior to produce virtue and prosperity: industry, prudence and circumspection are rewarded over a lifetime with business success, wealth and honor, while truth, justice and humanity are rewarded with the confidence, esteem and love of those we live with—incentives Smith attributes to God's design that operate as an invisible hand of morals paralleling the economic invisible hand.
“the world has been whether it's been created or just happens to be it has these built-in incentives that align our behavior in classic economic census incentives that create the production of virtue and prosperity”
Most human conduct is driven by a sense of duty to general rules rather than by genuine internal sentiment; the 'coarse clay' of humanity must follow this sense of duty because their other sentiments would otherwise be too much at variance with propriety—people express gratitude or help others more out of propriety and the impression it makes on others than out of authentic benevolence.
“the course clay of humanity needs really to follow this sense of duty because their other sentiments... will be too much at variance with propriety”
In the sole invisible-hand passage of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that the rich, consuming little more than the poor and pursuing only their own vain and insatiable desires, are 'led by an invisible hand' to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life as if the earth had been divided equally—so that without intending or knowing it they advance the interest of society; the beggar by the highway possesses a security that kings fight for, and all ranks of life are nearly upon a level in real happiness.
“they are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants and thus without intending it without knowing it advance the interest of the society”
Self-deceit is the fatal weakness of mankind and the source of half the disorders of human life; if we saw ourselves as others see us, reformation would be unavoidable because we could not endure the sight.
“this self-deceit this fatal weakness of mankind is the source of half the disorders of human life if we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us... a Reformation would generally be unavoidable”
Smith treats general rules of conduct as the laws of the deity, and a sense of duty toward these rules is, for most people, the practical guide that secures tolerable decency, since their raw sentiments would otherwise be too much at variance with propriety and virtue.
“the course clay of humanity needs really to follow this sense of duty because their other sentiments... will be too much at variance with propriety and and virtue”
For social passions like friendship, kindness and gratitude Smith approves of genuine spontaneous sentiment supplementing the sense of duty, but for unsocial passions like indignation and hatred he holds we should be restrained and act only as much as the sense of duty permits, following an Aristotelian moderation between excess (wrath) and deficiency (turning the other cheek).
“for the unsocial past passions indignation hatred and so on he basically says no you should just do those as much as the sense of duty permits”
Economists and social scientists must develop notions of a more beautiful social system but be careful not to confuse the model with reality—a tendency to create a beautiful model and assume it would create a beautiful social organism is a key danger, related to Smith's coming critique of the 'man of system.'
“we just have to be careful though... we don't confuse our model with reality you know I think we have a tendency to create a beautiful model and assume that would create a beautiful social organism”
Self-deceit is the fatal weakness of mankind and the source of half the disorders of human life; if we saw ourselves as others see us, reformation would be unavoidable because we could not endure the sight.
“this self-deceit this fatal weakness of mankind is the source of half the disorders of human life if we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us or in which they would see us if they knew all a Reformation would generally be unavoidable”
Smith applies an Aristotelian moderation between extremes to wrath: we respect the person who has reason for wrath but restrains it, while we are critical of the person who is mistreated yet simply turns the other cheek, making us sympathetic to appropriately wrathful conduct.
“somebody who's mistreated but just turns the other cheek he's critical of... it's a sort of Aristotelian moderation to this Greek idea of moderation between the extremes”
We develop a sense of general rules of virtue and propriety by continually observing behaviors and taking cues from society; a feeling for these increasingly universal general rules constitutes our sense of duty.
“in society we continually observe behaviors take cues and develop a sense of general rules of virtue of good conduct ideas of propriety for all the different virtues in all the different contexts and so we learn these general rules”
Self-deceit occurs when our immediate passions mislead our internal spectator (the 'man within the breast') so that it becomes unaligned with the universalist impartial spectator, allowing us to think well of conduct that the true impartial spectator would condemn.
“self-deceit is when your media passions basically mislead your internal spectator your man within the breasts such that the man within the breasts is now unaligned with the Universalist impartial spectator”
Whether sentiments beyond a sense of duty should enter our motives depends on the agreeableness of the passions: for social passions (friendship, kindness, gratitude) genuine spontaneous impulse pleasingly supplements duty, but for unsocial passions (indignation, hatred) one should be restrained by duty and not act on the passion itself.
“for social passions you know friendship kindness appreciation gratitude he thinks it's nice that the genuine impulse also supplements the sense of duty basically but for the unsocial past passions indignation hatred and so on he basically says no you should just do those as much as the sense of duty permits”
Smith's ultimate explanation for both the moral and economic order is providential—God created and set up everything to work out for the happiness of mankind, and Smith characteristically finds a silver lining in even unattractive features of human nature by attributing a divine purpose to them.
“Smith's basic explanation is that God created it this way I mean even for the economics in a sense he's sort of God created everything set up everything to work out this way”
Smith illustrates that prudence and self-command are practiced not from direct sensibility to long-term utility (e.g., refusing chocolate cake today is not driven by directly feeling next week's thinness) but from a sense of propriety embodied in a developed habit—propriety, not raw utility, is the proximate motivator of self-disciplined conduct.
“prudence and self-command are things we often do not because we're actually sensible to the long term utility of taking care of ourselves... it's a sense of propriety that have developed in a habit of prudence or self command”
Self-deceit occurs when immediate passions mislead the internal spectator (the 'man within the breast') so that it becomes unaligned with the universalist impartial spectator; this fatal weakness is the source of half the disorders of human life, because if we saw ourselves as others would see us if they knew all, reformation would be unavoidable.
“self-deceit is when your media passions basically mislead your internal spectator your man within the breasts such that the man within the breasts is now unaligned with the Universalist impartial spectator”
For social passions (friendship, kindness, gratitude) Smith thinks it is good when genuine spontaneous sentiment supplements the sense of duty, but for unsocial passions (indignation, hatred, resentment) one should be restrained by the sense of duty alone; this reflects an Aristotelian moderation between extremes, whereby a person with just cause who restrains wrath is respected, while one who passively turns the other cheek to mistreatment is criticized.
“for social passions you know friendship kindness appreciation gratitude he thinks it's nice that the genuine impulse also supplements the sense of duty... but for the unsocial passions indignation hatred and so on he basically says no”
We develop general rules of virtue by continually observing behaviors and taking cues from society; a feeling for these general rules constitutes our sense of duty, which becomes increasingly universalist as the rules become more general.
“we continually observe behaviors take cues and develop a sense of general rules of virtue of good conduct ideas of propriety... and then a feeling for these general rules is our sense of duty”
The opening of part four chapter one is a remarkable indictment of empty materialism: Smith mocks the frivolous gadgets and 'trinkets' men carry to impress neighbors, arguing power and riches are 'enormous and operose machines' contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences while requiring anxious maintenance and being ready to crush their possessor—contradicting the parody of Smith as a champion of greed and showing material excess does not produce happiness.
“power and riches appear them to be what they are enormous and operas machines contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences to the body... ready every moment to burst into pieces and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessor”
Smith distinguishes two kinds of rules: exact, precise, indispensable rules (analogous to grammar in writing and to justice/commutative justice in ethics, including prudence which is closer to grammar) versus loose, vague, indeterminate, aspirational rules (analogous to the rules of sublime or elegant writing and to all the becoming virtues like beneficence, gratitude, and fortitude); the looser the rules, the more one must fall back on sentiments other than the sense of duty.
“he talks about two different kinds of rules one kind are exact and precise and indispensable and those kinds of rules in writing have their analog in grammar and in ethics in justice and commutative justice”
The danger of the wide-angle, beauty-of-system view of public policy is the 'man of system' problem and the temptation to confuse one's beautiful model with reality—creating an elegant model and assuming it would create a beautiful social organism—when the social whole is really only a vague tapestry not a rigorous model.
“we don't confuse our model with reality... I think we have a tendency to create a beautiful model and assume that would create a beautiful social organism”
The invisible-hand passage is structurally a comparative claim resting on a dubious supposed fact ('Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters') and a counterfactual ('had the earth been divided into equal portions'); the egalitarian-distribution claim is overstated to the point of being preposterous, and is best salvaged only by reading 'necessaries of life' narrowly as bare subsistence.
“it's a comparative claim okay about a supposed fact and a counterfactual... I mean overall I think the whole thing is terribly muddled in these ways”
Public spirit is often driven less by genuine benevolence toward people's welfare than by a sense of the beauty and grandeur of the social/economic system—people inspired by the aesthetic appeal of 'the great machine' pursue public policy more from love of system than from direct care for the utility that beauty represents, which Smith treats as a significant problem.
“the person who is then inspired with public spirit does it more from a notion of the beauty a grandeur... then that he's actually benevolent... and that's a big problem”
Much actual virtuous behavior (e.g., expressing gratitude or helping others) is motivated not by an internal desire for the outcome but by the impression it makes on others and by a sense of propriety—doing what would be benevolent if one were feeling benevolent—rather than by genuine benevolence itself.
“our actual behavior is is not necessarily motivated internally by the desire for the outcome but rather by the impression it makes on others”
Smith's conception of law is anti-legal-positivist: he counts as laws the duties enforced through internal sentiment and social norms—approbation and disapprobation—not merely what the state or government enforces, giving a much broader sense of duty than codified law.
“the way he speaks of law in this way is a very anti legal positivist approach because he's essentially saying I count as laws duties that are enforced in this internal sentimental... moral way social through social norms approval and disapproval”
Self-monitoring and the moral judgment of those closest to us function as a graduated, bottom-up monitoring device: strangers know your least, family and neighbors know more and therefore monitor more effectively, and the state policeman knows the least, so the goodness of the state ultimately depends on individuals being good monitors of themselves.
“the cop knows the least because the cop is got his own incentives and is a stranger of a different kind... it's a monitoring device”
Smith makes an evolutionary argument that if custom and fashion ever seriously perverted the general moral fabric, that society would not continue or prosper—so surviving societies have moral fabrics that custom has not grossly corrupted.
“if custom and fashion did ever seriously pervert the general moral fabric that society wouldn't continue or wouldn't prosper so that's an evolutionary argument about which cultures”
Smith develops an 'invisible hand of morals' that parallels his invisible hand in economics, but the moral sphere lacks a price mechanism: there is no medium of exchange, no property right, and only an implicit 'shadow price' for honor and esteem, so the moral harmony is structurally a level above the market harmony of buyers and sellers.
“Adam Smith is declaring developing an invisible hand of morals very parallel to a... indivisible hand theory in economics in the market”
Smith's framework frowns on the person who makes waves and does not celebrate the cultural hero who challenges dominant foolishness or groupthink, instead favoring a moderating, bargaining, conciliatory approach.
“Smith very much frowns on the guy who makes waves... he doesn't at all celebrate the sort of cultural hero who challenges a dominant foolishness who challenges some kind of groupthink”
Smith makes an evolutionary argument that if custom and fashion ever seriously perverted the general moral fabric, the society would not continue or prosper—an argument about which cultures survive.
“he says that if custom and fashion did ever seriously pervert the general moral fabric that society wouldn't continue or wouldn't prosper so that's an evolutionary argument about which cultures”
Unlike the market's price mechanism, the moral sphere lacks a true equilibrating mechanism: there is at most an implicit shadow price (more praise, more honor) but no medium of exchange and no property right, so the moral harmony is not directly analogous to market harmony.
“there's an implicit what Becker would call a shadow price for some of these there's no medium of exchange there's no medium exchange there's no property right you can't sell your weekend in a certain way”
Smith adopts an anti-legal-positivist view of law: he counts as laws the duties enforced through internal sentiment and social norms (approval and disapproval) rather than only what government codifies and the police enforce, making duty the true glue of society.
“the way he speaks of law in this way is a very anti legal positivist approach because he's essentially saying I count as laws duties that are enforced in this internal sentimental right moral way social through social norms approval and disapproval”
Klein argues the invisible-hand passage is muddled because it is a comparative claim about a supposed fact (Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters) and a counterfactual (had the earth been divided equally) that is dubiously supported by the text and, if read as a critique of egalitarian distribution, leads to the preposterous overstatement that the beggar by the highway is equally well off as kings.
“the specific of the invisible hand passage it's a comparative claim okay about a supposed fact and a counterfactual”
Much human virtuous behavior (gratitude, helping others) is motivated not by a genuine internal impulse toward the outcome but by a sense of duty and the impression the conduct makes on others—the 'weak spark of benevolence' is not powerful enough to explain decent conduct on its own.
“this idea that our actual behavior is is not necessarily motivated internally by the desire for the outcome but rather by the impression it makes on others and we had this discussion last time of the that the week witty call it the week spark of benevolence it's not so powerful”
The moral 'invisible hand' lacks a true equilibrating mechanism like prices in markets: the closest parallel is that prudence and industry yield commensurate prosperity, but in the moral sphere there is only an implicit 'shadow price' (in Becker's sense) for honor and esteem—there is no medium of exchange, no property right, nothing analogous to the price-coordinated harmony of buyers and sellers.
“in the moral sphere it's not as it's not as obvious but true you get more praise and more honor but there's clearly nothing like a price that's right there's an implicit what Becker would call a shadow price for some of these there's no medium of exchange”
Smith does not invoke fear of divine punishment or God watching us as the main motivator of good behavior; instead the man within the breast is your awareness of how others view you, divinely implanted but not equivalent to God standing in judgment—he knew most people don't feel religious fear intensely enough for it to drive conduct.
“he could have said the reason people do the right thing is they're afraid they're gonna be punished and go to hell he doesn't say that either because he knows that most people don't feel that intensely enough”
Part five argues that custom and fashion (custom being what everyone wears, fashion being the style of those of high rank) influence our sense of beauty far more than our moral sentiments, which are much more robust; while customs can get locked in and even pervert particular usages (Smith condemns slavery and infanticide as gross violations that are never just), Smith holds custom and fashion never pervert the general moral fabric of a society—and makes an evolutionary argument that any society whose general moral fabric was seriously perverted would not continue or prosper.
“our moral sentiments are much more robust and not so sensitive to custom and fashion”
Smith takes an anti-legal-positivist approach to law by counting as 'laws' the duties enforced through internal sentiment and social norms—approval and disapproval—not merely what government's written law enforces; the sense of duty is the true glue of society.
“the way he speaks of law in this way is a very anti legal positivist approach because he's essentially saying I count as laws duties that are enforced in this internal sentimental... moral way social through social norms approval and disapproval”
The people we live with—family and neighbors—function as the most effective non-governmental monitors of conduct because they have the most information about our full story, whereas a stranger knows little and the state's policeman knows least and has his own incentives; thus the goodness of the state ultimately depends on individuals being good monitors of themselves, making it a bottom-up theory.
“a stranger who you interact with doesn't know your full story but your family your neighbor knows a little bit more... and the cop knows the least because the cop is got his own incentives and is a stranger”
Although Smith grounds good behavior in divine design, he does not invoke fear of divine punishment or a God watching over us as the main motivator of human decency; instead the motivator is the man within the breast—an awareness of how others view us—because most people don't feel fear of hell intensely enough for it to drive conduct.
“he could have said the reason people do the right thing is they're afraid they're gonna be punished and go to hell he doesn't say that either because he knows that most people don't feel that intensely enough”
In the sole invisible-hand passage of the book, Smith argues that the rich, though selfish and rapacious and meaning only their own convenience, consume little more than the poor and are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life that would have occurred under equal division of the earth—thus unintentionally advancing society's interest; Smith further claims all ranks are nearly on a level in real happiness, the beggar by the highway possessing the security kings fight for.
“they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements they are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions”
Classical liberalism ought to embrace a semi-anthropomorphic view of the whole—not that society is an organism, but that we sympathize with an imagined being who views the whole abstractly and benevolently (the being whose hand is invisible, akin to the impartial spectator)—and the Austrian movement (Kirzner, Mises after his socialism critique, Rothbard) and James Buchanan have veered too far away from this useful social-aggregate framing under Hayek's influence.
“classical liberalism as a political set of political positions and political outlook you know very much ought to have this semi anthropomorphic view of the whole not not that society is an organism but that there is a kind of organism if you will that views the whole”
A central danger for economists and policy analysts is confusing a beautiful model with reality: the discussion of the 'grand affairs' inspires public spirit and a sense of beauty in conceiving a more beautiful social system, but there is a tendency to create a beautiful model and then assume it would create a beautiful social organism—a vague tapestry too imprecise to treat as a rigorous model, connecting to the danger of the 'man of system'.
“we just have to be careful though as I said... we don't confuse our model with reality you know I think we have a tendency to create a beautiful model and assume that would create a beautiful social organism”
Smith delivers a powerful condemnation of slavery, declaring that there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not possess a degree of magnanimity which his sordid master is too often scarcely capable of conceiving, and that the slave traders are the 'refuse of the jails of Europe' whose levity, brutality, and baseness justly expose them to the contempt of those they enslave—an inversion in which the morally superior party is the enslaved.
“there is not a Negro from the coast of Africa who does not in this respect possess a degree of magnanimity which the soul of his sordid master is too often scarce capable of conceiving”
Smith articulates a law of unintended consequences: the natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man because the current is too rapid and strong, so well-intended political solutions are often overwhelmed by reality—though this applies broadly to politics, parenting, and business, not only markets.
“the natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it”
The norms and incentives Smith attributes to providence could alternatively be explained as evolved: cultures with better incentives thrive while those without them struggle, so there can be more than one mechanism producing the same moral order.
“Hayek in the beginning of the fatal conceit clearly talks about how these norms and incentives could emerge evolutionarily as cultures that had the better incentives thrive and those that didn't would struggle”
Prudence and self-command are typically practiced not because we are directly sensible to the long-term utility of taking care of ourselves but because we have developed a sense of propriety and a habit of prudence—e.g., refusing chocolate cake out of propriety, not a calculation that we'll be thinner next week.
“if I go out and an eat right or you know refrain not having a piece of chocolate cake it's not that I'm so sensible to the fact that next week I'm going to be thinner... but it's a sense of propriety that have developed in a habit of prudence”
Self-deceit occurs when immediate passions mislead the internal spectator (the man within the breast) so that it becomes unaligned with the true Universalist impartial spectator, meaning a person may think well of conduct that the deceived inner spectator has approved.
“self-deceit is when your media passions basically mislead your internal spectator your man within the breasts such that the man within the breasts is now unaligned with the Universalist impartial spectator”
Self-deceit occurs when immediate passions mislead the 'man within the breast' (one's internal spectator) so that it becomes unaligned with the universalist impartial spectator, allowing a person to think well of conduct that the true impartial spectator would condemn.
“self-deceit is when your media passions basically mislead your internal spectator your man within the breasts such that the man within the breasts is now unaligned with the Universalist impartial spectator”
In a politicized democratic age, an encompassing political religion—where everyone is invited to see themselves as part of government and where society fractures into sects and factions—can grossly pervert moral sentiment on a very broad scale and for a long time, an outcome Smith's optimism about invisible-hand mechanisms underweights.
“what happens when you have a political religion that pretty much encompasses you know so much of the society so that the whole society in a sense is a sect... in this sense of an encompassing political religion maybe then they can be grossly perverted on a very broad broad scale forever or for a long time”
The critique that commerce and the pursuit of money corrupt and leave people heartless is a straw man and parody; voluntary interactions are very much about virtue rather than cruelty, and critics ignore the corrupting effects of government and collective action on virtue—e.g., undermining parent-child relationships via Social Security or eroding concern for the poor because the government will handle it.
“I think that's a straw man and a parody of what voluntary interactions actually are about I think they're very much about virtue and not about cruelty and heartlessness”
A 'dog that doesn't bark' in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the absence of class, national, or racial distinction: Smith makes sweeping claims about propriety, morality, conscience, and prudence as universal human capacities and never says these differ among the classes, never stereotypes the poor or groups like the Irish—making him a remarkable egalitarian for 1759 who attributed equal moral capacity and capacity for prudence to all ranks and races.
“there's not a single class statement that those are different among the classes he never says of course this is among me and my friends among the poor you know they're a bunch of German he doesn't say that”
Smith treats the rules of justice (commutative justice) as exact and precise like grammar—black and white with no gray areas—partly because of the danger of the slippery slope: once a person begins to 'chicane' (rationalize a particular violation as harmless), they are no longer to be trusted and there is no enormity of which they may not become capable.
“a man often becomes a villain the moment he begins even in his own heart to chicane in this manner... when once we begin to give way to such refinements there is no enormity so gross of which we may not be capable”
The real danger of an expansive, bailout-providing 'government as parent' is not primarily the moral hazard reducing future prosperity but that it corrupts our humanity: it destroys incentives to act with prudence and care, distorts incentives to help our fellows, and encourages people to lobby for government (a zero-sum game) rather than produce wealth (a non-zero-sum game).
“the real danger of government as Baelor out government is parent is that it corrupts our humanity it destroys our incentives to act with prudence... it encourages us to lobby for and to use government which is a zero-sum game rather than to produce wealth which is a nonzero-sum game”
Critics of free markets caricature market participants as heartless money-loving people obsessed with efficiency and claim commerce corrupts, but this is a straw man; voluntary interactions are very much about virtue rather than cruelty, while critics ignore the corrupting effects of government and collective action on virtue (e.g. parent-child relationships weakened by Social Security, neglect of the poor because the government will handle it).
“in the anti market view commerce corrupts our pursuit of money corrupts our commercial interactions corrupt our heartlessness leaves people in the dust”
Even if people pay their private bills and lead decent private lives, they hold and act on political opinions, loyalties and broad economic theories that are often wrong and unsupported by evidence, and cultural institutions are heavily government-influenced (government runs K-12, ~70% of college professors work for the government), creating real space and need for the heterodox challenger that Smith's framework, which frowns on wave-makers, does not celebrate.
“they do have opinions about it they do participate in it... actually do then go against a lot of these virtues”
Klein critiques the invisible-hand passage as muddled and overstated: it makes a comparative claim resting on a dubious supposed fact ('Providence divided the earth among the few lordly masters') and an ill-defined counterfactual (equal division), and the assertion that the beggar by the highway possesses the security kings fight for is preposterous overstatement that does a disservice to Smith's genuine point about happiness.
“the specific of the invisible hand passage it's a comparative claim okay about a supposed fact and a counterfactual”
In a politicized democratic age, an encompassing 'political religion'—where everyone is invited to feel part of the government and where the whole society becomes a sect divided into competing factions—can grossly pervert moral sentiment on a broad scale and for a long time, contrary to Smith's optimism that perversions remain confined to particular usages.
“what happens when you have a political religion that pretty much encompasses... so much of the society so that the whole society in a sense is a sect... maybe then they can be grossly perverted on a very broad broad scale forever or for a long time”
Government as bailer-out and parent corrupts our humanity by destroying incentives to act prudently and carefully, encouraging zero-sum lobbying for government favors rather than positive-sum wealth production, with moral hazard reducing future prosperity.
“the real danger of government as Baelor out government is parent is that it corrupts our humanity it destroys our incentives to act with prudence... it encourages us to lobby for and to use government which is a zero-sum game rather than to produce wealth which is a nonzero-sum game”
Critics of decentralized markets caricature commerce as corrupting and heartless while ignoring the corrupting effects of government and collective action on virtue—e.g., undermining parent-child relationships via Social Security or eroding concern for the poor because the government 'will take care of it.'
“in the anti market view commerce corrupts our pursuit of money corrupts... but certainly those who are critical of decentralized market-based voluntary interactions ignore the possibility often of the corrupting effects of government on virtue”
Smith's invisible hand is far broader than the Hayekian economic invisible hand—encompassing morals, culture, history, and political institutions—so the economic version is only one part of a wider Smithian notion.
“this invisible hand is a lot broader than the Hayekian invisible hand it's sort of everything morals culture history political institutions”
Smith argues that custom and fashion can corrupt our sense of beauty (e.g., in clothing) and influence variations in manners across professions, ages, nations and states of society, but our moral sentiments are much more robust: we can always step back and judge the propriety that a custom recommends, so custom pervorts only particular usages and never the general moral fabric.
“our moral sentiments are much more robust and not so sensitive to custom and fashion”
There is a large debate in the Smith literature over how seriously Smith took the providential source of moral order, with an alternative view being that our sense of good evolved as cultures with better incentives thrived—Hayek's evolutionary account in The Fatal Conceit—so more than one mechanism could be at work.
“there's a huge debate in the Smith literature about how serious Smith was about the providential source of all this”
Government-as-parent bailouts corrupt humanity by destroying incentives to act prudently and carefully and to help one's fellows, and by encouraging people to lobby for and use government—a zero-sum game—rather than to produce wealth, which is a non-zero-sum game.
“the real danger of government as Baelor out government is parent is that it corrupts our humanity it destroys our incentives to act with prudence... it encourages us to lobby for and to use government which is a zero-sum game rather than to produce wealth which is a nonzero-sum game”
Part V argues that custom and fashion influence our sense of beauty but only minimally pervert the Moral Sentiments, which are far more robust; we can always step back and judge the propriety that a custom recommends, so custom and fashion pervert only particular usages, never the general moral fabric of a society.
“as regards the Moral Sentiments these are much more robust than just our sense of beauty as in actually clothing design say our moral sentiments are much more robust and not so sensitive to custom and fashion”
In part five Smith argues that while custom and fashion strongly influence our sense of beauty (e.g., in clothing), they affect the moral sentiments only at the margin—perverting particular usages but never the general moral fabric of a society—because moral sentiments are much more robust, and we can always step back and judge the propriety that a custom recommends from the standpoint of another community's sense of propriety.
“as regards the Moral Sentiments these are much more robust than just our sense of beauty as in actually clothing design say our moral sentiments are much more robust and not so sensitive to custom and fashion”
Self-deceit, the fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life; if we saw ourselves as others see us (or would if they knew all), reformation would be unavoidable because we could not endure the sight.
“this self-deceit this fatal weakness of mankind is the source of half the disorders of human life if we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us or in which they would see us if they knew all a Reformation would generally be unavoidable we could not otherwise endure the sight”
Smith handles the passions asymmetrically: for social passions (friendship, kindness, gratitude) it is good when genuine spontaneous sentiment supplements the sense of duty, but for unsocial passions (indignation, hatred, resentment) one should act only as far as the sense of duty permits and be restrained—wrath is the excess, and in an Aristotelian manner we respect the person who has reason for anger but restrains it while we are critical of one who merely turns the other cheek when mistreated.
“for the unsocial past passions indignation hatred and so on he basically says no you should just do those as much as the sense of duty permits you”
People closest to us (family, neighbors) function as more effective non-governmental monitors of conduct than strangers or the police, because they possess more information about our full story, while the cop knows the least and has his own incentives—making the family a kind of final bulwark for good conduct.
“a stranger who you interact with doesn't know your full story but your family your neighbor knows a little bit more your family knows a little bit more and the cop knows the least because the cop is got his own incentives and is a stranger of a different kind”
Government acting as a bailer-out or parent corrupts our humanity more than through moral hazard alone: it destroys incentives to act with prudence and care, and redirects effort toward lobbying for government (a zero-sum game) rather than producing wealth (a non-zero-sum game).
“the real danger of government as Baelor out government is parent is that it corrupts our humanity it destroys our incentives to act with prudence”
The natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man—the current is too rapid and too strong to stop—so even well-intended political solutions and attempts to overturn market or natural forces are often overwhelmed by reality; this invisible-hand notion is far broader than the Hayekian economic invisible hand and encompasses morals, culture, history and political institutions.
“the natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it”
There is a serious scholarly debate about how genuinely Smith held the providential (God-as-designer) source of moral and economic order, with an alternative view that these norms and incentives could emerge evolutionarily as cultures with better incentives thrive—but Roberts suggests it matters less what Smith really meant than what he thought useful for people to think about.
“there's a huge debate in the Smith literature about how serious Smith was about the providential source of all this”
In the sole explicit invisible-hand passage in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith claims the rich—though selfish and consuming little more than the poor, intending only their own convenience—are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of life's necessaries as if the earth had been divided equally, thereby unintentionally advancing society and the multiplication of the species, so that the beggar by the highway possesses the security that kings fight for.
“they are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants”
People become inspired with public spirit toward the great machine of the economy more from a sense of the beauty, grandeur, and order of the whole system than from genuine benevolence toward the utility that is the source of that beauty—which Smith treats as a big problem.
“the person who is then inspired with public spirit does it more from a notion of the beauty a grandeur or grandeur of the system then that he's actually benevolent... and that's a big problem”
Roberts's optimism rests on the claim that despite a culture that reveres political leaders as saviors, most people in their daily lives—raising children, interacting with spouses and friends—do not actually count on government as a source of benevolence, and political leaders simply lack the money or wisdom to act as wizards, so government remains 'a rock in the stream' that slows but does not stop the current of private virtue.
“most of us don't count on government and don't counsel our friends and children to count on government as a source of benevolence”
Roberts's optimism about modern culture rests on the claim that most people, in raising children and interacting with spouses and friends, do not count on or counsel reliance on government as a source of benevolence; even where political culture invokes leaders as wizard-like saviors (Boudreaux's term), in daily life people largely ignore government because it lacks the money or wisdom to deliver—government is a 'rock in the stream' that slows and diverts but does not stop the current of private virtue.
“most of us don't count on government and don't counsel our friends and children to count on government as a source of benevolence”
The danger of public spirit is that the person inspired to support public policy is moved more by the sense of beauty, grandeur, and propriety of the whole social/economic system as a 'great machine' than by genuine benevolence or direct care for the utility (the real welfare) that is the actual source of that beauty.
“the person who is then inspired with public spirit does it more from a notion of the beauty a grandeur or grandeur of the system then that he's actually benevolent... that you know he actually directly cares about the utility which is the source of that beauty and that's a big problem”
The person inspired with public spirit acts more from a sense of the beauty and grandeur of the social/economic system than from genuine benevolence toward the utility that is the source of that beauty—and Klein flags this as a big problem, especially when government dominates institutions so that utility may not conform well to our notions of propriety.
“the person who is then inspired with public spirit does it more from a notion of the beauty a grandeur of the system then that he's actually benevolent... and that's a big problem”
Roberts's optimism rests on the claim that most people, in raising their children and interacting with spouses and friends, do not count on government as a source of benevolence even though the broader culture treats political leaders as wizard-like saviors; government simply lacks enough money or wisdom to pull it off, so it acts like a rock in the stream that slows but does not stop the natural current of private virtue.
“most of us don't count on government and don't counsel our friends and children to count on government as a source of benevolence”
Classical liberalism ought to embrace a 'semi-anthropomorphic' view of the social whole—sympathizing with an imagined being who has superior knowledge and benevolence but withholds or lacks coercive power (the being whose hand is invisible, identifiable with the impartial spectator)—and this social-organism imagining must be carefully kept distinct from a statist anthropomorphism that identifies that being with the government.
“classical liberalism... very much ought to have this semi anthropomorphic view of the whole not not that society is an organism but that there is a kind of organism if you will that views the whole”
Klein argues classical liberalism rightly ought to have a 'semi-anthropomorphic' view of the whole—imagining social aggregate beings (like the impartial spectator or the being whose hand is invisible) who possess superior knowledge and benevolence but no power—and that the Austrian/libertarian movement (Hayek's critique of 'social', Mises, Rothbard, Kirzner, and the conflicted Buchanan) has veered too far away from this useful social anthropomorphism for fear of statist connotations.
“classical liberalism... very much ought to have this semi anthropomorphic view of the whole not that society is an organism but that there is a kind of organism if you will that views the whole”
Despite the cultural tendency to see political leaders as wizard-like saviors, most people in daily life do not actually counsel their children or friends to rely on government for benevolence, and government usually lacks the money or wisdom to deliver, so the invisible-hand mechanisms of private life still work reasonably well—grounding continued optimism.
“most of us don't count on government and don't counsel our friends and children to count on government as a source of benevolence”
Smith claims false notions of religion are almost the only cause that can occasion any very gross perversion of natural moral sentiments, implying that large-scale perversions of proper sentiment do not normally persist.
“almost the only cause of gross perversions of the proper sense of duty or a virtue our false notions of religion”
The modern consumer perspective, absent from Smith's example, vindicates his point: when entrepreneurs like Brin and Page create great wealth, the value they create redounds to everyone—employees gain fascinating work and consumers benefit tremendously—so their disproportionate share of the pie is something to welcome rather than redistribute.
“we've got to put the consumer side into it that Smith doesn't talk about in his example we've benefitted tremendously... I like that they created that to me their well-being redounds to me”
Modern consumers must add the consumer-side benefit that Smith omitted: when entrepreneurs like Brin and Page become billionaires they fund innovations (e.g., the Tesla electric car) and create fascinating work, and their well-being redounds to everyone, so their disproportionate share of the pie is welcome rather than something better redistributed.
“we've got to put the consumer side into it that Smith doesn't talk about in his example we've benefitted tremendously”
Smith holds that almost the only cause of gross perversions of the proper sense of duty or virtue is false notions of religion, implying that large perversions of proper sentiment do not generally persist or spread broadly.
“almost the only cause of gross perversions of the proper sense of duty or a virtue our false notions of religion”
Roberts argues the modern reading of the invisible-hand passage must add the consumer side that Smith omitted: when entrepreneurs like Brin and Page create great wealth and enjoy nicer cars and vacations than their employees, their innovations redound to the benefit of everyone, so their disproportionate share of the pie is justified by the value created rather than something to be forcibly redistributed.
“those of us have got to put the consumer side into it that Smith doesn't talk about in his example we've benefitted tremendously”
Smith claims that false notions of religion are almost the only cause that can occasion any very gross perversion of our natural moral sentiments, implying that large perversions of proper sentiment do not generally persist.
“almost the only cause of gross perversions of the proper sense of duty or a virtue our false notions of religion”
Klein criticizes the invisible-hand passage as muddled and exaggerated: it rests on a dubious supposed fact ('Providence divided the earth among the few lordly masters') and an unclear counterfactual ('had the earth been divided into equal portions'); the claim that the beggar possesses the security kings fight for is overstated, and the leveling claim is rescuable only if 'the necessaries of life' means a bare subsistence minimum.
“he kind of exaggerated the point such an extent... the beggar who stuns himself by the side of the road possesses the security which Kings are fighting for you know again I mean let's talk to the beggars about that”
Smith praises certain public works and government functions—calling the perfection of police, the extension of trade and manufactures noble and magnificent objects—on the grounds that the same love of system and regard for the beauty of order recommends institutions that promote public welfare; Klein interprets this as about public policy generally and its effect on the whole social system rather than an endorsement of government provision specifically.
“the perfection of police the extension of trade and manufacturers are noble and magnificent objects He praises some of the public works side of government”
A modern reading of the invisible-hand passage that Smith omits is the consumer side: when entrepreneurs like Brin and Page create great wealth, their well-being redounds to everyone through the products and employment they generate, so their disproportionate share of the pie is justified by the value they created rather than being something the world would be better off forcibly redistributing.
“we've got to put the consumer side into it that Smith doesn't talk about in his example we've benefitted tremendously”
These moral and economic incentive systems could be explained either as divinely implanted (Smith's providential view) or as evolutionarily developed, with cultures that had better incentives thriving while those that didn't struggled—the latter view (Hayek's in The Fatal Conceit) shows more than one mechanism can produce the same harmonious outcome.
“Hayek in the beginning of the fatal conceit clearly talks about how these norms and incentives could emerge evolutionarily as cultures that had the better incentives thrive and those that didn't would struggle so it's clearly there there can be more than one mechanism”
Smith makes an evolutionary argument that if custom and fashion ever seriously perverted the general moral fabric of a society, that society would not continue or prosper—an early selection-among-cultures argument about which moral frameworks survive.
“he makes one of his most notable evolutionary arguments here he says that if custom and fashion did ever seriously pervert the general moral fabric that society wouldn't continue or wouldn't prosper”
Smith claims the almost only cause of gross perversions of the proper sense of duty or virtue is false notions of religion; Klein extends this by arguing that in a modern democratic age, 'political religion'—where everyone is invited to identify with government and the whole society becomes a sect or faction—could grossly pervert moral sentiments on a very broad and lasting scale in ways Smith's optimistic framework did not anticipate.
“almost the only cause of gross perversions of the proper sense of duty or a virtue our false notions of religion”
Klein argues classical liberalism ought to embrace a 'semi-anthropomorphic' view of the whole—not that society is an organism, but that we usefully imagine spectator-beings with a benevolent, superior-knowledge view of the social whole who deliberately withhold power; the Austrian movement (Hayek's critique of the word 'social', Mises after his Socialism book, Rothbard, Kirzner, and an anguished Buchanan) has veered too far away from this useful social-aggregate sympathizing.
“classical liberalism as a political set of political positions... very much ought to have this semi anthropomorphic view of the whole not not that society is an organism but that there is a kind of organism if you will that views the whole”
Klein argues the modern setting differs fundamentally from Smith's: people now hold strong opinions about policy, develop affections and loyalties to political factions based on broad, foolish, unsupported theories, and cultural institutions (K-12, ~70% of college professors work for government) are heavily influenced by government—creating a world where widely-held but wrong opinions about how things work demand a confrontational 'Challenger' (Mises, Friedman) figure that Smith's framework, which frowns on those who make waves and challenge groupthink, conspicuously lacks.
“the government you know largely runs K through 12 about seventy percent of college professors work for the government including us the government plays a huge role in the culture”
Part six of The Theory of Moral Sentiments concerns the character of virtue and describes an evolutionary nature within the individual whereby a person develops greater self-command and prudence over time, becoming a 'wise and virtuous man' who pursues perfection—the within-individual analog of moving from a lower to a higher referent community of propriety.
“in part six he definitely talks about that evolutionary nature within a within an individual that over time so you have community I and J who may differ in their level of propriety”
Government growth is like a rock in a stream: it slows and pushes around the current of private life and self-directed activity, but people continue to 'swirl around' and do their own thing, so the larger current of beneficial private mechanisms keeps going despite ever-larger government.
“government's much bigger than it was... and yet so far it's kind of a rock in the stream... we kind of swirl around we do that we kind of do our own thing despite that it slows it down it pushes it around in various ways but the current keeps going”
Smith's framework is implicitly optimistic not only that people learn to pay their bills but that they tend to get their opinions right, reflecting an optimistic view of culture that may be disappointed by how things have actually turned out.
“I think the book is saying not only do people tend to learn to pay their bills but they do tend to get their opinions right about things he's also I think got a kind of a optimistic view of culture”
Smith's basic explanation for both the moral and economic order is that God created and arranged everything to work out well, and he consistently finds a 'silver lining'—when he identifies an unattractive feature of human nature, he argues there is a reason God placed it in us.
“Smith's basic explanation is that God created it this way... He's always finding a silver lining if you find something in the human nature that he finds unattractive he'll then say but there's a reason God put it there in us”
Religion inculcates the general rules of good conduct, and for the 'coarse clay of humanity'—most ordinary people—a tolerable regard to the sense of duty based on these divinely-inculcated general rules is really all that can guide their decency, because their other sentiments apart from duty would be too much at variance with propriety and virtue.
“the course clay of humanity needs really to follow this sense of duty because their other sentiments you know apart from a sense of duty will be too much at variance with propriety and and virtue”
Smith's praise of public works and 'the perfection of police' refers to the effects of good public policy on the whole social system contemplated abstractly, not specifically to government provision, so it poses no contradiction with classical liberalism.
“I think he's talking about public policy generally not specifically that it should be government works... but the effect public policy has on the whole society”
Smith always finds a silver lining in human nature: whenever he identifies something unattractive in humanity, he explains there is still something good about it because God put it there for a reason.
“He's always finding a silver lining if you find something in the human nature that he finds unattractive he'll then say but there's... a reason God put it there in us”
Our last podcast we were trying to get through parts three, four and five but got through only part of part three, and the pace is not under our control—it is a coordination problem between two partial spectators trying to harmonize.
“the pace is not exactly under our control it's a coordination problem between two partial spectators of each other trying to harmonize”
The pace of the discussion is itself a coordination problem between two partial spectators trying to harmonize.
“it's a coordination problem between two partial spectators of each other trying to harmonize dan and I”
An iPod is a pretty useful thing, though some of these gadgets are frivolous.
“I mean like iPods a pretty useful thing isn't it well it depends I don't have one so I don't know”
Our goal today is to finish at least Part 3 and hopefully get to Parts 4 and 5, maybe into Part 6, but the pace is a coordination problem between two partial spectators trying to harmonize.
“it's a coordination problem between two partial spectators of each other trying to harmonize”